Myth and Argument in Plato’s Phaedrus, Republic, and Phaedo investigates the role played by escha... more Myth and Argument in Plato’s Phaedrus, Republic, and Phaedo investigates the role played by eschatological myth in the arguments of Plato’s Phaedrus, Republic and Phaedo. It argues that a reconsideration of the agenda followed by Socrates in each of these dialogues brings into view the contribution made by the mythological narrative to their argumentative line. Each of the three chapters of my thesis analyses the nature of this contribution. The first chapter argues that the myth occupying the central pages of the Phaedrus contributes to developing one of the themes addressed in the dialogue, namely a link between the divine realm and the activities thought by Phaedrus to be unrelated to the religious sphere. By showing that Eros fosters imitation of the gods, the palinode makes an important contribution to this topic. The second chapter proposes that the myth of Er and passage 608c2-621d3 in which it is included are an essential part of the line of argument of the Republic. I analyse the aims Socrates sets in Book 2 for his investigation into justice, and show that they include the description of the positive consequences of justice along with the benefits it causes in and by itself. By listing the rewards just people will receive from other people and the gods, passage 608c2-621d3 gives a description of the positive consequences of justice. The third chapter argues that the argumentative line followed in the Phaedo finds its culmination in the eschatological myth. Socrates expresses a hope for post-mortem justice in his defence of the philosophical life. To render it plausible to his interlocutors he needs to show that the soul is both immortal and intrinsically intelligent. After vindicating these notions, Socrates presents in the concluding myth the image of an afterlife governed by ethical principles
logos. They hold the agents responsible for their actions and for subjecting to passions and reje... more logos. They hold the agents responsible for their actions and for subjecting to passions and rejecting the reason voluntarily: thus Medea, who yields to her insanity, is solely responsible for her crime. Stoic monism prohibits division between the order of desire and the order of reason, where boulèsis secures the transition between the two in Plato and Aristotle. However, the notion of boulèsis is present in Stoicism as voluntas, where the Latinisation of the term creates additional difficulties (pp. 357–410). Boulèsis is considered a reasonable inclination to act, which, in its most restrictive version (in Cicero), is attributed to the sage only. Revisiting the Socratic tradition, M.-L. concludes that the Stoics’ rational monism, due to their unique theory of passion, weakens moral intellectualism (p. 316). One issue to which I would like to draw attention is that M.-L. considers economising the concept of the will suggesting that ‘the weakness of the will’ does not have any proper motivation or value. According to M.-L., the Greeks should help resolve the question without unnecessarily introducing this ‘psychic double’, or the will, the concept arguably ‘more postulated than actually found or demonstrated’ (pp. 10–13). These bold claims are made in the introduction only. I would like to see M.-L. return to them and explain how ancient intellectualism can solve the specific problems raised by Davidson, Frankfurt and Elster mentioned in the beginning of the book, especially provided that, as M.-L. correctly notices, the Greeks considered evil differently from the modern perspective (p. 17). The monograph is a welcome addition to the discussion of problems in ancient moral philosophy, and will be of interest to both specialists in ancient ethics and modern moral philosophers, who might find it challenging to reconsider the questions of moral freedom and psychic conflicts, without necessarily positing a faculty of the will.
This paper argues that the dialogical dynamic gives important information on the importance of, a... more This paper argues that the dialogical dynamic gives important information on the importance of, and the hierarchy between, the reasons illustrated in favour of justice in Plato's Republic. Despite his interlocutors' request to focus exclusively on the effect of justice in and by itself, Socrates indicates that the description of the consequences of justice included in Book 10 (608c2-621d3) is an integral part of his defence, and that some of these consequences, the rewards assigned by the gods in the afterlife, are more important than both the other consequences of justice and the benefit of justice in and by itself.
Myth and Argument in Plato’s Phaedrus, Republic, and Phaedo investigates the role played by escha... more Myth and Argument in Plato’s Phaedrus, Republic, and Phaedo investigates the role played by eschatological myth in the arguments of Plato’s Phaedrus, Republic and Phaedo. It argues that a reconsideration of the agenda followed by Socrates in each of these dialogues brings into view the contribution made by the mythological narrative to their argumentative line. Each of the three chapters of my thesis analyses the nature of this contribution. The first chapter argues that the myth occupying the central pages of the Phaedrus contributes to developing one of the themes addressed in the dialogue, namely a link between the divine realm and the activities thought by Phaedrus to be unrelated to the religious sphere. By showing that Eros fosters imitation of the gods, the palinode makes an important contribution to this topic. The second chapter proposes that the myth of Er and passage 608c2-621d3 in which it is included are an essential part of the line of argument of the Republic. I analyse the aims Socrates sets in Book 2 for his investigation into justice, and show that they include the description of the positive consequences of justice along with the benefits it causes in and by itself. By listing the rewards just people will receive from other people and the gods, passage 608c2-621d3 gives a description of the positive consequences of justice. The third chapter argues that the argumentative line followed in the Phaedo finds its culmination in the eschatological myth. Socrates expresses a hope for post-mortem justice in his defence of the philosophical life. To render it plausible to his interlocutors he needs to show that the soul is both immortal and intrinsically intelligent. After vindicating these notions, Socrates presents in the concluding myth the image of an afterlife governed by ethical principles
logos. They hold the agents responsible for their actions and for subjecting to passions and reje... more logos. They hold the agents responsible for their actions and for subjecting to passions and rejecting the reason voluntarily: thus Medea, who yields to her insanity, is solely responsible for her crime. Stoic monism prohibits division between the order of desire and the order of reason, where boulèsis secures the transition between the two in Plato and Aristotle. However, the notion of boulèsis is present in Stoicism as voluntas, where the Latinisation of the term creates additional difficulties (pp. 357–410). Boulèsis is considered a reasonable inclination to act, which, in its most restrictive version (in Cicero), is attributed to the sage only. Revisiting the Socratic tradition, M.-L. concludes that the Stoics’ rational monism, due to their unique theory of passion, weakens moral intellectualism (p. 316). One issue to which I would like to draw attention is that M.-L. considers economising the concept of the will suggesting that ‘the weakness of the will’ does not have any proper motivation or value. According to M.-L., the Greeks should help resolve the question without unnecessarily introducing this ‘psychic double’, or the will, the concept arguably ‘more postulated than actually found or demonstrated’ (pp. 10–13). These bold claims are made in the introduction only. I would like to see M.-L. return to them and explain how ancient intellectualism can solve the specific problems raised by Davidson, Frankfurt and Elster mentioned in the beginning of the book, especially provided that, as M.-L. correctly notices, the Greeks considered evil differently from the modern perspective (p. 17). The monograph is a welcome addition to the discussion of problems in ancient moral philosophy, and will be of interest to both specialists in ancient ethics and modern moral philosophers, who might find it challenging to reconsider the questions of moral freedom and psychic conflicts, without necessarily positing a faculty of the will.
This paper argues that the dialogical dynamic gives important information on the importance of, a... more This paper argues that the dialogical dynamic gives important information on the importance of, and the hierarchy between, the reasons illustrated in favour of justice in Plato's Republic. Despite his interlocutors' request to focus exclusively on the effect of justice in and by itself, Socrates indicates that the description of the consequences of justice included in Book 10 (608c2-621d3) is an integral part of his defence, and that some of these consequences, the rewards assigned by the gods in the afterlife, are more important than both the other consequences of justice and the benefit of justice in and by itself.
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