Book Chapters by Colette Sciberras
Handbook of Buddhism in Europe, eds. Martin Baumann, Jorn Borup, Knut Jacobsen
This chapter explores the presence and practice of Buddhism in Malta. It begins by examining ear... more This chapter explores the presence and practice of Buddhism in Malta. It begins by examining early Maltese-language references to Buddhism and other Asian philosophies and arts, outlining the initial academic, artistic, and practical engagements with Buddhist thought. The chapter then provides an overview of current Buddhist demographics and organizations in Malta, detailing various Buddhist activities from the past two decades. Finally, an exploratory study of a small sample of Maltese Buddhists is presented, aiming to understand the diverse forms of Buddhism practiced on the islands and the unique challenges and experiences faced by Buddhists in Malta.
Hartman, Laura (ed.) That all may Flourish: Comparative Religious Environmental Ethics, 2018
This chapter compares Western philosophical and scientific foundations with Buddhist philosophies... more This chapter compares Western philosophical and scientific foundations with Buddhist philosophies on the topic of flourishing in nature. It argues that flourishing is good by querying the purpose of nature, the existence of God and the good. Defining flourishing in terms of Aristotle’s final cause, and questioning some of the assumptions of the founders of modern science, the chapter presents a common quandary – whether science and faith are reconcilable. Through attempting to steer a Middle way between belief in eternal souls, gods and divine purposes, and the depressing conclusions of nihilists and (some) atheists, it suggests that Buddhism can be seen as scientific, if the definition of what counts as an ‘observation’ is widened. Then, by weaving together Buddhism and Aristotle, the chapter makes the case for the positive value of flourishing in nature and among humans.
Hartman, Laura (ed.) That all may Flourish: Comparative Religious Environmental Ethics, 2018
This dialogue brings Buddhist thought into conversation with Protestant Christian theological eth... more This dialogue brings Buddhist thought into conversation with Protestant Christian theological ethics. The chapter examines the worldly and spiritual conflicts and connections of flourishing in Buddhist philosophy, and how those concepts echo Christian writings. Dialogue follows about Buddhist and Christian views of the afterlife, as well as suffering and impermanence, goodness and permanence, and how there can be happiness in both permanence and impermanence. Further discussion about how the tensions between material and spiritual flourishing play out in other aspects of life leads to the questions whether the world may be seen as good, what counts as good, and where value lies.
Issues in Ethics and Animal Rights, 2011
A Philosopher at Large: Essays commemorating Peter Serracino Inglott, 2013
Journal Articles by Colette Sciberras
Environmental Values 22 (3), Jun 2013
I examine whether certain aspects of early Buddhist doctrine are compatible with ascribing value ... more I examine whether certain aspects of early Buddhist doctrine are compatible with ascribing value to nature, by focusing, in particular, on the doctrine of the Three Marks of Existence. This portrays the world as characterized by suffering, impermanence, and by ‘not-self.’ From the perspective of environmental philosophy, each of these is problematic, either because nature is viewed negatively, or else because only nibbāna is valued positively, and this is understood to entail a repudiation of the world. I argue against such interpretations and show that the doctrine of not-self militates against any attribution of value, whether positive or negative. This disposes of the prevalent charge that the doctrines imply a negative view of nature.
Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 2008
In this article, I defend Buddhism from Paul Waldau's charge of speciesism. I argue that Waldau a... more In this article, I defend Buddhism from Paul Waldau's charge of speciesism. I argue that Waldau attributes to Buddhism various notions that it does not necessarily have, such as the ideas that beings are morally considerable if they possess certain traits, and that humans, as morally considerable beings, ought never to be treated as means. These ideas may not belong in Buddhism, and for Waldau's argument to work, he needs to show that they do. Moreover, a closer look at his case reveals a more significant problem for ecologically minded Buddhists-namely that the Pāli texts do not seem to attribute intrinsic value to any form of life at all, regardless of species. Thus, I conclude that rather than relying on
Conference Presentations by Colette Sciberras
Post-traditional Buddhism is generally presented as being highly rational and even scientific, a... more Post-traditional Buddhism is generally presented as being highly rational and even scientific, and the seemingly superstitious practices of Tibetan Buddhists are, at best, overlooked by Western observers. Yet since the arrival of Tibetan Buddhism to the West, some of its largest institutions have been subject to scandalous allegations of abuse, which make it appear that the modern Western mind is as gullible as any other, and that the Enlightenment and secularization process have done little to prevent Europeans from falling prey to superstition, charlatans, and cults.
The contradictions in Tibetan Buddhism, and the controversies they often give rise to, can be elucidated through distinguishing between three waves of Buddhism around the world: first, traditional, ‘pre-colonization Buddhism,’ which perhaps no longer exists anywhere in a pure form; second, modern, ‘scientific Buddhism,’ which is the offspring of four centuries of East-West interaction, and which predominates in the popular understanding of ‘Buddhism’ worldwide; and finally post-secular ‘glocal Buddhism,’ which rejects the straightjacket of science, rationality, and Western modernity, and instead promotes diversity and localisation, while emphasizing the Buddha’s original experience. Tibetan institutions, teachers, and students each contain different blends of all of these strands, which can give rise to confusion and misunderstanding.
History has brought it about that what is referred to as ‘Buddhism’ today is often presented as a... more History has brought it about that what is referred to as ‘Buddhism’ today is often presented as a highly reasonable, evidence-based, and even scientific approach to understanding reality and our place in it. From the collaborations of the Dalai Lama with neuro- and cognitive scientists, to the rise of mindfulness apps and robotic zen priests, we find that Buddhism seems to be making leaps and bounds in its attempt to keep up with modern times, often paying the same allegiance to science, technological optimism, and instrumentalist reasoning that defines the spirit of modernity.
All this belies the vast number of seemingly irrational and superstitious beliefs and practices, including the numerous claims to magic-making and psychic-abilities, which pervade most forms of Buddhism up to this day. Often written off as a subsequent aberration of the Buddha’s original teachings, Vajrayāna Buddhism, in particular, is often denied the status of being ‘true Buddhism;’ as though the reformist and protestant trends of 16th Century Europe had spread through Asia too. The modern view of Buddhism as highly rational predominates to such an extent that anything that does not easily fit with it is often seen as a corruption and not an authentic form of Buddhism.
Yet, even the most rigorous attempt to stay true to the original Buddhist teachings, perhaps by restricting one’s studies to the Pāli canon, or even just those sutras found in the Gadhāran manuscripts from the first century BCE, will encounter an emphasis on faith and devotion to the Buddha, and an account of miracles performed by his advanced students, which is difficult to reconcile with the thesis that Buddhism is scientific. In contrast to the picture portrayed by early teachers and interpreters of Buddhism to the West – such as the Sri Lankan reformer Anagārika Dharmapāla, and Henry Steel Olcott, co-founder of the Theosophical Society – even the oldest known Buddhist texts contain exhortations to faith and belief, and several accounts of magic and miracles.
Within Tibetan Buddhism, a form of Vajrayāna Buddhism, the main object of faith is the guru or lama. In pre-1950s Tibet, which is best described as a theocratic feudalism, this evolved into a highly ritualised system of lama worship; recognized reincarnate lamas, known as tulkus, are placed on a throne, often at a very young age, to be treated as living Buddhas by the general populace, which, in its devotion, supported the monasteries financially and was subject to monastic rule. Although this may have functioned reasonably well in pre-modern Tibet; today, when cameras, the internet, and social media are pervasive, there are many reasons for devotees to become disillusioned with the lama’s behaviour, to doubt his realization, and consequently, for anti-clericalism to arise.
It is arguable that the various scandals that have riddled Tibetan Buddhism ever since Tibet encountered modernity are the result of a clash between two ‘waves’ of Buddhism, the wave of premodern traditions and beliefs, that is, Tibetan Buddhism as it existed before the 1950s , and the modern wave of Buddhism interpreted as rational and scientific, which Tibetan Buddhists have responded to for at least sixty years. It could also be stated that a third ‘wave’ of Buddhism – termed ‘global’ or ‘glocal’ Buddhism – understands this clash and responds by rejecting the colonialising attitude that requires Buddhism to fit the straightjacket of Western forms of science and rationality.
One way to do this is to reject the concept of knowledge as exclusively that imparted to the modern mind by Plato; as justified, true belief, that is. When Tibetan Buddhists who practice dzogchen talk of ‘merging one’s mind with the mind of the guru,’ this involves a non-dualistic form of knowledge that cannot be stated as a propositional belief, much less declared to be true or false, or given any justification. As we read in the three statements of Garab Dorje, knowing the essence of the mind is followed by a decision, not a justification, and that decision is based on confidence, not reasoning.
This explains, perhaps, how Tibetan Buddhist institutions in the West can survive scandals similar to those the Roman Catholic Church seems to struggle with. Yet, to the extent that Tibetan Buddhism becomes increasingly immersed in the West, it will perhaps need to address the ever-growing number of complaints being made against lamas. It can do this either by abolishing the institution of recognized reincarnate lamas and/or the practice of public devotion, or else it can lay claim to guru devotion as a form of knowing. The latter, however, will probably entail supplying reasons and justifications to appeal to the modern mind; that is, all the options presented involve capitulating once again to colonialism. If somehow Tibetan Buddhism is to survive in the contemporary world, unabashed and unreformed, it might, perhaps, have to return to secrecy.
Theses by Colette Sciberras
I examine the consistency between contemporary environmentalist ideals and Buddhist philosophy, f... more I examine the consistency between contemporary environmentalist ideals and Buddhist philosophy, focusing, first, on the problem of value in nature. I argue that the teachings found
in the Pāli canon cannot easily be reconciled with a belief in the intrinsic value of life, whether human or otherwise. This is because all existence is regarded as inherently unsatisfactory, and all beings are seen as impermanent and insubstantial, while the ultimate spiritual goal is often viewed, in early Buddhism, as involving a deep renunciation of the world.
Therefore, the discussion focuses mostly on the Mahāyāna vehicle, which, I suggest has better resources for environmentalism because enlightenment and the ordinary world are not conceived as antithetical. Still, many contemporary green ideas do not sit well with classical Mahāyāna doctrines. Mahāyāna philosophers coincide in equating ultimate reality with 'emptiness,‘ and propose knowledge of this reality as a final soteriological purpose.
Emptiness is generally said to be ineffable, and to involve the negation of all views. An important question is how to reconcile environmentalism with the relinquishing of views. I consider several prevalent themes in environmentalism, including the philosophy of
'Oneness,‘ and other systems that are often compared with Buddhism, like process thought. Many of these turn out to have more in common with an extreme view that Buddhism seeks
to avoid, namely, eternalism.
I attempt to outline an environmental position that, like the doctrine of emptiness, traverses a Middle Path between eternalism and nihilism. I conclude by proposing that emptiness could be regarded as the source of value in nature, if it is seen in its more positive aspect, as 'pliancy.‘ This would imply that what
Buddhist environmentalists should seek to protect is not any being in its current form, nor any static natural system, but the possibility of adaptation and further evolution.
I will consider the issue of the self and its relation to the environment, focusing on the accoun... more I will consider the issue of the self and its relation to the environment, focusing on the accounts given in ecofeminism and deep ecology. Though both stress the relatedness of the human self to nature, these accounts differ in various ways. Ecofeminism stresses the value of personal relations with particular others, whereas deep ecology argues that we should expand our sense of self to include all natural others and the whole of nature.
Deep ecology’s views on the self, which are loosely based on scientific ecology will be examined further and I will argue that the implications are that selves are not to be seen as static things but rather as processes, and as constituted by their relations with others. This understanding of the self, I will argue, enriches both deep ecology and ecofeminism’s claims on selfhood, and will enable the resolution of some of the difficulties they perceive in each other’s account.
Self-Published Text Books by Colette Sciberras
Philosophy for MATSEC, 2020
Module 2 Part 2 of the MATSEC Intermediate and Advanced Philosophy Syllabi (EQF 4)
Philosophy for MATSEC, 2021
Module 1 of the MATSEC Intermediate and Advanced Philosophy Syllabi (EQF 4)
Other papers by Colette Sciberras
The compatibility of Buddhism with ecological awareness and contemporary "green" convictions is s... more The compatibility of Buddhism with ecological awareness and contemporary "green" convictions is so often taken for granted, that today, there is hardly a book published about this ancient Eastern religion, which does not have something to say about the environment. It is supposed that the two lifestyles fit neatly together; moderate consumption or frugality, for example, serves both Buddhist and environmentalist goals well. The Buddhist practice of universal loving-kindness and the emphasis on minimizing the suffering of other beings (other animals too) even at cost to oneself, can lead to various "green" practices such as vegetarianism, boycotting harmful products, protection of wild habitat, and so on. Moreover, certain Buddhist teachings are believed to reflect ecological principles, for instance, the doctrine of dependent-arising (sk. pratītyasamutpāda )-in brief, that all things depend on others-has a clear resonance with scientific ecology, which studies the relations between natural beings, for instance, species in an ecosystem.
Talks by Colette Sciberras
In Buddhism, faith is understood not just in cognitive terms, as belief without evidence, but as ... more In Buddhism, faith is understood not just in cognitive terms, as belief without evidence, but as also involving affective and conative aspects. Faith is cultivated by increasing one's feelings of love and devotion until one's heart 'leaps' into action. It is not at all a matter of developing strong beliefs. In fact, the object of faith, the Buddha, is not held to exist absolutely or even independently, but rather, like everything else, is understood to exist conventionally and/or relative to other things. Having faith in such an object is analogous to the way we have faith in money, which also has value only relatively and conventionally. In fact, in Buddhism, faith can be seen as currency to be invested in a moral market. Buddhists believe that by making offerings with faith, one can even improve circumstances in this lifetime. If this hypothesis is true, then such an understanding could be useful to environmentalists for achieving their purposes.
What was the attitude of ancient philosophers to travel? How does travel enhance philosophy? This... more What was the attitude of ancient philosophers to travel? How does travel enhance philosophy? This talk was given at Giovanni Curmi Higher Secondary School, for Library Week, 2018.
Can Faith and Reason can be reconciled? I examined the principle non-contradiction as it appears ... more Can Faith and Reason can be reconciled? I examined the principle non-contradiction as it appears in Aristotle and Buddhism, and argued that if faith is seen as a turning of the soul, rather than assent to the truth of a proposition, it can be reconciled with what we know about the world through science.
I will be giving a presentation on how nature is valued, relying on a view of the natural world a... more I will be giving a presentation on how nature is valued, relying on a view of the natural world as systems embedded within systems. We shall then consider together the implications for this for conservation practices and the scientific use of animals
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Book Chapters by Colette Sciberras
Journal Articles by Colette Sciberras
Conference Presentations by Colette Sciberras
The contradictions in Tibetan Buddhism, and the controversies they often give rise to, can be elucidated through distinguishing between three waves of Buddhism around the world: first, traditional, ‘pre-colonization Buddhism,’ which perhaps no longer exists anywhere in a pure form; second, modern, ‘scientific Buddhism,’ which is the offspring of four centuries of East-West interaction, and which predominates in the popular understanding of ‘Buddhism’ worldwide; and finally post-secular ‘glocal Buddhism,’ which rejects the straightjacket of science, rationality, and Western modernity, and instead promotes diversity and localisation, while emphasizing the Buddha’s original experience. Tibetan institutions, teachers, and students each contain different blends of all of these strands, which can give rise to confusion and misunderstanding.
All this belies the vast number of seemingly irrational and superstitious beliefs and practices, including the numerous claims to magic-making and psychic-abilities, which pervade most forms of Buddhism up to this day. Often written off as a subsequent aberration of the Buddha’s original teachings, Vajrayāna Buddhism, in particular, is often denied the status of being ‘true Buddhism;’ as though the reformist and protestant trends of 16th Century Europe had spread through Asia too. The modern view of Buddhism as highly rational predominates to such an extent that anything that does not easily fit with it is often seen as a corruption and not an authentic form of Buddhism.
Yet, even the most rigorous attempt to stay true to the original Buddhist teachings, perhaps by restricting one’s studies to the Pāli canon, or even just those sutras found in the Gadhāran manuscripts from the first century BCE, will encounter an emphasis on faith and devotion to the Buddha, and an account of miracles performed by his advanced students, which is difficult to reconcile with the thesis that Buddhism is scientific. In contrast to the picture portrayed by early teachers and interpreters of Buddhism to the West – such as the Sri Lankan reformer Anagārika Dharmapāla, and Henry Steel Olcott, co-founder of the Theosophical Society – even the oldest known Buddhist texts contain exhortations to faith and belief, and several accounts of magic and miracles.
Within Tibetan Buddhism, a form of Vajrayāna Buddhism, the main object of faith is the guru or lama. In pre-1950s Tibet, which is best described as a theocratic feudalism, this evolved into a highly ritualised system of lama worship; recognized reincarnate lamas, known as tulkus, are placed on a throne, often at a very young age, to be treated as living Buddhas by the general populace, which, in its devotion, supported the monasteries financially and was subject to monastic rule. Although this may have functioned reasonably well in pre-modern Tibet; today, when cameras, the internet, and social media are pervasive, there are many reasons for devotees to become disillusioned with the lama’s behaviour, to doubt his realization, and consequently, for anti-clericalism to arise.
It is arguable that the various scandals that have riddled Tibetan Buddhism ever since Tibet encountered modernity are the result of a clash between two ‘waves’ of Buddhism, the wave of premodern traditions and beliefs, that is, Tibetan Buddhism as it existed before the 1950s , and the modern wave of Buddhism interpreted as rational and scientific, which Tibetan Buddhists have responded to for at least sixty years. It could also be stated that a third ‘wave’ of Buddhism – termed ‘global’ or ‘glocal’ Buddhism – understands this clash and responds by rejecting the colonialising attitude that requires Buddhism to fit the straightjacket of Western forms of science and rationality.
One way to do this is to reject the concept of knowledge as exclusively that imparted to the modern mind by Plato; as justified, true belief, that is. When Tibetan Buddhists who practice dzogchen talk of ‘merging one’s mind with the mind of the guru,’ this involves a non-dualistic form of knowledge that cannot be stated as a propositional belief, much less declared to be true or false, or given any justification. As we read in the three statements of Garab Dorje, knowing the essence of the mind is followed by a decision, not a justification, and that decision is based on confidence, not reasoning.
This explains, perhaps, how Tibetan Buddhist institutions in the West can survive scandals similar to those the Roman Catholic Church seems to struggle with. Yet, to the extent that Tibetan Buddhism becomes increasingly immersed in the West, it will perhaps need to address the ever-growing number of complaints being made against lamas. It can do this either by abolishing the institution of recognized reincarnate lamas and/or the practice of public devotion, or else it can lay claim to guru devotion as a form of knowing. The latter, however, will probably entail supplying reasons and justifications to appeal to the modern mind; that is, all the options presented involve capitulating once again to colonialism. If somehow Tibetan Buddhism is to survive in the contemporary world, unabashed and unreformed, it might, perhaps, have to return to secrecy.
Theses by Colette Sciberras
in the Pāli canon cannot easily be reconciled with a belief in the intrinsic value of life, whether human or otherwise. This is because all existence is regarded as inherently unsatisfactory, and all beings are seen as impermanent and insubstantial, while the ultimate spiritual goal is often viewed, in early Buddhism, as involving a deep renunciation of the world.
Therefore, the discussion focuses mostly on the Mahāyāna vehicle, which, I suggest has better resources for environmentalism because enlightenment and the ordinary world are not conceived as antithetical. Still, many contemporary green ideas do not sit well with classical Mahāyāna doctrines. Mahāyāna philosophers coincide in equating ultimate reality with 'emptiness,‘ and propose knowledge of this reality as a final soteriological purpose.
Emptiness is generally said to be ineffable, and to involve the negation of all views. An important question is how to reconcile environmentalism with the relinquishing of views. I consider several prevalent themes in environmentalism, including the philosophy of
'Oneness,‘ and other systems that are often compared with Buddhism, like process thought. Many of these turn out to have more in common with an extreme view that Buddhism seeks
to avoid, namely, eternalism.
I attempt to outline an environmental position that, like the doctrine of emptiness, traverses a Middle Path between eternalism and nihilism. I conclude by proposing that emptiness could be regarded as the source of value in nature, if it is seen in its more positive aspect, as 'pliancy.‘ This would imply that what
Buddhist environmentalists should seek to protect is not any being in its current form, nor any static natural system, but the possibility of adaptation and further evolution.
Deep ecology’s views on the self, which are loosely based on scientific ecology will be examined further and I will argue that the implications are that selves are not to be seen as static things but rather as processes, and as constituted by their relations with others. This understanding of the self, I will argue, enriches both deep ecology and ecofeminism’s claims on selfhood, and will enable the resolution of some of the difficulties they perceive in each other’s account.
Self-Published Text Books by Colette Sciberras
Other papers by Colette Sciberras
Talks by Colette Sciberras
The contradictions in Tibetan Buddhism, and the controversies they often give rise to, can be elucidated through distinguishing between three waves of Buddhism around the world: first, traditional, ‘pre-colonization Buddhism,’ which perhaps no longer exists anywhere in a pure form; second, modern, ‘scientific Buddhism,’ which is the offspring of four centuries of East-West interaction, and which predominates in the popular understanding of ‘Buddhism’ worldwide; and finally post-secular ‘glocal Buddhism,’ which rejects the straightjacket of science, rationality, and Western modernity, and instead promotes diversity and localisation, while emphasizing the Buddha’s original experience. Tibetan institutions, teachers, and students each contain different blends of all of these strands, which can give rise to confusion and misunderstanding.
All this belies the vast number of seemingly irrational and superstitious beliefs and practices, including the numerous claims to magic-making and psychic-abilities, which pervade most forms of Buddhism up to this day. Often written off as a subsequent aberration of the Buddha’s original teachings, Vajrayāna Buddhism, in particular, is often denied the status of being ‘true Buddhism;’ as though the reformist and protestant trends of 16th Century Europe had spread through Asia too. The modern view of Buddhism as highly rational predominates to such an extent that anything that does not easily fit with it is often seen as a corruption and not an authentic form of Buddhism.
Yet, even the most rigorous attempt to stay true to the original Buddhist teachings, perhaps by restricting one’s studies to the Pāli canon, or even just those sutras found in the Gadhāran manuscripts from the first century BCE, will encounter an emphasis on faith and devotion to the Buddha, and an account of miracles performed by his advanced students, which is difficult to reconcile with the thesis that Buddhism is scientific. In contrast to the picture portrayed by early teachers and interpreters of Buddhism to the West – such as the Sri Lankan reformer Anagārika Dharmapāla, and Henry Steel Olcott, co-founder of the Theosophical Society – even the oldest known Buddhist texts contain exhortations to faith and belief, and several accounts of magic and miracles.
Within Tibetan Buddhism, a form of Vajrayāna Buddhism, the main object of faith is the guru or lama. In pre-1950s Tibet, which is best described as a theocratic feudalism, this evolved into a highly ritualised system of lama worship; recognized reincarnate lamas, known as tulkus, are placed on a throne, often at a very young age, to be treated as living Buddhas by the general populace, which, in its devotion, supported the monasteries financially and was subject to monastic rule. Although this may have functioned reasonably well in pre-modern Tibet; today, when cameras, the internet, and social media are pervasive, there are many reasons for devotees to become disillusioned with the lama’s behaviour, to doubt his realization, and consequently, for anti-clericalism to arise.
It is arguable that the various scandals that have riddled Tibetan Buddhism ever since Tibet encountered modernity are the result of a clash between two ‘waves’ of Buddhism, the wave of premodern traditions and beliefs, that is, Tibetan Buddhism as it existed before the 1950s , and the modern wave of Buddhism interpreted as rational and scientific, which Tibetan Buddhists have responded to for at least sixty years. It could also be stated that a third ‘wave’ of Buddhism – termed ‘global’ or ‘glocal’ Buddhism – understands this clash and responds by rejecting the colonialising attitude that requires Buddhism to fit the straightjacket of Western forms of science and rationality.
One way to do this is to reject the concept of knowledge as exclusively that imparted to the modern mind by Plato; as justified, true belief, that is. When Tibetan Buddhists who practice dzogchen talk of ‘merging one’s mind with the mind of the guru,’ this involves a non-dualistic form of knowledge that cannot be stated as a propositional belief, much less declared to be true or false, or given any justification. As we read in the three statements of Garab Dorje, knowing the essence of the mind is followed by a decision, not a justification, and that decision is based on confidence, not reasoning.
This explains, perhaps, how Tibetan Buddhist institutions in the West can survive scandals similar to those the Roman Catholic Church seems to struggle with. Yet, to the extent that Tibetan Buddhism becomes increasingly immersed in the West, it will perhaps need to address the ever-growing number of complaints being made against lamas. It can do this either by abolishing the institution of recognized reincarnate lamas and/or the practice of public devotion, or else it can lay claim to guru devotion as a form of knowing. The latter, however, will probably entail supplying reasons and justifications to appeal to the modern mind; that is, all the options presented involve capitulating once again to colonialism. If somehow Tibetan Buddhism is to survive in the contemporary world, unabashed and unreformed, it might, perhaps, have to return to secrecy.
in the Pāli canon cannot easily be reconciled with a belief in the intrinsic value of life, whether human or otherwise. This is because all existence is regarded as inherently unsatisfactory, and all beings are seen as impermanent and insubstantial, while the ultimate spiritual goal is often viewed, in early Buddhism, as involving a deep renunciation of the world.
Therefore, the discussion focuses mostly on the Mahāyāna vehicle, which, I suggest has better resources for environmentalism because enlightenment and the ordinary world are not conceived as antithetical. Still, many contemporary green ideas do not sit well with classical Mahāyāna doctrines. Mahāyāna philosophers coincide in equating ultimate reality with 'emptiness,‘ and propose knowledge of this reality as a final soteriological purpose.
Emptiness is generally said to be ineffable, and to involve the negation of all views. An important question is how to reconcile environmentalism with the relinquishing of views. I consider several prevalent themes in environmentalism, including the philosophy of
'Oneness,‘ and other systems that are often compared with Buddhism, like process thought. Many of these turn out to have more in common with an extreme view that Buddhism seeks
to avoid, namely, eternalism.
I attempt to outline an environmental position that, like the doctrine of emptiness, traverses a Middle Path between eternalism and nihilism. I conclude by proposing that emptiness could be regarded as the source of value in nature, if it is seen in its more positive aspect, as 'pliancy.‘ This would imply that what
Buddhist environmentalists should seek to protect is not any being in its current form, nor any static natural system, but the possibility of adaptation and further evolution.
Deep ecology’s views on the self, which are loosely based on scientific ecology will be examined further and I will argue that the implications are that selves are not to be seen as static things but rather as processes, and as constituted by their relations with others. This understanding of the self, I will argue, enriches both deep ecology and ecofeminism’s claims on selfhood, and will enable the resolution of some of the difficulties they perceive in each other’s account.
Everyday morality with regards to animals is flawed, and the problem may lie with unexamined assumptions that underlie our beliefs about ourselves and about nature. If, as a society, we are to claim any degree of moral integrity, we urgently need to re-think our treatment of nonhuman others. In other words, we need to expand our moral circle, in the same way that humans have previously widened their moral consideration to include others, for instance, with the abolition of slavery and the declaration of human rights.
I base my claims on the findings and theories of evolutionary science, and on an ancient view of nature which perhaps still pervades human consciousness - that of the Scala Naturae¬ - as it appears in Aristotle. I argue that the contrast between Aristotle and Darwin is not as great as might be imagined. Aristotle's views lend support to the idea that nonhuman beings have a good of their own written into their very natures (entelécheia). Yet his depiction of living creatures as organic - i.e. as tools for the soul - might have paved the way for the pervasive belief that nonhuman living creatures are there to serve human needs.
Since we have established, scientifically, many relevant similarities between humans and other animals - since we can agree with Aristotle that we share most functions of soul, mind, and life (psūchē) with them - especially, the capacity to feel pain, for self-directed movement, to form social bonds and groups, and for at least some precursors of thought and language - we can conclude that they have a good of their own, independent of any use humans might make of them. Our failure to take their interests into account, therefore, and our allowing them to be treated in ways we would never allow our pets to be treated, that is, our endorsement of the miserable lives that some animals lead based on nothing more than the fact that they are cows, pigs, or chickens is analogous to racism and sexism.