IN ATTEMPTING TO GAIN “a clear view of the degree to which cer-tainty attaches to the senses”... more IN ATTEMPTING TO GAIN “a clear view of the degree to which cer-tainty attaches to the senses”' Descartes offers the authors of the Sixth Set of Objections one of his most detailed discussions of sense perception. The most notable feature of this account that distin-guishes three ...
Most accounts of integrity agree that the person of integrity must have a relatively stable sense... more Most accounts of integrity agree that the person of integrity must have a relatively stable sense of who he is, what is important to him, and the ability to stand by what is most important to him in the face of pressure to do otherwise. But does integrity place any constraints on the kind of principles that the person of integrity stands for? In response to several recent accounts of integrity, I argue that it is not enough that a person stand for what he believes in, nor even that he is committed to and stands for what, in his best judgement, is morally right. In our web of moral concepts integrity is internally related to a host of virtues which exclude weakness of will and dogmatism, and presuppose trustworthiness. Integrity requires that the principles stood for must be those that a morally good, morally trustworthy agent would stand for, and that the agent himself is morally trustworthy.
L'A. defend la these selon laquelle l'affirmation de la necessite de l'incompatibilit... more L'A. defend la these selon laquelle l'affirmation de la necessite de l'incompatibilite des couleurs releve de notre experience de la perception des couleurs et s'apparente donc a une necessite de la subjectivite (C. McGinn). Au-dela des positions contraires de C. L. Hardin et J. Westphal, respectivement fondees sur le mecanisme psychophysique de l'experience de la couleur et sur les proprietes de surface des objets percus (absorption et reflexion), l'A. montre que le probleme de l'incompatibilite souleve par Locke et Wittgenstein peut etre resolu par la propriete bi-dimensionnelle de l'etendue de la couleur selon laquelle deux couleurs ne peuvent survenir dans le meme espace sensoriel
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1997
Abstract Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, t... more Abstract Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, the interpretations of Berkeley's account of perception by sugges-tion are either incomplete or mistaken. In this paper I begin by examining a common interpretation of suggestion, the ' ...
IN ATTEMPTING TO GAIN “a clear view of the degree to which cer-tainty attaches to the senses”... more IN ATTEMPTING TO GAIN “a clear view of the degree to which cer-tainty attaches to the senses”' Descartes offers the authors of the Sixth Set of Objections one of his most detailed discussions of sense perception. The most notable feature of this account that distin-guishes three ...
Most accounts of integrity agree that the person of integrity must have a relatively stable sense... more Most accounts of integrity agree that the person of integrity must have a relatively stable sense of who he is, what is important to him, and the ability to stand by what is most important to him in the face of pressure to do otherwise. But does integrity place any constraints on the kind of principles that the person of integrity stands for? In response to several recent accounts of integrity, I argue that it is not enough that a person stand for what he believes in, nor even that he is committed to and stands for what, in his best judgement, is morally right. In our web of moral concepts integrity is internally related to a host of virtues which exclude weakness of will and dogmatism, and presuppose trustworthiness. Integrity requires that the principles stood for must be those that a morally good, morally trustworthy agent would stand for, and that the agent himself is morally trustworthy.
L'A. defend la these selon laquelle l'affirmation de la necessite de l'incompatibilit... more L'A. defend la these selon laquelle l'affirmation de la necessite de l'incompatibilite des couleurs releve de notre experience de la perception des couleurs et s'apparente donc a une necessite de la subjectivite (C. McGinn). Au-dela des positions contraires de C. L. Hardin et J. Westphal, respectivement fondees sur le mecanisme psychophysique de l'experience de la couleur et sur les proprietes de surface des objets percus (absorption et reflexion), l'A. montre que le probleme de l'incompatibilite souleve par Locke et Wittgenstein peut etre resolu par la propriete bi-dimensionnelle de l'etendue de la couleur selon laquelle deux couleurs ne peuvent survenir dans le meme espace sensoriel
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1997
Abstract Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, t... more Abstract Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, the interpretations of Berkeley's account of perception by sugges-tion are either incomplete or mistaken. In this paper I begin by examining a common interpretation of suggestion, the ' ...
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Papers by Jody Graham