Papers by Allannah Furlong
Revue Francaise De Psychanalyse, 2010
The author suggests that lovesickness incorporates a particular mnemic trace or « humiliation » i... more The author suggests that lovesickness incorporates a particular mnemic trace or « humiliation » imprinted on the psyche –soma, a residue of the fantasy generated by the primal scene. The lover’s ecstasy or subjugation thus relates to an object that evokes both the original injury to self-esteem and the possibility of its healing. Before this former deadlock sets in, these patients are confronted with a stage of non-mediatised thing-representation. This explains the unusual temporality of the lover’s giddiness, which results from the failure of the perceptual apparatus to escape adequately from a massive stimulatory influx. Does the tormenting effect of any trauma not ensue from the fact that the ego is not only delivered to the onslaughts of disturbing cognitive « representations » but also attacked from inside by their drive-producing residues that continue to « activate » the infantile state of internal emergency? It is this memory that goes to constitute the drive.
Il s'agit, dans ce texte, de se referer a des concepts psychanalytiques pour evaluer les dema... more Il s'agit, dans ce texte, de se referer a des concepts psychanalytiques pour evaluer les demandes d'information de tiers (tiers payants, tribunaux et agents de la securite publique.). Definir la confidentialite comme une promesse de « ne Jamais rien devoiler » a l'exterieur de la relation revient a ne pas tenir compte de l'incidence de l'ecoute de tiers sur la liberte de pensee et de parole de l'analyste et de l'analysant. La decision de divulguer ou non certains elements du travail analytique repose sur le critere essentiel de l'utilite de la divulgation pour l'analyse. Nous proposons aux fins de discussion un enonce de principes sur la confidentialite a l'egard des tiers qui relevent de la theorie et de la clinique psychanalytique plutot que des codes deontologiques d'autres disciplines ou d'un contexte juridico-social donne.
Page 1. Confidential Relationships Psychoanalytic, Ethical, and Legal Contexts Christine M. Kogge... more Page 1. Confidential Relationships Psychoanalytic, Ethical, and Legal Contexts Christine M. Koggel Allannah Furlong Charles Levin Page 2. Page 3. CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS Psychoanalytic, Ethical, and Legal Contexts YNNS-TT4-KKJO Page 4. ...
Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1975
Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), Actual-Self, Ideal-Self, and Self-Ideal Discrepancy results from 13... more Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), Actual-Self, Ideal-Self, and Self-Ideal Discrepancy results from 134 first-year female nursing students were studied by the multivariate methods of factor analysis and multiple regression. Ideal-Self was less variant than Actual-Self, and correlated significantly with it. Factorial compositions of the three self-conceptual indices uncovered three overlapping factors: a tension-steadiness-worry factor, a well-being factor, and superficial social assets factor. The correlation of MAS with the discrepancy scores was overwhelmingly due to its relationship to Actual-Self, since it was only scarcely related to Ideal-Self, MAS was mainly associated with traits loading on the tension factor and secondarily with the well-being factor. Traits touching upon intellectual efficiency, physical attractiveness, and methodicalness were unrelated to MAS.
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association
The moment is opportune for a renewed look at what we understand about patient consent to treatme... more The moment is opportune for a renewed look at what we understand about patient consent to treatment. Until recently, little reference to informed consent could be found in the literature, as though it has never been a preoccupation for psychoanalytic practitioners. Yet several post-Freudian authors offer reasons to suppose the risk of misunderstandings about consent. In fact, the very discovery of transference, replete with unrequited infantile wishes, implies that at some level, at some moment, in every psychoanalytic treatment there will be moments when “consent” will to some extent vacillate. A distinction, justifiable on etymological and intersubjective grounds, is made between patients’ consent as a cognitive, somewhat passive, acceptance and patients’ assent as an arduous, conflicted, partial disagreement with the symbolically limiting details of analytic work. It is in the discovery and working through of unexpected unconscious responses to aspects of the analytic setting and...
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 00221325 1975 10533953, Sep 4, 2012
Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), Actual-Self, Ideal-Self, and Self-Ideal Discrepancy results from 13... more Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), Actual-Self, Ideal-Self, and Self-Ideal Discrepancy results from 134 first-year female nursing students were studied by the multivariate methods of factor analysis and multiple regression. Ideal-Self was less variant than Actual-Self, and correlated significantly with it. Factorial compositions of the three self-conceptual indices uncovered three overlapping factors: a tension-steadiness-worry factor, a well-being factor, and superficial social assets factor. The correlation of MAS with the discrepancy scores was overwhelmingly due to its relationship to Actual-Self, since it was only scarcely related to Ideal-Self, MAS was mainly associated with traits loading on the tension factor and secondarily with the well-being factor. Traits touching upon intellectual efficiency, physical attractiveness, and methodicalness were unrelated to MAS.
Canadian journal of psychiatry. Revue canadienne de psychiatrie, 1998
To encourage mental health professionals concerned about the practice of psychotherapy to add the... more To encourage mental health professionals concerned about the practice of psychotherapy to add their voices to the legal debate on disclosure. Analysis of recent court decisions, in particular 2 Supreme Court of Canada judgements, R. v. O'Connor and R. v. Carosella, and 1 United States Supreme Court judgement, Jaffee v. Redmond. The lack of a common definition of psychotherapy may, in part, have made it awkward for mental health professionals to mount a concerted defence of psychotherapy dossiers. Unless mental health professionals develop a more robust justification and delimitation for privilege, in Canadian courts possible relevance of clinical material is likely to override concern for the patient's privacy interest. Future research might evaluate the impact of loss of privilege upon different types of psychotherapy.
The International journal of psycho-analysis, 1992
Although Freud (1913b) originally proposed the 'principle of leasing a definite hour', th... more Although Freud (1913b) originally proposed the 'principle of leasing a definite hour', there are many proponents of a more 'lenient' fee policy. The author critically examines some of the arguments put forward by the latter writers and argues that the missed session risks degrading into a 'missing' session if a financial marker does not remain in the patient's vacated place. The conflict mobilized in both partners to the therapeutic relationship by the missed session is best left open for analytic exploration rather than solved by a 'rational' and 'flexible' fee arrangement. The author suggests ways of theorizing, and eventually interpreting, the 'breach' in the relationship in terms of the absent, decentred subject, the Desire of the Other, the inherent contingency of our most primitive identifications, and the ineluctable violence and alienation of human interdependency. The 'rule of indenture' is seen in closer affinity ...
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 2005
It is assumed that confidentiality is not one singular ethical entity but a conglomerate of quite... more It is assumed that confidentiality is not one singular ethical entity but a conglomerate of quite different issues depending upon clinical context and the sector of information sharing at stake. The focus here is on how to think psychoanalytically about requests for information from third parties (payers, courts, public security). Defining confidentiality as a promise to 'never tell anything' outside of the relationship omits evaluation of the impact of the third's listening on the combined freedom of thought and freedom of speech in analyst and analysand. Circulation of information outside the dyad need not be toxic, need not disrupt the analytic couple's openness to new meaning. Key to contamination and inhibition of analytic work is whether or not disclosure serves an analytic end. Current defense of confidentiality relies heavily on the models of protection of privacy and professional secrecy, which, though useful and relevant, fail to encompass the transitional, intersubjective space engendered by the analytic process. Suggestions are made for alternate sources of paradigms better suited to represent the latter. Offered for discussion is a draft of a confidentiality policy with respect to third parties that is informed by psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice rather than by local legal jurisdiction or original disciplines' ethics codes.
Book Reviews necessarily a straightforward process nor does it necessarily provide an accurate de... more Book Reviews necessarily a straightforward process nor does it necessarily provide an accurate description of events in the past. The interaction of the history of trauma, symptoms, and the relationship of the patient with the therapist is complicated, dynamic, and changing and cannot be formula-driven. Furthermore, talking about trauma does not usually relieve symptoms, and on occasion, may exacerbate them. The author's treatment approach is hardly innovative and advocates supportive company, bibliotherapy, cessation of smoking, regular exercise, recovery from chemical dependence, sleep restriction, morning light, and spirituality, in addition to individual and group therapy. One is struck by the similarity to substance abuse programs in which something is done to or recommended to be done to or for the patient. The diagnostic omissions are striking. Never mentioned are current stresses, job losses, marital conflicts, psychotic disorder, family history of affective disorder, severe and current traumas such as rape, violence and harassment, all of which are extremely relevant and usually bring the patient to treatment. As an addictionologist, the author uses simplified formula such as in a recovery program. There is an implied denial of psychiatric evaluation and treatment. Nowhere does he recommend seeking a psychiatrist, the person best trained to recognize complex biological, psychological and sociological factors and place them in a meaningful formulation and treatment decision. Instead he advises seeking a licensed, qualified clinician. If I were a potential patient to whom this book is directed, what would I think of it? I might feel that someone finally understands me. I might feel that my therapist missed my trauma history, even if I couldn't remember it. I might feel that the antidepressant medicines I've been taking were not helpful and may be harmful, even if they greatly reduced my symptoms. (Interestingly, there are other medicines, such as adenergic agents which control symptoms of PTSD of which the author seems unaware.) I might avoid ECT, in spite of suicidal thoughts driven by delusions or hallucinations. The oversimplicity, partial truths, distortions and omissions of this book do not support its title, The Truth about Depression. Instead, they support the author's theories which are clearly incomplete.
Résumé:
Disons que depuis son origine, on estime que la psychanalyse a pour principale visée de d... more Résumé:
Disons que depuis son origine, on estime que la psychanalyse a pour principale visée de déchiffrer le « sens » que recèle le trouble mental, là où il y avait discontinuité et manque de sens. Pourtant, comme on le sait, Freud s’est très tôt rendu compte d’un paradoxe : souvent ses patients ne se plaignaient aucunement de ne pas se comprendre. Au contraire, il lui arrivait de se trouver devant un « mur » de sens sans faille. Donc, la fameuse « quête de sens » inhérente à la fonction psychanalytique doit être relativisée. Cet article vise non pas une violence comportementale mais une violence psychique, celle de l’hégémonie du sens. Il s’agit de la plus ou moins douce « violence » d’interprétation que pourraient véhiculer les nouveaux paradigmes de la psychiatrie moderne en refoulant ou en niant l’apport au savoir de la psychanalyse. Ces paradigmes attribuent aux faits objectivables et empiriquement observables une réalité et une causalité première, sinon exclusive. La psyché est dépeinte comme une expression passive de la biologie. Dans le même mouvement, ces nouvelles ‘interprétations’ scientifiques font l’économie de l’examen contre-transférentiel. La contribution du « sens » relationnel à l’évolution psychique est soit minimisée comme un placebo, soit tout simplement évacuée.
Pourquoi s’accrocher à la vue des ‘faits’ et abandonner la pensée et ses acquisitions psychanalytiques? La recherche frénétique d’un « roc » à la base du vécu psychologique révèle à la fois le besoin désespéré de « convaincre » l’autre et la fragilité fondamentale de la capacité du moi de fonctionner sans mise en miroir. Si l’autre ne « voit » pas la réalité psychique si apparente au psychanalyste, ce dernier est-il aussi vulnérable au doute que tout autre sujet, dans sa détermination à défendre ses perceptions face à une réalité extérieure qui les réfute?
« Nous avons tous besoin d'un lieu où nous cacher, un lieu où garder au secret ces souvenirs , pe... more « Nous avons tous besoin d'un lieu où nous cacher, un lieu où garder au secret ces souvenirs , pensées, impulsions, espoirs et rêves qui font partie de notre vie mais que nous ne pouvons intégrer ni réaliser, tout en craignant de nous en délester. Pour certains, ce lieu est physique, pour d'autres, il est psychique, et pour quelques-uns, il n'est ni l'un ni l'autre. Comme la mémoire que nous chérissons, il nous est difficile de l'abandonner » (Livret de la bande musicale de 2046). « C'est un amour inconcevable, disait la patiente étendue sur le divan, et pourtant tout aussi impossible à abandonner. C'est comme si j'étais suspendue à un couteau planté dans mon coeur, et que je me débattais dans ma douleur sans pouvoir y mettre fin. C'est sans issue : je ne peux même pas hurler ni laisser couler mes larmes, sauf devant vous. Je voudrais mourir et emporter avec moi ce secret et la douleur qu'il me cause. »
Confidentiality with respect to third parties: A psychoanalytic view Allannah Furlong It is assum... more Confidentiality with respect to third parties: A psychoanalytic view Allannah Furlong It is assumed that confidentiality is not one singular ethical entity but a conglomerate of quite different issues depending upon clinical context and the sector of information sharing at stake. The focus here is on how to think psychoanalytically about requests for information from third parties (payers, courts, public security). Defining confidentiality as a promise to 'never tell anything' outside of the relationship omits evaluation of the impact of the third's listening on the combined freedom of thought and freedom of speech in analyst and analysand. Circulation of information outside the dyad need not be toxic, need not disrupt the analytic couple's openness to new meaning. Key to contamination and inhibition of analytic work is whether or not disclosure serves an analytic end. Current defense of confidentiality relies heavily on the models of protection of privacy and professional secrecy, which, though useful and relevant, fail to encompass the transitional, intersubjective space engendered by the analytic process. Suggestions are made for alternate sources of paradigms better suited to represent the latter. Offered for discussion is a draft of a confidentiality policy with respect to third parties that is informed by psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice rather than by local legal jurisdiction or original disciplines' ethics codes.
In a series of papers over the past clecacle, Allannah Furlong has examined some of the technical... more In a series of papers over the past clecacle, Allannah Furlong has examined some of the technical stresses inherent in the classical psyclroanalytic frarne ancl tlreir clinical and ethical implications. Here she cliscusses confidentiality as a beleaguered aspect of the analytic frarne, In the early 1990s, the legal fallout from the recovered-rnemory clebate brought sharply into lbcus the dubious probative value of using in court "evidence" fi'om tlre psychothelapeutic process. Defendants in sexual-assault trials began seeking access to the personal files of cornplainants, Bioethicalconceptions of infolmed consent threatened to l>ecome the standard for all professional work. As a result, the psychoanalytic frame was placed at risk of distortion and collapse. In this chapter; Furlong reasons from the insicle out tlre clinical and theoretical lbundation fr:r confidentiality as it is actually practiced in the psychoanalytic situation, the bettel to distinguisl'r the specific implications for clinical work of sharing it with colleagues ancl with tlrircl parties. 39
The International journal of psycho-analysis, 1998
In this paper, reservations are expressed about two deviations from analytic neutrality: when the... more In this paper, reservations are expressed about two deviations from analytic neutrality: when the analyst seeks the patient's permission for publication or presentation of clinical material and when the analyst allows the patient access to the dossier under access-of-information legislation. In the first case, concern centres mainly on the entanglement of the patient in the therapist's sanctioned version of their work, an entanglement that might inhibit future revisions of the patient's self-understanding. In the second case, the analytic mental space, symbolised by the dossier, is viewed as neither uniquely the analyst's nor the patient's, a complex dialectical chamber the privacy of which must be respected, even by the patient whose discourse contributes to it, in order for it to function effectively. Transparency and accountability in the analytic context reveal a paradox that is not exclusive to it: the possibility of full disclosure runs counter to the expre...
The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1975
Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), Actual-Self, Ideal-Self, and Self-Ideal Discrepancy results from 13... more Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), Actual-Self, Ideal-Self, and Self-Ideal Discrepancy results from 134 first-year female nursing students were studied by the multivariate methods of factor analysis and multiple regression. Ideal-Self was less variant than Actual-Self, and correlated significantly with it. Factorial compositions of the three self-conceptual indices uncovered three overlapping factors: a tension-steadiness-worry factor, a well-being factor, and superficial social assets factor. The correlation of MAS with the discrepancy scores was overwhelmingly due to its relationship to Actual-Self, since it was only scarcely related to Ideal-Self, MAS was mainly associated with traits loading on the tension factor and secondarily with the well-being factor. Traits touching upon intellectual efficiency, physical attractiveness, and methodicalness were unrelated to MAS.
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Papers by Allannah Furlong
Disons que depuis son origine, on estime que la psychanalyse a pour principale visée de déchiffrer le « sens » que recèle le trouble mental, là où il y avait discontinuité et manque de sens. Pourtant, comme on le sait, Freud s’est très tôt rendu compte d’un paradoxe : souvent ses patients ne se plaignaient aucunement de ne pas se comprendre. Au contraire, il lui arrivait de se trouver devant un « mur » de sens sans faille. Donc, la fameuse « quête de sens » inhérente à la fonction psychanalytique doit être relativisée. Cet article vise non pas une violence comportementale mais une violence psychique, celle de l’hégémonie du sens. Il s’agit de la plus ou moins douce « violence » d’interprétation que pourraient véhiculer les nouveaux paradigmes de la psychiatrie moderne en refoulant ou en niant l’apport au savoir de la psychanalyse. Ces paradigmes attribuent aux faits objectivables et empiriquement observables une réalité et une causalité première, sinon exclusive. La psyché est dépeinte comme une expression passive de la biologie. Dans le même mouvement, ces nouvelles ‘interprétations’ scientifiques font l’économie de l’examen contre-transférentiel. La contribution du « sens » relationnel à l’évolution psychique est soit minimisée comme un placebo, soit tout simplement évacuée.
Pourquoi s’accrocher à la vue des ‘faits’ et abandonner la pensée et ses acquisitions psychanalytiques? La recherche frénétique d’un « roc » à la base du vécu psychologique révèle à la fois le besoin désespéré de « convaincre » l’autre et la fragilité fondamentale de la capacité du moi de fonctionner sans mise en miroir. Si l’autre ne « voit » pas la réalité psychique si apparente au psychanalyste, ce dernier est-il aussi vulnérable au doute que tout autre sujet, dans sa détermination à défendre ses perceptions face à une réalité extérieure qui les réfute?
Disons que depuis son origine, on estime que la psychanalyse a pour principale visée de déchiffrer le « sens » que recèle le trouble mental, là où il y avait discontinuité et manque de sens. Pourtant, comme on le sait, Freud s’est très tôt rendu compte d’un paradoxe : souvent ses patients ne se plaignaient aucunement de ne pas se comprendre. Au contraire, il lui arrivait de se trouver devant un « mur » de sens sans faille. Donc, la fameuse « quête de sens » inhérente à la fonction psychanalytique doit être relativisée. Cet article vise non pas une violence comportementale mais une violence psychique, celle de l’hégémonie du sens. Il s’agit de la plus ou moins douce « violence » d’interprétation que pourraient véhiculer les nouveaux paradigmes de la psychiatrie moderne en refoulant ou en niant l’apport au savoir de la psychanalyse. Ces paradigmes attribuent aux faits objectivables et empiriquement observables une réalité et une causalité première, sinon exclusive. La psyché est dépeinte comme une expression passive de la biologie. Dans le même mouvement, ces nouvelles ‘interprétations’ scientifiques font l’économie de l’examen contre-transférentiel. La contribution du « sens » relationnel à l’évolution psychique est soit minimisée comme un placebo, soit tout simplement évacuée.
Pourquoi s’accrocher à la vue des ‘faits’ et abandonner la pensée et ses acquisitions psychanalytiques? La recherche frénétique d’un « roc » à la base du vécu psychologique révèle à la fois le besoin désespéré de « convaincre » l’autre et la fragilité fondamentale de la capacité du moi de fonctionner sans mise en miroir. Si l’autre ne « voit » pas la réalité psychique si apparente au psychanalyste, ce dernier est-il aussi vulnérable au doute que tout autre sujet, dans sa détermination à défendre ses perceptions face à une réalité extérieure qui les réfute?