Papers by Bharath Gopalaswamy
Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation, 2012
Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East, 2012
THESIS 8250Modelling sound propagation often can present difficult challenges due to computationa... more THESIS 8250Modelling sound propagation often can present difficult challenges due to computational demands. In general, the direct solutions of the system equations arising from the full field discretization of many three-dimensional problems of practical engineering interest cannot be attempted. The current study consists of modelling sound propagation through a full field approach known as the Wave Expansion Method (WEM). The boundary conditions used in this study are Neumann and Free radiation conditions. The major advantage of the WEM is that it requires only around 2-3 nodes per wavelength to obtain accurate solutions which oflfers a significant computational advantage over conventional finite element, finite difference and boundary element approaches, which require around 8-10 nodes per wavelength
w The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has yet to enter into force because of th... more w The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has yet to enter into force because of the unwillingness of a number of states—including India—to ratify it. Although India initially participated in negotiating the CTBT, it subsequently walked out of the negotiations and has never signed the treaty. There has been a long debate in India over the need for nuclear testing. This debate preceded the country’s first nuclear test in 1974, was revived again with the 1998 tests and has entered a new phase since the 2005 India–United States deal on civil nuclear cooperation. This debate has developed alongside the growth of India’s nuclear deterrent. It is unlikely that India will ratify the CTBT in the foreseeable future—even if China or the United States do— given the present domestic and international circumstances. The most likely outcome is that India will continue to observe its voluntary moratorium on testing nuclear weapons, while keeping open in principle its option to resume...
The proliferation of ballistic missiles has long been a major international security concern. Bal... more The proliferation of ballistic missiles has long been a major international security concern. Ballistic missiles enable states to rapidly deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) over vast distances, and missile proliferation therefore exacerbates the WMD threat. The existing measures such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct have had very little effect in containing missile proliferation. This paper discusses flight test ban as a possible alternative in curbing missile proliferation. Although flight tests may not be necessary for countries, which possess Scud type technology, flight tests are still necessary for countries, which intend on developing long range systems. Verification technologies such as remote sensing, infrasound monitoring have been discussed. One particular concern on the missile nonproliferation agenda is that of satellite launch vehicles (SLVs) has also been addressed.
Intelligence and National Security, 2020
India's Military Modernization, 2015
List of Tables and Figures List of Abbreviations Introduction Rajesh Basrur and Bharath Gopalaswa... more List of Tables and Figures List of Abbreviations Introduction Rajesh Basrur and Bharath Gopalaswamy Innovation in Strategic Technologies: India's Experience in a Conceptual and Historical Context Kartik Bommakanti 2. The Skewed Balance: Technologists' Dominance in India's Military Modernization Bibhu Prasad Routray 3. India's Nuclear Weaponization: Warheads, Delivery Systems, and Doctrinal Compatibility T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj 4. India's Operational Nuclear Policy: The Gap between Theory, Practice, and Credibility Gaurav Kampani 5. Changing Priorities for the Indian Military in Space Victoria Samson 6. India and Space Security Bharath Gopalaswamy 7. Indian Options for an Eff ective Ballistic Missile Defence System Probal Kumar Ghosh 8. Cruise Missiles in India: Key Operational and Technological Issues Kalyan M. Kemburi and Richard A. Bitzinger 9. Adaptation of Information Superiority in the Indian Armed Forces Jaganath Sankaran Index Notes on Editors and Contributors
The RUSI Journal, 2008
... 9. KR Sridhara Murthi and HN Madhusudan, 'Strategic Considerations in Indian Space Progr... more ... 9. KR Sridhara Murthi and HN Madhusudan, 'Strategic Considerations in Indian Space Programme Towards Maximizing Socioeconomic Benefits', Acta ... 12. On the evolution of Indian missile capability, see Harsh V Pant and Bharath Gopalaswamy, 'India's Emerging Missile ...
Space Policy, 2010
India has recently stated an intention to develop an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. The reason... more India has recently stated an intention to develop an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. The reasons for this may include the country's growing economic and political clout, alongside the increasing importance of space to this status, the significance of space assets to the military, a perceived threat from China, and fear of being disadvantaged in future treaty negotiations if not 'in the club'. Nevertheless, development and use of an ASAT would have potentially catastrophic debris-related consequences that would also create major political problems for the user. The state of India's ASAT activities is described and recommendations on avoiding hasty development, such as researching methods of protecting satellites, strengthening bilateral relations with China and pushing for a legally binding norm on ASATs, are made.
Comparative Strategy, 2008
... In 1979, India first launched its SLV-3 space booster (334 km/40 kg). The 35 kg satelliteRohi... more ... In 1979, India first launched its SLV-3 space booster (334 km/40 kg). The 35 kg satelliteRohini was successfully placed into the near-earth orbit in 1980. ... 19. G. Balachandran, Still Pie in the Sky, Indian Express, April 26, 2007. 20. ...
Astropolitics, 2012
International security concerns about ballistic missile proliferation have frequently highlighted... more International security concerns about ballistic missile proliferation have frequently highlighted the links between ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. This article examines the extent of these links through a comprehensive survey of ballistic missile and space rocket programs in regional powers. It notes that missiles were derived from existing space launchers in just a small fraction of these cases. In
In January 2007 China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile system. That test, although p... more In January 2007 China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile system. That test, although primarily meant as a warning shot across America’s bow, also helped concentrate New Delhi’s mind to begin fashioning policy responses to the militarization of space. The former head of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), Dr. Kasturirangan, typified India’s response when he noted: “obviously we start worrying...India has spent a huge sum to develop its capabilities and place assets in space...there is a need to look at means to securing these.”1 The scientific advisor to the Indian defense minister also warned that China’s test could possibly lead ISRO and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to collaborate in developing satellite kill technologies.2 The debate was subsequently joined in by the chief of India’s air force Air Chief Marshal Naik who made a forceful case for building anti-satellite weapons on the grounds that, “Our satellites are vulnerable to a...
Foreign Affairs, 2017
Since the 2005 Indian–U.S. Civil Nuclear Agreement, a number of notable nuclear arms control anal... more Since the 2005 Indian–U.S. Civil Nuclear Agreement, a number of notable nuclear arms control analysts and scholars [1] have called for mainstreaming Pakistan into the nuclear nonproliferation regime, meaning the de facto acceptance of Pakistan as a nuclear weapons power. Indeed, for a while the Barack Obama administration began negotiations [2] with Pakistan to explore nuclear mainstreaming during its second term. Most of these scholars argue that the process of normalizing Pakistan's nuclear status should proceed differently than U.S. negotiations with India, which led to only partial normalization. In India's case, because of geopolitical and commercial considerations, Washington demanded and got few nonproliferation concessions from New Delhi. There were no nuclear arms caps, posture changes, or accession to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT), all of which were longstanding U.S. demands until the George W. Bush administration decided to do away with them. The failure of the United States to drive a hard nonproliferation bargain with India, these arms control advocates argue, has undermined the nuclear nonproliferation regime, a mistake that should not be repeated with Pakistan. But pushing the nonproliferation track for normalizing Pakistan's nuclear status would be a mistake. Indeed, Pakistan has rejected these proposals, demanding a nuclear agreement similar to the one negotiated with India. It is thus no surprise that the negotiations with the United States during Obama's second term quickly ended in failure. Moreover, even if successful, such bargains would have done little to reduce the mounting dangers of a nuclear catastrophe that stem from the risks of state failure in Pakistan and its grand strategy of asymmetric warfare in South Asia. In thinking through the case for mainstreaming a nuclear Pakistan, one must not lose sight of the two key principles that underlie U.S. nonproliferation policy. Those principles are to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons in the international system and to preserve the so-called nuclear taboo. Although the United States can no longer roll back the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, it has succeeded in walling it off from other nuclear aspirant states in the international system so far. However, Washington has not paid sufficient attention to address the scenarios that pose the greatest danger to the continued prevalence of the nuclear taboo. The threat that Pakistan poses to the international community does not stem from the mere existence of its arsenal, but from the potential for its inadvertent and instrumental use. There are mounting threats from violent non-state actors who seem determined to steal from and sabotage Pakistani nuclear weapons. Likewise, the
India Review, 2014
Since China tested a Kinetic-Energy Anti-Satellite (KE-ASAT) weapon in 2007, evidence has surface... more Since China tested a Kinetic-Energy Anti-Satellite (KE-ASAT) weapon in 2007, evidence has surfaced that India may have initiated a similar program. This article makes an anticipatory policy intervention against the development of KE-ASAT weapons. It presents data to show that space debris, and not KE-ASAT weapons, pose the highest risk for the safe operation of Indian satellites. It models a KE-ASAT weapons exchange between India and China in three different scenarios to demonstrate that use of such weapons even on a limited scale would produce an exponential increase in space debris. The latter would threaten the safe operation of satellites for all countries concerned. These data suggest that the concept of deterrence as understood in conventional and nuclear spheres is not easily transportable to the domain of space weapons, which threaten the physical destruction of satellites. If weaponization of space becomes inevitable, policy makers would be better off investing in weapons that disable but do not physically destroy satellites.
Abstract: It has been twelve years since the 1998 nuclear tests in India and Pakistan. Sufficient... more Abstract: It has been twelve years since the 1998 nuclear tests in India and Pakistan. Sufficient time has passed to draw some conclusions about the meaning, motivations, and implications of those events. This issue begins with an article which sets the stage for the ...
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Papers by Bharath Gopalaswamy