Papers by Frank Mathewson
Canadian Competition Record, 2000
In the Winter 1999-2000 issue (Vol. 19, No.4) of this publication, Michael Trebilcock and Ralph W... more In the Winter 1999-2000 issue (Vol. 19, No.4) of this publication, Michael Trebilcock and Ralph Winter reviewed the state of the efficiency defence in the assessment of proposed mergers in Canada prior to the decision of the Competition Tribunal in The Commissioner of ...
Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, 1990
Calculating Productivity Ratios 144 MEASURES OF TRADE SECTOR OUTPUT PER INPUT UNIT 144 Current Me... more Calculating Productivity Ratios 144 MEASURES OF TRADE SECTOR OUTPUT PER INPUT UNIT 144 Current Measures of Trade Sector Productivity 144 Real Sales per Input Unit 146 Real Value Added per Input Unit 146 Notes I 51 CHAPTER 4 LABOUR MARKET CHARACTERISTICS /57 INTRODUCTION 157 AGGREGA1E LABOUR CHARAC1ERISTICS OF THE TRADE SECTOR 158 Average Weekly Earnings in the Trade Sector 158 Education Background 160 Age Distribution 160 Part-Time Employment 164 Sex 165 Labour Market Characteristics and Average Weekly Earnings 166
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Vertical Integration by Contractual Restraints in Spatial Markets
The Journal of Business, 1983
... efficient for the manufacturer. In the absence of any restraint, discount houses will free-ri... more ... efficient for the manufacturer. In the absence of any restraint, discount houses will free-ride on the provision of the information, undercutting the incentives to incur the costs of providing the information. Telser (i960) has advanced ...
Advertising, Consumer Information, and Product Quality
The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
? This paper addresses a number of related issues which have engendered considerable controversy:... more ? This paper addresses a number of related issues which have engendered considerable controversy: does the market supply the optimal quality character? istics of products in the presence of consumer ignorance? Does it supply to con? sumers the correct amount and type of ...
Information, Search, and Price Variability of Individual Life Insurance Contracts
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1983
... For example, firms may have different medical criteria for additional benefits that are inclu... more ... For example, firms may have different medical criteria for additional benefits that are included in ... across contract classes (ie, we view each firm as a single-product life insurance firm). ... the analytics by avoiding the difficulties in packaging that would emerge from multi-output firms. ...
A Consumer Theory of Demand for the Media
The Journal of Business, 1972
Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to Entry
Journal of Political Economy, 1988
... Many but not all firms have the freedom to choose liability rules. In some countries, service... more ... Many but not all firms have the freedom to choose liability rules. In some countries, service professions have unlimited liability rules im-posed by government; historically, banks in some countries faced unlimited liability. Why do governments impose unlimited liability? ...
The Economics of the Union-Controlled Firm
Economica, 1982
Ensuring Failure: Financial System Stability and Deposit Insurance in Canada
Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, 1995
Information, Entry, and Regulation in Markets for Life Insurance
Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, 1983
Fiscal Transfer Pricing in Multinational Corporations
Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, 1980
Price Effects of Market Power in the Canadian Newspaper Industry: Reply
The Canadian Journal of Economics, 1974
Cents and Non$ense: The Economics of Canadian Policy Issues
The Canadian Journal of Economics, 1973
A Note on the Price Effects of Market Power in the Canadian Newspaper Industry
The Canadian Journal of Economics, 1972
The region losing capital is doing so because initially its PK was lower than in the other region... more The region losing capital is doing so because initially its PK was lower than in the other region. Increasing its L/K ratio is supposed to raise its PK and the complementary fall in the L/K ratio in the other region is supposed to lower its PK so that the PKS are equilized. However if returns to scale are very strong this may never happen. For example, in the industry and region losing capital, as the L/K ratio rises, output is falling, raising the input-output coefficients in production. If the latter effect outweighs the effect of a changed L/K ratio, the PK will not rise and the outflow of capital will only cease when there is no more capital in that region. If both factors are required in production, labour will become unemployed in that region and output of that region's good will cease. This equilibrium regional unemployment can arise in several ways. We could start with both factors being immobile between regions. Then, for example, development of capital markets in the country could result in capital becoming mobile. The result of this is described in the above two paragraphs. We could also start from an initial equilibrium point with full employment in both regions and with capital mobility and hence equalization of capital rentals between regions. If the regions are specialized in the production of different goods, a substantial fall in the world price of one region's good, in particular the poorer (lower relative PL) region's good, could reduce the return to capital below the critical level for any of it remaining in that region. Labour would become unemployed there. Secondly, a technological improvement in one region's industry could so lower its input-output coefficients (raise the MPK for a given L/K) that the other region could no longer compete for capital. Once again equilibrium unemployment would result in one region.
The Economics of Vertical Restraints in Distribution
New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, 1986
Anti-trust policy in the United States and other countries towards vertical restrictions on distr... more Anti-trust policy in the United States and other countries towards vertical restrictions on distribution (restrictions placed by manufacturers on retailers’ prices and quantities), has been fragmented and unsettled. This is, in part, because of a lack of consensus on what these restraints represent. On the one hand, vertical restraints have been explained as devices of monopolistic control of cartel coordination. On the other, restraints have been viewed as devices that can be used as purely vertical instruments to implement ‘efficient’ forms of distribution.
The Economics of Life Insurance Regulation: Valuation Constraints
This chapter presents and tests a positive theory of life insurance regulation. The predictions o... more This chapter presents and tests a positive theory of life insurance regulation. The predictions of our theory are tested using experimental episodes in Canadian financial markets and regulatory adjustments ending in 1977 with the removal of the formal regulatory constraint.
The Competitive E?ects of Vertical Agreements: Comment
Review of Industrial Organization
The Economics of Franchise Contacts
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Papers by Frank Mathewson