Papers by Elena Del Rey Canteli
Apunts d'Economia Pública
Servei de Publicacions, 2021
Apunts d’economia pública: els teoremes fonamentals de l’Economia del benestar: 3r curs del Grau en Economia
Universitat de Girona. Servei de Publicacions eBooks, Jul 1, 2021
Apunts d’economia pública pels estudiants del 3r curs del Grau en Economia. En aquest document s&... more Apunts d’economia pública pels estudiants del 3r curs del Grau en Economia. En aquest document s'estudia: el concepte d’eficiència de Pareto i les condicions necessàries i suficients perquè una assignació assoleixi aquesta propietat i l’equilibri de mercat, és a dir, l’assignació resultant de la lliure interacció dels agents econòmics. S'enuncia i demostra el Primer Teorema Fonamental de l’Economia del Benestar, teorema que demostra que el mercat pot funcionar com si una mà invisible el portés cap a l’eficiència (una mesura de benestar) i s'enuncia i explica la rellevància del Segon Teorema Fonamental de l’Economia del Benestar, que estableix que qualsevol de les infinites assignacions Pareto eficients pot ser obtinguda com a resultat d’un equilibri de mercat mitjançant la redistribució de les dotacions inicials. I finalment es proposen una sèrie d’exercicis resolts per facilitar l’assimilació dels concepte
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
Whereas public student loans are often income contingent, private banks typically offer pure loan... more Whereas public student loans are often income contingent, private banks typically offer pure loans, or don't offer loans at all. In order to provide a rationale for these observations, we present a model with perfectly competitive banks and risk averse students who have private information on their ability to learn. We show that the combination of ex-post moral hazard and adverse selection produces credit market rationing when default penalties are low. Intermediate levels of default penalties can result in the existence of an equilibrium that pools together ability types. However, pooling contracts are not insuring at equilibrium, which implies a second type of credit market failure. Finally, if default penalties are large enough, equilibrium contracts provide less able students with insurance against the eventuality of a bad outcome, just in the income contingent loan fashion. The model is also used to explain other stylized facts, such as the positive impact of returns to education and interest rate subsidies on the development of the student loan market. Also, it explains why, unlike banks, governments offer income contingent loans.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
In this paper we explore the effects of a labor market reform that changed the statutory minimum ... more In this paper we explore the effects of a labor market reform that changed the statutory minimum working age in Spain in 1980. In particular, the reform raised the statutory minimum working age from 14 to 16 years old, while the minimum age for attaining compulsory education was kept at 14 until 1990. To study the effects of this change, we exploit the different incentives faced by individuals born at various times of the year before and after the reform. We show that, for individuals born at the beginning of the year, the probabilities of finishing both the compulsory and the post-compulsory education level increased after the reform. In addition, we find that the reform decreases mortality while young (16-25) for both genders while it increases mortality for middle age women (26-40). We provide evidence to proof that the latter increase is partly explained by the deterioration of the health habits of affected women. Together, these results help explain the closing age gap in life expectancy between women and men in Spain.
Revista Hacienda Pública Española, 2017
We study the program Préstamos Renta Universidad that provided loans to Master's students in Spai... more We study the program Préstamos Renta Universidad that provided loans to Master's students in Spain between 2007 and 2010. We estimate predicted income functions and calculate individual repayment burdens and government cost using unconditional quantile regression analysis. We exploit the changing conditions of the successive calls to illustrate three important lessons for the design of student loan schemes: fixed monthly repayments exert an excessive burden to graduates at the lower end of the income distribution; general interest rate subsidies are costly to the taxpayer and unfairly distributed; while the deferment of payments due in case of hardship protects low earners, general grace periods are costly and inequitable.
Ix Encuentro De Economia Publica Hacienda Y Medio Ambiente 7 Y 8 De Febrero De 2002 2002, 2002
Under certain conditions markets and exams are identically able to generate the optimal allocatio... more Under certain conditions markets and exams are identically able to generate the optimal allocation of students to schools of different quality. These conditions include the absence of liquidity constraints. But also the share of a common welfare maximizing objective by educational institutions. This paper explores the deviations from optimality implied by the strategic choice of prices and/or exams by competing schools of different quality.
E Publica Revista Electronica Sobre La Ensenanza De La Economia Publica, 2012
En el presente documento proponemos un ejercicio tutorial y una práctica docente que permita al e... more En el presente documento proponemos un ejercicio tutorial y una práctica docente que permita al estudiante a asimilar y entender mejor el concepto de exceso de gravamen o pérdida irrecuperable de eficiencia asociada a la imposición. Para ello planteamos, en primer lugar, un modelo de elección individual entre ocio y trabajo/consumo. Centrándonos en el individuo representativo, estudiamos su elección de horas de trabajo en ausencia de impuestos. A continuación, introducimos un impuesto proporcional sobre la renta del trabajo y, alternativamente, un impuesto de suma fija capaz de generar una recaudación igual. Verificamos que el impuesto proporcional siempre deja al individuo con un nivel de bienestar inferior respecto al escenario del impuesto de suma fija, es decir, que el impuesto proporcional genera una pérdida irrecuperable de eficiencia. Aunque la resolución manual del problema es factible, proponemos utilizar la herramienta Solver de Excel. Esto nos permite jugar de manera más ágil con los valores de los diferentes parámetros y verificar que hay pérdida de eficiencia independientemente de que el individuo decida trabajar más o menos horas en respuesta a la introducción del impuesto sobre la renta del trabajo.
In this paper we investigate the welfare effects of both education subsidies and intergenerationa... more In this paper we investigate the welfare effects of both education subsidies and intergenerational transfers along an arbitrary, non-optimal balanced growth path in an overlapping generations model with both physical and human capital. A lump-sum transfer from the working middle-aged to the elderly translates into a lower accumulation of both physical and human capital (and thus a smaller growth rate). However, it can increase or decrease welfare. A change in the rate of education subsidy can have either a positive or a negative effect on the accumulation of both physical and human capital, but conditions that guarantee a clear-cut sign of the effect of education subsidies on welfare are derived. We also study the comparative dynamics when departing from the laissez-faire balanced growth path, and show that the intergenerational effects of the optimal policy are equivalent to those of a pure pay-as-you-go social security system.
Economic Record, 2012
We consider risk‐averse individuals who differ in two characteristics – ability to benefit from e... more We consider risk‐averse individuals who differ in two characteristics – ability to benefit from education and inherited wealth – and analyse higher education participation under two alternative financing schemes – tax subsidy and (risk‐sharing) income‐contingent loans. With decreasing absolute risk aversion, wealthier individuals are more likely to undertake higher education despite the fact that, according to the stylised financing schemes we consider, individuals do not pay any upfront financial cost of education. We then determine which financing scheme arises when individuals are allowed to vote between schemes. We show that the degree of risk aversion plays a crucial role in determining which financing scheme obtains a majority, and that the composition of the support group for each financing scheme can be of two different types.
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2012
In this paper, we explore the consequences for optimality of a social planner adopting two differ... more In this paper, we explore the consequences for optimality of a social planner adopting two different welfare criteria. The framework of analysis is an overlapping generations model with physical and human capital. We first show that, when the social welfare function is a discounted sum of individual utilities defined over consumption per unit of natural labor, the precise cardinalization of the individual utility function becomes crucial for both the characterization of the social optimum and the policies that support it. Also, decentralizing the social optimum requires an education subsidy that is definitely positive, but its size depends in a determinant way on the aforementioned cardinalization. In contrast, when the social welfare function is a discounted sum of individual utilities defined over consumption per unit of efficient labor, the precise cardinalization of preferences becomes irrelevant. More strikingly, along the optimal growth path, the education subsidy is negative,...
Journal of Economic Theory, 2013
In OLG economies with life-cycle saving and exogenous growth, competitive equilibria in general f... more In OLG economies with life-cycle saving and exogenous growth, competitive equilibria in general fail to achieve optimality because individuals accumulate amounts of physical capital that differ from the one that maximizes welfare along a balanced growth path (the Golden Rule). With human capital, a second potential source of departure from optimality arises, related to education decisions. We propose to recover the Golden Rule of physical and also human capital accumulation. We characterize the optimal policy to decentralize the Golden Rule balanced growth path when there are no constraints for individuals to finance their education investments, and show that it involves education taxes. Also, when the government subsidizes the repayment of education loans, optimal pensions are positive.
European Journal of Political Economy, 2010
Most industrial countries have traditionally subsidized the provision of higher education. Severa... more Most industrial countries have traditionally subsidized the provision of higher education. Several alternative …nancing schemes, which rely on larger contributions from students, are being increasingly adopted. Schemes such as income contingent loans, like the Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), provide insurance against uncertain educational outcomes. This paper analyses alternative …nancing schemes for higher education, with particular emphasis on the insurance role and its e¤ect on higher education participation.
Economics of Education Review, 2013
, and participants at the 2010 CEPR Development Economics Workshop Pre conference (Barcelona) and... more , and participants at the 2010 CEPR Development Economics Workshop Pre conference (Barcelona) and the 2011 CEA Meeting (Ottawa) for their insightful comments. We retain responsibility for any remaining errors.
Optimal redistribution when educational background matters
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Papers by Elena Del Rey Canteli