One of the threats to concern to facilities using significant quantities of radioactive material ... more One of the threats to concern to facilities using significant quantities of radioactive material is radiological sabotage. Both the Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission have issued guidance to facilities for radiological sabotage protection. At those facilities where the inventories of radioactive materials change frequently, there is an operational need for a technically defensible method of
Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for safeguards and security programs are becoming increas... more Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for safeguards and security programs are becoming increasingly performance oriented. Master Safeguards and Security Agreemtns specify performance levels for systems protecting DOE security interests. In order to measure and validate security system performance, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has developed cost effective validation tools and a comprehensive validation approach that synthesizes information gained from different
The Material Control and Material Accounting Task Force defined the roles, objectives, and goals ... more The Material Control and Material Accounting Task Force defined the roles, objectives, and goals of material control and material accounting within the domestic Safeguards Program for licensed strategic special nuclear material (SSNM). The Task Force then assessed current regulations and practices vis a vis the proposed goals. Based on that assessment, the Task Force developed a proposed program for the
The report discusses people-related problems in security forces at nuclear power reactors and nuc... more The report discusses people-related problems in security forces at nuclear power reactors and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Security personnel issues are discussed under headings of corporate attitude toward security, security force management and organization, security officer selection and training, security force morale and security equipment. Problems are also discussed from the point of
The USDOE initiated the Production Risk Evaluation Program (PREP) at Sandia National Laboratories... more The USDOE initiated the Production Risk Evaluation Program (PREP) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to asses quantitatively the potential for serious production disruption as the result of random failures, accidents, natural disasters, or sabotage at its facilities. SNL developed a procedure incorporating both network and fault tree models that identifies production vulnerabilities. For each production step, a steady-state flow model
The U.S. DOE initiated the Production Risk Evaluation Program (PREP) at Sandia National Laboratoi... more The U.S. DOE initiated the Production Risk Evaluation Program (PREP) at Sandia National Laboratoires (SNL) to assess quantitatively the potential for serious production disruption as the result of random failures, accidents, natural disasters, or sabotage at its facilities. SNL developed a procedure incorporating both network and fault tree models that identifies production vulnerabilities. For each production step, a steady-state flow
Using pseudodata based on the Reid soft-core potential, the authors consider the extent to which ... more Using pseudodata based on the Reid soft-core potential, the authors consider the extent to which a single measurement of the tensor polarization of recoil deuterons can facilitate the separation of deuteron charge and quadrupole form factors in the range 0 less than q$sup 2$ less than 35 fm$sup -2$. (NL)
A new algorithm for computing the effective-interaction is presented. Its convergence properties ... more A new algorithm for computing the effective-interaction is presented. Its convergence properties are tested in two solvable models and it is found to always converge and to be able to reproduce all the eigenvalues of the full Hamiltonian.
It is shown that the impulse approximation cross section for backward ed-> enp at large momentum ... more It is shown that the impulse approximation cross section for backward ed-> enp at large momentum transfer near threshold is very much smaller than the empirical data. It is found that the conventional "Jankus theory" is inadequate at large momentum transfer because of the neglect of the aD 1 component of the deuteron state. By taking into account the simplest meson exchange currents of pionic range the theoretical prediction of the cross section comes into reasonable agreement with the existing data.
Effective safeguards and security management begins with comprehensive strategic planning that sy... more Effective safeguards and security management begins with comprehensive strategic planning that synthesizes protection objectives, threat information, existing protection capabilities, consequences of protection failure, and the costs and impacts of safeguards changes into cost effective protection strategies that adequately address credible threats. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has developed a structured risk management approach to safeguards and security planning that is
The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potent... more The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy. I.
There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design... more There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), inter alia, to revitalize the technical base for safeguards in the United States and develop advanced safeguards concepts for the future. As part of NGSI, a team of representatives from four U.S. national laboratories and a U.S. university developed a proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective implementation of international and domestic safeguards requirements with safety and other objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. The proposed approach represents a graded, iterative process for accomplishing these goals through inclusion of appropriate design activities throughout all phases of the project plan. It was developed by using the DOE regulatory environment as a starting point. The relevant actions, deliverables, project interfaces, and organizational decision points necessary to incorporate both domestic and international safeguards were identified for a DOE project. The multi-laboratory team then produced a generic SBD process that could be employed for commercial projects within the U.S. or internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed herein. SBD appears complementary to the Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative undertaken by the Energy Facility Contractor Group (EFCOG) in 2006 with input from NNSA, Defense Nuclear Security NA-70. That initiative focused on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet more stringent standards. A collaborative approach among key stakeholders is suggested.
The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potent... more The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.
There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design... more There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclea...
The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to ... more The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing ‘nuclear security’ risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as “the integration of international and national safeguards, physi...
The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction ... more The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC&A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.
The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce pro... more The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design ...
One of the threats to concern to facilities using significant quantities of radioactive material ... more One of the threats to concern to facilities using significant quantities of radioactive material is radiological sabotage. Both the Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission have issued guidance to facilities for radiological sabotage protection. At those facilities where the inventories of radioactive materials change frequently, there is an operational need for a technically defensible method of
Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for safeguards and security programs are becoming increas... more Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for safeguards and security programs are becoming increasingly performance oriented. Master Safeguards and Security Agreemtns specify performance levels for systems protecting DOE security interests. In order to measure and validate security system performance, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has developed cost effective validation tools and a comprehensive validation approach that synthesizes information gained from different
The Material Control and Material Accounting Task Force defined the roles, objectives, and goals ... more The Material Control and Material Accounting Task Force defined the roles, objectives, and goals of material control and material accounting within the domestic Safeguards Program for licensed strategic special nuclear material (SSNM). The Task Force then assessed current regulations and practices vis a vis the proposed goals. Based on that assessment, the Task Force developed a proposed program for the
The report discusses people-related problems in security forces at nuclear power reactors and nuc... more The report discusses people-related problems in security forces at nuclear power reactors and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Security personnel issues are discussed under headings of corporate attitude toward security, security force management and organization, security officer selection and training, security force morale and security equipment. Problems are also discussed from the point of
The USDOE initiated the Production Risk Evaluation Program (PREP) at Sandia National Laboratories... more The USDOE initiated the Production Risk Evaluation Program (PREP) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to asses quantitatively the potential for serious production disruption as the result of random failures, accidents, natural disasters, or sabotage at its facilities. SNL developed a procedure incorporating both network and fault tree models that identifies production vulnerabilities. For each production step, a steady-state flow model
The U.S. DOE initiated the Production Risk Evaluation Program (PREP) at Sandia National Laboratoi... more The U.S. DOE initiated the Production Risk Evaluation Program (PREP) at Sandia National Laboratoires (SNL) to assess quantitatively the potential for serious production disruption as the result of random failures, accidents, natural disasters, or sabotage at its facilities. SNL developed a procedure incorporating both network and fault tree models that identifies production vulnerabilities. For each production step, a steady-state flow
Using pseudodata based on the Reid soft-core potential, the authors consider the extent to which ... more Using pseudodata based on the Reid soft-core potential, the authors consider the extent to which a single measurement of the tensor polarization of recoil deuterons can facilitate the separation of deuteron charge and quadrupole form factors in the range 0 less than q$sup 2$ less than 35 fm$sup -2$. (NL)
A new algorithm for computing the effective-interaction is presented. Its convergence properties ... more A new algorithm for computing the effective-interaction is presented. Its convergence properties are tested in two solvable models and it is found to always converge and to be able to reproduce all the eigenvalues of the full Hamiltonian.
It is shown that the impulse approximation cross section for backward ed-> enp at large momentum ... more It is shown that the impulse approximation cross section for backward ed-> enp at large momentum transfer near threshold is very much smaller than the empirical data. It is found that the conventional "Jankus theory" is inadequate at large momentum transfer because of the neglect of the aD 1 component of the deuteron state. By taking into account the simplest meson exchange currents of pionic range the theoretical prediction of the cross section comes into reasonable agreement with the existing data.
Effective safeguards and security management begins with comprehensive strategic planning that sy... more Effective safeguards and security management begins with comprehensive strategic planning that synthesizes protection objectives, threat information, existing protection capabilities, consequences of protection failure, and the costs and impacts of safeguards changes into cost effective protection strategies that adequately address credible threats. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has developed a structured risk management approach to safeguards and security planning that is
The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potent... more The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy. I.
There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design... more There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), inter alia, to revitalize the technical base for safeguards in the United States and develop advanced safeguards concepts for the future. As part of NGSI, a team of representatives from four U.S. national laboratories and a U.S. university developed a proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective implementation of international and domestic safeguards requirements with safety and other objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. The proposed approach represents a graded, iterative process for accomplishing these goals through inclusion of appropriate design activities throughout all phases of the project plan. It was developed by using the DOE regulatory environment as a starting point. The relevant actions, deliverables, project interfaces, and organizational decision points necessary to incorporate both domestic and international safeguards were identified for a DOE project. The multi-laboratory team then produced a generic SBD process that could be employed for commercial projects within the U.S. or internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed herein. SBD appears complementary to the Safety and Security Interface Technology Initiative undertaken by the Energy Facility Contractor Group (EFCOG) in 2006 with input from NNSA, Defense Nuclear Security NA-70. That initiative focused on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet more stringent standards. A collaborative approach among key stakeholders is suggested.
The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potent... more The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.
There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design... more There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclea...
The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to ... more The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing ‘nuclear security’ risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as “the integration of international and national safeguards, physi...
The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction ... more The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC&A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.
The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce pro... more The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design ...
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