Once upon a time a young man was walking through the woods on his way home from the market. In hi... more Once upon a time a young man was walking through the woods on his way home from the market. In his pack he carried vegetables, fruits, and bread for his family. Wandering down the path and approaching a clearing, he happened to smell smoke. A quick investigation uncovered a bush overcome by low flames that were growing higher, and from the middle of the bush an adder called out for assistance. Tying one of the bread sacks to his staff and reaching it into the flames, the young man called to the adder to slip inside the sack and be lifted to safety. The adder complied and was saved. Away from danger the adder expressed his happiness and explained that some travelers had kindled the fire a few minutes before. The young man, pleased with himself after saving the adder and then putting out the fire, prepared to go on his way and suggested that the adder go in peace now and no longer harm men since he owed his life to a man’s kindness. The adder, though, turned to strike him.
Husserl was well aware of the tendency to found the infant’s ability to begin pairing on an insti... more Husserl was well aware of the tendency to found the infant’s ability to begin pairing on an instinct—an instinct, in some sense, “for the Other.” As early as 1909, Theodor Lipps had claimed that the only possible foundation for social ontology was instinct. He was led to this conclusion through a line of reasoning which should be very familiar.
The world is filled with monsters. The Yeti, Sasquatch, Mono Grande, Big Foot. It is filled, at l... more The world is filled with monsters. The Yeti, Sasquatch, Mono Grande, Big Foot. It is filled, at least, with accounts of such monsters; for although we have witnesses and photographs and documented accounts, few believe that such creatures are more than constructs of the imagination. This strong denial is interesting from a sociological perspective, but it also says much about our concepts of human and animal as well. If such creatures exist or are even imagined to exist, the boundary between the human and the animal is eroded. It is not important-at least not for the particular task of this investigation-whether or not they do exist. Like most, I imagine that there are better explanations for the reported sightings than maintaining the existence of reclusive monsters. I, too, am a slave to the scientific paradigm of the world. But I see no reason not to allow for the possibility of such creatures. Regardless, this is not the crucial matter, for it is merely our experience of the possibility of such Others that I want to investigate. How do we make sense of our given humanity in a world where such creatures might exist? How do we know what is human and what is animal if we admit the possibility of a creature described as neither or as both? How might the comfortable, constructed moral boundaries of our community be called into question? And what do the stories of encounters-stories that are reported as truth-say
ABSTRACT For the moment, we shift gears. Having investigated the constitution of the Ego and the ... more ABSTRACT For the moment, we shift gears. Having investigated the constitution of the Ego and the Other, we eventually want to turn to the ethical implications of such a social ontology. I begin, though, with an inquiry into the nature of moral action and the degree to which being moral is a necessary human way of being as opposed to a voluntary choice made in certain situations.
In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli published a formula establishing the correct relation between pressure ... more In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli published a formula establishing the correct relation between pressure and kinetic energy when a fluid flows over a solid object. A generation earlier, Newton had argued that drag was calculable as a relation among the density of the fluid medium, the dimensions of the object, and the square of the velocity of that object. By that reasoning, if air acted as an ideal fluid, it would make flight all but impossible. Had Newton been right, the lift needed to get a Boeing 707 off the ground would require a wingspan on the plane greater than 400 yards (rather than the 43 yards it actually takes). Bernoulli, it turned out, had figured out the true nature of air: a fluid, but not an ideal fluid by any means. It would take until the turn of the twentieth century for scientists to realise the implications of Bernoulli's Principle for aerodynamics, thus leading to the Wright Brothers' first powered flight in 1903 and every other innovation and application in flight today. The history of the airfoil is often thought to be a direct proof of the realism of science. 1 If science is not truly describing an objective world separate from the knower, so goes the claim, then why do planes fly? And especially, why do they fly according to a principle that was discovered long before anyone knew it would be applicable to flight? Bernoulli's Principle did not explain why air flows at different speeds across an airfoil, but it did describe the difference in pressures. It did not give directions for building an airplane wing, but it did establish the scientific law of nature that would make the planes of the future fly. And the proof was in the pudding in the sky. Unlike Icarus, Orville and Wilbur stayed up. Still today, the Bernoulli Principle is used to make predictions and
Supernatural-to be sure-they assured him that it was a reason to travel in groups, to be sure to ... more Supernatural-to be sure-they assured him that it was a reason to travel in groups, to be sure to be home before dusk turned into night and the beast awakened, hungry. Reverend Singh, more curious than frightened, suggested constructing a platform in a tree in order to have a vantage point from which to shoot the beast, but the villagers wanted no part of it. By early October, though, he had finally found someone to lead him to a place where there had been several sightingsto a white-ant mound near Godamuri, where the locals told stories of a creature that raced through the night, haunting the jungle. Singh and his party set up camp near the ant mound and began their vigil.
L'A. defend la these de la categorialite morale developpee par R. Sokolowski, selon laquelle ... more L'A. defend la these de la categorialite morale developpee par R. Sokolowski, selon laquelle la nature de l'action morale procede de l'etre-moral de l'etre humain et non pas d'un choix concernant notre mode social d'existence. Considerant le cas de l'acteur non-jugemental et celui de l'acteur irreflechi, Sokolowski fournit une analyse formelle de la moralite qui souffre de l'absence d'une determination de la normativite
I’m not sure how many connected men I’ve met in my life. At least three. Likely more. The number ... more I’m not sure how many connected men I’ve met in my life. At least three. Likely more. The number seems high to me as I’ve lived most of my life in the quiet American Midwest – not a hot-bed of Cosa Nostra activity by most regards. And yet, I have . . . stories. When I was just out of my first year of college I was in search of a summer job and thus came to tutor the only son of a rich Italian businessman in a town in Illinois. The boy was attending summer High School and it was my job to see he passed every class, especially the math and science courses, his greatest challenges. We worked for hours each day (it was a struggle; he bore more than a passing resemblance to A. J. Soprano in body as well as mind); and I would reward myself most nights by accepting the hospitality of the family, especially happy to take home a Tupperware container of the mother’s manicotti or the grandmother’s freshly made and frozen cassatta siciliana – exotic foods to my Ohio-born, Hamburger Helperacquainted, Velveeta-accustomed palate. In my memories, twisted and interpreted as memories necessarily are, the grandmother was a lovely stereotype. Not a scheming Livia Soprano, but a Hollywood creation nonetheless: the happy Italian nonna committed to her family, talking about “the Old Country” with a tear in her eye, offering food as the solution to all of life’s problems. She had been born in Italy and moved to the U.S. as a young girl; and after more than seventy years in this county she still seemed “Italian” to me in a way that was somehow deeper than her son. Is thinking in such a stereotype itself somehow immoral? Was I wrong to think this way? Am I wrong to remember this way? Was I wrong to care so much for this woman and her family, knowing – no, not quite knowing – but “knowing” how it was that the bills were paid? Where is the beginning and the end of my own complicity? Have another plate of mani-got for now, my “adopted” grandmother would say. Don’t worry. You’ll figure it all out tomorrow.
Press www.press.uchicago.edu Cover image: cat. no. 14 Unless otherwise noted all drawings appear ... more Press www.press.uchicago.edu Cover image: cat. no. 14 Unless otherwise noted all drawings appear by courtesy of the artist and Packer Schopf Gallery. All works are graphite on paper and were completed between 1999 and 2004; they are identified in this publication by the latest date noted on the back. This project has had an unusual trajectory, one both highly localized in DePaul University and also connected to international academic centers and unpredictable academic disciplines. It began in 2003, when Ryan Feigenbaum, a DePaul student majoring in philosophy, noticed that the campus security guard in his dormitory passed the late shift by drawing. Their conversations led Ryan to introduce members of the philosophy department to the artist, Peter Karklins, rightly suspecting that they would respond to his interest in phenomenology, Jungian theory, and Greek philosophy. Internal discussions of the drawings and their implications quickly expanded to include colleagues at other universities, generating so much interest and commentary that in rapid sequence a publication, symposium, and exhibition took shape. Sean Kirkland, Associate Professor in the Philosophy department, has spearheaded the project with energy and enthusiasm, successfully enlisting a diverse group of scholars with an even wider range of disciplinary interests. He has also helped to select the works shown in the exhibition and served as general editor of the publication. We thank the contributors, who have shown such willingness to participate and whose perspectives deeply enrich our understanding of this material. Charles Suchar, Dean of the Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, has provided welcome support for the project, as have the departments of Philosophy, History of Art and Architecture, and Environmental Studies, as well as the Institute of Nature and Culture and the Humanities Center. Finally, we are grateful to Peter Karklins for his generosity in sharing his intensely personal and compelling work with a wide audience.
Animality is at the core of much of Rachel Rosenthal's performance art and painting. Looking ... more Animality is at the core of much of Rachel Rosenthal's performance art and painting. Looking to the work of Rosenthal (as well as Plato, Shakespeare, Rauschenberg, and others), this essay is an attempt to understand the intricate relationships among the artist, the animal, the audience, and the notion of performance itself. ********** AUTHOR: The animal is first philosophy, first performer, first image, first sound, first love, first being. This first part is to be read aloud. ROSENTHAL: (Stands) "Communicate! Communicate! My deep preference is always to chuck it all and go live with the animals in the bosom of the Earth. I keep putting it off in order to perform pieces that bring the Earth into conscious focus" (Rachel 196). AUTHOR: We're grateful for deep lack of freedom. Procrastination in a myopic world. (Crumples up the paper in his hand, looks with shame to see who is watching, throws it into the PIT which is decorated as a grave, takes a new piece of paper and starts writing.) ROSENTHAL: (Laughing at first as she stands even taller. Then startled, frightened.) "I am a primate. Timid. I hide in the branches, in caves, behind rocks. I'm naked. I can't defend myself. I am scared. Many of my people die of a crunched skull--the leopards ..." ("Rachel's" 121) (She reaches down into the PIT and retrieves the skull--a hollowed head of cabbage--from earlier scene. She holds it aloft in one hand.) "To be or ..." (130). KAFKA: (Rising) "A parable: Leopards break into the temple and drink the sacrificial vessels dry; this is repeated over and over again; finally it can be calculated in advance and becomes a part of the ceremony" (Collected 7). (Cue leopards.) In the fall of 1980 Rachel Rosenthal began performing with a rat. Tatti Wattles--in Bonsoir, Dr. Schon!, riding on Rosenthal's head, tangled in her still-present hair--took to the stage as if he had been born for it. He was soon a star. Rosenthal, for her part--and as always--put on a show. At one point, she detonated little fireworks, spun, yelled, and screamed: "I am a vampire!" And in the panic of the performance, Tatti left his nest of hair, slid down Rosenthal's face--claws marking and tearing her cheek, blood streaking to her neck--and settled on her shoulder. His work quick and true, the rat made of Rosenthal a bloody beautiful human-rodent hybrid, eine schone Fledermaus, transforming her before the audience and giving her wings. ROSENTHAL: "Tatti had a good sense of timing [...]. [He] had a great stage presence [...]. He loved being in the limelight and never hid or presented his backside. All the photos show him, handsome, looking directly into the camera. In performance, he always knew where his light was" (Tatti 37,50). (She tosses the cabbage back into the PIT.) In later versions of the production, Rosenthal would construct a miniature bat costume for Tatti and swing him through the air. They were vampires together in those years. When Nicholas Ridout recalls how he once saw a mouse cautiously and apparently improvisationally make an entrance from downstage left in a London theatre's production of Harold Pinter's The Caretaker, he uses it as an opportunity to think through how worries about animal exploitation in the theatre point to the real exploitation of the human actor on stage. "The theatre is all about humans coming face [to face] with other humans and either liking it or not liking it," explains Ridout. "The animal clearly has no place in such communication [...]. It should not be there because it does not know what to do there, is not capable of performing theatrically by engaging a human audience in experimental thinking about the conditions of their own humanity [...]" (58). The rodent, for Ridout, is a sign. Though he struggles to "let the animal be" and not "commit the act of violence of putting it on stage as a sign" (61), its exploitation is, inevitably, but a symbol for the human actor's exploitation on stage. …
Introduction: The People v. Pooh IN 1981 THE FAMILY of a nine-year old girl took Winnie the Pooh ... more Introduction: The People v. Pooh IN 1981 THE FAMILY of a nine-year old girl took Winnie the Pooh to court, claiming that he had slapped her across the face--beating her, even, to the point of brain damage on the day that the family had visited Disneyland. Robert Hill, who was in the Pooh costume that day, testified that the allegations were false and that due to his restricted vision he at most might have accidentally bumped the girl with Pooh's ear. Following his testimony, and after a brief recess, Hill returned to the courtroom in costume as Winnie the Pooh. Throughout direct and cross examination Pooh answered the lawyers' questions only by nodding his head or stomping his feet. When the defense attorney asked "What do you do at Disneyland?" Pooh stood and danced all around the courtroom. Everyone began cheering and laughing uncontrollably. The judge cried out "Have the record show that he's doing a two-step" (Koenig, 201). Clearly, they agreed, Winnie the Pooh was loving, harmless, and fun. In only twenty-one minutes the jury acquitted Pooh, and he left the courtroom a vindicated bear. The scene, if not of the crime then of our investigation, our vacation: Disneyland, located on 200 acres in Anaheim, California. Half the land is used for parking; the other half houses the attraction itself, often called the Magic Kingdom. After entering the grounds and paying a fee, one parks and abandons the family car--often in the midst of 15,000 other cars. For twice the normal fee, "preferred parking" that is closer to the main entrance of the park is available. General parking, however, is serviced by a tram system with cars that stop at various places in the lot and drop people off at the main entrance. Successfully completing the first line of the day--the line to buy a ticket--one enters and emerges onto Main Street U.S.A., a representation of a Midwestern American main street at the turn of the century. A horse-drawn street car or one of several other vehicles glides up the street and past the various stores, or it is possible to walk to the Central Plaza at which Main Street ends, directly in front of Sleeping Beauty's Castle. At this point, the park opens up and visitors may go off in various directions into the themed lands. There are seven such lands: Adventureland (which is home to the Jungle Cruise and the Indiana Jones Adventure), Frontierland (with the Big Thunder Mountain Railroad rollercoaster and the Mark Twain Steamboat), New Orleans Square (housing the Haunted Mansion and the popular Pirates of the Caribbean), Critter Country (which includes Splash Mountain and the Country Bear Playhouse), Fantasyland (containing rides based on Disney's cartoons and It's a Small World), Mickey's Toontown (the newest land, built to resemble a town where Disney characters live), and Tomorrowland (with Star Tours, Space Mountain, Autopia, Submarine Voyage, Rocket Rods, and remodeled Astro Orbitor). The entire Magic Kingdom is also surrounded by a train track with four steam trains circling the park every twenty minutes, going--in essence--nowhere. Visiting the park and living in society with Disneyland we become the kind of people who properly inhabit such institutions. We become the kind of people who can want to sue Winnie the Pooh and let him testify in court as himself. We live the contradiction; and in consuming the Disney Magic, we are changed. The changes manifest themselves in our experience of the park and of ourselves, and it is the nature of such changes which we convene to investigate. Confronted with a chasm between experience and what we take to be reality, how do we begin to bridge the gap? How do we become-Disney as we consume the Disney product? What phenomenological traces are there of our transformations? A Whole New World The chasm between perception and reality is constructed for a purpose at Disneyland. Always, it is necessary for the experience. …
I: Morality and Phenomenology. 1. Introduction. 2. Science, Morality, and Phenomenology. II: The ... more I: Morality and Phenomenology. 1. Introduction. 2. Science, Morality, and Phenomenology. II: The Ego and the Other in a Pairing Relation. 1. Introduction. 2. Empathic Perception and the Constitution of the Ego and the Other in Cartesian Meditations. 3. The Sphere of Ownness. 4. The Reciprocal Relation of Pairing: Some Problems. 5. Theunissen and the Question Concerning Pairing. III: Instinct and the Presence of the Other. 1. The Case for Instinct. 2. The Other as Unity. 3. Re-Thinking Infantile Intentionality. 4. Limitations from a Husserlian Standpoint. IV: Moral Categoriality & Moral Being. 1. Introduction. 2. The History of Moral Theory. 3. Categoriality and Foundations. 4. Moral Categoriality. 5. Morality as Choice v. Mode of Being. 6. Problem: The Unthinking Actor. 7. Problem: The Non-Judgmental Actor. 8. Conclusion. V: Phenomenological Communitarianism. 1. Introduction: The Descriptive & the Normative. 2. Communitarian Theory in General: Three Problems. 3. The 'Disappearing-Self' Problem. 4. The 'Intersubjective Good' Problem. 5. The 'Constitution of a Community' Problem. 6. The State of our Union, the Union of our State. VI: Non-Human Life and the Boundaries of Community. 1. Introduction: A Persian Fable. 2. Initial Human Pairing with Animals. 3. 'Animal Phenomenology' and the Possibility of Community Generated without Humans. 4. The Gracious Act of Attention Late-in-Coming. 5. Community through Narrative. 6. Humans and Animals in a Second-Order Community. 7. Conclusion: The Common Good as Moral Foundation. Bibliography. Index.
... A version of chapter 2 was included in The Animal/Human Boun-dary:Historical Perspectives, ed... more ... A version of chapter 2 was included in The Animal/Human Boun-dary:Historical Perspectives, edited by Angela NH Creager and William ... In finding the necessary images and in procuring the rights to copyrighted photos I also wish to thank Marianela Fornerino, Amy Berman ...
Once upon a time a young man was walking through the woods on his way home from the market. In hi... more Once upon a time a young man was walking through the woods on his way home from the market. In his pack he carried vegetables, fruits, and bread for his family. Wandering down the path and approaching a clearing, he happened to smell smoke. A quick investigation uncovered a bush overcome by low flames that were growing higher, and from the middle of the bush an adder called out for assistance. Tying one of the bread sacks to his staff and reaching it into the flames, the young man called to the adder to slip inside the sack and be lifted to safety. The adder complied and was saved. Away from danger the adder expressed his happiness and explained that some travelers had kindled the fire a few minutes before. The young man, pleased with himself after saving the adder and then putting out the fire, prepared to go on his way and suggested that the adder go in peace now and no longer harm men since he owed his life to a man’s kindness. The adder, though, turned to strike him.
Husserl was well aware of the tendency to found the infant’s ability to begin pairing on an insti... more Husserl was well aware of the tendency to found the infant’s ability to begin pairing on an instinct—an instinct, in some sense, “for the Other.” As early as 1909, Theodor Lipps had claimed that the only possible foundation for social ontology was instinct. He was led to this conclusion through a line of reasoning which should be very familiar.
The world is filled with monsters. The Yeti, Sasquatch, Mono Grande, Big Foot. It is filled, at l... more The world is filled with monsters. The Yeti, Sasquatch, Mono Grande, Big Foot. It is filled, at least, with accounts of such monsters; for although we have witnesses and photographs and documented accounts, few believe that such creatures are more than constructs of the imagination. This strong denial is interesting from a sociological perspective, but it also says much about our concepts of human and animal as well. If such creatures exist or are even imagined to exist, the boundary between the human and the animal is eroded. It is not important-at least not for the particular task of this investigation-whether or not they do exist. Like most, I imagine that there are better explanations for the reported sightings than maintaining the existence of reclusive monsters. I, too, am a slave to the scientific paradigm of the world. But I see no reason not to allow for the possibility of such creatures. Regardless, this is not the crucial matter, for it is merely our experience of the possibility of such Others that I want to investigate. How do we make sense of our given humanity in a world where such creatures might exist? How do we know what is human and what is animal if we admit the possibility of a creature described as neither or as both? How might the comfortable, constructed moral boundaries of our community be called into question? And what do the stories of encounters-stories that are reported as truth-say
ABSTRACT For the moment, we shift gears. Having investigated the constitution of the Ego and the ... more ABSTRACT For the moment, we shift gears. Having investigated the constitution of the Ego and the Other, we eventually want to turn to the ethical implications of such a social ontology. I begin, though, with an inquiry into the nature of moral action and the degree to which being moral is a necessary human way of being as opposed to a voluntary choice made in certain situations.
In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli published a formula establishing the correct relation between pressure ... more In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli published a formula establishing the correct relation between pressure and kinetic energy when a fluid flows over a solid object. A generation earlier, Newton had argued that drag was calculable as a relation among the density of the fluid medium, the dimensions of the object, and the square of the velocity of that object. By that reasoning, if air acted as an ideal fluid, it would make flight all but impossible. Had Newton been right, the lift needed to get a Boeing 707 off the ground would require a wingspan on the plane greater than 400 yards (rather than the 43 yards it actually takes). Bernoulli, it turned out, had figured out the true nature of air: a fluid, but not an ideal fluid by any means. It would take until the turn of the twentieth century for scientists to realise the implications of Bernoulli's Principle for aerodynamics, thus leading to the Wright Brothers' first powered flight in 1903 and every other innovation and application in flight today. The history of the airfoil is often thought to be a direct proof of the realism of science. 1 If science is not truly describing an objective world separate from the knower, so goes the claim, then why do planes fly? And especially, why do they fly according to a principle that was discovered long before anyone knew it would be applicable to flight? Bernoulli's Principle did not explain why air flows at different speeds across an airfoil, but it did describe the difference in pressures. It did not give directions for building an airplane wing, but it did establish the scientific law of nature that would make the planes of the future fly. And the proof was in the pudding in the sky. Unlike Icarus, Orville and Wilbur stayed up. Still today, the Bernoulli Principle is used to make predictions and
Supernatural-to be sure-they assured him that it was a reason to travel in groups, to be sure to ... more Supernatural-to be sure-they assured him that it was a reason to travel in groups, to be sure to be home before dusk turned into night and the beast awakened, hungry. Reverend Singh, more curious than frightened, suggested constructing a platform in a tree in order to have a vantage point from which to shoot the beast, but the villagers wanted no part of it. By early October, though, he had finally found someone to lead him to a place where there had been several sightingsto a white-ant mound near Godamuri, where the locals told stories of a creature that raced through the night, haunting the jungle. Singh and his party set up camp near the ant mound and began their vigil.
L'A. defend la these de la categorialite morale developpee par R. Sokolowski, selon laquelle ... more L'A. defend la these de la categorialite morale developpee par R. Sokolowski, selon laquelle la nature de l'action morale procede de l'etre-moral de l'etre humain et non pas d'un choix concernant notre mode social d'existence. Considerant le cas de l'acteur non-jugemental et celui de l'acteur irreflechi, Sokolowski fournit une analyse formelle de la moralite qui souffre de l'absence d'une determination de la normativite
I’m not sure how many connected men I’ve met in my life. At least three. Likely more. The number ... more I’m not sure how many connected men I’ve met in my life. At least three. Likely more. The number seems high to me as I’ve lived most of my life in the quiet American Midwest – not a hot-bed of Cosa Nostra activity by most regards. And yet, I have . . . stories. When I was just out of my first year of college I was in search of a summer job and thus came to tutor the only son of a rich Italian businessman in a town in Illinois. The boy was attending summer High School and it was my job to see he passed every class, especially the math and science courses, his greatest challenges. We worked for hours each day (it was a struggle; he bore more than a passing resemblance to A. J. Soprano in body as well as mind); and I would reward myself most nights by accepting the hospitality of the family, especially happy to take home a Tupperware container of the mother’s manicotti or the grandmother’s freshly made and frozen cassatta siciliana – exotic foods to my Ohio-born, Hamburger Helperacquainted, Velveeta-accustomed palate. In my memories, twisted and interpreted as memories necessarily are, the grandmother was a lovely stereotype. Not a scheming Livia Soprano, but a Hollywood creation nonetheless: the happy Italian nonna committed to her family, talking about “the Old Country” with a tear in her eye, offering food as the solution to all of life’s problems. She had been born in Italy and moved to the U.S. as a young girl; and after more than seventy years in this county she still seemed “Italian” to me in a way that was somehow deeper than her son. Is thinking in such a stereotype itself somehow immoral? Was I wrong to think this way? Am I wrong to remember this way? Was I wrong to care so much for this woman and her family, knowing – no, not quite knowing – but “knowing” how it was that the bills were paid? Where is the beginning and the end of my own complicity? Have another plate of mani-got for now, my “adopted” grandmother would say. Don’t worry. You’ll figure it all out tomorrow.
Press www.press.uchicago.edu Cover image: cat. no. 14 Unless otherwise noted all drawings appear ... more Press www.press.uchicago.edu Cover image: cat. no. 14 Unless otherwise noted all drawings appear by courtesy of the artist and Packer Schopf Gallery. All works are graphite on paper and were completed between 1999 and 2004; they are identified in this publication by the latest date noted on the back. This project has had an unusual trajectory, one both highly localized in DePaul University and also connected to international academic centers and unpredictable academic disciplines. It began in 2003, when Ryan Feigenbaum, a DePaul student majoring in philosophy, noticed that the campus security guard in his dormitory passed the late shift by drawing. Their conversations led Ryan to introduce members of the philosophy department to the artist, Peter Karklins, rightly suspecting that they would respond to his interest in phenomenology, Jungian theory, and Greek philosophy. Internal discussions of the drawings and their implications quickly expanded to include colleagues at other universities, generating so much interest and commentary that in rapid sequence a publication, symposium, and exhibition took shape. Sean Kirkland, Associate Professor in the Philosophy department, has spearheaded the project with energy and enthusiasm, successfully enlisting a diverse group of scholars with an even wider range of disciplinary interests. He has also helped to select the works shown in the exhibition and served as general editor of the publication. We thank the contributors, who have shown such willingness to participate and whose perspectives deeply enrich our understanding of this material. Charles Suchar, Dean of the Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, has provided welcome support for the project, as have the departments of Philosophy, History of Art and Architecture, and Environmental Studies, as well as the Institute of Nature and Culture and the Humanities Center. Finally, we are grateful to Peter Karklins for his generosity in sharing his intensely personal and compelling work with a wide audience.
Animality is at the core of much of Rachel Rosenthal's performance art and painting. Looking ... more Animality is at the core of much of Rachel Rosenthal's performance art and painting. Looking to the work of Rosenthal (as well as Plato, Shakespeare, Rauschenberg, and others), this essay is an attempt to understand the intricate relationships among the artist, the animal, the audience, and the notion of performance itself. ********** AUTHOR: The animal is first philosophy, first performer, first image, first sound, first love, first being. This first part is to be read aloud. ROSENTHAL: (Stands) "Communicate! Communicate! My deep preference is always to chuck it all and go live with the animals in the bosom of the Earth. I keep putting it off in order to perform pieces that bring the Earth into conscious focus" (Rachel 196). AUTHOR: We're grateful for deep lack of freedom. Procrastination in a myopic world. (Crumples up the paper in his hand, looks with shame to see who is watching, throws it into the PIT which is decorated as a grave, takes a new piece of paper and starts writing.) ROSENTHAL: (Laughing at first as she stands even taller. Then startled, frightened.) "I am a primate. Timid. I hide in the branches, in caves, behind rocks. I'm naked. I can't defend myself. I am scared. Many of my people die of a crunched skull--the leopards ..." ("Rachel's" 121) (She reaches down into the PIT and retrieves the skull--a hollowed head of cabbage--from earlier scene. She holds it aloft in one hand.) "To be or ..." (130). KAFKA: (Rising) "A parable: Leopards break into the temple and drink the sacrificial vessels dry; this is repeated over and over again; finally it can be calculated in advance and becomes a part of the ceremony" (Collected 7). (Cue leopards.) In the fall of 1980 Rachel Rosenthal began performing with a rat. Tatti Wattles--in Bonsoir, Dr. Schon!, riding on Rosenthal's head, tangled in her still-present hair--took to the stage as if he had been born for it. He was soon a star. Rosenthal, for her part--and as always--put on a show. At one point, she detonated little fireworks, spun, yelled, and screamed: "I am a vampire!" And in the panic of the performance, Tatti left his nest of hair, slid down Rosenthal's face--claws marking and tearing her cheek, blood streaking to her neck--and settled on her shoulder. His work quick and true, the rat made of Rosenthal a bloody beautiful human-rodent hybrid, eine schone Fledermaus, transforming her before the audience and giving her wings. ROSENTHAL: "Tatti had a good sense of timing [...]. [He] had a great stage presence [...]. He loved being in the limelight and never hid or presented his backside. All the photos show him, handsome, looking directly into the camera. In performance, he always knew where his light was" (Tatti 37,50). (She tosses the cabbage back into the PIT.) In later versions of the production, Rosenthal would construct a miniature bat costume for Tatti and swing him through the air. They were vampires together in those years. When Nicholas Ridout recalls how he once saw a mouse cautiously and apparently improvisationally make an entrance from downstage left in a London theatre's production of Harold Pinter's The Caretaker, he uses it as an opportunity to think through how worries about animal exploitation in the theatre point to the real exploitation of the human actor on stage. "The theatre is all about humans coming face [to face] with other humans and either liking it or not liking it," explains Ridout. "The animal clearly has no place in such communication [...]. It should not be there because it does not know what to do there, is not capable of performing theatrically by engaging a human audience in experimental thinking about the conditions of their own humanity [...]" (58). The rodent, for Ridout, is a sign. Though he struggles to "let the animal be" and not "commit the act of violence of putting it on stage as a sign" (61), its exploitation is, inevitably, but a symbol for the human actor's exploitation on stage. …
Introduction: The People v. Pooh IN 1981 THE FAMILY of a nine-year old girl took Winnie the Pooh ... more Introduction: The People v. Pooh IN 1981 THE FAMILY of a nine-year old girl took Winnie the Pooh to court, claiming that he had slapped her across the face--beating her, even, to the point of brain damage on the day that the family had visited Disneyland. Robert Hill, who was in the Pooh costume that day, testified that the allegations were false and that due to his restricted vision he at most might have accidentally bumped the girl with Pooh's ear. Following his testimony, and after a brief recess, Hill returned to the courtroom in costume as Winnie the Pooh. Throughout direct and cross examination Pooh answered the lawyers' questions only by nodding his head or stomping his feet. When the defense attorney asked "What do you do at Disneyland?" Pooh stood and danced all around the courtroom. Everyone began cheering and laughing uncontrollably. The judge cried out "Have the record show that he's doing a two-step" (Koenig, 201). Clearly, they agreed, Winnie the Pooh was loving, harmless, and fun. In only twenty-one minutes the jury acquitted Pooh, and he left the courtroom a vindicated bear. The scene, if not of the crime then of our investigation, our vacation: Disneyland, located on 200 acres in Anaheim, California. Half the land is used for parking; the other half houses the attraction itself, often called the Magic Kingdom. After entering the grounds and paying a fee, one parks and abandons the family car--often in the midst of 15,000 other cars. For twice the normal fee, "preferred parking" that is closer to the main entrance of the park is available. General parking, however, is serviced by a tram system with cars that stop at various places in the lot and drop people off at the main entrance. Successfully completing the first line of the day--the line to buy a ticket--one enters and emerges onto Main Street U.S.A., a representation of a Midwestern American main street at the turn of the century. A horse-drawn street car or one of several other vehicles glides up the street and past the various stores, or it is possible to walk to the Central Plaza at which Main Street ends, directly in front of Sleeping Beauty's Castle. At this point, the park opens up and visitors may go off in various directions into the themed lands. There are seven such lands: Adventureland (which is home to the Jungle Cruise and the Indiana Jones Adventure), Frontierland (with the Big Thunder Mountain Railroad rollercoaster and the Mark Twain Steamboat), New Orleans Square (housing the Haunted Mansion and the popular Pirates of the Caribbean), Critter Country (which includes Splash Mountain and the Country Bear Playhouse), Fantasyland (containing rides based on Disney's cartoons and It's a Small World), Mickey's Toontown (the newest land, built to resemble a town where Disney characters live), and Tomorrowland (with Star Tours, Space Mountain, Autopia, Submarine Voyage, Rocket Rods, and remodeled Astro Orbitor). The entire Magic Kingdom is also surrounded by a train track with four steam trains circling the park every twenty minutes, going--in essence--nowhere. Visiting the park and living in society with Disneyland we become the kind of people who properly inhabit such institutions. We become the kind of people who can want to sue Winnie the Pooh and let him testify in court as himself. We live the contradiction; and in consuming the Disney Magic, we are changed. The changes manifest themselves in our experience of the park and of ourselves, and it is the nature of such changes which we convene to investigate. Confronted with a chasm between experience and what we take to be reality, how do we begin to bridge the gap? How do we become-Disney as we consume the Disney product? What phenomenological traces are there of our transformations? A Whole New World The chasm between perception and reality is constructed for a purpose at Disneyland. Always, it is necessary for the experience. …
I: Morality and Phenomenology. 1. Introduction. 2. Science, Morality, and Phenomenology. II: The ... more I: Morality and Phenomenology. 1. Introduction. 2. Science, Morality, and Phenomenology. II: The Ego and the Other in a Pairing Relation. 1. Introduction. 2. Empathic Perception and the Constitution of the Ego and the Other in Cartesian Meditations. 3. The Sphere of Ownness. 4. The Reciprocal Relation of Pairing: Some Problems. 5. Theunissen and the Question Concerning Pairing. III: Instinct and the Presence of the Other. 1. The Case for Instinct. 2. The Other as Unity. 3. Re-Thinking Infantile Intentionality. 4. Limitations from a Husserlian Standpoint. IV: Moral Categoriality & Moral Being. 1. Introduction. 2. The History of Moral Theory. 3. Categoriality and Foundations. 4. Moral Categoriality. 5. Morality as Choice v. Mode of Being. 6. Problem: The Unthinking Actor. 7. Problem: The Non-Judgmental Actor. 8. Conclusion. V: Phenomenological Communitarianism. 1. Introduction: The Descriptive & the Normative. 2. Communitarian Theory in General: Three Problems. 3. The 'Disappearing-Self' Problem. 4. The 'Intersubjective Good' Problem. 5. The 'Constitution of a Community' Problem. 6. The State of our Union, the Union of our State. VI: Non-Human Life and the Boundaries of Community. 1. Introduction: A Persian Fable. 2. Initial Human Pairing with Animals. 3. 'Animal Phenomenology' and the Possibility of Community Generated without Humans. 4. The Gracious Act of Attention Late-in-Coming. 5. Community through Narrative. 6. Humans and Animals in a Second-Order Community. 7. Conclusion: The Common Good as Moral Foundation. Bibliography. Index.
... A version of chapter 2 was included in The Animal/Human Boun-dary:Historical Perspectives, ed... more ... A version of chapter 2 was included in The Animal/Human Boun-dary:Historical Perspectives, edited by Angela NH Creager and William ... In finding the necessary images and in procuring the rights to copyrighted photos I also wish to thank Marianela Fornerino, Amy Berman ...
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