... that relations are just complex ideas, it might be wondered whether he has an account of judg... more ... that relations are just complex ideas, it might be wondered whether he has an account of judgment at all. ... Hume saw the problems such a theory faced concerning existential beliefs ... By ceasing to treat existence as a predicate, Hume was confronted with the issue of what it was to ...
Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile... more Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile apparent contradictions in Hume's theory. Two examples occur early in Part I of Book I of the Treatise. Hume argues that all ideas are derivable from impressions (what Garrett calls "the Copy Principle"). Garrett defends Hume's rigorous attempt to found this principle empirically, taking Hume at his word when he describes it as "the first principle I establish in the science of human nature." (T 7)1 Notoriously, Hume almost immediately provides a counter-example: suppose a person had experienced all shades of blue except one, and further suppose they were presented with a table of all these shades, with a blank where the missing shade ought to be. Clearly, Hume says, such a person could supply "from his own imagination" the relevant idea, without having first experienced the corresponding impression. This presents an apparent counter-example to the Copy Principle. Another example occurs a little later. Hume claims that "Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation." (T 10) Distinct ideas are separable. Garrett calls this "the Separability Principle", and it is almost as important for Hume as the Copy Principle. For one thing, it shows that Hume's theory of ideas, though heavily influenced by Locke, is importantly different from the earlier theory: Locke thought there were some necessary connections between distinct ideas, connections that could not be reduced to identities or partial identities.2 More importantly, the separability of distinct ideas is the primary ground of Hume's conceivability criterion of demonstration, crucially employed in the arguments concerning the causation, necessary connection and induction. But Hume seems to present an apparent counter-example to the Separability Principle as well. When discussing distinctions of reason, Hume admits that we can distinguish between "the
By the time Hume started to work on his Treatise, the notion of an idea as the primary, most gene... more By the time Hume started to work on his Treatise, the notion of an idea as the primary, most general sort of mental item dominated European philosophy. Although Descartes noted that, strictly speaking, only those "thoughts that are as it were images of things" were appropriately described as ideas, in practice he used "the word 'idea' to refer to whatever is immediately perceived by the mind." 1 Not only do we have ideas of trees and the sun, but we also have ideas of our own activities of thinking and willing. Locke characterizes 'idea' as "being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks." Locke also thinks that we not only have ideas that derive from things or objects in the world (ideas of sensation), but also of the activities and operations of our own minds (ideas of reflection). Ideas of sensation are acquired through the operation of external objects on our sense organs, while ideas of reflection come from introspection, from thinking about what happens within our own minds. He also thinks that these ideas of reflection are of two basic sorts of mental activity, perception and willing, that correspond to two faculties of mind: the understanding (or the power of thinking) and the will (or the power of volition). 2 Hume introduced important innovations concerning the theory of ideas. The two most important are the distinction between impressions and ideas, and the use he made of the principles of association in explaining mental phenomena. Hume divided the perceptions of the mind into two classes. The members of one class, impressions, he held to have a greater degree of force and vivacity than the members of the other class, ideas. He also supposed that ideas are causally dependent copies of impressions. And, unlike Locke and others, Hume makes positive use of the principle of association, both of the association of 80 ideas, and, in a more limited way, of the association of impressions. Such associations are central to his explanations of causal reasoning, belief, the indirect passions (pride and humility, love and hatred), and sympathy. These views about impressions and ideas and the principles of association form the core of Hume's science of human nature. Relying on them, he attempts a rigorously empirical investigation of human nature. The resulting system is a remarkable but complex achievement. I. IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS Hume begins Book 1 of the Treatise, "Of the Understanding," by saying: "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS" (T 1.1.1.1, SBN 1). In his later Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (hereafter Enquiry) he says much the same thing, but adds an example: "Every one will readily allow, that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory the sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination" (EHU 2.1, SBN 17). In neither work does he make an attempt to explain what he means by the phrase, "perceptions of the mind," but it would have been obvious to any eighteenthcentury reader that he is using that expression much as Descartes and Locke had used the term "idea": for anything that mind is aware of or experiences. As he put it later in the Treatise: "To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive" (T 1.2.6.7, SBN 67). Hume's initial step in the Treatise is to show that perceptions of the mind may divided into "two distinct kinds," impressions and ideas. These two kinds commonly differ, he says, "in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind." Among our impressions, those perceptions with the most "force and vivacity," are sensations (including those of pain and pleasure) and the passions and emotions. Ideas are described as "the faint images" of impressions that are found "in
Your use of the HUME STUDIES archive indicates your acceptance of HUME STUDIES' Terms and Conditi... more Your use of the HUME STUDIES archive indicates your acceptance of HUME STUDIES' Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.humesociety.org/hs/about/terms.html. HUME STUDIES' Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the HUME STUDIES archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a HUME STUDIES transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
This is a book about Hume's epistemology in A Treatise of Human Nature. I un dertake to pres... more This is a book about Hume's epistemology in A Treatise of Human Nature. I un dertake to present a sustained interpretation of a theory of justification opera tive in that work. In doing so, I mine sections that have received comparatively little attention. These include I.iii.9 (“Of the ...
... that relations are just complex ideas, it might be wondered whether he has an account of judg... more ... that relations are just complex ideas, it might be wondered whether he has an account of judgment at all. ... Hume saw the problems such a theory faced concerning existential beliefs ... By ceasing to treat existence as a predicate, Hume was confronted with the issue of what it was to ...
Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile... more Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile apparent contradictions in Hume's theory. Two examples occur early in Part I of Book I of the Treatise. Hume argues that all ideas are derivable from impressions (what Garrett calls "the Copy Principle"). Garrett defends Hume's rigorous attempt to found this principle empirically, taking Hume at his word when he describes it as "the first principle I establish in the science of human nature." (T 7)1 Notoriously, Hume almost immediately provides a counter-example: suppose a person had experienced all shades of blue except one, and further suppose they were presented with a table of all these shades, with a blank where the missing shade ought to be. Clearly, Hume says, such a person could supply "from his own imagination" the relevant idea, without having first experienced the corresponding impression. This presents an apparent counter-example to the Copy Principle. Another example occurs a little later. Hume claims that "Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation." (T 10) Distinct ideas are separable. Garrett calls this "the Separability Principle", and it is almost as important for Hume as the Copy Principle. For one thing, it shows that Hume's theory of ideas, though heavily influenced by Locke, is importantly different from the earlier theory: Locke thought there were some necessary connections between distinct ideas, connections that could not be reduced to identities or partial identities.2 More importantly, the separability of distinct ideas is the primary ground of Hume's conceivability criterion of demonstration, crucially employed in the arguments concerning the causation, necessary connection and induction. But Hume seems to present an apparent counter-example to the Separability Principle as well. When discussing distinctions of reason, Hume admits that we can distinguish between "the
By the time Hume started to work on his Treatise, the notion of an idea as the primary, most gene... more By the time Hume started to work on his Treatise, the notion of an idea as the primary, most general sort of mental item dominated European philosophy. Although Descartes noted that, strictly speaking, only those "thoughts that are as it were images of things" were appropriately described as ideas, in practice he used "the word 'idea' to refer to whatever is immediately perceived by the mind." 1 Not only do we have ideas of trees and the sun, but we also have ideas of our own activities of thinking and willing. Locke characterizes 'idea' as "being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks." Locke also thinks that we not only have ideas that derive from things or objects in the world (ideas of sensation), but also of the activities and operations of our own minds (ideas of reflection). Ideas of sensation are acquired through the operation of external objects on our sense organs, while ideas of reflection come from introspection, from thinking about what happens within our own minds. He also thinks that these ideas of reflection are of two basic sorts of mental activity, perception and willing, that correspond to two faculties of mind: the understanding (or the power of thinking) and the will (or the power of volition). 2 Hume introduced important innovations concerning the theory of ideas. The two most important are the distinction between impressions and ideas, and the use he made of the principles of association in explaining mental phenomena. Hume divided the perceptions of the mind into two classes. The members of one class, impressions, he held to have a greater degree of force and vivacity than the members of the other class, ideas. He also supposed that ideas are causally dependent copies of impressions. And, unlike Locke and others, Hume makes positive use of the principle of association, both of the association of 80 ideas, and, in a more limited way, of the association of impressions. Such associations are central to his explanations of causal reasoning, belief, the indirect passions (pride and humility, love and hatred), and sympathy. These views about impressions and ideas and the principles of association form the core of Hume's science of human nature. Relying on them, he attempts a rigorously empirical investigation of human nature. The resulting system is a remarkable but complex achievement. I. IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS Hume begins Book 1 of the Treatise, "Of the Understanding," by saying: "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS" (T 1.1.1.1, SBN 1). In his later Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (hereafter Enquiry) he says much the same thing, but adds an example: "Every one will readily allow, that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory the sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination" (EHU 2.1, SBN 17). In neither work does he make an attempt to explain what he means by the phrase, "perceptions of the mind," but it would have been obvious to any eighteenthcentury reader that he is using that expression much as Descartes and Locke had used the term "idea": for anything that mind is aware of or experiences. As he put it later in the Treatise: "To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive" (T 1.2.6.7, SBN 67). Hume's initial step in the Treatise is to show that perceptions of the mind may divided into "two distinct kinds," impressions and ideas. These two kinds commonly differ, he says, "in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind." Among our impressions, those perceptions with the most "force and vivacity," are sensations (including those of pain and pleasure) and the passions and emotions. Ideas are described as "the faint images" of impressions that are found "in
Your use of the HUME STUDIES archive indicates your acceptance of HUME STUDIES' Terms and Conditi... more Your use of the HUME STUDIES archive indicates your acceptance of HUME STUDIES' Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.humesociety.org/hs/about/terms.html. HUME STUDIES' Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the HUME STUDIES archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a HUME STUDIES transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
This is a book about Hume's epistemology in A Treatise of Human Nature. I un dertake to pres... more This is a book about Hume's epistemology in A Treatise of Human Nature. I un dertake to present a sustained interpretation of a theory of justification opera tive in that work. In doing so, I mine sections that have received comparatively little attention. These include I.iii.9 (“Of the ...
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