Papers by Douglas Ollivant
Abstract : Rapid Decisive Operations has emerged as the primary Joint Warfighting Concept for the... more Abstract : Rapid Decisive Operations has emerged as the primary Joint Warfighting Concept for the Future Force. It anticipates-as its name suggests-leveraging American technological advantages to quickly and utterly overwhelm an opponent. Yet the theory has its roots in the mid-1990s concept of "Shock and Awe," as popularized by Harlan Ullman. This monograph then questions whether a pre-9/11 concept can fulfill the requirements of what is generally known as the "Bush Doctrine," the commitment to preemptive war against terrorists and states which sponsor or facilitate them. The monograph first defines the Bush Doctrine, using various Presidential speeches and the National Security Strategy. The Doctrine can be simplified as a commitment to preemptive war against terrorists groups, weak states that facilitate terrorist groups, and rogue states that sponsor terrorist groups. The central chapter of the monograph then defines Rapid Decisive Operations, highlighting its commitment to using asymmetrical effects in a rapid tempo to produce "cybershock," or the inability to react to American operations and demands. The fourth chapter then uses these four features of Rapid Decisive Operations and examines their utility against each of the three groups mentioned in the Bush Doctrine. The final chapters draws conclusions, and while Rapid Decisive Operations is not judged to be utterly without merit, the concept is found to lack applicability in the areas of warfare most likely to face the United States in coming decades. The monograph concludes by recommending that Joint Forces Command re- examine the assumptions underlying Rapid Decisive Operations and consider designing a new Joint Warfighting Concept from properly validated assumptions.
Perspectives on Political Science, 2008
Jacques Maritain and Orestes Brownson use distinct approaches to the role of Christianity in the ... more Jacques Maritain and Orestes Brownson use distinct approaches to the role of Christianity in the American state. Comparing and contrasting them allows us to examine the role of religion in the polity, the legitimacy of varying types of government, and the origin of human rights. Each author highlights a different tension in democratic theory and attempts to provide correctives.
Military review, Mar 1, 2007
This paper is a postscript to the authors 'July-August 2006 Military Review article "Pro... more This paper is a postscript to the authors 'July-August 2006 Military Review article "Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN Operations." That article won the Combined Arms Center Commanding General's Special Topics Writing Competition: Countering Insurgency. "PRODUCING VICTORY" was an Operation Iraqi Freedom II product. We wrote the bulk of the article in mid-to-late 2005, but the essay's foundational experiences clearly ended in late 2004. We believe that we gravitated to some key principles based on those experiences--specifically, that the combined arms maneuver battalion, partnering with indigenous security forces and living among the population it secures, should be the basic tactical unit of counterinsurgency warfare. However, that does not mean that the essay could not use some updating to serve as a framework for operations in 2007. Of course, in many ways, we are manifestly unqualified to update the article. While one author keeps his hand in the intel world, he is in graduate school in Virginia; the other has served at division level since mid-2005 and makes no pretense about seeing today's Baghdad, save by air. Nevertheless, with the strategy we articulated now being made possible by the "surge" of Army brigades, we felt compelled to add this postscript. The tinder for ethnic and religious cruelty was always a flammable thread in the fabric of Iraq. Given the sadistic nature of the Saddam Hussein regime, the current conflagration sparked by the bombing of the Golden Dome is, in a sad way, understandable. This level of sectarian violence, new since 2004, makes the environment more complex, but it does not fundamentally change the battalion-level dynamic we prescribed. In particular, whether we portray the problem as insurgency or low-level civil war, the antidote remains much the same: a strong, representative government that has a monopoly on the use of force. The Iraqi Government needs to exert primacy over competing religious, tribal, and ethnic centers of power. It would have been preferable if this government had been built from the bottom up, drawing legitimacy from neighborhood and district advisory councils rather than from the top down, but this is now a moot point: we have to work with the government we have, not the one we wish we had. Early 2007 finds the U.S. military in Iraq responsible for two related missions: counterinsurgency in support of the Iraqi Government, and nascent peace enforcement between warring Shi'a and Sunni partisans. While analogies are slippery, our current predicament somewhat echoes pre-Dayton Bosnia. The most notable difference, of course, is that in Iraq all parties involved are also shooting at us. To be sure, this is an Iraqi problem that ultimately requires an Iraqi solution. The coalition force mission is to catalyze this process by mitigating the effects of insurgents and partisans in battalion areas of operations while assisting the Iraqi Government at all levels in developing the necessary institutions to govern. At the same time, we need to be constantly aware of actions that empower one belligerent over another, particularly within the government itself. Our mission to strengthen civil government rests on kinetic and non-kinetic foundations. As Soldiers, we are conditioned for kinetic action. While this visceral response is often the safest in the short term--and may be necessary--it often comes at the cost of local support. Four years into our experience in Iraq, it is unrealistic to expect that we would be overwhelmingly popular. But support from the population--even tacit support--is critical. Like a patient diagnosed with cancer forced to choose between chemotherapy and malignant decay, the average Iraqi can and should be expected to choose a path of distressed hope over terminal despair. But we must first demonstrate that there is such a path. Just as the 20th century required America to provide an alternative to both fascism and communism, the 21st century demands an alternative to both repressive dictatorship and Islamic extremism. …
Military review, Jul 1, 2006
Sunrise over Baghdad finds a maneuver battalion executing several missions Two platoons are on pa... more Sunrise over Baghdad finds a maneuver battalion executing several missions Two platoons are on patrol, one sweeping a main supply route for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the other escorting "Team Trash"--a dump truck and bucket loader--through a poor Shi'a neighborhood. A third platoon is still at the brigade detention facility in-processing several insurgents captured the previous night, while a fourth escorts the battalion medical platoon for a medical outreach in one of the battalion "s assigned neighborhoods. Meanwhile, the battalion commander and a company commander prepare to attend a neighborhood council meeting; the executive officer updates the agenda for the weekly fusion-cell meeting; and the operations officer meets with the district police chief and an Iraqi Army representative to discuss security for an upcoming holiday. Shift change is taking place for both the American platoons and the Iraqi Security Forces guarding the US. forward operating base (FOB), and the American military liaison officer--an assistant operations officer--accompanies a squad-sized Iraqi patrol to clear the FOB's perimeter. The headquarters company commander and the battalion logistician are negotiating a local contract for a crane to help reposition barrier materials in the neighborhood to respond to an emerging threat. The battalion intelligence officer (S2) reads the previous night's patrol reports before meeting his Iraqi counterpart for tea at the FOB's civil-military operations center (CMOC). Later in the day, the civil affairs team leader and a company executive officer will join the assistant S2 and a local sheik at the CMOC to discuss the merits of a proposed reconstruction project. Finally, yet another platoon prepares to conduct a precision raid against an insurgent cell after dark, based on intelligence gathered from a walk-in informant and confirmed by a local cleric's security chief So begins another day in Baghdad. ********** OUR THESIS IS SIMPLE: The combined arms maneuver battalion, partnering with indigenous security forces and living among the population it secures, should be the basic tactical unit of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. Only such a battalion--a blending of infantry, armor, engineers, and other branches, each retrained and employed as needed--can integrate all arms into full-spectrum operations at the tactical level. (1) Smaller conventional forces might develop excellent community relations, but they lack the robust staff and sufficient mass to fully exploit local relationships. Conversely, while brigades and divisions boast expanded analysis and control capabilities, they cannot develop the street-level rapport so critical for an effective COIN campaign. Unconventional forces are likewise no panacea because the expansion of Special Operations Command assets or the creation of stability and reconstruction or system-administration forces will not result in sustainable COIN strategies. (2) Recent experience in Iraq affirms previously forgotten lessons: "Winning the Peace" requires simultaneous execution along the full spectrum of kinetic and non-kinetic operations. (3) While political developments in Iraq and the United States might have moved past the point at which our suggested COIN solution would be optimal, we argue that the maneuver battalion should be the centerpiece of the Army's future COIN campaigns. This paper examines why the maneuver battalion is the premier organization around which to build COIN doctrine, and it identifies current obstacles and future improvements to such a battalion-centric strategy. Back to the Future Upon returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), we began to search older works on COIN, hoping to find hints of a larger framework in which to ground our observations. The work we both (independently) found indispensable was Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, a 1964 book by David Galula. Based on his firsthand knowledge of insurgencies in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria, Galula derives numerous lessons, several of which reflected our own experiences. …
Perspectives on Politics, Jun 1, 2008
Perspectives on Politics, Jun 1, 2010
Perspectives on Politics, 2008
Stephen Biddle on The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. By the U.S. Army and... more Stephen Biddle on The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. By the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Forward by David H. Petraeus, James F. Amos, and John A. Nagl. Introduction by Sarah Sewall. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 472p. $15.00.
Military review, 2006
Sunrise over Baghdad finds a maneuver battalion executing several missions Two platoons are on pa... more Sunrise over Baghdad finds a maneuver battalion executing several missions Two platoons are on patrol, one sweeping a main supply route for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the other escorting "Team Trash"--a dump truck and bucket loader--through a poor Shi'a neighborhood. A third platoon is still at the brigade detention facility in-processing several insurgents captured the previous night, while a fourth escorts the battalion medical platoon for a medical outreach in one of the battalion "s assigned neighborhoods. Meanwhile, the battalion commander and a company commander prepare to attend a neighborhood council meeting; the executive officer updates the agenda for the weekly fusion-cell meeting; and the operations officer meets with the district police chief and an Iraqi Army representative to discuss security for an upcoming holiday. Shift change is taking place for both the American platoons and the Iraqi Security Forces guarding the US. forward operating...
The rapid spread of liberal regimes in the developed world has been the most notable of the posit... more The rapid spread of liberal regimes in the developed world has been the most notable of the positive political stories of the twentieth century. Throughout the West-and increasingly in other parts of the world--constitutional governments dedicated to protecting, or at least obligated to protect, the rights of their citizens have become the norm. The rise of these states has resulted in an increase in the official recognition of human dignity unthinkable only two hundred years ago. Across the world, the wealthiest and most powerful nations are, for the most part, measured and regularly called to account, through their own constitutional mechanisms, based on how they treat their citizens as human beings-as persons. In fact, it appears that despite continuing pockets of nationalism and tribalism, liberalism has created an ideological hegemony within the developed world. Despite the myriad of political problems we continue to face, the positive effects of this achievement cannot be deni...
This paper is a postscript to the authors 'July-August 2006 Military Review article "Pro... more This paper is a postscript to the authors 'July-August 2006 Military Review article "Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN Operations." That article won the Combined Arms Center Commanding General's Special Topics Writing Competition: Countering Insurgency. "PRODUCING VICTORY" was an Operation Iraqi Freedom II product. We wrote the bulk of the article in mid-to-late 2005, but the essay's foundational experiences clearly ended in late 2004. We believe that we gravitated to some key principles based on those experiences--specifically, that the combined arms maneuver battalion, partnering with indigenous security forces and living among the population it secures, should be the basic tactical unit of counterinsurgency warfare. However, that does not mean that the essay could not use some updating to serve as a framework for operations in 2007. Of course, in many ways, we are manifestly unqualified to update the article. While one autho...
Journal of Markets Morality, Mar 27, 2012
... 476 In God We Trust: Religion and American Political Life Corwin E. Smidt (Editor) Grand Rapi... more ... 476 In God We Trust: Religion and American Political Life Corwin E. Smidt (Editor) Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2001 (268 pages, paper) ... Yoder and Niebuhr are cited in both essays; Maritain, Murray, Neuhaus, Novak, Schindler, or Simon (inter alia) in neither. ...
Christian Faith and Modern Democracy: God and Politics in the Fallen World Robert P. Kraynak Notr... more Christian Faith and Modern Democracy: God and Politics in the Fallen World Robert P. Kraynak Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001 (334 pages)
Perspectives on Political Science, 2008
Perspective on Politics, 2010
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Papers by Douglas Ollivant