Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if ... more Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons (CR): S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn't have if it weren't the case that P. Dretske develops an analysis of knowing that centers on CR, and argues that the requirement undermines skepticism by implying the falsity of closure. We develop a Dretske-style analysis of knowing that incorporates CR, and we argue that this analysis not only accords with closure, but also implies it. In addition, we argue that the analysis accounts for the prima facie plausibility of closure-invoking skeptical arguments, and nonetheless implies that they are fallacious. If our arguments turn out to be sound, the acceptability of Dretske's analysis of knowing will be significantly enhanced by the fact that, despite implying closure, it undermines closure-based skepticism.
Last year Charlotte Shreve and I (Adams and Shreve 2016) presented an argument that synesthesia c... more Last year Charlotte Shreve and I (Adams and Shreve 2016) presented an argument that synesthesia contains evidence against higher order thought theories of consciousness. Rocco Gennaro (2016) took up the challenge and argued that H.O.T. theories like his could handle the example and dismiss the argument. Below we suggest otherwise. We think the traditional versions of H.O.T. theory are still vulnerable to our argument and we maintain that Gennaro's version is as well.
In "Beat the (Backward) Clock," we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu's Backward Clock ... more In "Beat the (Backward) Clock," we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu's Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick's or Fred Dretske's Theories of Knowledge. Williams' reply to our paper, "There's Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke," is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
Wayward causal chains present an obstacle for causal theories of intentional action-as is well kn... more Wayward causal chains present an obstacle for causal theories of intentional action-as is well known. It is not enough that the intention to A cause one's A-ing, it must cause it non-deviantly in order to be intentional A-ing. For without excludin.g deviant causal pathways, many cases which should not be counted as intentional actions would slip through the net and become classified as intentional. S intends to drop the precious vase, but his intention so unnerves him that it causes him to shake, thereby causing him to drop and break the vase. Even if S had changed his mind (which he did not) and ceased to intend to drop the vase, he could not have avoided dropping it. Although the intention to drop the vase is a key player in the etiology of S's vase-breaking, we are not inclined to count it as intentional breaking. Recently, Myles Brand [5] has catalogued two varieties of deviance (waywardness) in causal chains which might prevent an action's being intentional, even if caused by
As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre ... more As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre o agente cognitivo e seu ambiente. Os estados cognitivos de um agente epistêmico fazem o rastreamento da verdade das proposições que são objeto de conhecimento ao embasarem a crença em indicadores confiáveis da verdade (evidência, razões, ou métodos de formação de crença). A novidade nessa abordagem é que se dá pouca ênfase no tipo de justificação epistêmica voltada ao fornecimento de procedimentos de decisão doxástica ou regras de responsabilidade epistêmica. Este artigo oferece um pouco da história das teorias de rastreamento e, então, defende-as contra muitas objeções que se pretendem (equivocadamente) refutadoras dessas teorias. PALAVRAS – CHAVE – Teorias de rastreamento. Nozick. Dretske. Conhecimento. ABSTRACT Tracking theories of knowledge maintain that knowledge is a real relation between cognitive agent and environment. Cognitive states of a knower track the truth of known propos...
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Abstract Connectionist and computationalist theories are contrasted in many ways in the literatur... more Abstract Connectionist and computationalist theories are contrasted in many ways in the literature. Extremely common among these contrasts are distinctions that in various ways involve rules. For example, connectionist models are not supposed to use explicit rules where computationalist models do. Connectionist models are said to use soft rules, or soft constraints, where computationalist models do not. The authors believe that, while the distinctions that have been offered in the literature make sense, they do not serve to ...
Rote, repetitive Type 1 Rehearsal is defined as the continuous maintenance of information in memo... more Rote, repetitive Type 1 Rehearsal is defined as the continuous maintenance of information in memory using the minimum cognitive capacity necessary for maintenance. This definition is operationalized in an incidental paradigm where pairs of words are overtly rehearsed 1, 5, or 10 times (maintained for 1.33 to 13.33 seconds). An analysis of the types of errors made on a forced-choice recognition test supported the hypothesis that acoustic-phonemic components of the memory trace, as opposed to semantic and contextual components , are added or strengthened by this rehearsal process. Furthermore, it was observed that co rehearsed words did not effectively cue one another's recall. These results are discussed in relation to the usefulness of the distinction between Type I and Type II rehearsal. The terms Type I and Type II rehearsal were proposed by Craik and Lockhart (1972) to refer to two theoretically distinct kinds of processing. Type II rehearsal results in deep (semantic) analysis or mnemonic elaboration and is beneficial for long-term performance. Type I rehearsal was characterized as a rote repetition of analyses that have already been completed. This process was supposed to maintain information for immediate performance at a given level of analysis (within a levelof-analysis framework), but not to enhance long-term performance. A similar dichotomy was proposed by Woodward, Bjork, and Jongeward (1973). This article is primarily concerned with the definition of Type I rehearsal, and with the effects of Type I rehearsal on the memory code as measured, primarily, with a recognition procedure. Research on Type I rehearsal has been hampered and roundly criticized (e.g., Nelson, 1977) for lack of an operational definition.
In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams ... more In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counterexample to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.
... Page 8. 330 Frederick Adams and Alfred R. Mele suggested, that licenses the claim that Benny ... more ... Page 8. 330 Frederick Adams and Alfred R. Mele suggested, that licenses the claim that Benny does try. On this latter understanding, trying involves no more effort than do basic actions. The second argument runs as follows. ...
A great deal of attention has been paid in recent years to the functional roles of intentions in ... more A great deal of attention has been paid in recent years to the functional roles of intentions in intentional action. In this paper we sketch and defend a position on this issue while attacking a provocative alternative. Our position has its roots in a cybernetic theory of purposive behavior and is only part of the larger task of understanding all goal-directed behavior. Indeed, a unified model of goal-directed behavior, with appropriate modifications for different types of systems, is a long-range ambition.
Debates concerning the relative merits of programming languages and connectionist networks freque... more Debates concerning the relative merits of programming languages and connectionist networks frequently discuss the role of rules in the different computational devices (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Gasser & Lee, chap. this volume; Morgan & Tienson, 1988, 1990; Lachter & Bever, 1988; Pinker & Prince, 1988; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986a, 1986b). Among the specific questions that arise are
Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counterexamples to... more Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counterexamples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge.1 Here we respond to his two recent claims that we have made mistakes in our reply. We deny both of his claims. A. The Oracle Case: In his original paper, Haze claimed to have invented two counterexamples to tracking theories (though he mainly targeted Nozick). In our reply to Haze, we explained why the examples were neither counterexamples to Nozick nor Dretske. In the first example, person A (Haze) delusionally thinks person B (his neighbor) is an oracle, not a knowledgeable tax lawyer. A dislikes lawyers and would not believe B if A knew B were a lawyer. B tells A "p," a truth about tax law. A believes p but also delusionally believes B is an oracle. Haze argues that A does not know that p because of the delusion. We countered that as long as the delusion does not affect A's ability to understand or believe what B says, and as long as B wouldn't say "p" unless p, that nothing in tracking theories bars A's knowing that p. The delusion does not affect A's coming to know that p.2 With respect to the current interpretation Haze says: Firstly, the assumption that they make is right: in the example as I intended it, the main delusion I have is that my neighbor is not a lawyer but a divine oracle. I was not imagining myself to have delusions concerning the issue of what my neighbour has and has not said to me…. It occurs to me that perhaps this counterexample should have been more fully specified. If we imagine the origin of my belief to have been forgotten by me, so that it becomes mere history, then perhaps I could be said to know that p. But as I am imagining it, the stuff about my neighbor being a divine oracle is fresh in my mind and I think of it with wonder every time I think of p…I do not know what more to say in support of my view here, so I will leave it at that and just hope that you agree with me about this. (Haze, " Reply to Adams and Clarke, " 3) Haze claims that A still does not know that p. W still maintain that he does. Does it matter that A forgot where he acquired his belief that p is true? It could. If someone who did not know that p told him, it would matter. But B knows that p. In the "fully specified" emendation Haze insists that A remembers it was B who said "p" each time A believes that p. We still do not see why that matters, as long as the delusion is not affecting A's ability to think clearly about the meanings of tax law p and as long as B knows tax law and is not being deceptive in any way. As far as we can tell A is tracking the truth about p and knows that p. Haze seems to be throwing himself on the court of public opinion. Okay, good. We have presented these ideas at several venues over the past year and everyone so far as agreed with us. B. The Nutt Case: Now lets consider Haze's claim that we make a second mistake in our reply to him. Let's call the neighbor in the example 'Norman Nutt.' Haze's second example is this: My neighbor is a tax lawyer. Here, unlike in the previous counterexample, I have no delusional belief. It is my neighbor who is the strange one: for years, he has intently nurtured an eccentric plan to get me to believe the truth about whether p, where p is a true proposition of tax law, along with five false propositions about tax law. His intention to do this is very counterfactually robust. He moves in next door 1 Tristan Haze, " Reply to Adams and Clarke, " Logos and Episteme, Volume VII, Number 2 (2016):. 2 We also considered a case where the delusion spreads and does affect A's belief and does block knowledge, but Haze does not reply to that interpretation.
Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that hu... more Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, the mind is still in the head.
Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if ... more Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons (CR): S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn't have if it weren't the case that P. Dretske develops an analysis of knowing that centers on CR, and argues that the requirement undermines skepticism by implying the falsity of closure. We develop a Dretske-style analysis of knowing that incorporates CR, and we argue that this analysis not only accords with closure, but also implies it. In addition, we argue that the analysis accounts for the prima facie plausibility of closure-invoking skeptical arguments, and nonetheless implies that they are fallacious. If our arguments turn out to be sound, the acceptability of Dretske's analysis of knowing will be significantly enhanced by the fact that, despite implying closure, it undermines closure-based skepticism.
Last year Charlotte Shreve and I (Adams and Shreve 2016) presented an argument that synesthesia c... more Last year Charlotte Shreve and I (Adams and Shreve 2016) presented an argument that synesthesia contains evidence against higher order thought theories of consciousness. Rocco Gennaro (2016) took up the challenge and argued that H.O.T. theories like his could handle the example and dismiss the argument. Below we suggest otherwise. We think the traditional versions of H.O.T. theory are still vulnerable to our argument and we maintain that Gennaro's version is as well.
In "Beat the (Backward) Clock," we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu's Backward Clock ... more In "Beat the (Backward) Clock," we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu's Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick's or Fred Dretske's Theories of Knowledge. Williams' reply to our paper, "There's Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke," is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
Wayward causal chains present an obstacle for causal theories of intentional action-as is well kn... more Wayward causal chains present an obstacle for causal theories of intentional action-as is well known. It is not enough that the intention to A cause one's A-ing, it must cause it non-deviantly in order to be intentional A-ing. For without excludin.g deviant causal pathways, many cases which should not be counted as intentional actions would slip through the net and become classified as intentional. S intends to drop the precious vase, but his intention so unnerves him that it causes him to shake, thereby causing him to drop and break the vase. Even if S had changed his mind (which he did not) and ceased to intend to drop the vase, he could not have avoided dropping it. Although the intention to drop the vase is a key player in the etiology of S's vase-breaking, we are not inclined to count it as intentional breaking. Recently, Myles Brand [5] has catalogued two varieties of deviance (waywardness) in causal chains which might prevent an action's being intentional, even if caused by
As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre ... more As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre o agente cognitivo e seu ambiente. Os estados cognitivos de um agente epistêmico fazem o rastreamento da verdade das proposições que são objeto de conhecimento ao embasarem a crença em indicadores confiáveis da verdade (evidência, razões, ou métodos de formação de crença). A novidade nessa abordagem é que se dá pouca ênfase no tipo de justificação epistêmica voltada ao fornecimento de procedimentos de decisão doxástica ou regras de responsabilidade epistêmica. Este artigo oferece um pouco da história das teorias de rastreamento e, então, defende-as contra muitas objeções que se pretendem (equivocadamente) refutadoras dessas teorias. PALAVRAS – CHAVE – Teorias de rastreamento. Nozick. Dretske. Conhecimento. ABSTRACT Tracking theories of knowledge maintain that knowledge is a real relation between cognitive agent and environment. Cognitive states of a knower track the truth of known propos...
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Abstract Connectionist and computationalist theories are contrasted in many ways in the literatur... more Abstract Connectionist and computationalist theories are contrasted in many ways in the literature. Extremely common among these contrasts are distinctions that in various ways involve rules. For example, connectionist models are not supposed to use explicit rules where computationalist models do. Connectionist models are said to use soft rules, or soft constraints, where computationalist models do not. The authors believe that, while the distinctions that have been offered in the literature make sense, they do not serve to ...
Rote, repetitive Type 1 Rehearsal is defined as the continuous maintenance of information in memo... more Rote, repetitive Type 1 Rehearsal is defined as the continuous maintenance of information in memory using the minimum cognitive capacity necessary for maintenance. This definition is operationalized in an incidental paradigm where pairs of words are overtly rehearsed 1, 5, or 10 times (maintained for 1.33 to 13.33 seconds). An analysis of the types of errors made on a forced-choice recognition test supported the hypothesis that acoustic-phonemic components of the memory trace, as opposed to semantic and contextual components , are added or strengthened by this rehearsal process. Furthermore, it was observed that co rehearsed words did not effectively cue one another's recall. These results are discussed in relation to the usefulness of the distinction between Type I and Type II rehearsal. The terms Type I and Type II rehearsal were proposed by Craik and Lockhart (1972) to refer to two theoretically distinct kinds of processing. Type II rehearsal results in deep (semantic) analysis or mnemonic elaboration and is beneficial for long-term performance. Type I rehearsal was characterized as a rote repetition of analyses that have already been completed. This process was supposed to maintain information for immediate performance at a given level of analysis (within a levelof-analysis framework), but not to enhance long-term performance. A similar dichotomy was proposed by Woodward, Bjork, and Jongeward (1973). This article is primarily concerned with the definition of Type I rehearsal, and with the effects of Type I rehearsal on the memory code as measured, primarily, with a recognition procedure. Research on Type I rehearsal has been hampered and roundly criticized (e.g., Nelson, 1977) for lack of an operational definition.
In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams ... more In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counterexample to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.
... Page 8. 330 Frederick Adams and Alfred R. Mele suggested, that licenses the claim that Benny ... more ... Page 8. 330 Frederick Adams and Alfred R. Mele suggested, that licenses the claim that Benny does try. On this latter understanding, trying involves no more effort than do basic actions. The second argument runs as follows. ...
A great deal of attention has been paid in recent years to the functional roles of intentions in ... more A great deal of attention has been paid in recent years to the functional roles of intentions in intentional action. In this paper we sketch and defend a position on this issue while attacking a provocative alternative. Our position has its roots in a cybernetic theory of purposive behavior and is only part of the larger task of understanding all goal-directed behavior. Indeed, a unified model of goal-directed behavior, with appropriate modifications for different types of systems, is a long-range ambition.
Debates concerning the relative merits of programming languages and connectionist networks freque... more Debates concerning the relative merits of programming languages and connectionist networks frequently discuss the role of rules in the different computational devices (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Gasser & Lee, chap. this volume; Morgan & Tienson, 1988, 1990; Lachter & Bever, 1988; Pinker & Prince, 1988; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986a, 1986b). Among the specific questions that arise are
Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counterexamples to... more Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counterexamples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge.1 Here we respond to his two recent claims that we have made mistakes in our reply. We deny both of his claims. A. The Oracle Case: In his original paper, Haze claimed to have invented two counterexamples to tracking theories (though he mainly targeted Nozick). In our reply to Haze, we explained why the examples were neither counterexamples to Nozick nor Dretske. In the first example, person A (Haze) delusionally thinks person B (his neighbor) is an oracle, not a knowledgeable tax lawyer. A dislikes lawyers and would not believe B if A knew B were a lawyer. B tells A "p," a truth about tax law. A believes p but also delusionally believes B is an oracle. Haze argues that A does not know that p because of the delusion. We countered that as long as the delusion does not affect A's ability to understand or believe what B says, and as long as B wouldn't say "p" unless p, that nothing in tracking theories bars A's knowing that p. The delusion does not affect A's coming to know that p.2 With respect to the current interpretation Haze says: Firstly, the assumption that they make is right: in the example as I intended it, the main delusion I have is that my neighbor is not a lawyer but a divine oracle. I was not imagining myself to have delusions concerning the issue of what my neighbour has and has not said to me…. It occurs to me that perhaps this counterexample should have been more fully specified. If we imagine the origin of my belief to have been forgotten by me, so that it becomes mere history, then perhaps I could be said to know that p. But as I am imagining it, the stuff about my neighbor being a divine oracle is fresh in my mind and I think of it with wonder every time I think of p…I do not know what more to say in support of my view here, so I will leave it at that and just hope that you agree with me about this. (Haze, " Reply to Adams and Clarke, " 3) Haze claims that A still does not know that p. W still maintain that he does. Does it matter that A forgot where he acquired his belief that p is true? It could. If someone who did not know that p told him, it would matter. But B knows that p. In the "fully specified" emendation Haze insists that A remembers it was B who said "p" each time A believes that p. We still do not see why that matters, as long as the delusion is not affecting A's ability to think clearly about the meanings of tax law p and as long as B knows tax law and is not being deceptive in any way. As far as we can tell A is tracking the truth about p and knows that p. Haze seems to be throwing himself on the court of public opinion. Okay, good. We have presented these ideas at several venues over the past year and everyone so far as agreed with us. B. The Nutt Case: Now lets consider Haze's claim that we make a second mistake in our reply to him. Let's call the neighbor in the example 'Norman Nutt.' Haze's second example is this: My neighbor is a tax lawyer. Here, unlike in the previous counterexample, I have no delusional belief. It is my neighbor who is the strange one: for years, he has intently nurtured an eccentric plan to get me to believe the truth about whether p, where p is a true proposition of tax law, along with five false propositions about tax law. His intention to do this is very counterfactually robust. He moves in next door 1 Tristan Haze, " Reply to Adams and Clarke, " Logos and Episteme, Volume VII, Number 2 (2016):. 2 We also considered a case where the delusion spreads and does affect A's belief and does block knowledge, but Haze does not reply to that interpretation.
Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that hu... more Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, the mind is still in the head.
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