Papers by Brian Embry
Cartesian Composites and the True Mode of Union, 2020
Descartes argues that the mind and body are really distinct substances. But he also insists that ... more Descartes argues that the mind and body are really distinct substances. But he also insists that minds and bodies are sometimes united and compose a human being. But how are mind and body united? In virtue of what do they compose a human? This question is crucial to understanding the place of human beings in Descartes's ontology. Many scholars have argued that Descartes has no solution-or no good solution-to the unity problem, and they call into question the ontological status of the mind-body composite. On some views, Cartesian humans are mere aggregates, like stacks of pancakes; on other views, Descartes is not entitled to the view that humans exist at all. I argue that Descartes has a solution to the unity problem, and he appropriates this solution from contemporaneous Jesuit discussions of soul-body unity-discussions that remain mostly unknown to contemporary scholars. The upshot is that Descartes has the metaphysical machinery to account for mind-body unity and doesn't have to say that a human being is like a stack of pancakes.
This paper explains Sebastián Izquierdo's (1601-1681) theory of priority. Izquierdo was a sevente... more This paper explains Sebastián Izquierdo's (1601-1681) theory of priority. Izquierdo was a seventeenth-century Spanish scholastic philosopher who was best known in the seventeenth century for his ambitious work, Pharus Scientiarum (“Lighthouse of the Sciences”), which attempts to carry out the Baconian project of establishing a universal art of acquiring and disseminating knowledge. Disputation 15 of the Pharus contains one of the most detailed treatments of priority in the history of philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to limn the contours of that theory. Taking Aristotle as a source of inspiration, Izquierdo distinguishes between absolute and relative priority, and the former he divides into priority of duration, priority of worth, priority of origin, and priority of non-mutual connection. These priorities can also be “chained” and “mixed” in various ways. The task for Izquierdo is to explain what unifies the various priority relations: why do they all count as instances of a single phenomenon (or do they)? I argue that Izquierdo answers this question by means of his notion of a series, which is central to his theory of priority. I explain what a series is, and I explain how Izquierdo’s entire theory of priority is generated from his notion of a series. In the end, Izquierdo’s theory is admirably simple, yet remarkably flexible and able to accommodate a wide variety of priority claims.
For Francisco Suárez, beings of reason are non-existent objects that we can think about, objects ... more For Francisco Suárez, beings of reason are non-existent objects that we can think about, objects like goat-stags and round squares. The first section of the fifty-fourth of Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations is about the ontological status of beings of reason. Suárez’s view has been the subject of disagreement in the literature because he sometimes says that there are beings of reason, and he sometimes says there are not. In this paper, I argue for and explain an ontological pluralist reading of Suárez. Ontological pluralism is the claim that there is more than one way of being. I distinguish between two varieties of ontological pluralism, strict and non-strict, and argue that Suárez endorsed the latter. In the contemporary literature, it is sometimes alleged that ontological pluralism is an idle hypothesis, unintelligible or philosophically vacuous. I argue that Suárez has a response to this objection in his argument against ontological monism.
A response to Scott Davison's "epistemic challenge" to petitionary prayer. I argue that we don't ... more A response to Scott Davison's "epistemic challenge" to petitionary prayer. I argue that we don't need to have reason to believe that a prayer has been answered in order for the institution of petitionary prayer to be justified.
It is necessarily true that water is H2O, but it is a contingent fact that there is any water at ... more It is necessarily true that water is H2O, but it is a contingent fact that there is any water at all. Water therefore seems ill suited to ground the necessary truth that water is H2O. One view traditionally attributed to Scotus and Henry of Ghent was that while water is contingent, the essence of water is necessary; hence, the essence of water can ground the so-called eternal truth that water is H2O. Francisco Suárez rejects this view on the grounds that it contradicts the Christian doctrine of creation, according to which everything other than God was contingently created in time. Suárez’s own view of the eternal truths has proven elusive to commentators, but I argue that Suárez ultimately endorses a version of the view he rejects: essences ground the eternal truths. But this raises several puzzles: how is Suárez’s view distinct from the views traditionally ascribed to Scotus and Henry? How does Suárez’s view escape the argument from creation, which Suárez raises against his opponents? I argue that Suárez distinguishes between his view and his opponents’ view by saying that essences have “extrinsic being,” whereas his opponents claim that essences have “intrinsic being.” The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic being has not received much attention, but I argue that it marks an important fault line in scholastic thinking about the ontological status of non-existents. I argue that the notion of extrinsic being can be explicated in terms of ontological pluralism and grounding. The notion of extrinsic being helps differentiate Suárez’s view from his Scotistic and Henrician opponents, and it allows Suárez to respond to the creation argument he raises against his opponents. On my reading, Suárez’s solution to the problem of eternal truths turns out to be both highly original and philosophically satisfying.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018
There is a long-standing debate about whether Descartes was a libertarian or a compatibilist abou... more There is a long-standing debate about whether Descartes was a libertarian or a compatibilist about free will. 2 This debate is occasioned by some apparently contradictory claims made by Descartes. In several contexts Descartes seems to endorse a version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). PAP can be understood in a number of ways, but for the purpose of this paper I'll understand it as saying, roughly, that free agents can act otherwise than they do (when acting freely). 3 Every time Descartes endorses PAP, he straightaway endorses a claim dubbed by Scott Ragland 'Clear and Distinct Determinism' (CDD). According to CDD, if an agent S has a clear and distinct perception that x is true (or good), S cannot refrain from endorsing (or pursuing) x. 4 To the extent that one emphasizes Descartes's endorsements of PAP, he looks like a libertarian;
I reconstruct an account of truthmakers [verificativa] in 17th-century scholasticism.
I explain an influential 17th-century scholastic theory of negative entities according to which n... more I explain an influential 17th-century scholastic theory of negative entities according to which negative entities are spatially extended simples located where the positive entities of which they are negations are not located, and negative entities affect their subjects by means of spatial co-location.
Translations by Brian Embry
It's the first day of class. A seventeenth-century philosopher teaches his class how to argue.
Hurtado argues that God cannot lie, but lying is a speech act, and not all deceptions are speech ... more Hurtado argues that God cannot lie, but lying is a speech act, and not all deceptions are speech acts.
I don't usually translate things, but I translated this for a seminar on corporeal substance. It'... more I don't usually translate things, but I translated this for a seminar on corporeal substance. It's not polished, but it's clear enough. Feel free to use it for pleasure and edification - Carleton's jabs at Descartes are pretty funny.
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Papers by Brian Embry
Translations by Brian Embry