Drafts by Z. Hershel Fishman
Philosophical positions sometimes clash with ordinary speech. For example, a skeptic who denies t... more Philosophical positions sometimes clash with ordinary speech. For example, a skeptic who denies that knowledge is attainable faces the question of whether a sentence in ordinary speech containing the phrase 'I know that' is necessarily a falsehood. Trenton Merricks (2001) discusses a similar question regarding his view that inanimate objects like tables, chairs, and statues do not exist. In Merricks's view, only the atoms 1 that are thought (incorrectly) to compose the inanimate objects exist but those atoms don't compose anything. He calls this view that eliminates the existence of inanimate objects, 'eliminativism'. After establishing eliminativism, Merricks goes on to argue (pp. 162-190) that since inanimate objects do not exist, therefore whenever people ('the folk') talk about inanimate objects in ordinary speech as if inanimate objects exist, the folk speak falsely. Merricks rejects van Inwagen's (1990, § §10-11) view that even according to eliminativism the folk do not speak falsely when they talk about inanimate objects in ordinary speech. I will argue that van Inwagen's position is much more defensible than would seem from the way it is portrayed by Merricks. Merricks (pp. 162-163) starts the discussion about the truth value of expressions in ordinary speech that imply the existence of inanimate objects by citing van Inwagen (1990, § §10-11). Like Merricks, van Inwagen had argued for the non-existence of inanimate objects. 2 However, van Inwagen argued that when people talk about inanimate objects in ordinary speech they are not speaking falsely because their use of a term like 'chair' should be taken to refer to the atoms arranged chairwise. Merricks understood van Inwagen's reasoning to be that the folk are speaking loosely when they talk about chairs because 'eliminativism is consistent with what all people believe' (Merricks p. 163). I will focus on Merricks's first two arguments against this claim that the beliefs and ordinary speech of the folk are consistent with eliminativism. Merricks's first argument (p. 163) is against the idea that ordinary folk belief is consistent with eliminativism. Merricks's argument is that eliminativism is 'undeniably striking and surprising', and if eliminativism is consistent with what all people believe, then it wouldn't seem striking and surprising. Merricks's second argument (pp. 163-167) focuses on an analogy made by van Inwagen (1990, pp. 101-102). Van Inwagen made the point that just as the sentence 'The sun moved behind the elms' may be describing a true event 'in a misleading or loose or even wrong way' (van Inwagen p. 101), given the fact that the earth rather than the sun moves, and still if the event that the sun appeared to move behind the elms in fact occurred, the sentence 'The sun moved behind the elms' would be true, similarly the sentence 'There are two very valuable chairs in the next room' would be true if it describes a true fact about atoms arranged chairwise. Merricks (p. 165) claims that van Inwagen's analogy between chairs existing and the sun moving "does double duty for van Inwagen." First, it serves to describe van Inwagen's view that ordinary speech about chairs is 2 However, van Inwagen and Merricks differ on whether unconscious living organisms exist. According to van Inwagen the criteria for existence as a composite object is to constitute a life, but according Merricks the criteria for existence is to be causally non-redundant (p. 114). Merricks is open to the possibility that molecules or plants, for example, may be causally non-redundant and therefore exist (p. 115). However, he considers conscious mental properties to be the only properties that are known to confer causal non-redundancy on the composite objects that possess them (Chapter 4, pp. 85-117).
Vagueness has been a difficult problem in philosophy at least since Eubulides of Miletus raised t... more Vagueness has been a difficult problem in philosophy at least since Eubulides of Miletus raised the sorites paradox (Hyde and Raffman 2018), which essentially is that since no precise definition of a heap to the exact number of grains of sand can seemingly be true, then what is a heap? Peter Unger (1980) raised a similar problem but one he argued (p.413) was a "really new problem", which he called the Problem of the Many (POM). Unger realized that while the sorites paradox raises the problem of where to figuratively "draw the line" modally or temporally for defining objects and predicates (most of which are arguably vague in some way), there is a different problem of where to literally draw the boundary around objects. What makes this an especially novel problem is that since, it argues, there is no right answer to where to draw the boundary, every possible boundary is a true boundary, and thus, it argues, every object if it exists must be many objects. In this essay I will focus on Peter van Inwagen's treatment of the POM. I will briefly discuss the distinction between Unger's POM and a similar argument made by yet a third Peter (Geach 1980, p.215) (that appeared in print in the same year as Unger's). This distinction will light our way throughout the discussion and will help make sense of van Inwagen's answer to the POM, defending it against attacks on it by Unger, Lewis (1993), and Hudson (2000). Unger's Problem of the many Unger begins with the example of clouds with the pretheoretic assumption that they exist. At the (extended) center of the cloud, its water-droplet density will be high enough such that every water droplet is definitely part of it. Moving out to the periphery, the water-droplet density starts decreasing until it tapers off to the point where water droplets are just part of the air surrounding the cloud. What about the area where the cloudhood is not clear one way or the other? There is no right answer, Unger argues, where to draw the cloud's boundary. Therefore, every possible boundary that can be drawn will define a different cloud. Hence if clouds exist, then every typical cloud is many clouds, and the same argument generalizes to many 1 things, including humans (p.429, 461). He therefore thinks the best solution is nihilism. He then says (pp.448-450) that many philosophers to whom he proposed the problem dismissed it with what amounts to an exclusion principle, for example, that two distinct objects cannot nearly entirely overlap.
Contact: hershy.fishman2gmail.com Ewald Hering wrote in 1878 that four primary colors; red, yello... more Contact: hershy.fishman2gmail.com Ewald Hering wrote in 1878 that four primary colors; red, yellow, green and blue; perceptually comprise all other colors. For example, orange is composed of red and yellow, and purple of red and blue. However, not any two of the primaries can comprise a secondary color. There are no reddish greens or yellowish blues; rather the four primary colors work in opposing pairs, red vs. green and yellow vs. blue. This theory has also been that of Leonardo da Vinci (quoted in Sekuler & Blake 2002), and is now fully accepted by modern color scientists. However, many people (outside the field) feel that only red, yellow and blue are primaries, but green is perceptually composed of yellow and blue. According to this viewpoint, yellow and blue don't oppose each other, and thus no two primaries are opponents, but all three primaries can't go together. Thus, if we should describe an opponency system, each secondary color is the opponent of the third primary: Green (yellow-blue) opposes red, orange (yellow-red) opposes blue, and purple (blue-red) opposes yellow. (According to the classical four-primary theory, the reason orange can't go together with blue and purple can't go together with yellow is because of their yellow and blue components). This three-primary viewpoint has indeed been the widespread color theory in the 17th and 18th century, held by great minds such as Robert Boyle, and is referred to as the "painter's primaries" (MacEvoy 2005). Thomas Young also originally proposed that the three cone types in the retina code for these three primary colors (quoted in Boynton 1979, p 15). However, this viewpoint is now not even considered as a dissenting theory. Palmer (1999, pg. 109; see Kuehni 2004 who also alludes to this), in a footnote, comments that those who have this feeling "almost certainly'' do so because of their experience with mixing blue and yellow paints which produce green paint. However, while this experience clearly would influence someone in this direction and experience with paints was clearly the inspiration of the three-primary theory, it still seems that it does not totally explain away this viewpoint. It is hard to imagine that a child who grew up mixing lights instead of paints would feel that yellow subjectively has green and red components. So is it all a matter of subjective feeling or is there any evidence for Hering's classical theory? Leo Hurvich, (1981), who together with Dorothea Jameson is responsible for the acceptance of the classical theory (Lennie 2000, Sekuler & Blake 2002), cites four lines of empirical evidence as a basis for it (pp 17-23): 1) When one stares for some time at a red, yellow, green or blue image and then looks at a white background s/he will see a green, blue, red or yellow afterimage respectively. 2) Likewise, a gray rectangle surrounded by red will look greenish, by yellow will look bluish and vice versa. This is referred to as simultaneous color contrast. 3) At a certain distance from the center of the retina the eye can no longer detect reds and greens, and only yellows and blues are seen. 4) The colors unseen by color-deficient people are paired, either red and green or yellow
The dialectics of a sugya in the Babylonian Talmud (BT) present themselves on the surface as a na... more The dialectics of a sugya in the Babylonian Talmud (BT) present themselves on the surface as a naturally flowing narrative. A closer look, however, uncovers various layers, at times imperfectly attached. This was noted by the earliest traditional commentators, 1 but only in rare instances where the narrative cannot possibly be given an acceptable coherent explanation. In more recent times, the critical study of the Talmud has begun to unravel these layers sugya by sugya. The goals of the critical and traditional approaches do not completely overlap, but to a significant degree they do. A well-grounded understanding of the Talmudic reasoning is often crucial in the attempt to correctly identify a crack in the narrative. Conversely, that potential crack may be the solution to many a difficulty in a sugya. In this vein, I will attempt to analyze a sugya using a combination of these two approaches. The sugya has two parallels in the BT, in Horyaot 6a (I will denote that version as H) and Temurah 15a-b (I will denote it T). First a short introduction to the sugya: The Mishnah (Horayot 4b-5a) teaches, based on Numbers (15:22-26), that if all of Israel has inadvertently committed idolatry 2 (following an erroneous permissive order of the Court) they must bring a bull as a burnt-offering ('olah) and a male goat as a sin-offering (ḥaṭat). Unlike regular sin-offerings, this one is offered in the inner sanctuary and is therefore entirely burnt 3 (including its hide). There are differing opinions in the Mishnah regarding this offering. 4 Rabbi Yehuda says that each tribe that sinned must bring its own bull and goat. Rabbi Shimon agrees but says that in addition the Court must bring another pair of offerings, whereas Rabbi Meir says that the Court is the only party that brings the offerings (and thus only one set is brought). It is remarkable that a report in Ezra 8:35 of the offerings that the Israelites brought when they rebuilt the Temple upon their return from the Babylonian exile mentions twelve goats as sin-offerings that were burnt and twelve bulls as burnt-offerings (among other burnt-offerings of lambs and rams). These two types of offerings in these numbers are exactly what they would be required to bring for inadvertent idolatry according to Rabbi Yehuda! This verse has not escaped the notice of the Tannaim, and although not portrayed as such in the Talmud 5 may have served as an important source for Rabbi Yehuda's opinion. Indeed, a Beraita in the Sifra (Wayikra, Ḥova 3:5) and Tosefta (Parah 1:2), cited in both the Babylonian (BT) and Palestinian Talmud (PT) in Horayot (6a,1:8 respectively) in the name of none other than R. Yehuda, 6 it is confirmed that those offerings were indeed brought for idolatry. Following is the text of the Sifra (Wayikra Ḥova 3:5): Similarly 7 Rabbi Yose said, "THOSE WHO CAME FROM THE CAPTIVITY, THE PEOPLE OF THE EXILE, OFFERED BURNT-OFFERINGS FOR THE GOD OF ISRAEL, TWELVE BULLS FOR ALL OF ISRAEL, NINETY-SIX RAMS, SEVENTY-SEVEN LAMBS, TWELVE SIN-OFFERING GOATS, ALL OF THEM BURNT-OFFERINGS FOR GOD (Ezra 8:35)." Can a sin-offering be a burnt-offering? Rather just as a burnt-offering is not eaten, so were the sin-offerings not eaten. Rabbi Yehuda says, they brought them [to atone] for idolatry. 8 8 See Appendix, Point 1 and note 72 regarding whether Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Yehuda are in agreement. 7 The Sifra is relating the following to another similar but unrelated exegesis. 6 In T it is in the name of Rabbi Yose. See Appendix, Point 1. 14 Bold lettering denotes a Tannaic source. Uppercase letters denote scripture. 13 It can also not be offered, since it has nothing to atone for. Instead it is left to pasture until it gets a blemish and is then sold for the Temple's sake. 12 Rashi (to T and H), Tosfot Harosh to H, and the simple reading of the Gemara. See Ḥazon Ish for a different explanation (according to Rashi to H's method, but incompatible with his words) that the Gemara meant to say that the majority from those of the First Temple era were still alive. See also Appendix, Point 7 for the difference between H and T. 11 This is the straightforward understanding of Rav Papa's statement (at least before its possible reinterpretation at the end of the sugya). There are, however, other understandings of this statement, including apparently that of the commentary attributed to Rashi (see Imre Binyamin to H). 10 The Gemara assumes that they agree with Rabbi Yehuda that the offerings were brought for idolatry. 9 As is often alluded to in Jeremiah.
Vogel's (2000) bootstrapping paradox gets to the heart of the externalist view that we can know w... more Vogel's (2000) bootstrapping paradox gets to the heart of the externalist view that we can know without knowing that we know. Vogel's point is essentially that this allows for non-closure under known entailment (but of a different nature from non-closure regarding skepticism). However, if we think of such knowledge as its reliabilist definition, reliable belief, or if we realize that such knowledge is of a lower form, animal knowledge (Cohen 2002), as it seems necessarily so, the intuition that it must be closed under known entailment in this way goes away.
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Drafts by Z. Hershel Fishman