
Chris S Friel
Interested in Bernard Lonergan
Address: Cardiff, Wales, United Kingdom
Address: Cardiff, Wales, United Kingdom
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Ronen Bergman and Yoav Zitun:First Hours of Black Saturday • 7 Days • Yedioth Ahronoth (ynet.co.il) and for an English translation see: Israeli HQ ordered troops to shoot Israeli captives on 7 October | The Electronic Intifada
Yaniv Kubovich: IDF Ordered Hannibal Directive on October 7 to Prevent Hamas Taking Soldiers Captive - Israel News - Haaretz.com
Ronen Bergman and Yoav Zitun:First Hours of Black Saturday • 7 Days • Yedioth Ahronoth (ynet.co.il) and for an English translation see: Israeli HQ ordered troops to shoot Israeli captives on 7 October | The Electronic Intifada
Yaniv Kubovich: IDF Ordered Hannibal Directive on October 7 to Prevent Hamas Taking Soldiers Captive - Israel News - Haaretz.com
‘The apprehension of values in feelings’ is a term indicative of the later (post-1968) Lonergan: it has been the subject of debate in Lonergan scholarship. This study will re-examine sources for the later work including Scheler and Hildebrand. Lonergan uses these sources creatively. It will be argued that Lonergan is closer to Scheler in that there is no fourth level insight (or intellectual perception) in the apprehension of values, but that nevertheless Lonergan draws on Hildebrand for his account of motivation. The study traces the development of Lonergan’s thought on motivation and proposes what for short can be termed ‘the motivation theory’: In general, values are apprehended insofar as the felt experience of the subject is motivated by self-transcendence. Specifically, this involves two cases according as feelings respond to an object that is known or unknown. The next three paragraphs attempt to flesh these ideas out.
Feelings can be in response to objects that are known, and may include feelings that are self-transcending. Such feeling is revelatory—the objects in question are then revealed as values. In this way the ‘apprehension of values in feelings’ is intentional—that is, it is directed to/for the sake of an object. Nevertheless, as well as being intentional, it is conscious. Consciousness, or self-awareness, can be, as in the apprehension of values in feelings, a self-awareness of self-transcendence. That is, we are not merely aware (just as we are aware that we are about to sneeze) but we are also aware that we are moving into a fuller, deeper experience (as in moral or religious conversion). We are aware of a felt experience of self-transcendence. The object (which is first known) can be seen as a value. In a proper sense, this is what values are.
Now, although as a rule self-transcending feeling is intentional in that it involves a response to an object that is known, self-transcending feeling may not be in response to an object in any ordinary sense. For example, religious objects may also occasion a felt-experience of self-transcendence, yet these ‘objects’ are not, properly, known. For example, they may be represented symbolically, but we may have little idea of God as the final end. In such cases self-transcendence is both similar and different to that outlined in the previous paragraph. It is similar in that it also involves self-transcending motivation; it is different in that no object need be known. Lonergan’s position deliberately allows the possibility of an orientation to a mysterious value which can be felt, and thus experienced, even though the value is not known as an object—such experiencing being that of a self-transcending subject.
Thus, in speaking of ‘levels’ of consciousness, with the ‘apprehension of values in feelings’ on a fourth level, Lonergan ‘turns to the subject’ by moving away from the known object of intentionality and towards the conscious subject. Lonergan’s turn to the subject is motivated by the desire to highlight self-transcending feeling. It is a ‘turn to the vertical.’ In general such self-transcending feeling can emerge in relatively familiar situations. However, by way of exception there is also the special case of self-transcending that is the apprehension of religious value. Thus Lonergan speaks of faith as the ‘knowledge born of religious love.’ In many ways it is this special case that is in the foreground of Lonergan’s concerns. Thus Lonergan’s teaching on the apprehension of values, and more generally, his conceptual system fashioned in the later work is readily seen in the context of what he taught regarding general and special categories. That is to say, it provides an apologetic clarification of issues. He has set up a general context that allows him to speak about the gift of God’s love without presuming confessional commitment. Thus, although he was an orthodox, Catholic theologian, Lonergan has a method that facilitates dialogue in an age of pluralism. By explicitly refraining from talk of ends and objects he has not assumed prior metaphysical commitments.
Accordingly, the thesis presents an alternative perspective to much of the commentary that has evolved on Lonergan’s new notion of value and its tendency to intellectualism. Possibly this arises because sympathetic commentators are too inclined to turn to Lonergan for general positions in ethics without appreciating the narrower focus of Lonergan’s concerns. The thesis insists that Lonergan’s account of value must be seen in the light of his new notion of belief. A consideration of sources such as Rahner, Cantwell Smith, and Stewart reveals how this is now motivated by ecumenical considerations in an age of pluralism.
Although this appreciation of Lonergan’s new notion of value as just that, new, represents a hermeneutics of discontinuity, a term of art is fashioned (‘two types of deliberation’) that reveals the continuity in Lonergan’s thought as regards deliberation. Here, Lonergan’s abiding concern with conversion is highlighted. It will underline what might be called the ‘vertical’ as opposed to ‘horizontal’ concern that can be traced back to Lonergan’s essay on Finality, Love and Marriage in 1943, and indeed, in his doctoral work on Aquinas. As a matter of fact (and somewhat confusingly) the ‘notion of value’ is a technical term in Lonergan which will be elucidated by using the technical term fashioned here: Lonergan’s ‘notion of value’ corresponds to ‘vertical deliberation.’ With this term of art Lonergan stamps his mark on the new approach to value on display in Method. The notion of value, however, represents a development of the earlier notion of being.
Continuity is also traced in the development of the structure of the human good over thirty years (in four phases) always in the context of redemption. This can be seen as incorporating Lonergan’s idea of two vectors: the way up and the way down. Lonergan’s turn to the subject, then, can be viewed as moving away from extrinsicism to a softer form of apologetics.
Taken as a whole this thesis will shed light on why Lonergan regarded value theory a fruitful approach in ethics and how he could claim both that values rested on feelings, and that beliefs rested on values. That is to say, it studies the connection between value and credibility in the thought of Bernard Lonergan.
KEYWORDS:
BERNARD LONERGAN, MECHANISTIC DETERMINISM, ABSTRACTION, GALILEO, RANDOMNESS