The subject of this volume is ''legalization and world politics.'' ''World politics'' in this for... more The subject of this volume is ''legalization and world politics.'' ''World politics'' in this formulation needs no clarification, but ''legalization''-the real focus of the volume-must be more clearly defined, if only because of its relative unfamiliarity to students of international relations. In the introduction the editors have briefly previewed the concept of legalization used throughout the volume, a concept developed collaboratively by the authors of this article. We understand legalization as a particular form of institutionalization characterized by three components: obligation, precision, and delegation. In this article, we introduce these three characteristics, explore their variability and the range of institutional forms produced by combining them, and explicate the elements of legalization in greater detail. The Elements of Legalization ''Legalization'' refers to a particular set of characteristics that institutions may (or may not) possess. These characteristics are defined along three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation. Obligation means that states or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of rules or commitments. Specifically, it means that they are legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that their behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of international law, and often of domestic law as well. Precision means that rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation means that third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules. Each of these dimensions is a matter of degree and gradation, not a rigid dichotomy, and each can vary independently. Consequently, the concept of legalization encompasses a multidimensional continuum, ranging from the ''ideal type'' of legal
The review of international organizations, Feb 28, 2024
By nearly every measure, power in the international system is concentrated, meaning that most sta... more By nearly every measure, power in the international system is concentrated, meaning that most states lack significant power resources. And yet international relations theory tends to focus on the behavior of great powers. This special issue instead explores the strategies that "weak" states use in the context of international organizations both to advance their interests and to resist pressure from stronger states. We define weakness as a relative lack of power across one or more dimensions. While the literature, to the extent it has focused on weak actors, has too often defined weakness solely in material terms, we adopt a broader conception that builds on the influential typology of power by Barnett and Duvall (Barnett and Duvall, 2005a, Barnett and Duvall, International Organization 59, 39-75, 2005b). A multidimensional conceptualization of power allows analysts to show how actors that are weak in one dimension (often material power) may be stronger on other dimensions, giving them greater capacity for action than is often recognized. From this framework we create a typology of "strategies of the weak" that emphasizes the agency of weaker actors to make the most of their positions. The contributions to the special issue, summarized here, illuminate and substantiate many of these strategies across a diverse range of international organizations, understood as both forums and actors. As the articles show, these alternative theoretical mechanisms help explain how and why seemingly weak states sometimes fare better than a simplistic assessment of their material capabilities might suggest. By deepening our understanding of weakness and how it influences state behavior, the volume advances our theoretical understanding of how power is built, wielded, and resisted in and through international organization.
Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mar 1, 2017
Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (... more Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation as a three- (or more) party relationship, with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets to building communities of assurance and trust. After developing the basic regulator-intermediary-target (RIT) model, we discuss important extensions and variations of the model. We then discuss the varieties of regulatory capture that may appear where intermediaries are involved.
Why are international institutions organized in such different ways? Some, like the World Trade O... more Why are international institutions organized in such different ways? Some, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Health Organization, seek very wide memberships. Others, like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Group of Eight, are deliberately restricted. Some, like the UN, cover an extremely broad range of issues. Others are narrowly focused, dealing with a single product (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC) or a single problem (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species). Some, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), perform a variety of centralized tasks and even negotiate sensitive economic policies with member states. Others do little more than organize meetings and collate information, as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum does for its members. Most institutions allocate votes equally to all members. But a few of the more important institutions-including the IMF, European Union (EU), and UN Security Council-give large members more votes and effective veto power. Some institutions, like the Outer Space Treaty, are built around rigid promises. Others, like the WTO, allow states to alter their obligations when faced with unusual circumstances. All these institutions address serious problems of international cooperation, but they are designed in very different ways to cope with them. What explains these differences in institutional design? The Rational Design project has one overriding aim: to make explicit the connections between specific cooperation problems and their institutional solutions.' To transform this broad goal into a workable research We thank Jeffrey Smith, Marc Trachtenberg, Deborah Larson, Matthew Baum, Stanley Sheinbaum, the anonymous reviewers, and the editors of 10, David Lake and Peter Gourevitch. 1. In the volume's introduction we define international institution broadly enough to include treaties but not so broadly as to include tacit bargaining; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, this volume.
Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regula... more Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regulate targets. Existing literatures focus heavily on intermediaries of a single type-Opportunists, motivated solely by self-interest. But intermediaries can also be motivated by different types of loyalty: to leaders (Vassals), to policies (Zealots), or to institutions (Mandarins). While all three types of loyalists are resistant to the traditional problems of opportunism (slacking and capture), each brings pathologies of its own. We explain the behavioral logic of each type of loyalty and analyze the risks and rewards of different intermediary loyaltiesboth for governors and for the public interest. We illustrate our claims with examples drawn from many different realms of regulation and governance.
Nesting, Overlap and Parallelism: Governance Schemes for International Production Standards Ken A... more Nesting, Overlap and Parallelism: Governance Schemes for International Production Standards Ken Abbott and Duncan Snidal Memo for Alter-Meunier Princeton Nesting Conference February 2006 Some of our current research concerns the development of governance ...
International institutions may have an important role to play in ensuring advanced AI systems ben... more International institutions may have an important role to play in ensuring advanced AI systems benefit humanity. International collaborations can unlock AI's ability to further sustainable development, and coordination of regulatory efforts can reduce obstacles to innovation and the spread of benefits. Conversely, the potential dangerous capabilities of powerful and general-purpose AI systems create global externalities in their development and deployment, and international efforts to further responsible AI practices could help manage the risks they pose. This paper identifies a set of governance functions that could be performed at an international level to address these challenges, ranging from supporting access to frontier AI systems to setting international safety standards. It groups these functions into four institutional models that exhibit internal synergies and have precedents in existing organizations: 1) a Commission on Frontier AI that facilitates expert consensus on opportunities and risks from advanced AI, 2) an Advanced AI Governance Organization that sets international standards to manage global threats from advanced models, supports their implementation, and possibly monitors compliance with a future governance regime, 3) a Frontier AI Collaborative that promotes access to cutting-edge AI, and 4) an AI Safety Project that brings together leading researchers and engineers to further AI safety research. We explore the utility of these models and identify open questions about their viability.
Koremos, et. al. in this article attempt to shift the focus of research in Institutionalist I.R. ... more Koremos, et. al. in this article attempt to shift the focus of research in Institutionalist I.R. theory from the question of whether or not institutions matter to the question of how these institutions actually work. Their main goal is to offer a systematic account of the wide range of design features that characterized international institutions. The authors basic premise is that states use international institutions to further their own goals and they design them accordingly. Thus design differences are not random and can be modeled. They work within the rational choice framework. Rational design can explain much about institutions but not everything.
Analysts have had a long fascination with moments of significant change and discontinuity in poli... more Analysts have had a long fascination with moments of significant change and discontinuity in political relations. Studies of “exogenous shocks,” “critical junctures,” “historical events,” “policy windows,” and “punctuated equilibria” have occupied a prominent place in qualitative assessments of policy and institutional change. Yet, despite analysts’ interest, these turning points remain poorly understood. Leading theoretical treatments are overwhelmingly descriptive, offering little in the way of explanatory capacity. Introducing the concept of Temporal Focal Points, my thesis provides a temporal extension to Thomas C. Schelling’s focal point hypothesis. Temporal Focal Points—definite, exceptional phases along the temporal continuum—precipitate a convergence of expectations among actors in time that heightens the likelihood of agreement. Convergent expectations are a crucial means of overcoming temporal coordination problems among actors. By facilitating a spike in analytical activi...
New international agreements often recycle language from previous agreements, using boilerplate s... more New international agreements often recycle language from previous agreements, using boilerplate solutions alongside customized provisions. The presence of boilerplate in international agreements has important implications for understanding how international rules are made. The determinants behind boilerplate in international agreements have not previously been systematically evaluated. Using original data from a sample of 348 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) adopted between 1989 and 2009, we combine novel text analysis measures with Latent Order Logistic (LOLOG) graph network techniques to assess the determinants behind boilerplate in labor and environmental provisions commonly found in PTAs. Our results indicate that whereas boilerplate can be used for both efficiency and distributive purposes, international boilerplate is used primarily for efficiency gains and power-distribution considerations are not systematically important.
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views ind... more Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult to control because the policy benefits they can create (or the trouble they can cause) give them leverage. Conversely, tight governor control constrains intermediaries. The governor thus faces a dilemma: emphasizing control limits intermediary competence and risks policy failure; emphasizing intermediary competence risks control failure. This “governor's dilemma” helps to explain puzzling features of indirect governance: why it is not limited to principal–agent delegation but takes multiple forms; why governors choose forms that ...
The study of informal international institutions has advanced considerably over the past decade. ... more The study of informal international institutions has advanced considerably over the past decade. Much of this work, including our own, has approached this phenomenon from the perspective of rationalist institutionalism. Yet, existing work has also been criticized from several conceptual, theoretical, and empirical angles. The recent special issue of International Politics on the “cascading dynamics” of informality by Cooper et al. (Int Politics, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-022-00399-4) offers an important example of such critiques. It builds on earlier work in the field, advancing our understanding of a number of processes and institutions, but also partly casts itself as a reaction to the approach we have adopted. We argue that key aspects of this critique are misguided and that Cooper et al. exaggerate the differences that divide us. Our aim in this article is to respond to their criticisms, clarify the key research issues at stake, emphasize the complementarities among a...
The subject of this volume is ''legalization and world politics.'' ''World politics'' in this for... more The subject of this volume is ''legalization and world politics.'' ''World politics'' in this formulation needs no clarification, but ''legalization''-the real focus of the volume-must be more clearly defined, if only because of its relative unfamiliarity to students of international relations. In the introduction the editors have briefly previewed the concept of legalization used throughout the volume, a concept developed collaboratively by the authors of this article. We understand legalization as a particular form of institutionalization characterized by three components: obligation, precision, and delegation. In this article, we introduce these three characteristics, explore their variability and the range of institutional forms produced by combining them, and explicate the elements of legalization in greater detail. The Elements of Legalization ''Legalization'' refers to a particular set of characteristics that institutions may (or may not) possess. These characteristics are defined along three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation. Obligation means that states or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of rules or commitments. Specifically, it means that they are legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that their behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of international law, and often of domestic law as well. Precision means that rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation means that third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules. Each of these dimensions is a matter of degree and gradation, not a rigid dichotomy, and each can vary independently. Consequently, the concept of legalization encompasses a multidimensional continuum, ranging from the ''ideal type'' of legal
The review of international organizations, Feb 28, 2024
By nearly every measure, power in the international system is concentrated, meaning that most sta... more By nearly every measure, power in the international system is concentrated, meaning that most states lack significant power resources. And yet international relations theory tends to focus on the behavior of great powers. This special issue instead explores the strategies that "weak" states use in the context of international organizations both to advance their interests and to resist pressure from stronger states. We define weakness as a relative lack of power across one or more dimensions. While the literature, to the extent it has focused on weak actors, has too often defined weakness solely in material terms, we adopt a broader conception that builds on the influential typology of power by Barnett and Duvall (Barnett and Duvall, 2005a, Barnett and Duvall, International Organization 59, 39-75, 2005b). A multidimensional conceptualization of power allows analysts to show how actors that are weak in one dimension (often material power) may be stronger on other dimensions, giving them greater capacity for action than is often recognized. From this framework we create a typology of "strategies of the weak" that emphasizes the agency of weaker actors to make the most of their positions. The contributions to the special issue, summarized here, illuminate and substantiate many of these strategies across a diverse range of international organizations, understood as both forums and actors. As the articles show, these alternative theoretical mechanisms help explain how and why seemingly weak states sometimes fare better than a simplistic assessment of their material capabilities might suggest. By deepening our understanding of weakness and how it influences state behavior, the volume advances our theoretical understanding of how power is built, wielded, and resisted in and through international organization.
Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mar 1, 2017
Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (... more Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation as a three- (or more) party relationship, with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets to building communities of assurance and trust. After developing the basic regulator-intermediary-target (RIT) model, we discuss important extensions and variations of the model. We then discuss the varieties of regulatory capture that may appear where intermediaries are involved.
Why are international institutions organized in such different ways? Some, like the World Trade O... more Why are international institutions organized in such different ways? Some, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Health Organization, seek very wide memberships. Others, like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Group of Eight, are deliberately restricted. Some, like the UN, cover an extremely broad range of issues. Others are narrowly focused, dealing with a single product (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC) or a single problem (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species). Some, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), perform a variety of centralized tasks and even negotiate sensitive economic policies with member states. Others do little more than organize meetings and collate information, as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum does for its members. Most institutions allocate votes equally to all members. But a few of the more important institutions-including the IMF, European Union (EU), and UN Security Council-give large members more votes and effective veto power. Some institutions, like the Outer Space Treaty, are built around rigid promises. Others, like the WTO, allow states to alter their obligations when faced with unusual circumstances. All these institutions address serious problems of international cooperation, but they are designed in very different ways to cope with them. What explains these differences in institutional design? The Rational Design project has one overriding aim: to make explicit the connections between specific cooperation problems and their institutional solutions.' To transform this broad goal into a workable research We thank Jeffrey Smith, Marc Trachtenberg, Deborah Larson, Matthew Baum, Stanley Sheinbaum, the anonymous reviewers, and the editors of 10, David Lake and Peter Gourevitch. 1. In the volume's introduction we define international institution broadly enough to include treaties but not so broadly as to include tacit bargaining; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, this volume.
Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regula... more Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regulate targets. Existing literatures focus heavily on intermediaries of a single type-Opportunists, motivated solely by self-interest. But intermediaries can also be motivated by different types of loyalty: to leaders (Vassals), to policies (Zealots), or to institutions (Mandarins). While all three types of loyalists are resistant to the traditional problems of opportunism (slacking and capture), each brings pathologies of its own. We explain the behavioral logic of each type of loyalty and analyze the risks and rewards of different intermediary loyaltiesboth for governors and for the public interest. We illustrate our claims with examples drawn from many different realms of regulation and governance.
Nesting, Overlap and Parallelism: Governance Schemes for International Production Standards Ken A... more Nesting, Overlap and Parallelism: Governance Schemes for International Production Standards Ken Abbott and Duncan Snidal Memo for Alter-Meunier Princeton Nesting Conference February 2006 Some of our current research concerns the development of governance ...
International institutions may have an important role to play in ensuring advanced AI systems ben... more International institutions may have an important role to play in ensuring advanced AI systems benefit humanity. International collaborations can unlock AI's ability to further sustainable development, and coordination of regulatory efforts can reduce obstacles to innovation and the spread of benefits. Conversely, the potential dangerous capabilities of powerful and general-purpose AI systems create global externalities in their development and deployment, and international efforts to further responsible AI practices could help manage the risks they pose. This paper identifies a set of governance functions that could be performed at an international level to address these challenges, ranging from supporting access to frontier AI systems to setting international safety standards. It groups these functions into four institutional models that exhibit internal synergies and have precedents in existing organizations: 1) a Commission on Frontier AI that facilitates expert consensus on opportunities and risks from advanced AI, 2) an Advanced AI Governance Organization that sets international standards to manage global threats from advanced models, supports their implementation, and possibly monitors compliance with a future governance regime, 3) a Frontier AI Collaborative that promotes access to cutting-edge AI, and 4) an AI Safety Project that brings together leading researchers and engineers to further AI safety research. We explore the utility of these models and identify open questions about their viability.
Koremos, et. al. in this article attempt to shift the focus of research in Institutionalist I.R. ... more Koremos, et. al. in this article attempt to shift the focus of research in Institutionalist I.R. theory from the question of whether or not institutions matter to the question of how these institutions actually work. Their main goal is to offer a systematic account of the wide range of design features that characterized international institutions. The authors basic premise is that states use international institutions to further their own goals and they design them accordingly. Thus design differences are not random and can be modeled. They work within the rational choice framework. Rational design can explain much about institutions but not everything.
Analysts have had a long fascination with moments of significant change and discontinuity in poli... more Analysts have had a long fascination with moments of significant change and discontinuity in political relations. Studies of “exogenous shocks,” “critical junctures,” “historical events,” “policy windows,” and “punctuated equilibria” have occupied a prominent place in qualitative assessments of policy and institutional change. Yet, despite analysts’ interest, these turning points remain poorly understood. Leading theoretical treatments are overwhelmingly descriptive, offering little in the way of explanatory capacity. Introducing the concept of Temporal Focal Points, my thesis provides a temporal extension to Thomas C. Schelling’s focal point hypothesis. Temporal Focal Points—definite, exceptional phases along the temporal continuum—precipitate a convergence of expectations among actors in time that heightens the likelihood of agreement. Convergent expectations are a crucial means of overcoming temporal coordination problems among actors. By facilitating a spike in analytical activi...
New international agreements often recycle language from previous agreements, using boilerplate s... more New international agreements often recycle language from previous agreements, using boilerplate solutions alongside customized provisions. The presence of boilerplate in international agreements has important implications for understanding how international rules are made. The determinants behind boilerplate in international agreements have not previously been systematically evaluated. Using original data from a sample of 348 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) adopted between 1989 and 2009, we combine novel text analysis measures with Latent Order Logistic (LOLOG) graph network techniques to assess the determinants behind boilerplate in labor and environmental provisions commonly found in PTAs. Our results indicate that whereas boilerplate can be used for both efficiency and distributive purposes, international boilerplate is used primarily for efficiency gains and power-distribution considerations are not systematically important.
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views ind... more Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult to control because the policy benefits they can create (or the trouble they can cause) give them leverage. Conversely, tight governor control constrains intermediaries. The governor thus faces a dilemma: emphasizing control limits intermediary competence and risks policy failure; emphasizing intermediary competence risks control failure. This “governor's dilemma” helps to explain puzzling features of indirect governance: why it is not limited to principal–agent delegation but takes multiple forms; why governors choose forms that ...
The study of informal international institutions has advanced considerably over the past decade. ... more The study of informal international institutions has advanced considerably over the past decade. Much of this work, including our own, has approached this phenomenon from the perspective of rationalist institutionalism. Yet, existing work has also been criticized from several conceptual, theoretical, and empirical angles. The recent special issue of International Politics on the “cascading dynamics” of informality by Cooper et al. (Int Politics, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-022-00399-4) offers an important example of such critiques. It builds on earlier work in the field, advancing our understanding of a number of processes and institutions, but also partly casts itself as a reaction to the approach we have adopted. We argue that key aspects of this critique are misguided and that Cooper et al. exaggerate the differences that divide us. Our aim in this article is to respond to their criticisms, clarify the key research issues at stake, emphasize the complementarities among a...
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