Bas van Bavel has produced an important historical study, one highly relevant to current discussi... more Bas van Bavel has produced an important historical study, one highly relevant to current discussions about economic policy. The context in which this work is set is the ongoing debate over optimal economic policy. For a time, from the collapse of the Soviet Union until about a decade ago, it seemed that this question might be settled: neoliberalism had triumphed, and the best political economy prescription clearly involved a heavy dose of free markets. Certainly, there was debate at the margins: Should healthcare be publicly provisioned? How big a welfare state should one have? What is the proper role for central banks? These were minor issues, however. Then came the financial crisis of 2007–2008, and all that had seemed settled was at play again. The response to the crisis by free-market advocates most typically ran along these lines: Yes, the crisis was bad, but it was the result of crony capitalism, not of true free markets. If the central banks and the international economic institutions had not gotten in bed with the big banks, this all could have been avoided. Van Bavel’s work provides a very important counter-response: True, but free markets produce crony capitalism, like an acorn produces and oak tree. Van Bavel’s main thesis is that free factor markets work well, for a time, at producing wealth and lifting all boats. With the rise of factor markets and financial elites, though, this changes. As van Bavel puts it, “the rise and dominance of markets for land, labour, and capital are self-undermining, as . . . feedback mechanisms results in welfare declining again and markets losing their quality in facilitating successful and rapid exchange” (2). Van Bavel backs his thesis with extensive evidence from three case studies: Iraq between 500 and 1100 CE, Northern Italy from 1000 to 1500, and the Low Countries between 1100 and 1800. He also touches, much more lightly, on other instances of market societies, such as modern England, the United States, early modern China, and the Roman Empire. After assembling a wealth of historical material, van Bavel claims,
another, citing recent work analyzing traces of lapis lazuli in the dental remains of a medieval ... more another, citing recent work analyzing traces of lapis lazuli in the dental remains of a medieval woman that resonates with studies of texts produced by German nuns working as scribes (77). Similar additions discuss biocodicology (the biological analysis of parchment), recent developments in the study of the Yersinia Pestis bacterium (although it came out just a touch too soon to include Monica Green’s important recent contribution in The American Historical Review [Volume 125, Issue 5, December 2020]) and the use of DNA to track medieval migration, along with other similar developments, all with the usual helpful citations of recent work. Perhaps most notably, chapter 4 (“Debating the Middle Ages”) now contains a discussion of the recent turn toward a global Middle Ages. Arnold notes that this development puts medieval history in step with a general historiographical turn toward global history, but he also emphasizes the distinctive contribution that medievalists can make in this area. In this section, Arnold discusses approaches that are “not geographically bounded by traditional kingdoms, still less modern nation-states, and which need not take the west European experience as its centre or starting point” (113). He notes the medieval history is rather late to this party and rightly cautions against “slipping into any simple ‘earlier than thou’ position” vis a vis modernist global historians (116). Medievalists, he suggests, can more usefully emphasize that global history does not have to adhere to modernist approaches, or stick to the themes that define modern global history, in order to do important work. As an example, Arnold points to how research on nodal sites—global crossroads like the Mediterranean world—has helped problematize the assumed “whiteness” of the Middle Ages, clarifying the ways that interactions between Christians and non-Christian others were fundamental to the formation of new racial categories and prejudices (117). Arnold does not sidestep the fact that there remains much to be debated regarding this new field—for example, whether a grand globalism is possible or desirable, or whether it remains too problematic to discuss Eurasia, Africa, the Americas, and Australasia under a single rubric. He points to the nagging problem of periodization and whether the heading “medieval” can usefully be applied across such a vast geographical space and in the face of such enormous cultural diversity. There are technical challenges too. Already a linguistically challenging field in its oldest and most traditional form, this will only be truer of a medieval history that has gone global. Furthermore, as is the case within Europe itself, the medieval globe is characterized by extremely uneven source preservation, making some regions and eras more accessible than others. These are important debates and real challenges, but Arnold seems to enjoin the reader to approach them with determination and optimism, and with their eye firmly fixed on the benefits of reaching beyond geographical and methodological comfort zones and working in collaborative ways in order to do groundbreaking, transformative work. In the end, Arnold presents medieval history at its best: a multifaceted, intellectually and methodologically diverse area of study in which each subfield is enriched by its adjacency to and interaction with the others. This book suggests that historians ought to double down on the interdisciplinarity and creativity that has so long characterized medieval history. It is, of course, true that no field manages to be its ideal version at all times; scholars too often tend toward conservativism, defensiveness, and strong prejudice about particular questions or methods, as well as (perhaps above all) toward unproductive, pyrrhic infighting. In Arnold’s book, we see, in many ways, what the field of medieval history can be: broadly ecumenical within its own ranks and open to interdisciplinary collaboration, without defensiveness or insistence on disciplinary superiority. It is a heartwarming sight and makes this book useful not only for introducing students to medieval history but also for encouraging in them both intellectual generosity and openness to interdisciplinary conversation and collaboration.
... View full textDownload full text Full access. DOI: 10.1080/09538259.2011.561569 Gene Callahan... more ... View full textDownload full text Full access. DOI: 10.1080/09538259.2011.561569 Gene Callahan a * pages 325-327. Available online: 19 Apr 2011. ... Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms. Vernon L. Smith. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008 ...
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, May 25, 2017
Paul Feyerabend was one of the most intriguing figures in the twentieth-century philosophy of sci... more Paul Feyerabend was one of the most intriguing figures in the twentieth-century philosophy of science. A student of Karl Popper, he came to reject stridently his former teacher’s ‘rationalistic’ vi...
Block and Callahan permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not p... more Block and Callahan permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not physically damage the property owned by others. With respect to other territories, the property title may be more or less severely restricted. As is currently the case in some housing developments, the owner may be bound by contractual limitations on what he can do with his property (voluntary zoning), which might include residential vs. commercial use, no buildings more than four stories high, no sale or rent to Jews, Germans, Catholics, homosexuals, Haitians, families with or without children, or smokers, for example. Clearly, under this scenario there exists no such thing as freedom of immigration. Rather, there exists the freedom of many independent private property owners to admit or exclude others from their own property in accordance with their own unrestricted or restricted property titles. Admission to some territories might be easy, while to others it might be nearly impossible. In any case, however, admission to the property of the admitting person does not imply a "freedom to move around," unless other property owners consent to such movements. There will be as much immigration or non-immigration, inclusivity or exclusivity, desegregation or segregation, non-discrimination or discrimination based on racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural or whatever other grounds as individual owners or associations of individual owners allow. Hoppe then examines our current situation, where various states assert control over all of the land on earth: Ln an anarcho-capitalist society there is no government and, accordingly, no clear-cut distinction between inlanders (domestic citizens) and foreigners. This distinction comes into existence only with the establishment of a government, i.e., an institution which possesses a territorial monopoly of aggression (taxation). The territory over which a government's taxing power extends becomes "inland," and everyone residing outside of this temtory becomes a foreigner. [The existence of sltate borders. .. implies a twofold distortion with respect to peoples' natural inclination to associate with others. First, inlanders cannot exclude the government (the taxman) from their own property, but are subject to what one might call "forced integration" by government agents. Second, in order to be able to intrude on its subjects' private property so as to tax them, a government must invariably take control of existing roads, and it will employ its tax revenue to produce even more roads to gain even better access to all private property, as a potential tax source. Thus, this overproduction of roads. .. involves forced domestic integration (artificial desegregation of separate localities). Moreover, with the establishment of a government and state borders, immigration takes on an entirely new meaning. Immigration becomes immigration by foreigners across state borders, and the decision as to whether or not a person should be admitted no longer rests with private property owners or associations of such owners but with the government as the ultimate sovereign of all domestic residents and the ultimate super-owner of all their properties. Now, if the government excludes a person while even one domestic resident wants to admit this very person onto his property, the result is forced exclusion (a phenomenon that does not exist under private property anarchism). Furthermore, if the government admits a person while there is not even one domestic resident who wants to have this person on his property, the result is forced integration (also non-existent under private property anarchism). And Hoppe contends that democratic governments may have especially perverse incentives regarding immigration:
ABSTRACT Jeffrey Friedman has attempted to make a case for limiting state social engineering that... more ABSTRACT Jeffrey Friedman has attempted to make a case for limiting state social engineering that is based on the skeptical epistemology of Sir Karl Popper. But Popper's epistemology is flawed, both in its rejection of a priori theorizing and its insistence on empirical falsification rather than confirmation. Classical liberalism of the sort that Friedman advocates requires, as its basis, positive knowledge of economics and social reality—not Popperian skepticism.
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Nov 1, 2012
This paper argues that the long-standing predominance of a particular approach to science neither... more This paper argues that the long-standing predominance of a particular approach to science neither makes it uniquely scientific nor superior to rival approaches. To do so it examines the dominant scientific explanation of the 17 th and early 18 th centuries: the mechanical philosophy. The mechanical philosophy episode demonstrates the fragility of even the most entrenched scientific wisdoms and provides encouragement for out-of-step scholars everywhere.
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Dec 19, 2007
Max Weber and Ludwig von Mises were two of the 20 th century's foremost theorists of human action... more Max Weber and Ludwig von Mises were two of the 20 th century's foremost theorists of human action. Mises held Weber, his senior by some 17 years, in great esteem and often discussed his theories, even weaving some, such as Weber's model of ideal types, deeply into the fabric of his own social thought. However, at least at first glance, there seems to be a deep rift between the two men's conceptions about the rationality of action. Weber classified "social actions" into several distinct categories, some of which he saw as exhibiting little, if any, rationality. Mises, in contrast, held that all action is rational by conceptual necessity. Various writers have taken their views to be obviously incompatible, among them, Mises himself. This article suggests that the appearance of a conflict is produced by the failure to discern that Weber and Mises were addressing different sorts of questions and constructing frameworks to support different modes of analyzing social phenomena. I contend that, if that divergence of aim is properly understood, then the apparent contradiction will be seen as illusory. I
Mention "free market advocate" or "defender of private property rights" and the name Ronald Coase... more Mention "free market advocate" or "defender of private property rights" and the name Ronald Coase is certain to be included in the top ten list of virtually all cognoscenti of such matters. Nor can it be denied that there are numerous good and sufficient reasons for this assessment. Nevertheless, it is the contention of the present paper that this characterization is unjustified with respect to his most famous publication on social costs. Here, in sharp contrast to most of his otherwork, we argue that Coase is better interpreted in the very opposite manner: as an intellectual enemy of free enterprise and capitalism.
Roger Congleton's book is an extended examination of the rise of parliamentary democracy, in 'the... more Roger Congleton's book is an extended examination of the rise of parliamentary democracy, in 'the West' and in Japan, over the past two centuries. His study leads him to conclude that liberal democracy, where it has taken hold successfully, has done so through a process of gradual reform, rather than revolution. He devises some interesting models to show why we might expect to see this, and looks at a wealth of historical evidence illustrating his thesis. The vast scope of Congleton's work makes this a daunting book to review, as contained within it are his models of constitutional reform, his case studies of the constitutional history of six different polities (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Japan and the United States), and his methodological musings on the place of his project within the human sciences. By necessity, this review must give some parts short shrift. However, even a reviewer, such as the present one, who is skeptical about the value of particular parts Congleton's project must applaud both the ambitiousness of his project and the wealth of research that has been poured into it. A number of interesting historical conjectures are contained in this book; for example, Congleton makes the interesting case that European imperialism, which was one of the factors driving the transition from the Medieval world to the Modern, was a kind of prisoner's dilemma: Each nation would have been better off never embarking on empire building, as expenses typically outran the revenues available from empire, but, given that its neighbors were going to embark on an imperialist course, it had better do so as well, lest it come to be dominated by them. This reviewer is not sure that analysis is correct, but it is certainly worth considering. In any case, the continuing need for royal revenue to support empire-building kept driving monarchs back to their parliaments to ask for funds, and each time they did so, the parliaments grew stronger. Congleton also highlights the link, previously noted, of course, by Marx, between the new production technologies and new political forms: The new economies of scale in farming, textiles, mining, and metal working could not always be realized within the existing late-medieval legal systems. Medieval rules and regulations included a wide variety of internal and external
ABSTRACT Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. M... more ABSTRACT Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.
Block and Callahan permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not p... more Block and Callahan permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not physically damage the property owned by others. With respect to other territories, the property title may be more or less severely restricted. As is currently the case in some housing developments, the owner may be bound by contractual limitations on what he can do with his property (voluntary zoning), which might include residential vs. commercial use, no buildings more than four stories high, no sale or rent to Jews, Germans, Catholics, homosexuals, Haitians, families with or without children, or smokers, for example. Clearly, under this scenario there exists no such thing as freedom of immigration. Rather, there exists the freedom of many independent private property owners to admit or exclude others from their own property in accordance with their own unrestricted or restricted property titles. Admission to some territories might be easy, while to others it might be nearly impossible. In any case, however, admission to the property of the admitting person does not imply a "freedom to move around," unless other property owners consent to such movements. There will be as much immigration or non-immigration, inclusivity or exclusivity, desegregation or segregation, non-discrimination or discrimination based on racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural or whatever other grounds as individual owners or associations of individual owners allow. Hoppe then examines our current situation, where various states assert control over all of the land on earth: Ln an anarcho-capitalist society there is no government and, accordingly, no clear-cut distinction between inlanders (domestic citizens) and foreigners. This distinction comes into existence only with the establishment of a government, i.e., an institution which possesses a territorial monopoly of aggression (taxation). The territory over which a government's taxing power extends becomes "inland," and everyone residing outside of this temtory becomes a foreigner. [The existence of sltate borders. .. implies a twofold distortion with respect to peoples' natural inclination to associate with others. First, inlanders cannot exclude the government (the taxman) from their own property, but are subject to what one might call "forced integration" by government agents. Second, in order to be able to intrude on its subjects' private property so as to tax them, a government must invariably take control of existing roads, and it will employ its tax revenue to produce even more roads to gain even better access to all private property, as a potential tax source. Thus, this overproduction of roads. .. involves forced domestic integration (artificial desegregation of separate localities). Moreover, with the establishment of a government and state borders, immigration takes on an entirely new meaning. Immigration becomes immigration by foreigners across state borders, and the decision as to whether or not a person should be admitted no longer rests with private property owners or associations of such owners but with the government as the ultimate sovereign of all domestic residents and the ultimate super-owner of all their properties. Now, if the government excludes a person while even one domestic resident wants to admit this very person onto his property, the result is forced exclusion (a phenomenon that does not exist under private property anarchism). Furthermore, if the government admits a person while there is not even one domestic resident who wants to have this person on his property, the result is forced integration (also non-existent under private property anarchism). And Hoppe contends that democratic governments may have especially perverse incentives regarding immigration:
Bas van Bavel has produced an important historical study, one highly relevant to current discussi... more Bas van Bavel has produced an important historical study, one highly relevant to current discussions about economic policy. The context in which this work is set is the ongoing debate over optimal economic policy. For a time, from the collapse of the Soviet Union until about a decade ago, it seemed that this question might be settled: neoliberalism had triumphed, and the best political economy prescription clearly involved a heavy dose of free markets. Certainly, there was debate at the margins: Should healthcare be publicly provisioned? How big a welfare state should one have? What is the proper role for central banks? These were minor issues, however. Then came the financial crisis of 2007–2008, and all that had seemed settled was at play again. The response to the crisis by free-market advocates most typically ran along these lines: Yes, the crisis was bad, but it was the result of crony capitalism, not of true free markets. If the central banks and the international economic institutions had not gotten in bed with the big banks, this all could have been avoided. Van Bavel’s work provides a very important counter-response: True, but free markets produce crony capitalism, like an acorn produces and oak tree. Van Bavel’s main thesis is that free factor markets work well, for a time, at producing wealth and lifting all boats. With the rise of factor markets and financial elites, though, this changes. As van Bavel puts it, “the rise and dominance of markets for land, labour, and capital are self-undermining, as . . . feedback mechanisms results in welfare declining again and markets losing their quality in facilitating successful and rapid exchange” (2). Van Bavel backs his thesis with extensive evidence from three case studies: Iraq between 500 and 1100 CE, Northern Italy from 1000 to 1500, and the Low Countries between 1100 and 1800. He also touches, much more lightly, on other instances of market societies, such as modern England, the United States, early modern China, and the Roman Empire. After assembling a wealth of historical material, van Bavel claims,
another, citing recent work analyzing traces of lapis lazuli in the dental remains of a medieval ... more another, citing recent work analyzing traces of lapis lazuli in the dental remains of a medieval woman that resonates with studies of texts produced by German nuns working as scribes (77). Similar additions discuss biocodicology (the biological analysis of parchment), recent developments in the study of the Yersinia Pestis bacterium (although it came out just a touch too soon to include Monica Green’s important recent contribution in The American Historical Review [Volume 125, Issue 5, December 2020]) and the use of DNA to track medieval migration, along with other similar developments, all with the usual helpful citations of recent work. Perhaps most notably, chapter 4 (“Debating the Middle Ages”) now contains a discussion of the recent turn toward a global Middle Ages. Arnold notes that this development puts medieval history in step with a general historiographical turn toward global history, but he also emphasizes the distinctive contribution that medievalists can make in this area. In this section, Arnold discusses approaches that are “not geographically bounded by traditional kingdoms, still less modern nation-states, and which need not take the west European experience as its centre or starting point” (113). He notes the medieval history is rather late to this party and rightly cautions against “slipping into any simple ‘earlier than thou’ position” vis a vis modernist global historians (116). Medievalists, he suggests, can more usefully emphasize that global history does not have to adhere to modernist approaches, or stick to the themes that define modern global history, in order to do important work. As an example, Arnold points to how research on nodal sites—global crossroads like the Mediterranean world—has helped problematize the assumed “whiteness” of the Middle Ages, clarifying the ways that interactions between Christians and non-Christian others were fundamental to the formation of new racial categories and prejudices (117). Arnold does not sidestep the fact that there remains much to be debated regarding this new field—for example, whether a grand globalism is possible or desirable, or whether it remains too problematic to discuss Eurasia, Africa, the Americas, and Australasia under a single rubric. He points to the nagging problem of periodization and whether the heading “medieval” can usefully be applied across such a vast geographical space and in the face of such enormous cultural diversity. There are technical challenges too. Already a linguistically challenging field in its oldest and most traditional form, this will only be truer of a medieval history that has gone global. Furthermore, as is the case within Europe itself, the medieval globe is characterized by extremely uneven source preservation, making some regions and eras more accessible than others. These are important debates and real challenges, but Arnold seems to enjoin the reader to approach them with determination and optimism, and with their eye firmly fixed on the benefits of reaching beyond geographical and methodological comfort zones and working in collaborative ways in order to do groundbreaking, transformative work. In the end, Arnold presents medieval history at its best: a multifaceted, intellectually and methodologically diverse area of study in which each subfield is enriched by its adjacency to and interaction with the others. This book suggests that historians ought to double down on the interdisciplinarity and creativity that has so long characterized medieval history. It is, of course, true that no field manages to be its ideal version at all times; scholars too often tend toward conservativism, defensiveness, and strong prejudice about particular questions or methods, as well as (perhaps above all) toward unproductive, pyrrhic infighting. In Arnold’s book, we see, in many ways, what the field of medieval history can be: broadly ecumenical within its own ranks and open to interdisciplinary collaboration, without defensiveness or insistence on disciplinary superiority. It is a heartwarming sight and makes this book useful not only for introducing students to medieval history but also for encouraging in them both intellectual generosity and openness to interdisciplinary conversation and collaboration.
... View full textDownload full text Full access. DOI: 10.1080/09538259.2011.561569 Gene Callahan... more ... View full textDownload full text Full access. DOI: 10.1080/09538259.2011.561569 Gene Callahan a * pages 325-327. Available online: 19 Apr 2011. ... Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms. Vernon L. Smith. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008 ...
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, May 25, 2017
Paul Feyerabend was one of the most intriguing figures in the twentieth-century philosophy of sci... more Paul Feyerabend was one of the most intriguing figures in the twentieth-century philosophy of science. A student of Karl Popper, he came to reject stridently his former teacher’s ‘rationalistic’ vi...
Block and Callahan permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not p... more Block and Callahan permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not physically damage the property owned by others. With respect to other territories, the property title may be more or less severely restricted. As is currently the case in some housing developments, the owner may be bound by contractual limitations on what he can do with his property (voluntary zoning), which might include residential vs. commercial use, no buildings more than four stories high, no sale or rent to Jews, Germans, Catholics, homosexuals, Haitians, families with or without children, or smokers, for example. Clearly, under this scenario there exists no such thing as freedom of immigration. Rather, there exists the freedom of many independent private property owners to admit or exclude others from their own property in accordance with their own unrestricted or restricted property titles. Admission to some territories might be easy, while to others it might be nearly impossible. In any case, however, admission to the property of the admitting person does not imply a "freedom to move around," unless other property owners consent to such movements. There will be as much immigration or non-immigration, inclusivity or exclusivity, desegregation or segregation, non-discrimination or discrimination based on racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural or whatever other grounds as individual owners or associations of individual owners allow. Hoppe then examines our current situation, where various states assert control over all of the land on earth: Ln an anarcho-capitalist society there is no government and, accordingly, no clear-cut distinction between inlanders (domestic citizens) and foreigners. This distinction comes into existence only with the establishment of a government, i.e., an institution which possesses a territorial monopoly of aggression (taxation). The territory over which a government's taxing power extends becomes "inland," and everyone residing outside of this temtory becomes a foreigner. [The existence of sltate borders. .. implies a twofold distortion with respect to peoples' natural inclination to associate with others. First, inlanders cannot exclude the government (the taxman) from their own property, but are subject to what one might call "forced integration" by government agents. Second, in order to be able to intrude on its subjects' private property so as to tax them, a government must invariably take control of existing roads, and it will employ its tax revenue to produce even more roads to gain even better access to all private property, as a potential tax source. Thus, this overproduction of roads. .. involves forced domestic integration (artificial desegregation of separate localities). Moreover, with the establishment of a government and state borders, immigration takes on an entirely new meaning. Immigration becomes immigration by foreigners across state borders, and the decision as to whether or not a person should be admitted no longer rests with private property owners or associations of such owners but with the government as the ultimate sovereign of all domestic residents and the ultimate super-owner of all their properties. Now, if the government excludes a person while even one domestic resident wants to admit this very person onto his property, the result is forced exclusion (a phenomenon that does not exist under private property anarchism). Furthermore, if the government admits a person while there is not even one domestic resident who wants to have this person on his property, the result is forced integration (also non-existent under private property anarchism). And Hoppe contends that democratic governments may have especially perverse incentives regarding immigration:
ABSTRACT Jeffrey Friedman has attempted to make a case for limiting state social engineering that... more ABSTRACT Jeffrey Friedman has attempted to make a case for limiting state social engineering that is based on the skeptical epistemology of Sir Karl Popper. But Popper's epistemology is flawed, both in its rejection of a priori theorizing and its insistence on empirical falsification rather than confirmation. Classical liberalism of the sort that Friedman advocates requires, as its basis, positive knowledge of economics and social reality—not Popperian skepticism.
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Nov 1, 2012
This paper argues that the long-standing predominance of a particular approach to science neither... more This paper argues that the long-standing predominance of a particular approach to science neither makes it uniquely scientific nor superior to rival approaches. To do so it examines the dominant scientific explanation of the 17 th and early 18 th centuries: the mechanical philosophy. The mechanical philosophy episode demonstrates the fragility of even the most entrenched scientific wisdoms and provides encouragement for out-of-step scholars everywhere.
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Dec 19, 2007
Max Weber and Ludwig von Mises were two of the 20 th century's foremost theorists of human action... more Max Weber and Ludwig von Mises were two of the 20 th century's foremost theorists of human action. Mises held Weber, his senior by some 17 years, in great esteem and often discussed his theories, even weaving some, such as Weber's model of ideal types, deeply into the fabric of his own social thought. However, at least at first glance, there seems to be a deep rift between the two men's conceptions about the rationality of action. Weber classified "social actions" into several distinct categories, some of which he saw as exhibiting little, if any, rationality. Mises, in contrast, held that all action is rational by conceptual necessity. Various writers have taken their views to be obviously incompatible, among them, Mises himself. This article suggests that the appearance of a conflict is produced by the failure to discern that Weber and Mises were addressing different sorts of questions and constructing frameworks to support different modes of analyzing social phenomena. I contend that, if that divergence of aim is properly understood, then the apparent contradiction will be seen as illusory. I
Mention "free market advocate" or "defender of private property rights" and the name Ronald Coase... more Mention "free market advocate" or "defender of private property rights" and the name Ronald Coase is certain to be included in the top ten list of virtually all cognoscenti of such matters. Nor can it be denied that there are numerous good and sufficient reasons for this assessment. Nevertheless, it is the contention of the present paper that this characterization is unjustified with respect to his most famous publication on social costs. Here, in sharp contrast to most of his otherwork, we argue that Coase is better interpreted in the very opposite manner: as an intellectual enemy of free enterprise and capitalism.
Roger Congleton's book is an extended examination of the rise of parliamentary democracy, in 'the... more Roger Congleton's book is an extended examination of the rise of parliamentary democracy, in 'the West' and in Japan, over the past two centuries. His study leads him to conclude that liberal democracy, where it has taken hold successfully, has done so through a process of gradual reform, rather than revolution. He devises some interesting models to show why we might expect to see this, and looks at a wealth of historical evidence illustrating his thesis. The vast scope of Congleton's work makes this a daunting book to review, as contained within it are his models of constitutional reform, his case studies of the constitutional history of six different polities (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Japan and the United States), and his methodological musings on the place of his project within the human sciences. By necessity, this review must give some parts short shrift. However, even a reviewer, such as the present one, who is skeptical about the value of particular parts Congleton's project must applaud both the ambitiousness of his project and the wealth of research that has been poured into it. A number of interesting historical conjectures are contained in this book; for example, Congleton makes the interesting case that European imperialism, which was one of the factors driving the transition from the Medieval world to the Modern, was a kind of prisoner's dilemma: Each nation would have been better off never embarking on empire building, as expenses typically outran the revenues available from empire, but, given that its neighbors were going to embark on an imperialist course, it had better do so as well, lest it come to be dominated by them. This reviewer is not sure that analysis is correct, but it is certainly worth considering. In any case, the continuing need for royal revenue to support empire-building kept driving monarchs back to their parliaments to ask for funds, and each time they did so, the parliaments grew stronger. Congleton also highlights the link, previously noted, of course, by Marx, between the new production technologies and new political forms: The new economies of scale in farming, textiles, mining, and metal working could not always be realized within the existing late-medieval legal systems. Medieval rules and regulations included a wide variety of internal and external
ABSTRACT Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. M... more ABSTRACT Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.
Block and Callahan permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not p... more Block and Callahan permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not physically damage the property owned by others. With respect to other territories, the property title may be more or less severely restricted. As is currently the case in some housing developments, the owner may be bound by contractual limitations on what he can do with his property (voluntary zoning), which might include residential vs. commercial use, no buildings more than four stories high, no sale or rent to Jews, Germans, Catholics, homosexuals, Haitians, families with or without children, or smokers, for example. Clearly, under this scenario there exists no such thing as freedom of immigration. Rather, there exists the freedom of many independent private property owners to admit or exclude others from their own property in accordance with their own unrestricted or restricted property titles. Admission to some territories might be easy, while to others it might be nearly impossible. In any case, however, admission to the property of the admitting person does not imply a "freedom to move around," unless other property owners consent to such movements. There will be as much immigration or non-immigration, inclusivity or exclusivity, desegregation or segregation, non-discrimination or discrimination based on racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural or whatever other grounds as individual owners or associations of individual owners allow. Hoppe then examines our current situation, where various states assert control over all of the land on earth: Ln an anarcho-capitalist society there is no government and, accordingly, no clear-cut distinction between inlanders (domestic citizens) and foreigners. This distinction comes into existence only with the establishment of a government, i.e., an institution which possesses a territorial monopoly of aggression (taxation). The territory over which a government's taxing power extends becomes "inland," and everyone residing outside of this temtory becomes a foreigner. [The existence of sltate borders. .. implies a twofold distortion with respect to peoples' natural inclination to associate with others. First, inlanders cannot exclude the government (the taxman) from their own property, but are subject to what one might call "forced integration" by government agents. Second, in order to be able to intrude on its subjects' private property so as to tax them, a government must invariably take control of existing roads, and it will employ its tax revenue to produce even more roads to gain even better access to all private property, as a potential tax source. Thus, this overproduction of roads. .. involves forced domestic integration (artificial desegregation of separate localities). Moreover, with the establishment of a government and state borders, immigration takes on an entirely new meaning. Immigration becomes immigration by foreigners across state borders, and the decision as to whether or not a person should be admitted no longer rests with private property owners or associations of such owners but with the government as the ultimate sovereign of all domestic residents and the ultimate super-owner of all their properties. Now, if the government excludes a person while even one domestic resident wants to admit this very person onto his property, the result is forced exclusion (a phenomenon that does not exist under private property anarchism). Furthermore, if the government admits a person while there is not even one domestic resident who wants to have this person on his property, the result is forced integration (also non-existent under private property anarchism). And Hoppe contends that democratic governments may have especially perverse incentives regarding immigration:
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