Papers by Dr. Philip Blosser
Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 1996
The Backdrop to Husserl's Phenomenology.- Naturalism, Historism, and Phenomenology.- Husserl&... more The Backdrop to Husserl's Phenomenology.- Naturalism, Historism, and Phenomenology.- Husserl's Phenomenological Philosophy.- How Is Phenomenology Motivated?.- Working Notions: A Meditation on Husserlian Phenomenological Practice.- Percept, Concept, and the Stratification of Ideality.- Focusing and Phenomenology.- Quo Vadis, Phenomenology?.- Toward a Husserlian Conception of Epistemology.- Perception as a Source of Justification of Belief.- The Worldhood of the World and the Worldly Character of Objects in Husserl.- Thinking of Difference and Otherness from a Husserlian Perspective.- Husserl and His Philosophical Successors.- Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on Embodied Experience.- Making the Case for Gestalt Organization: Edmund Husserl and Aron Gurwitsch on the Problem of Independent Parts.- Phenomenology of Surprise.- The Crisis of Modern Society and Critical Rationality.- Can a Schelerian Ethic Be Grounded in the Heart without Losing Its Head?.- Phenomenology Beyond Philosophy....
My interest in [Max] Scheler's critique of Kant runs back nearly a decade. ... The more I rea... more My interest in [Max] Scheler's critique of Kant runs back nearly a decade. ... The more I read of Scheler, the more I began to see the value of a project dealing with his critique of Kant in Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wetethik, which would possess the virtue of focusing in a single project three important strands of philosophical interest: phenomenology, Kantianism, and ethics. ... The study is divided into six chapters and two appendices. Each of the chapters constituting the body of the work contains a brief analysis of the Kantian position or discussion of the basic questions at issue in it, an exposition of Scheler's critique of the Kantian position and its presuppositions, and a detailed appraisal of Scheler's critique. -- from the introduction by the author
This article was first presented as a paper at the Third International Symposium of the Max Schel... more This article was first presented as a paper at the Third International Symposium of the Max Scheler Gesselschaft in Jena, Germany, May 22-24, 1997, and subsequently published in Denken des Ursprungs/Ursprungs des Denkens: Scheler's Philosophie und ihre Anfänge in Jena, ed. Christian Bermes, et al. Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie 3 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1998), pp.160-171. It argues that as invaluable and insightful a defense as Scheler’s “ordo amoris” provides against reductionist impulses in intellectual history, it was not sufficiently worked out by him so as to achieve adequate clarity. Specifically, the conception needs to be worked out more carefully in order to achieve an adequate analysis of the distinctions between the various subjective faculties of value-apprehension, whether the apprehended values are emotional or logical or mathematical; and in order to achieve a clear analysis of the objective interrelationships among both logical and nonlogical values, and moral and nonmoral values.
This is my English translation of H. G. Stoker's doctoral dissertation written under Max ... more This is my English translation of H. G. Stoker's doctoral dissertation written under Max Scheler in 1925 (Das Gewissen: Erscheinungsformen und Theorien), quite possibly the most exhaustive study of conscience in any language. It was received with acclaim by Scheler, Heidegger and others in its day, but never promoted as an independent publication. Now I'm happy to help make it available to a much wider audience in English translation. It has sections exploring (1) various historical theories conscience (Jerome, Origen, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Cardinal Newman, Butler, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud, and many others); (2) the various terms used for conscience in Greek, Latin, and other European languages; (3) different types of theories -- those that identify conscience with the intellect, intuition, will, feelings, etc.; (4) the development of conscience; and (5) the reliability of conscience. The book is not highly technical, but reasonably accessible, and promises to be of interest to those interested in moral and religious psychology, ethics, and religion, as well as Schelerian phenomenology. The book will go on sale the end of March.
Scheler's ethics, set forth in his magisterial Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wer... more Scheler's ethics, set forth in his magisterial Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, rests on a key distinction between moral and nonmoral values. Moral values, good and evil, are defined by reference to the nonmoral value that is brought into being, as in teleological theories generally. Accordingly, Scheler rejects the purely formalist, deontological approach to determining the morality of an action found in Kant's ethics. Yet he accepts Kant's critique of consequentialist theories, admitting that ethics cannot be securely based on anything so uncertain as the anticipated realization of contingent, empirical goods and ends. The challenge for Scheler, then, is to come up with a teleological theory that avoids the empirical contingencies and uncertainties of consequentialism. This is precisely what he claims to achieve by establishing his ethics upon a phenomenological theory of values. According to Scheler's theory, nonmoral values phenomenologically exhibit an order of rank based on their relative duration, simplicity, and other such criteria, and range from such values as sensory pleasure and pain, at the lower end of the scale, to cultural, aesthetic, and religious values, at the upper end. Such values exhibit a priori interconnections among themselves and are regarded as intentional objects, as essences that are identifiable independently of any contingent, empirical bearers in which they might be instantiated in mundane reality. As such, these values provide the rigorous foundation required for establishing a viable ethics, in Scheler's view, because moral good and evil can be defined in terms of the relative rank of the nonmoral values that are brought into being. Moral values, then, are brought into being according to Scheler through the act of willing and realizing nonmoral values. Moral good appears through willing nonmoral values that are higher as opposed to lower, and positive as opposed to negative. Thus Scheler claims that moral value is never given directly as the content or object of the act of willing, but only, so to speak, "on the back" of this act. 2 Further, on his view, moral value is actually brought into being whenever the existence of a bearer of a positive nonmoral value is willed, regardless of whether we actually succeed in bringing about the existence of the intended nonmoral value or its bearer. Hence, Scheler's ethics is teleological, but not consequentialist, based on a priori principles, but not formalist. PHILIP BLOSSER Scheler's ethics, thus, rests upon a number of fundamental concepts, such as the concept of values, of the realization of values, and of the distinction between moral and nonmoral values, all of which lie at the heart of his theory. Yet a closer look at these concepts reveals that they presuppose a number of unclarified assumptions about such questions as how values exist, how values are realized, how moral value is related to willing, how evil arises, and how moral conflict occurs. These assumptions and questions call for further examination and elucidation. In what follows, six questions are singled out for consideration. They concern the existence of values, the realization of values, the question of pharisaism, the ontology of good and evil, the Socratic equation, and moral struggle.
Contributions to Phenomenology, 1993
Faith and Philosophy, 1991
Notice. Imprimer la notice. Advancing phenomenology: essays in honor of lester embree (contributi... more Notice. Imprimer la notice. Advancing phenomenology: essays in honor of lester embree (contributions to pheno menology, Vol. 62). Auteur : NENON T. Prix indicatif 166,16 Ajouter au panier le livre de NENON T. Date de parution : 07-2010 Langue : ANGLAIS 390p. ...
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2005
I dispute Scheler's view that good and evil cannot be willedas such; that moral value is alwa... more I dispute Scheler's view that good and evil cannot be willedas such; that moral value is always an inevitable and indirect by-product of willing other ends; that every act of willing yields a moral value; and that moral value attaches only to persons. I argue that moral value attaches to a variety of objects of willing (including one's own moral worth), and that, although all acts have moral implications, not all acts are typologically moral. Those that are, I suggest, typically involve a transactional categoriality where we take another's good or bad as our own. Those that are not may yield various values of personal willing whose positive or negative value is typologically non-moral. I also deny that obligation is diminished by value-insight or that all norms are categorially moral.
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 1995
Max Scheler’s Acting Persons, 2004
This article was first published as the second chapter in the anthology, Max Scheler’s Acting Per... more This article was first published as the second chapter in the anthology, Max Scheler’s Acting Persons: New Perspectives, edited by Stephen Schneck, Value Inquiry Book Series, No. 131 (Amsterdam: Rodolpi, 2002). It finds both positive insights as well as unresolved problems in Scheler's understanding of the person.
Reviews in Religion & Theology, 2009
... Retrieving the Natural Law: A Return to Moral First Things By J. Daryl Charles. BradfordMcC... more ... Retrieving the Natural Law: A Return to Moral First Things By J. Daryl Charles. BradfordMcCall. Article first published online: 26 JUN 2009. ... More content like this. Find more content: like this article. Find more content written by: Bradford McCall. ...
Journal of Reformed Theology
I begin by summarizing Stoker’s study of conscience in Das Gewissen. Then I contrast the initial ... more I begin by summarizing Stoker’s study of conscience in Das Gewissen. Then I contrast the initial acclaim it received from well-known phenomenologists with its subsequent undeserved neglect. One reason for the neglect, I surmise, is the waning of general interest in phenomenological approaches. Other reasons include Stoker’s relative isolation in South Africa, declining interest in Christian approaches to philosophy, and Calvinist concerns about the influence of Bavinck’s scholasticism and Scheler’s phenomenological method on Stoker. I argue that none of these reasons justifies the present neglect of Stoker’s magisterial work and its seminal insights.
The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review
The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review
The Personalist Forum 13 (2), pp. 332-338
The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review
The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review
Uploads
Papers by Dr. Philip Blosser