The purpose of this thesis is to articulate a new theory of normative ethics, called "ethical emp... more The purpose of this thesis is to articulate a new theory of normative ethics, called "ethical empathism." One of the basic tasks of ethics is to determine, without prejudice, who or what has moral standing. That is, who can be said to be entitled to basic practical respect in the form of rights, utilitarian consideration, or some form of care? The traditional, humanist, solution is that only human beings have moral standing, or else they have a surpassing degree of it. A detailed investigation of traditional humanism and of animal liberation ethics-which would extend moral standing to nonhuman animals-reveals a sort of deadlock. In the interests of furthering this debate, a new and formidable version of humanism is offered. It is dubbed "Juggernaut" because of its great success in apparently defeating, and resisting objections from, contemporary animal liberationist views. Juggernaut is based in the idea that nonhumans generally lack many dimensions of value which humans possess. Juggernaut is so compelling that critics of humanism, L. W. Sumner and Evelyn B. Pluhar (from a utilitarian and a strict rights perspective, respectively) have already reckoned it to be the best version of humanism to date. It becomes difficult to find fault with it, perhaps, until it is pointed out that the view lacks deep empathy. That is, humanism does not identify with the key reality of the point of view, for any conscious entity which can be said to have one. Such an identification with a being, and that being's good, results in a strong form of respect which is not contingent on any other attributes of the given being. Additionally, reductionist strategies in interpreting mental lives risk harming beings, by overlooking those with actual psychological capacities. Therefore, such forms of reductionism (among others related to the denial of free will, and of mind in general), are rejected as oppressive. In general, harmful treatment of nonhuman animals is characterized as not only unempathetic, but oppressive, and therefore "speciesist" (although Juggernaut, as implied, seeks to cast doubt on this judgment). Comparing the oppression of nonhuman animals, then, to racism, invites a possible comparison to the Holocaust. This comparison can be borne out at a conceptual level, since the treatments involved equally accord with what is meant by the term, "discriminatory oppression." Still, while there are many similarities of detail, there are also differences. This is unsurprising since, after all, there are many differences of detail between forms of racism and sexism, as well. Normative questions are explored, and entire moral theories are found to run counter to what the author identifies as "the classist fallacy" (inferring, just from the fact that a being does not belong to a certain favoured grouping or classification, that we may harm that being). These theories include such venerable constructions as Kantianism, contractarianism, natural law theory, and ecoholism. The theory which is treated at considerable length, however, is utilitarianism, which will claim to empathize with all beings in a given context, thus finding out all that is good, and then maximizing that good for all beings. From this premise, utilitarianism can seem to be a very formidable contender for the title of "deep empathy." It may seem as though, by contrast, strict rights views, which are less willing to harm individuals for "the greatest good," are merely v Cet animal est très méchant, Quand on l'attaque il se défend.
... Daniel Goldhagen explains that the Holocaust was only possible due to widespread anti-Semitis... more ... Daniel Goldhagen explains that the Holocaust was only possible due to widespread anti-Semitism, (Goldhagen 1997, 9) and it equally can be said that what may be called the "animal holocaust" is only conceivable in the context of a nearly all-pervasive speciesism. ...
The purpose of this thesis is to articulate a new theory of normative ethics, called "ethical emp... more The purpose of this thesis is to articulate a new theory of normative ethics, called "ethical empathism." One of the basic tasks of ethics is to determine, without prejudice, who or what has moral standing. That is, who can be said to be entitled to basic practical respect in the form of rights, utilitarian consideration, or some form of care? The traditional, humanist, solution is that only human beings have moral standing, or else they have a surpassing degree of it. A detailed investigation of traditional humanism and of animal liberation ethics-which would extend moral standing to nonhuman animals-reveals a sort of deadlock. In the interests of furthering this debate, a new and formidable version of humanism is offered. It is dubbed "Juggernaut" because of its great success in apparently defeating, and resisting objections from, contemporary animal liberationist views. Juggernaut is based in the idea that nonhumans generally lack many dimensions of value which humans possess. Juggernaut is so compelling that critics of humanism, L. W. Sumner and Evelyn B. Pluhar (from a utilitarian and a strict rights perspective, respectively) have already reckoned it to be the best version of humanism to date. It becomes difficult to find fault with it, perhaps, until it is pointed out that the view lacks deep empathy. That is, humanism does not identify with the key reality of the point of view, for any conscious entity which can be said to have one. Such an identification with a being, and that being's good, results in a strong form of respect which is not contingent on any other attributes of the given being. Additionally, reductionist strategies in interpreting mental lives risk harming beings, by overlooking those with actual psychological capacities. Therefore, such forms of reductionism (among others related to the denial of free will, and of mind in general), are rejected as oppressive. In general, harmful treatment of nonhuman animals is characterized as not only unempathetic, but oppressive, and therefore "speciesist" (although Juggernaut, as implied, seeks to cast doubt on this judgment). Comparing the oppression of nonhuman animals, then, to racism, invites a possible comparison to the Holocaust. This comparison can be borne out at a conceptual level, since the treatments involved equally accord with what is meant by the term, "discriminatory oppression." Still, while there are many similarities of detail, there are also differences. This is unsurprising since, after all, there are many differences of detail between forms of racism and sexism, as well. Normative questions are explored, and entire moral theories are found to run counter to what the author identifies as "the classist fallacy" (inferring, just from the fact that a being does not belong to a certain favoured grouping or classification, that we may harm that being). These theories include such venerable constructions as Kantianism, contractarianism, natural law theory, and ecoholism. The theory which is treated at considerable length, however, is utilitarianism, which will claim to empathize with all beings in a given context, thus finding out all that is good, and then maximizing that good for all beings. From this premise, utilitarianism can seem to be a very formidable contender for the title of "deep empathy." It may seem as though, by contrast, strict rights views, which are less willing to harm individuals for "the greatest good," are merely v Cet animal est très méchant, Quand on l'attaque il se défend.
... Daniel Goldhagen explains that the Holocaust was only possible due to widespread anti-Semitis... more ... Daniel Goldhagen explains that the Holocaust was only possible due to widespread anti-Semitism, (Goldhagen 1997, 9) and it equally can be said that what may be called the "animal holocaust" is only conceivable in the context of a nearly all-pervasive speciesism. ...
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