Papers by Dimitri Paolini
The Manchester School, Dec 11, 2013
We analyze the welfare effect of allowing a new university in a local area where another universi... more We analyze the welfare effect of allowing a new university in a local area where another university is already operating. We use a two-city model in which individuals, whose education depends on the average peer ability (peer group effect), can sort across cities by facing a mobility cost. Com-paring monopoly with a two-university system we find that introducing the second university is always welfare improving. We obtain a symmetric Nash equilibrium for every mobility costs and asymmetric Nash equilibria only for sufficiently low mobility costs. In particular, in the symmetric scenario both universities have the same peer groups (lower than the peer group under monopoly) and the same number of students. The asymmetric scenario instead is such that the "top" ("bottom") university has a peer group higher (lower) than the monopolistic one. Moreover, we find that the symmetric scenario always induces the highest welfare. After checking for equilibrium refinements we find that asymmetric equilibria are never strong Nash whereas the symmetric equilibrium is strong Nash only for sufficiently high mobility costs.
Social Science Research Network, 2015
Copyright industries face global fixed export costs, in terms of cultural and geographic distance... more Copyright industries face global fixed export costs, in terms of cultural and geographic distance together with formal trade barriers. Adjustment to these costs may occur along both the intensive and the extensive margin. We investigate this issue using a microeconomic approach that considers a hedonic model of revenues for US movie exports to evaluate: aggregation bias; simultaneity in the observation of imported movies and their revenues; and reliable estimations for country clusters. We find that product heterogeneity is a key element for both intensive and extensive margin adjustments at the country level.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2015
We study the effects of introducing a new university in a two-city model where individuals with h... more We study the effects of introducing a new university in a two-city model where individuals with heterogeneous innate ability choose whether to attend university. When attending university, they benefit from a peer group effect given by the average ability they share with the university. However, attendance implies the payment of a tuition fee and, for commuting individuals, mobility costs. We consider a two-city setting, and we compare a scenario with only one university with another one with one university for each city. We show that in the two-university system, there exists a symmetric Nash Equilibrium for every mobility cost and (at least) two asymmetric Nash Equilibria only for sufficiently low mobility costs. In the latter scenario, we are able to characterise the existence of two equilibria for extremely high and extremely low tuition fees. In the former, both universities exhibit the same average ability that is in turn lower than the one arising in a monopolistic system. In the asymmetric scenario, the "top" ("bottom") university instead has a higher (lower) peer group than the monopolistic one, regardless of the tuition fees. We further show that the introduction of a new university is always welfare improving.
Information Economics and Policy, Sep 1, 2020
w a s s e t u p i n 1 9 9 3 w i t h t h e p u r p o s e o f o r g a n i s i n g t h e j o i n t r... more w a s s e t u p i n 1 9 9 3 w i t h t h e p u r p o s e o f o r g a n i s i n g t h e j o i n t r e s e a r c h e f f o r t o f e c o n o m i s t s f r o m t h e t w o S a r d i n i a n u n i v e r s i t i e s ( C a g l i a r i a n d S a s s a r i ) i n v e s t i g a t i n g d u a l i s m a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d r e g i o n a l l e v e l . C R E N o S ' p r i m a r y a i m i s t o i m p r o v e k n o w l e d g e o n t h e e c o n o m i c g a p b e t w e e n a r e a s a n d t o p r o v i d e u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n f o r p o l i c y i n t e r v e n t i o n . P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n i s p a i d t o t h e r o l e o f i n s t i t u t i o n s , t e c h n o l o g i c a l p r o g r e s s a n d d i f f u s i o n o f i n n o v a t i o n i n t h e p r o c e s s o f c o n v e r g e n c e o r d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c a r e a s . T o c a r r y o u t i t s r e s e a r c h , C R E N o S c o l l a b o r a t e s w i t h r e s e a r c h c e n t r e s a n d u n i v e r s i t i e s a t b o t h n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l . T h e c e n t r e i s a l s o a c t i v e i n t h e f i e l d o f s c i e n t i f i c d i s s e m i n a t i o n , o r g a n i z i n g c o n f e r e n c e s a n d w o r k s h o p s a l o n g w i t h o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s s u c h a s s e m i n a r s a n d s u m m e r s c h o o l s . C R E N o S c r e a t e s a n d m a n a g e s s e v e r a l d a t a b a s e s o f v a r i o u s s o c i o -e c o n o m i c v a r i a b l e s o n I t a l y a n d S a r d i n i a .
Handbook of State Aid for Film, 2018
Any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distort... more Any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market" (Art.107, European Treaty, 2012). An exception to this law is public aid for movies, which is permitted for cultural goals, that is, to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Union to the extent that is contrary to the common interest. As remarked by Katsarova (2014), in 2010, the European film industry was rather dynamic, accounted for over 75,000 companies, and made 60 billion euros in revenue. Amongst the EU countries, France, Germany, the UK, Italy, and Spain accounted for approximately 80% of releases, industry turnover, and persons employed (more than 370,000 people). Considering these main European countries, in terms of movie production, direct public subsidies from government agencies are an important source of film funding. In 2012, the governments of Germany, France, Italy, and the UK provided funding in the amounts of 201.3 million euros, 720.1 million euros, 75.8 million euros, and
We study the effects of introducing a new university in a two-city model where individuals with h... more We study the effects of introducing a new university in a two-city model where individuals with heterogeneous innate ability choose whether to attend university. When attending university, they benefit from a peer group effect given by the average ability they share with the university. However, attendance implies the payment of a tuition fee and, for commuting individuals, mobility costs. We consider a two-city setting, and we compare a scenario with only one university with another one with one university for each city. We show that in the two-university system, there exists a symmetric Nash Equilibrium for every mobility cost and (at least) two asymmetric Nash Equilibria only for sufficiently low mobility costs. In the latter scenario, we are able to characterise the existence of two equilibria for extremely high and extremely low tuition fees. In the former, both universities exhibit the same average ability that is in turn lower than the one arising in a monopolistic system. In...
Information Economics and Policy, 2020
w a s s e t u p i n 1 9 9 3 w i t h t h e p u r p o s e o f o r g a n i s i n g t h e j o i n t r... more w a s s e t u p i n 1 9 9 3 w i t h t h e p u r p o s e o f o r g a n i s i n g t h e j o i n t r e s e a r c h e f f o r t o f e c o n o m i s t s f r o m t h e t w o S a r d i n i a n u n i v e r s i t i e s ( C a g l i a r i a n d S a s s a r i ) i n v e s t i g a t i n g d u a l i s m a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d r e g i o n a l l e v e l . C R E N o S ' p r i m a r y a i m i s t o i m p r o v e k n o w l e d g e o n t h e e c o n o m i c g a p b e t w e e n a r e a s a n d t o p r o v i d e u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n f o r p o l i c y i n t e r v e n t i o n . P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n i s p a i d t o t h e r o l e o f i n s t i t u t i o n s , t e c h n o l o g i c a l p r o g r e s s a n d d i f f u s i o n o f i n n o v a t i o n i n t h e p r o c e s s o f c o n v e r g e n c e o r d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c a r e a s . T o c a r r y o u t i t s r e s e a r c h , C R E N o S c o l l a b o r a t e s w i t h r e s e a r c h c e n t r e s a n d u n i v e r s i t i e s a t b o t h n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l . T h e c e n t r e i s a l s o a c t i v e i n t h e f i e l d o f s c i e n t i f i c d i s s e m i n a t i o n , o r g a n i z i n g c o n f e r e n c e s a n d w o r k s h o p s a l o n g w i t h o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s s u c h a s s e m i n a r s a n d s u m m e r s c h o o l s . C R E N o S c r e a t e s a n d m a n a g e s s e v e r a l d a t a b a s e s o f v a r i o u s s o c i o -e c o n o m i c v a r i a b l e s o n I t a l y a n d S a r d i n i a .
Italian Economic Journal, 2016
We consider a two-city model in which two university systems may occur: a centralized system in w... more We consider a two-city model in which two university systems may occur: a centralized system in which a social planner sets the tuition fee and a decentralized system in which universities are free to set their own fees. Within these two systems we also analyze two further scenarios, one with only one university and another with one university in each city. Individuals with heterogeneous innate ability decide whether to go to university according to the average ability (peer group effect henceforth), a tuition fee and mobility costs, if any. In the centralized system, the welfare is maximized by opening two free-of-fees universities, one in each city. This maximizes university participation and eliminates the impediment of mobility costs. In the decentralized system, whether a single-university or a two-university system is more welfare enhancing depends on the mobility costs. When mobility costs are sufficiently low, then having only one university is welfare maximizing. When, instead, mobility costs are high, two universities result to be welfare enhancing.
Italian Economic Journal, 2015
We examine the impact of public subsidies in the Italian movie industry by considering two dimens... more We examine the impact of public subsidies in the Italian movie industry by considering two dimensions: quantity (box-office revenues) and quality (film festival awards). Public subsidies and movie genres are employed as explanatory variables to investigate how public intervention and genre influence movie industry performance. We find that although public funding shows an overall negative influence on quantity and quality, there are some differences when considering public subsidies by genre. On balance, there is statistical evidence that dramas and thrillers are the genres that should be primarily financed by public agents.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
Copyright industries face global fixed export costs, in terms of cultural and geographic distance... more Copyright industries face global fixed export costs, in terms of cultural and geographic distance together with formal trade barriers. Adjustment to these costs may occur along both the intensive and the extensive margin. We investigate this issue using a microeconomic approach that considers a hedonic model of revenues for US movie exports to evaluate: aggregation bias; simultaneity in the observation of imported movies and their revenues; and reliable estimations for country clusters. We find that product heterogeneity is a key element for both intensive and extensive margin adjustments at the country level.
We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents endogenously choose to invest time... more We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents endogenously choose to invest time and real resources in education. Generically in the space of the economies, there is an open interval of possible lengths of schooling such that, at at least one of the associated steady states equilibria, some agents, but not all of them, choose to invest. Regular steady state equilibria are constrained Pareto inefficient in a strong sense. The Hosios (1990) condition is neither necessary, nor sufficient, for constrained Pareto optimality. We also provide restrictions on the fundamentals, which are sufficient to guarantee that equilibria are characterized by overeducation (undereducation), and present some results on their comparative statics properties.
We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents endogenously choose to invest time... more We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents endogenously choose to invest time and real resources in education. Generically, there is a steady state equilibrium, where some agents, but not all of them, choose to invest. Regular steady state equilibria are constrained Pareto inefficient in a strong sense. The Hosios (1990) condition is neither necessary, nor sufficient, for constrained Pareto optimality. We also provide restrictions on the fundamentals sufficient to guarantee that equilibria are characterized by overeducation (or undereducation), and present some results on their comparative statics properties.
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2014
Worldwide income taxation in the country of residence is a legal dogma of international taxation.... more Worldwide income taxation in the country of residence is a legal dogma of international taxation. We question this dogma from the perspective of relations between developed and developing countries from a legal and economic perspective, and make a modern and fair proposal for tax treaties. We will show under which conditions a developing and a developed country will voluntarily sign a tax treaty where information is exchanged truthfully and whether they should share revenues. Moreover, we will demonstrate how the conclusion of a tax treaty can assist in the implementation of a tax audit system.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
Global income taxation in the country of residence is a legal dogma of international taxation. We... more Global income taxation in the country of residence is a legal dogma of international taxation. We question this dogma from the perspective of relations with developing countries from a legal and economic perspective, and make a modern and fair proposal for tax treaties. We will show under which conditions a developing and a developed country will voluntarily sign a tax treaty where information is exchanged truthfully and whether they should share revenues. Moreover, we will demonstrate how the conclusion of a tax treaty can assist in the implementation of a tax audit system.
The Manchester School, 2013
We study the effect of a new university in a two‐city model in which individuals’ utility depends... more We study the effect of a new university in a two‐city model in which individuals’ utility depends on own ability, peer group ability, formal education and mobility costs. We compare a monopoly (one university in one city) with a two‐university system (one university in each city). Introducing the second university improves welfare when the fixed cost of each university is low. With two universities, we obtain a symmetric equilibrium for every mobility cost and asymmetric equilibria for low mobility costs. The symmetric system induces the highest welfare and is also Strong Nash (for high mobility costs).
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2014
T h i s i s a p o s t p r i n t v e r s i o n o f t h e f o l l ow i n g p u b l i s h e d d o c ... more T h i s i s a p o s t p r i n t v e r s i o n o f t h e f o l l ow i n g p u b l i s h e d d o c um e n t : J a r a , M . , P a o l i n i , D . a n d T e n a , J . d e D . ( 2 0 1 5 ) . M a n a g em e n t e f f i c i e n c y i n f o o t b a l l : a n em p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s o f tw o e x t r em e c a s e s . M a n a g e r i a l a n d D e c i s i o n E c o n om i c s , v . 3 6 , n . 5 , p p . 2 8 6 -2 98 . A v a l a i b l e i n : h t t p : / / d x . d o i . o r g / 1 0 . 1 0 0 2 /m d e . 2 6 6 8 © 1 W i l e y M a n a g em e n t E f f i c i e n c y i n F o o t b a l l : A n Em p i r i c a l A n a l y s i s o f Tw o E x t r em e C a s e s M i g u e l J a r a a , D im i t r i P a o l i n i b , c a n d J u a n d e D i o s T e n a H o r r i l l o c , d , * a D e p a r t am e n t o d e E c o n om í a , U n i v e r s i d a d d e C o n c e p c i ó n , B i o b í o , C h i l e b C R E N o S a n d D I S e a , U n i v e r s i t à d i S a s s a r i , S a s s a r i , I t a l y c CO R E , U n i v e r s i t é c a t h o l i q u e d e L o u v a i n , L o u v a i n L a N e u v e , B e l g i um d D e p a r tm e n t o f S t a t i s t i c s a n d I n s t i t u t o F l o r e s d e L em u s , U n i v e r s i d a d C a r l o s I I I , M a d r i d , S p a i n A n a l y s i s o f m a n a g e r i a l e f fi c i e n c y i n s p o r t e c o n om i c s t y p i c a l l y f o c u s e s o n e v a l u a t i n g c o a c h d e c i s i o n s i n s t e a d o f a s s e s s i n g t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a s a w h o l e . T h i s p a p e r s t u d i e s t h e r e l a t i v e imp o r t a n c e o f v a r i a b l e s r e l a t e d t o p ow e r a n d m a n a g e r i a l d e c i s i o n s b y e s t im a t i n g s t o c h a s t i c p r o d u c t i o n f r o n t i e r s m o d e l s f o r t h e C h i l e a n a n d I t a l i a n f o o t b a l l l e a g u e s . W e fi n d t h a t h i st o r i c a l a n d g e o g r a p h i c a l v a r i a b l e s i n t e n d e d t o c a p t u r e m a r k e t s i z e p l a y t h e i r e x p e c t e d r o l e s i n b o t h I t a l y a n d C h i l e . H ow e v e r , t h e d e g r e e o f t e c h n i c a l i n e f fi c i e n c y i s l ow e r m a g n i t u d e i n C h i l e . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e c o u l d b e d u e t o a sm a l l e r m a r k e t s i z e a n d / o r t o fi n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s f a c e d b y sm a l l c l u b s i n t h i s c o u n t r y . * C o r r e s p o n d e n c e t o : C R EN o S a n d D I S e a , U n i v e r s i t à d i S a s s a r i , S a s s a r i , I t a l y a n d D e p a r tm e n t o f S t a t i s t i c s a n d I n s t i t u t o F l o r e s d e L em u s , U n i v e r s i d a d C a r l o s I I I , M a d r i d , S p a i n . E m a i l : j t e n a@ e s t e c o n . u c 3m . e s * * * * * *
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2013
We study a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor ... more We study a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor markets. Human and physical capital are heterogeneous. Workers and firms endogenously select the sector they are active in, and choose the amount of their sector-specific investments in human and physical capital. To enter the high-skill sector, workers must pay a fixed cost that we interpret as direct cost of education. Given the distribution of the agents across sectors, at equilibrium, in each sector there is underinvestment in both human and physical capital, due to non-contractibility of investments. A second source of inefficiency is related to the self-selection of the agents into the two sectors. It typically induces too many workers to invest in education. Under suitable restrictions on the parameters, the joint effect of the two distortions is that equilibria are characterized by too many people investing too little effort in the high skill sector. We also analyze the welfare properties of equilibria and study the effects of several tax-subsidy policies on the total expected surplus.
Empirica, 2011
This article studies the behaviour of a firm searching to fill a vacancy. The main assumption is ... more This article studies the behaviour of a firm searching to fill a vacancy. The main assumption is that the firm can offer two different kinds of contracts to the workers, either a short-term contract or a long-term one. The short-term contract acts as a probationary stage in which the firm can learn about the worker. After this stage, the firm can propose a long-term contract to the worker or it can decide to look for another worker. We show that, if the short-term wage is fixed endogenously, it can be optimal for firms to start a working relationship with a short-term contract, but that this policy decreases unemployment and welfare. On the contrary, if the wage is fixed exogenously, this policy could be optimal also from a welfare point of view.
I l C R E N o S è u n c e n t r o d i r i c e r c a i s t i t u i t o n e l 1 9 9 3 c h e f a c a... more I l C R E N o S è u n c e n t r o d i r i c e r c a i s t i t u i t o n e l 1 9 9 3 c h e f a c a p o a l l e U n i v e r s i t à d i C a g l i a r i e S a s s a r i e d è a t t u a l m e n t e d i r e t t o d a S t e f a n o U s a i . I l C R E N o S s i p r o p o n e d i c o n t r i b u i r e a m i g l i o r a r e l e c o n o s c e n z e s u l d i v a r i o e c o n o m i c o t r a a r e e i n t e g r a t e e d i f o r n i r e u t i l i i n d i c a z i o n i d i i n t e r v e n t o . P a r t i c o l a r e a t t e n z i o n e è d e d i c a t a a l r u o l o s v o l t o d a l l e i s t i t u z i o n i , d a l p r o g r e s s o t e c n o l o g i c o e d a l l a d i f f u s i o n e d e l l ' i n n o v a z i o n e n e l p r o c e s s o d i c o n v e r g e n z a o d i v e r g e n z a t r a a r e e e c o n o m i c h e . I l C R E N o S s i p r o p o n e i n o l t r e d i s t u d i a r e l a c o m p a t i b i l i t à f r a t a l i p r o c e s s i e l a s a l v a g u a r d i a d e l l e r i s o r s e a m b i e n t a l i , s i a g l o b a l i s i a l o c a l i . P e r s v o l g e r e l a s u a a t t i v i t à d i r i c e r c a , i l C R E N o S c o l l a b o r a c o n c e n t r i d i r i c e r c a e u n i v e r s i t à n a z i o n a l i e d i n t e r n a z i o n a l i ; è a t t i v o n e l l ' o r g a n i z z a r e c o n f e r e n z e a d a l t o c o n t e n u t o s c i e n t i f i c o , s e m i n a r i e a l t r e a t t i v i t à d i n a t u r a f o r m a t i v a ; t i e n e a g g i o r n a t e u n a s e r i e d i b a n c h e d a t i e h a u n a s u a c o l l a n a d i p u b b l i c a z i o n i .
The paper studies a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfe... more The paper studies a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor markets. Workers and firms endogenously select (paying a fixed cost) the sector they are active in, and choose the amount of their investments. The economy is characterized by pecuniary externalities. Given the partition of the agents among the two sectors, at equilibrium there is underinvestment in both human and physical capital, as in Acemoglu (1996). A second externality is induced by the self-selection of the agents in the two sectors. When the difference between total factor productivities (TFP) is sufficiently large, subsidies to investments in education in the low TFP sector and fixed taxes increasing the cost to access the high productivity sector increase expected total surplus, while subsidies to investments in the high TFP sector can actually reduce it. To the contrary, subsidies to the amount of investments in human capital in the high TFP sector may have a positive...
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Papers by Dimitri Paolini