Many philosophers deny that happiness can be equated with pleasurable experiences. In influential... more Many philosophers deny that happiness can be equated with pleasurable experiences. In influential work, Nozick introduced an experience machine thought experiment to support the idea that happiness requires pleasurable experiences that are " in contact with reality. " In this thought experiment, people can choose to plug into a machine that induces exclusively pleasurable experiences. We test Nozick's hypothesis that people will reject this offer. We also contrast Nozick's experience machine scenario with scenarios that are less artificial and offer options which are less invasive or disruptive than being connected to a machine, specifically scenarios in which people are offered an experience pill or a pill that improves overall functioning. In order to show that happiness cannot be equated with pleasurable experiences, Robert Nozick (1974) invented a thought experiment involving an experience machine. In this thought experiment, we are to imagine that we can choose to plug into an experience machine that ensures our having exclusively pleasurable experiences. Nozick (1974: 646) supposes that we will reject this offer, because we want to live a life that is " in contact with reality " (more on this below). This paper takes Nozick's thought experiment as a starting point for a survey study, aiming to thereby determine the level of support for the intuition this thought experiment seeks to bring into relief. Empirical work on Nozick's " contact intuition " revealed that this intuition is not as universally shared as many in the philosophical community have supposed (De Brigard 2010, Weijers 2014). We probe deeper by considering variations of Nozick's original scenario that feature interventions which are both more realistic and less invasive than hooking someone up to a machine. Specifically, in Experiment 1 we also present the option of taking an experience pill that has the same effect as the experience machine as well as the option of taking a functioning pill that improves one's overall functioning. Inspired by Nozick, we predict that the less invasive an intervention is—the less it severs contact with reality—the more people will be prepared to accept it. We contrast our findings with those of the aforementioned earlier empirical studies. In a second experiment , we consider still further variations of Nozick's scenarios, which are parallel to the materials from Experiment 1 except that now instead of offering an improvement over the status quo the scenarios promise to prevent a pending loss. Recent research suggests that the difference in " valence " between the scenarios from Experiment 1 and those * All Supplementary Information as well as all data and the script for the statistical analyses are available at https://osf.io/nrx2x/?view_only=d001aeff6ea24503b7e844e05f71419f.
A 2007 study by Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal purports to show that universal categories emerge as a... more A 2007 study by Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal purports to show that universal categories emerge as a result of optimal partitioning of color space. Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal only consider color categorizations of up to six categories. However, in most industrialized societies eleven color categories are observed. This paper shows that when applied to the case of eleven categories, Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal's optimality criterion yields unsatisfactory results. Applications of the criterion to the intermediate cases of seven, eight, nine, and ten color categories are also briefly considered and are shown to yield mixed results. We consider a number of possible explanations of the failure of the criterion in the case of eleven categories, and suggest that, as color categorizations get more complex, further criteria come to play a role, alongside Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal's optimality criterion.
Abstract. At least many conditionals seem to convey the existence of a link between their anteced... more Abstract. At least many conditionals seem to convey the existence of a link between their antecedent and consequent. We draw on a recently proposed typology of conditionals to revive an old philosophical idea according to which the link is inferential in nature. We show that the proposal has explanatory force by presenting empirical results on two Dutch linguistic markers.
This paper considers Kamp and Partee's account of graded membership within a conceptual spaces fr... more This paper considers Kamp and Partee's account of graded membership within a conceptual spaces framework and puts the account to the test in the domain of colors. Three experiments are reported that are meant to determine, on the one hand, the regions in color space where the typical instances of blue and green are located and, on the other hand, the degrees of blueness/greenness of various shades in the blue–green region as judged by human observers. From the locations of the typical blue and typical green regions in conjunction with Kamp and Partee's account follow degrees of blueness/greenness for the color shades we are interested in. These predicted degrees are compared with the judged degrees, as obtained in the experiments. The results of the comparison support the account of graded membership at issue.
TWO ACCOUNTS OF SIMILARITY COMPARED LIEVEN DECOCK and IGOR DOUVEN VU University Amsterdam and Uni... more TWO ACCOUNTS OF SIMILARITY COMPARED LIEVEN DECOCK and IGOR DOUVEN VU University Amsterdam and University of Leuven Abstract Tversky's account of similarity could be said to reduce similarity to identity and thereby to reduce an allegedly philosophically ...
EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, 2013
Many contemporary qualia inversion arguments are inspired by findings in colour science, most not... more Many contemporary qualia inversion arguments are inspired by findings in colour science, most notably, the Hering-Jameson-Hurvich opponent processes theory. This is somewhat ironic, given that other findings in colour science-particularly findings indicating that phenomenal colour is asymmetrical-appear to exclude qualia inversion scenarios. In previous work, we proposed an alternative qualia change scenario-called "qualia compression"-that is impervious to the asymmetry objection. The present paper argues that qualia compression is more than merely another thought experiment. We do this by connecting it to recent developments in colour science. Specifically, we point at experiments on gamut expansion and compression by Brown and MacLeod, Li and Gilchrist, and Whittle.
The standard approach to the so-called paradoxes of identity has been to argue that these paradox... more The standard approach to the so-called paradoxes of identity has been to argue that these paradoxes do not essentially concern the notion of identity but rather betray misconceptions on our part regarding other metaphysical notions, like that of an object or a property. This paper proposes a different approach by pointing to an ambiguity in the identity predicate and arguing that the concept of identity that figures in many ordinary identity claims, including those that appear in the paradoxes, is not the traditional philosophical concept but one that can be defined in terms of relevant similarity. This approach to the paradoxes will be argued to be superior to the standard one.
In a famous critique, Goodman dismissed similarity as a slippery and both philosophically and sci... more In a famous critique, Goodman dismissed similarity as a slippery and both philosophically and scientifically useless notion. We revisit his critique in the light of important recent work on similarity in psychology and cognitive science. Specifically, we use Tversky's influential set-theoretic account of similarity as well as Gärdenfors's more recent resuscitation of the geometrical account to show that, while Goodman's critique contained valuable insights, it does not warrant a dismissal of similarity.
Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question o... more Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question of whether a subject can be said to know a proposition. Various philosophers have recently departed from this doctrine by claiming that the answer to this question also depends on practical concerns. They take this move to be warranted by the fact that people's knowledge attributions appear sensitive to contextual variation, in particular variation due to differing stakes. This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the aforementioned fact, one that allows us to stick to the orthodoxy. The alternative applies the conceptual spaces approach to the concept of knowledge. With knowledge conceived of spatially, the variability in knowledge attributions follows from recent work on identity, according to which our standards for judging things (including concepts) to be identical are context-dependent. On the proposal to be made, it depends on what is at stake in a context whether it is worth distinguishing between knowing and being at least close to knowing.
The conceptual spaces approach has recently emerged as a novel account of concepts. Its guiding i... more The conceptual spaces approach has recently emerged as a novel account of concepts. Its guiding idea is that concepts can be represented geometrically, by means of metrical spaces. While it is generally recognized that many of our concepts are vague, the question of how to model vagueness in the conceptual spaces approach has not been addressed so far, even though the answer is far from straightforward. The present paper aims to fill this lacuna.
Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most no... more Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most notably perhaps, they have figured in skeptical arguments for the fundamental unknowability of other persons' color experiences. For these arguments to succeed, it must be assumed that a person's having inverted color qualia may go forever unnoticed. This assumption is now generally deemed to be implausible. The present paper defines a variant of color qualia inversion-termed ''color qualia compression''-and argues that the possibility of undetectable color qualia compression is immune to the objections that have been levelled against color qualia inversion arguments, and that color qualia compression scenarios support full-blown skepticism regarding other people's color experiences. 2 See, for instance, , , , . 3 In fact, if our skeptical claim is correct, then color qualia compression scenarios can quite generally serve all dialectical purposes that color qualia inversion scenarios were meant to serve. This can be readily seen from Byrne's [2010, Sect. 3.10] summary of the various requirements that color qualia inversion scenarios are to meet if they are to support the various positions they have been alleged to support.
Putnam's internal realism is aimed at reconciling realist and antirealist intuitions about truth ... more Putnam's internal realism is aimed at reconciling realist and antirealist intuitions about truth and the nature of reality. A common complaint about internal realism is that it has never been stated with due precision. This paper attempts to render the position precise by drawing on the literature on conceptual spaces as well as on earlier work of the authors on the notion of identity.
This paper gives an overview of the main philosophical applications to which conceptual spaces ha... more This paper gives an overview of the main philosophical applications to which conceptual spaces have been put. In particular, we show how they can be used to (i) resolve in a uniform way the so--called paradoxes of identity, which are basically problems concerning material constitution and change over time;
The conceptual spaces approach has emerged as a new and powerful way of thinking about concepts. ... more The conceptual spaces approach has emerged as a new and powerful way of thinking about concepts. In earlier work, the present authors have addressed the question of how to model vague concepts in the conceptual spaces framework. That in turn was instrumental in Decock's and Douven's account of a graded membership relation in further work. In this paper, we make use of the account of graded membership to present a way of modelling comparative concepts in conceptual spaces. Finally, Dietz' alternative account of comparative concepts is contrasted with the presented Decock-Douven type account.
Edgington has proposed a solution to the sorites paradox in terms of 'verities', which she define... more Edgington has proposed a solution to the sorites paradox in terms of 'verities', which she defines as degrees of closeness to clear truth. Central to her solution is the assumption that verities are formally probabilities. She is silent on what verities might derive from and on why they should be probabilities. This paper places Edgington's solution in the framework of a spatial approach to conceptualization, arguing that verities may be conceived as deriving from how our concepts relate to each other. Building on work by Kamp and Partee, this paper further shows how verities, thus conceived, may plausibly be assumed to have probabilistic structure. The new interpretation of verities is argued to also help answer the question of what the verities of indicative conditionals are, a question which Edgington leaves open. Finally, the question of how to accommodate higher-order vagueness, given this interpretation, is addressed.
Many philosophers deny that happiness can be equated with pleasurable experiences. In influential... more Many philosophers deny that happiness can be equated with pleasurable experiences. In influential work, Nozick introduced an experience machine thought experiment to support the idea that happiness requires pleasurable experiences that are " in contact with reality. " In this thought experiment, people can choose to plug into a machine that induces exclusively pleasurable experiences. We test Nozick's hypothesis that people will reject this offer. We also contrast Nozick's experience machine scenario with scenarios that are less artificial and offer options which are less invasive or disruptive than being connected to a machine, specifically scenarios in which people are offered an experience pill or a pill that improves overall functioning. In order to show that happiness cannot be equated with pleasurable experiences, Robert Nozick (1974) invented a thought experiment involving an experience machine. In this thought experiment, we are to imagine that we can choose to plug into an experience machine that ensures our having exclusively pleasurable experiences. Nozick (1974: 646) supposes that we will reject this offer, because we want to live a life that is " in contact with reality " (more on this below). This paper takes Nozick's thought experiment as a starting point for a survey study, aiming to thereby determine the level of support for the intuition this thought experiment seeks to bring into relief. Empirical work on Nozick's " contact intuition " revealed that this intuition is not as universally shared as many in the philosophical community have supposed (De Brigard 2010, Weijers 2014). We probe deeper by considering variations of Nozick's original scenario that feature interventions which are both more realistic and less invasive than hooking someone up to a machine. Specifically, in Experiment 1 we also present the option of taking an experience pill that has the same effect as the experience machine as well as the option of taking a functioning pill that improves one's overall functioning. Inspired by Nozick, we predict that the less invasive an intervention is—the less it severs contact with reality—the more people will be prepared to accept it. We contrast our findings with those of the aforementioned earlier empirical studies. In a second experiment , we consider still further variations of Nozick's scenarios, which are parallel to the materials from Experiment 1 except that now instead of offering an improvement over the status quo the scenarios promise to prevent a pending loss. Recent research suggests that the difference in " valence " between the scenarios from Experiment 1 and those * All Supplementary Information as well as all data and the script for the statistical analyses are available at https://osf.io/nrx2x/?view_only=d001aeff6ea24503b7e844e05f71419f.
A 2007 study by Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal purports to show that universal categories emerge as a... more A 2007 study by Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal purports to show that universal categories emerge as a result of optimal partitioning of color space. Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal only consider color categorizations of up to six categories. However, in most industrialized societies eleven color categories are observed. This paper shows that when applied to the case of eleven categories, Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal's optimality criterion yields unsatisfactory results. Applications of the criterion to the intermediate cases of seven, eight, nine, and ten color categories are also briefly considered and are shown to yield mixed results. We consider a number of possible explanations of the failure of the criterion in the case of eleven categories, and suggest that, as color categorizations get more complex, further criteria come to play a role, alongside Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal's optimality criterion.
Abstract. At least many conditionals seem to convey the existence of a link between their anteced... more Abstract. At least many conditionals seem to convey the existence of a link between their antecedent and consequent. We draw on a recently proposed typology of conditionals to revive an old philosophical idea according to which the link is inferential in nature. We show that the proposal has explanatory force by presenting empirical results on two Dutch linguistic markers.
This paper considers Kamp and Partee's account of graded membership within a conceptual spaces fr... more This paper considers Kamp and Partee's account of graded membership within a conceptual spaces framework and puts the account to the test in the domain of colors. Three experiments are reported that are meant to determine, on the one hand, the regions in color space where the typical instances of blue and green are located and, on the other hand, the degrees of blueness/greenness of various shades in the blue–green region as judged by human observers. From the locations of the typical blue and typical green regions in conjunction with Kamp and Partee's account follow degrees of blueness/greenness for the color shades we are interested in. These predicted degrees are compared with the judged degrees, as obtained in the experiments. The results of the comparison support the account of graded membership at issue.
TWO ACCOUNTS OF SIMILARITY COMPARED LIEVEN DECOCK and IGOR DOUVEN VU University Amsterdam and Uni... more TWO ACCOUNTS OF SIMILARITY COMPARED LIEVEN DECOCK and IGOR DOUVEN VU University Amsterdam and University of Leuven Abstract Tversky's account of similarity could be said to reduce similarity to identity and thereby to reduce an allegedly philosophically ...
EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, 2013
Many contemporary qualia inversion arguments are inspired by findings in colour science, most not... more Many contemporary qualia inversion arguments are inspired by findings in colour science, most notably, the Hering-Jameson-Hurvich opponent processes theory. This is somewhat ironic, given that other findings in colour science-particularly findings indicating that phenomenal colour is asymmetrical-appear to exclude qualia inversion scenarios. In previous work, we proposed an alternative qualia change scenario-called "qualia compression"-that is impervious to the asymmetry objection. The present paper argues that qualia compression is more than merely another thought experiment. We do this by connecting it to recent developments in colour science. Specifically, we point at experiments on gamut expansion and compression by Brown and MacLeod, Li and Gilchrist, and Whittle.
The standard approach to the so-called paradoxes of identity has been to argue that these paradox... more The standard approach to the so-called paradoxes of identity has been to argue that these paradoxes do not essentially concern the notion of identity but rather betray misconceptions on our part regarding other metaphysical notions, like that of an object or a property. This paper proposes a different approach by pointing to an ambiguity in the identity predicate and arguing that the concept of identity that figures in many ordinary identity claims, including those that appear in the paradoxes, is not the traditional philosophical concept but one that can be defined in terms of relevant similarity. This approach to the paradoxes will be argued to be superior to the standard one.
In a famous critique, Goodman dismissed similarity as a slippery and both philosophically and sci... more In a famous critique, Goodman dismissed similarity as a slippery and both philosophically and scientifically useless notion. We revisit his critique in the light of important recent work on similarity in psychology and cognitive science. Specifically, we use Tversky's influential set-theoretic account of similarity as well as Gärdenfors's more recent resuscitation of the geometrical account to show that, while Goodman's critique contained valuable insights, it does not warrant a dismissal of similarity.
Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question o... more Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question of whether a subject can be said to know a proposition. Various philosophers have recently departed from this doctrine by claiming that the answer to this question also depends on practical concerns. They take this move to be warranted by the fact that people's knowledge attributions appear sensitive to contextual variation, in particular variation due to differing stakes. This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the aforementioned fact, one that allows us to stick to the orthodoxy. The alternative applies the conceptual spaces approach to the concept of knowledge. With knowledge conceived of spatially, the variability in knowledge attributions follows from recent work on identity, according to which our standards for judging things (including concepts) to be identical are context-dependent. On the proposal to be made, it depends on what is at stake in a context whether it is worth distinguishing between knowing and being at least close to knowing.
The conceptual spaces approach has recently emerged as a novel account of concepts. Its guiding i... more The conceptual spaces approach has recently emerged as a novel account of concepts. Its guiding idea is that concepts can be represented geometrically, by means of metrical spaces. While it is generally recognized that many of our concepts are vague, the question of how to model vagueness in the conceptual spaces approach has not been addressed so far, even though the answer is far from straightforward. The present paper aims to fill this lacuna.
Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most no... more Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most notably perhaps, they have figured in skeptical arguments for the fundamental unknowability of other persons' color experiences. For these arguments to succeed, it must be assumed that a person's having inverted color qualia may go forever unnoticed. This assumption is now generally deemed to be implausible. The present paper defines a variant of color qualia inversion-termed ''color qualia compression''-and argues that the possibility of undetectable color qualia compression is immune to the objections that have been levelled against color qualia inversion arguments, and that color qualia compression scenarios support full-blown skepticism regarding other people's color experiences. 2 See, for instance, , , , . 3 In fact, if our skeptical claim is correct, then color qualia compression scenarios can quite generally serve all dialectical purposes that color qualia inversion scenarios were meant to serve. This can be readily seen from Byrne's [2010, Sect. 3.10] summary of the various requirements that color qualia inversion scenarios are to meet if they are to support the various positions they have been alleged to support.
Putnam's internal realism is aimed at reconciling realist and antirealist intuitions about truth ... more Putnam's internal realism is aimed at reconciling realist and antirealist intuitions about truth and the nature of reality. A common complaint about internal realism is that it has never been stated with due precision. This paper attempts to render the position precise by drawing on the literature on conceptual spaces as well as on earlier work of the authors on the notion of identity.
This paper gives an overview of the main philosophical applications to which conceptual spaces ha... more This paper gives an overview of the main philosophical applications to which conceptual spaces have been put. In particular, we show how they can be used to (i) resolve in a uniform way the so--called paradoxes of identity, which are basically problems concerning material constitution and change over time;
The conceptual spaces approach has emerged as a new and powerful way of thinking about concepts. ... more The conceptual spaces approach has emerged as a new and powerful way of thinking about concepts. In earlier work, the present authors have addressed the question of how to model vague concepts in the conceptual spaces framework. That in turn was instrumental in Decock's and Douven's account of a graded membership relation in further work. In this paper, we make use of the account of graded membership to present a way of modelling comparative concepts in conceptual spaces. Finally, Dietz' alternative account of comparative concepts is contrasted with the presented Decock-Douven type account.
Edgington has proposed a solution to the sorites paradox in terms of 'verities', which she define... more Edgington has proposed a solution to the sorites paradox in terms of 'verities', which she defines as degrees of closeness to clear truth. Central to her solution is the assumption that verities are formally probabilities. She is silent on what verities might derive from and on why they should be probabilities. This paper places Edgington's solution in the framework of a spatial approach to conceptualization, arguing that verities may be conceived as deriving from how our concepts relate to each other. Building on work by Kamp and Partee, this paper further shows how verities, thus conceived, may plausibly be assumed to have probabilistic structure. The new interpretation of verities is argued to also help answer the question of what the verities of indicative conditionals are, a question which Edgington leaves open. Finally, the question of how to accommodate higher-order vagueness, given this interpretation, is addressed.
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Papers by Igor Douven