Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From su... more Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense
The paper explores the philosophical intelligibility of contemporary defences of collective polit... more The paper explores the philosophical intelligibility of contemporary defences of collective political forgiveness against a background of sceptical doubt, both general and particular. Three genera sceptical arguments are examined: one challenges the idea that political collectives exist; another challenges the idea that moral agency can be projected upon political collectives; a final argument challenges the attribution of emotions, especially anger, to collectives. Each of these sceptical arguments is rebutted. At a more particular level, the contrasts between individual forgiveness and collective forgiveness gives rise to various problems and the 'desiderata' for their resolution-authority, specificity and temporal proximity-are briefly explored. 1. Introduction. Forgiveness has traditionally been viewed as a process which involves an offender and a victim; it is viewed as a process in which the victim, in response to the repentance and apology of the offender, relinquishes the justified indignation previously directed at the offender. On such a construal forgiveness is moral because it involves the exercise of, or some approximation to the exercise of, a traditionally recognised moral virtue, the virtue of forgiveness; it is individual because it involves relations between two individuals, an offender and a victim; and it is temporally bounded because it might reasonably be expected to occur within the lifetime and within the living memory of offender and victim. More formally expressed: traditional forgiveness (F) involves three temporally distinct sequences of events (ti, tii, tiii) featuring an offender (O), and a victim (V). Thus: A victim (V) forgives (F) an offender (O) if and only if: (1) at ti O wrongs V, at which point warmth, respect and good will between O & V are replaced by justified resentment and indignation) (2) consequent upon (1) V experiences justified anger towards O and a breach in the hitherto cordial relations between O and V takes place (3) at tii O repents of the wrong; that is, O recognises the wrongness involved, displays sincere contrition and makes restitution to V (4) at tiii V forgives O (5) reconciliation between O and V occurs; that is, because of (3) and (4), O ceases to feel indignant and resumes warm personal relations with O.
Sceptics question whether 'distinctively human' predicates such as 'just', 'loving' and 'powerful... more Sceptics question whether 'distinctively human' predicates such as 'just', 'loving' and 'powerful' can intelligibly be attributed to a divine being. If not, then a vicious form of agnosticism seems to threaten orthodox theism. Especially if one assumes a broadly empiricist semantics the challenge, whether formulated in terms of a univocal or an equivocal understanding of predicates, seems to generate intractable philosophical problems. Aquinas' theory of analogical predication, understood either in terms of 'analogy duorum ad tertium' or in terms of 'analogy unus ad alterum', is an influential response to this sceptical challenge. Difficulties in each understanding are explored and it is suggested that a more fruitful framework for understanding theistic language is to be found in late 20th century nativism of Fodor and Quine. A familiar feature of Judaic-Christian thought and worship, indeed a feature of all theistic religions, is the belief that God possesses certain attributes. For example, he is wise, truthful, just and forgiving.
The paper explores the philosophical intelligibility of contemporary defences of collective polit... more The paper explores the philosophical intelligibility of contemporary defences of collective political forgiveness against a background of sceptical doubt, both general and particular. Three genera sceptical arguments are examined: one challenges the idea that political collectives exist; another challenges the idea that moral agency can be projected upon political collectives; a final argument challenges the attribution of emotions, especially anger, to collectives. Each of these sceptical arguments is rebutted. At a more particular level, the contrasts between individual forgiveness and collective forgiveness gives rise to various problems and the ‘desiderata’ for their resolution authority, specificity and temporal proximity are briefly explored.
Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From su... more Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense.
This paper examines contemporary virtue ethics and the claim that Christian ethics is a virtue et... more This paper examines contemporary virtue ethics and the claim that Christian ethics is a virtue ethic. Three central theses are identified as being central to virtue ethics: a priority thesis, a perfectionist thesis and a communitarian thesis. It is argued that defences of the priority thesis—it best addresses the moral crisis in our society, it does justice to historical consciousness and it remedies the incompleteness in deontic ethics—are unconvincing. It is argued that virtue and moral perfection are best understood in terms of psychologically appropriate dispositions to act in accordance with moral principles. It is further argued that the communitarian thesis raises relativist difficulties and fails to do justice to the universal elements of morality. Each of these arguments is developed philosophically and the implications for Christian ethics are explored. In light of the theory of virtue sketched in the paper it is concluded that the independence thesis, upon which virtue et...
Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From su... more Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense
The paper explores the philosophical intelligibility of contemporary defences of collective polit... more The paper explores the philosophical intelligibility of contemporary defences of collective political forgiveness against a background of sceptical doubt, both general and particular. Three genera sceptical arguments are examined: one challenges the idea that political collectives exist; another challenges the idea that moral agency can be projected upon political collectives; a final argument challenges the attribution of emotions, especially anger, to collectives. Each of these sceptical arguments is rebutted. At a more particular level, the contrasts between individual forgiveness and collective forgiveness gives rise to various problems and the 'desiderata' for their resolution-authority, specificity and temporal proximity-are briefly explored. 1. Introduction. Forgiveness has traditionally been viewed as a process which involves an offender and a victim; it is viewed as a process in which the victim, in response to the repentance and apology of the offender, relinquishes the justified indignation previously directed at the offender. On such a construal forgiveness is moral because it involves the exercise of, or some approximation to the exercise of, a traditionally recognised moral virtue, the virtue of forgiveness; it is individual because it involves relations between two individuals, an offender and a victim; and it is temporally bounded because it might reasonably be expected to occur within the lifetime and within the living memory of offender and victim. More formally expressed: traditional forgiveness (F) involves three temporally distinct sequences of events (ti, tii, tiii) featuring an offender (O), and a victim (V). Thus: A victim (V) forgives (F) an offender (O) if and only if: (1) at ti O wrongs V, at which point warmth, respect and good will between O & V are replaced by justified resentment and indignation) (2) consequent upon (1) V experiences justified anger towards O and a breach in the hitherto cordial relations between O and V takes place (3) at tii O repents of the wrong; that is, O recognises the wrongness involved, displays sincere contrition and makes restitution to V (4) at tiii V forgives O (5) reconciliation between O and V occurs; that is, because of (3) and (4), O ceases to feel indignant and resumes warm personal relations with O.
Sceptics question whether 'distinctively human' predicates such as 'just', 'loving' and 'powerful... more Sceptics question whether 'distinctively human' predicates such as 'just', 'loving' and 'powerful' can intelligibly be attributed to a divine being. If not, then a vicious form of agnosticism seems to threaten orthodox theism. Especially if one assumes a broadly empiricist semantics the challenge, whether formulated in terms of a univocal or an equivocal understanding of predicates, seems to generate intractable philosophical problems. Aquinas' theory of analogical predication, understood either in terms of 'analogy duorum ad tertium' or in terms of 'analogy unus ad alterum', is an influential response to this sceptical challenge. Difficulties in each understanding are explored and it is suggested that a more fruitful framework for understanding theistic language is to be found in late 20th century nativism of Fodor and Quine. A familiar feature of Judaic-Christian thought and worship, indeed a feature of all theistic religions, is the belief that God possesses certain attributes. For example, he is wise, truthful, just and forgiving.
The paper explores the philosophical intelligibility of contemporary defences of collective polit... more The paper explores the philosophical intelligibility of contemporary defences of collective political forgiveness against a background of sceptical doubt, both general and particular. Three genera sceptical arguments are examined: one challenges the idea that political collectives exist; another challenges the idea that moral agency can be projected upon political collectives; a final argument challenges the attribution of emotions, especially anger, to collectives. Each of these sceptical arguments is rebutted. At a more particular level, the contrasts between individual forgiveness and collective forgiveness gives rise to various problems and the ‘desiderata’ for their resolution authority, specificity and temporal proximity are briefly explored.
Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From su... more Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense.
This paper examines contemporary virtue ethics and the claim that Christian ethics is a virtue et... more This paper examines contemporary virtue ethics and the claim that Christian ethics is a virtue ethic. Three central theses are identified as being central to virtue ethics: a priority thesis, a perfectionist thesis and a communitarian thesis. It is argued that defences of the priority thesis—it best addresses the moral crisis in our society, it does justice to historical consciousness and it remedies the incompleteness in deontic ethics—are unconvincing. It is argued that virtue and moral perfection are best understood in terms of psychologically appropriate dispositions to act in accordance with moral principles. It is further argued that the communitarian thesis raises relativist difficulties and fails to do justice to the universal elements of morality. Each of these arguments is developed philosophically and the implications for Christian ethics are explored. In light of the theory of virtue sketched in the paper it is concluded that the independence thesis, upon which virtue et...
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Papers by Harry Bunting