Papers by Glenn Firebaugh
Demography, May 1, 1986
In a regression analysis of the 1961-1972 crude birthrates for 22 farm villages in the Punjab, In... more In a regression analysis of the 1961-1972 crude birthrates for 22 farm villages in the Punjab, India, I consistently obtained a negative coefficient for population density. Therefore I wrote that "Population density apparently has an inhibiting effect on fertility in these villages" (Firebaugh 1982, abstract; hereafter "Punjab study"). Professor Jensen suggests a different explanation for the negative coefficient: that it is artifactual. He gives two types of arguments-one logical, one statistical-for his artifact interpretation. The logical argument: An inverse relation between density and fertility is "puzzling" and "counterintuitive." If high density dampens fertility, (a) how did lower-fertility villages become more densely populated by 1961, and (b) why is there no evidence of convergence on the crude birth rate (CBR) during 1961- 1972? The statistical argument: The two key variables, the CBR and population density, have a common term (population). As a result, the observed relation between the CBR and density "is illusory, a statistical artifact" (Jensen 1986:284). Both arguments are wrong. Because Jensen devotes much more attention to the statistical argument, I begin with it.
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, Jun 1, 2015
Background-Asian-Americans outlive whites by an average of nearly 8 years. By determining the sou... more Background-Asian-Americans outlive whites by an average of nearly 8 years. By determining the sources of the Asian mortality advantage, we can pinpoint where there is the greatest potential for raising the life expectancy of whites and other groups in the United States. Methods-Our analyses include all Asian and white deaths in the United States between 2006 and 2010, from the Center for Disease Control (CDC). Using the International Classification of Diseases (version 10), we code causes of deaths into 19 categories, based on the most common causes as well as causes particularly relevant to racial differences. We then create life tables and apply a newly-developed demographic method to determine whether Asians have longer life expectancy because they are less likely than whites to die of causes of death that strike at younger ages, or because they tend to outlive whites regardless of cause of death. Results-Nearly 90% of the Asian-white life expectancy gap is attributable to the fact that Asians tend to outlive whites regardless of the cause of death. The causes that contribute the most to the gap are heart disease (24%) and cancers (18%). Men contribute somewhat more to the gap than women do (55% versus 45%), primarily because Asian-white differences in mortality are greater among men than among women with respect to suicide, traffic accidents, and accidental poisoning. Conclusions-For almost all causes of death, Asian victims tend to be older than white victims. The greatest potential for raising the life expectancy of whites to that of Asians, then, resides in efforts that effectively increase whites' average age at death for the most common causes of death.
Social Science & Medicine, Oct 1, 2017
In 2015, age-adjusted mortality rates increased for 8 of the 10 leading causes of death in the Un... more In 2015, age-adjusted mortality rates increased for 8 of the 10 leading causes of death in the United States. As a result, life expectancy declined by 0.17 years for both women and men. The decline could be just an anomaly, or it could represent the start of a new trend of stagnation or decline in life expectancy, as some scholars have warned. The first step is to determine the sources of the decline. In this study we analyze the contribution of specific causes of death to the decline in men's versus women's life expectancy, as well as the mechanisms that generated the decline. With regard to mechanisms, we examine whether the decline in life expectancy resulted from reductions in the average age at death for most causes of death, or from a greater risk of dying of causes that disproportionately affect the young and middle-aged. Using CDC mortality data, we construct life tables for men and women separately, based on 20 different underlying causes of death. We find that men's reduction in life expectancy was attributable primarily to changes in midlife mortality, with a greater risk of dying of causes such as accidental poisoning or homicide. The reduction in women's life expectancy, on the other hand, was attributable primarily to changes in old-age mortality, where the mean age at death for most causes (such as heart disease and mental illnesses) was lower in 2015 than it was in 2014. These gender-specific mechanisms that contributed to the decline in life expectancy are common to the major racial/ethnic groups, but the magnitude of the decline differs greatly across racial/ethnic groups. Future research can use the tools provided here to investigate in more detail how the gender-specific mechanisms of the 2015 decline differ by race.
American Sociological Review, Dec 26, 2012
Each year, more than 700,000 convicted offenders are released from prison and reenter neighborhoo... more Each year, more than 700,000 convicted offenders are released from prison and reenter neighborhoods across the country. Prior studies have found that minority ex-inmates tend to reside in more disadvantaged neighborhoods than do white ex-inmates. However, because these studies do not control for pre-prison neighborhood conditions, we do not know how much (if any) of this racial variation is due to arrest and incarceration, or if these observed findings simply reflect existing racial residential inequality. Using a nationally representative dataset that tracks individuals over time, we find that only whites live in significantly more disadvantaged neighborhoods after prison than prior to prison. Blacks and Hispanics do not, nor do all groups (whites, blacks, and Hispanics) as a whole live in worse neighborhoods after prison. We attribute this racial variation in the effect of incarceration to the high degree of racial neighborhood inequality in the United States: because white offenders generally come from much better neighborhoods, they have much more to lose from a prison spell. In addition to advancing our understanding of the social consequences of the expansion of the prison population, these findings demonstrate the importance of controlling for preprison characteristics when investigating the effects of incarceration on residential outcomes.
JAMA Pediatrics, May 1, 2019
IMPORTANCE Racial and ethnic minorities receive lower-quality health care than white non-Hispanic... more IMPORTANCE Racial and ethnic minorities receive lower-quality health care than white non-Hispanic individuals in the United States. Where minority infants receive care and the role that may play in the quality of care received is unclear. OBJECTIVE To determine the extent of segregation and inequality of care of very low-birth-weight and very preterm infants across neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) in the United States.
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Nov 1, 1997
One of the striking features of our historical era is the degree of global inequality. In some na... more One of the striking features of our historical era is the degree of global inequality. In some nations the average person lives on less than $200 per year. In other nations the average income is 100 times larger. Though adjusting for purchasing power parity narrows the gap by about 40 percent (Ram 1979), it is quite evident that the world's $23 trillion annual output is unequally distributed in the extreme.
Demographic Research, Oct 30, 2014
Blacks have lower life expectancy than whites in the United States. That disparity could be due t... more Blacks have lower life expectancy than whites in the United States. That disparity could be due to racial differences in the causes of death, with blacks being more likely to die of causes that affect the young, or it could be due to differences in the average ages of blacks and whites who die of the same cause. Prior studies fail to distinguish these two possibilities. In this study we determine how much of the 2000-10 reduction in the racial gap in life expectancy resulted from narrowing differences in the cause-specific mean age at death for blacks and whites, as opposed to changing cause-specific probabilities for blacks and whites. We introduce a method for separating the difference-in-probabilities and difference-inage components of group disparities in life expectancy. Based on the new method, we find that 60% of the decline in the racial gap in life expectancy from 2000 to 2010 was attributable to reduction in the age component,
Journal of Family History, Apr 1, 2007
Why does Eastern Europe have the lowest fertility in the world? Most explanations focus on the co... more Why does Eastern Europe have the lowest fertility in the world? Most explanations focus on the consequences of upheaval in that region during the 1990s. These so-called “transition” explanations miss a major part of the story. For the Romanian case, we show that the decline in fertility over the 1990s represents the continuation of a longstanding trend that was only interrupted by the extremely efficient pro-natalist policies inaugurated in the 1960s. We conclude that the conventional transition explanations of the 1990s fertility decline in Eastern Europe are incomplete because they fail to give due weight to the effect of population policies.
Annual Review of Sociology, Aug 1, 2000
About seventy percent of the world's total income inequality is between-nation inequality as ... more About seventy percent of the world's total income inequality is between-nation inequality as opposed to within-nation inequality. Between-nation inequality is the bigger component because average incomes in the richest nations are roughly 30 times greater than average incomes in the poorest nations. This highly uneven distribution of income across nations likely reflects the long-run divergence of national incomes over the course of the Industrial Revolution. Empirical investigations suggest, however, that between-nation income inequality has stabilized in recent decades. Because between-nation inequality has stabilized, the direction of the current trend in total world income inequality depends on the direction of the change in income inequality in the average nation.
Population and Development Review, Mar 1, 2004
American Journal of Political Science, May 1, 1988
Discussions of ratio variables in political science typically assume--incorrectly--that Karl Pear... more Discussions of ratio variables in political science typically assume--incorrectly--that Karl Pearson's (1897) warning about ratio correlation also applies to ratio regression. As a result, conventional wisdom concerning ratio regression most often is wrong. Contrary to that ...
Demography, Dec 18, 2015
This study is the first to investigate whether and, if so, why Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites ... more This study is the first to investigate whether and, if so, why Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites in the United States differ in the variability of their lifespans. Although Hispanics enjoy higher life expectancy than whites, very little is known about how lifespan variability-and thus uncertainty about length of life-differs by race/ethnicity. We use 2010 U.S. National Vital Statistics System data to calculate lifespan variance at ages 10+ for Hispanics and whites, and then decompose the Hispanic-white variance difference into cause-specific spread, allocation, and timing effects. In addition to their higher life expectancy relative to whites, Hispanics also exhibit 7 % lower lifespan variability, with a larger gap among women than men. Differences in cause-specific incidence (allocation effects) explain nearly two-thirds of Hispanics' lower lifespan variability, mainly because of the higher mortality from suicide, accidental poisoning, and lung cancer among whites. Most of the remaining Hispanic-white variance difference is due to greater age dispersion (spread effects) in mortality from heart disease and residual causes among whites than Hispanics. Thus, the Hispanic paradox-that a socioeconomically disadvantaged population (Hispanics) enjoys a mortality advantage over a socioeconomically advantaged population (whites)-pertains to lifespan variability as well as to life expectancy. Efforts to reduce
American Sociological Review, Apr 1, 1979
Page 1. STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF URBANIZATION IN ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA, 1950-1970* ... The pri... more Page 1. STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF URBANIZATION IN ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA, 1950-1970* ... The primary reason is economic development, but economic development alone is inadequate for explaining urbanization in the Third World. ...
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Nov 7, 2016
American Journal of Sociology, Sep 1, 1996
L'A. s'efforce de mesurer l'impact economique de la penetration du capital et de l... more L'A. s'efforce de mesurer l'impact economique de la penetration du capital et de l'investissement etranger sur l'economie des pays en voie de developpement. Il examine et critique le mode d'evaluation de la production propose par W. J. Dixon et T. Boswell. Il estime qu'il convient de distinguer investissement local et investissement etranger. Il presente les differents types d'interpretation et etudie un certain nombre de donnees collectees concernant le Panama, la Jamaique, le Liberia, la Guinee et enfin Trinidad et Tobago. Il se demande, d'une part, si l'investissement local et preferable a l'investissement etranger et, d'autre part, si ce dernier appauvrit les pays en voie de developpement. Il s'interroge sur le bien-fonde de la theorie de la dependance
SAGE Publications, Inc. eBooks, Jan 23, 2014
Contemporary Sociology, Mar 1, 2013
Alluding by its title to Adam Smith, The Cultural Wealth of Nations contributes to a field of cul... more Alluding by its title to Adam Smith, The Cultural Wealth of Nations contributes to a field of cultural economics pioneered by scholars such as Viviana Zelizer, that explores the inseparability of economic and cultural domains and more specifically, the creation of economic value through symbolic representations, ritual, and narrative. The editors compiled a number of case studies that illumine the manner in which cultural resources (cultural ‘‘heritage,’’ narratives about artifacts and places, images shaping the perception of products and peoples) are transmuted into economic wealth. The book examines historical processes, institutions, and agents that have effected such transformations, the social actors best positioned to recoup the resulting profits, difficulties encountered in attempts to turn culture to economic ends, and tactics used to surmount them. The case studies, almost all of which usefully cross-reference one another, stress a common theme: nations, ethnic groups, and diverse economic actors may be advantaged or disadvantaged in efforts to marshal cultural resources to create economic value through ‘‘heritage’’ tourism, the ‘‘branding’’ of nations, peoples, and commodities, and the management of consumer perceptions of production processes. Several common theoretical perspectives on the transmutation of cultural resources into economic wealth underlie the specific subjects examined by each of the papers. One is that there are asymmetries and inequalities, whether between nations, ethnic and occupational groups, or producers of any marketed commodity, in the power to define cultural values and turn them to economic use. A paper on the history of heritage conservation and on the designation of UNESCO World Heritage sites offers a detailed account of the specific political history, as well as the institutionalized professional power and ethos that resulted in a clustering of designated heritage sites in wealthy nations. These nations are then better positioned than others to recoup the economic value to be culled from the exploitation of heritage sites for tourist and other commercial purposes. A transnational mobilization of conservation professionals, embedded in universities, scholarly disciplines, and cultural bureaucracies has resulted in the institutionalization of rules favoring ‘‘cultural heritage’’ production in some countries more than in others. Adopting a ‘‘global value chain perspective,’’ some papers demonstrate that in a long chain of production and marketing, in which goods are endowed with symbolic value through branding, design, and narratives targeting particular groups of consumers, the creators of added cultural value often recoup most of the economic value of the final product—for example, companies in the United Kingdom responsible for the branding of South African wine, or middlemen in Thailand selling silk cloth on the internet. Erving Goffman’s work on impression management, long turned to good use by scholars in the sociology of institutions, occupations, and tourism, is explicitly adopted here as a helpful perspective in the study of cultural economy. What are the options for a country heavily dependent upon international tourism whose image as an attractive destination is spoiled by war and widely circulated images of atrocities? Will it turn the death camps and killing fields into historical ‘‘attractions’’? Or will it attempt to erase all signs recalling its stigmatizing history, rebranding the nation as identical to that of other countries whose imagery and histories it hijacks as its own? One paper in this volume, analyzing Croatia’s tactics for managing a discreditable national identity in the interests of resuscitating its tourist industry, adopts Goffman’s theory of stigma, suggesting
Demographic Research, Sep 2, 2016
South Korea has the highest rate and highest rate of increase in suicide among developed countrie... more South Korea has the highest rate and highest rate of increase in suicide among developed countries. The suicide epidemic in Korea is an anomaly, and suicide rates are high for both men and women, with no signs of decreasing. Yet we do not know the extent to which suicide has reduced life expectancy in Korea. We investigated whether and to what extent the rapid increase in suicide has contributed to changes in Korean life expectancy, a key indicator of population health. We used a recently developed decomposition method that separates the contribution of suicide's effect on change in life expectancy into two parts: that due to change in the overall suicide incidence rate and that due to change in the mean age of suicide victims. From 1995 to 2010, life expectancy increased by 6.5 years in Korea, with change in most causes of death contributing to its growth. We nonetheless find, as expected, that the rise in suicides reduced the increase in life expectancy from 1995 to 2010, so life expectancy in Korea is about 0.21 years lower than it would have been without the increase in suicides. Moreover, had the age of suicide victims remained stable, we project that Korea's life expectancy would be fully 0.70 years lower than it is.
American Sociological Review, Feb 1, 1987
Page 1. 136 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW Y = kX+E; E(E) = 0; X,E independent var (Y/X) $ 0, var(X... more Page 1. 136 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW Y = kX+E; E(E) = 0; X,E independent var (Y/X) $ 0, var(X) # 0. Firebaugh and Gibbs have proved this propor-tion by a complicated econometric argument (note 7, p. 720). Here is a short proof. ...
American Sociological Review, Feb 1, 1980
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Papers by Glenn Firebaugh