Punishment is traditionally modelled as a ‘constructed incentive’. Specifically, the person who p... more Punishment is traditionally modelled as a ‘constructed incentive’. Specifically, the person who punishes is constructing a set of incentives that will motivate the person being punished to change her behaviour. Yet, while this model captures something important about the logic of punishment, it also misses important contours of how humans punish and how they learn from punishment. We argue that, in addition to understanding punishment as a form of incentive, we must also understand it as a form of communication. According to the communication model, a person can learn from punishment by attempting to infer the punisher’s communicative intent. Meanwhile, the punisher can choose punishments that are maximally informative given the learner’s likely inferential stance. This coordinated communicative reasoning enables faster and more accurate learning during punishment and provides a better fit to empirical data on how people actually punish and learn from punishment.
Prior research suggests that negligent harms are punished because of the resulting negative outco... more Prior research suggests that negligent harms are punished because of the resulting negative outcomes. Under this account, negligent but completely harmless acts should not be punished. An alternative possibility is that negligence is punished as a way of modifying future thought and behavior. Across three studies we find support for this second proposal. Study 1 demonstrates that punishment is assigned to negligent agents, irrespective of whether or not a harm actually occurs. Study 2 demonstrates that non-negligent agents who cause harm are punished less than negligent agents who do not cause harm. Study 3 shows that the punishment of harmful negligent actions is only judged to be successful when it results in the agent ceasing to act negligently, and not when it results in the harm ceasing to occur. Together, these results suggest that a primary function of punishment in cases of negligence is modify future thought.
Humans use punishment to influence each other’s behavior. Many current theories presume that this... more Humans use punishment to influence each other’s behavior. Many current theories presume that this operates as a simple form of incentive. In contrast, we show that people infer the communicative intent behind punishment, which can sometimes diverge sharply from its immediate incentive value. In other words, people respond to punishment not as a reward to be maximized, but as a communicative signal to be interpreted. Specifically, we show that people expect harmless, yet communicative, punishments to be as effective as harmful punishments (Study 1). Under some situation, people display a systematic preference for harmless punishments over more canonical, harmful punishments (Study 2). People readily seek out and infer the communicative message inherent in a punishment (Study 3). And, people expect that learning from punishment depends on the ease with which its communicative intent can be inferred (Study 4). Taken together, these findings demonstrate that people expect punishment to ...
Knowledge of intention and outcome is integral to making judgments of responsibility, blame, and ... more Knowledge of intention and outcome is integral to making judgments of responsibility, blame, and causality. Yet, little is known about the effect of conflicting intentions and outcomes on these judgments. In a series of four experiments, we combine good and bad intentions with positive and negative outcomes, presenting these through everyday moral scenarios. Our results demonstrate an asymmetry in responsibility, causality, and blame judgments for the two incongruent conditions: well-intentioned agents are regarded more morally and causally responsible for negative outcomes than ill-intentioned agents are held for positive outcomes. This novel effect of an intention-outcome asymmetry identifies an unexplored aspect of moral judgment and is partially explained by extra inferences that participants make about the actions of the moral agent.
Punishment is traditionally modeled as a “constructed incentive”. Specifically, the person who pu... more Punishment is traditionally modeled as a “constructed incentive”. Specifically, the person who punishes is constructing a set of incentives that will motivate the person being punished to change her behavior. This model spans moral psychology, behavioral economics, artificial intelligence and comparative psychology. Yet, while it captures something important about the logic of punishment, it also misses important contours of how humans punish and how they learn from punishment. We argue that, in addition to understanding punishment as a form of incentive, we must also understand it as a form of communication. According to the constructed incentive model, a person learns from punishment the way she learns from other negative events: by trying to avoid the state or action that elicited it. In contrast, according to the communication model, a person can learn from punishment by attempting to infer the punisher’s communicative intent. Meanwhile, the punisher can choose punishments that ...
Punishment is traditionally modelled as a ‘constructed incentive’. Specifically, the person who p... more Punishment is traditionally modelled as a ‘constructed incentive’. Specifically, the person who punishes is constructing a set of incentives that will motivate the person being punished to change her behaviour. Yet, while this model captures something important about the logic of punishment, it also misses important contours of how humans punish and how they learn from punishment. We argue that, in addition to understanding punishment as a form of incentive, we must also understand it as a form of communication. According to the communication model, a person can learn from punishment by attempting to infer the punisher’s communicative intent. Meanwhile, the punisher can choose punishments that are maximally informative given the learner’s likely inferential stance. This coordinated communicative reasoning enables faster and more accurate learning during punishment and provides a better fit to empirical data on how people actually punish and learn from punishment.
Prior research suggests that negligent harms are punished because of the resulting negative outco... more Prior research suggests that negligent harms are punished because of the resulting negative outcomes. Under this account, negligent but completely harmless acts should not be punished. An alternative possibility is that negligence is punished as a way of modifying future thought and behavior. Across three studies we find support for this second proposal. Study 1 demonstrates that punishment is assigned to negligent agents, irrespective of whether or not a harm actually occurs. Study 2 demonstrates that non-negligent agents who cause harm are punished less than negligent agents who do not cause harm. Study 3 shows that the punishment of harmful negligent actions is only judged to be successful when it results in the agent ceasing to act negligently, and not when it results in the harm ceasing to occur. Together, these results suggest that a primary function of punishment in cases of negligence is modify future thought.
Humans use punishment to influence each other’s behavior. Many current theories presume that this... more Humans use punishment to influence each other’s behavior. Many current theories presume that this operates as a simple form of incentive. In contrast, we show that people infer the communicative intent behind punishment, which can sometimes diverge sharply from its immediate incentive value. In other words, people respond to punishment not as a reward to be maximized, but as a communicative signal to be interpreted. Specifically, we show that people expect harmless, yet communicative, punishments to be as effective as harmful punishments (Study 1). Under some situation, people display a systematic preference for harmless punishments over more canonical, harmful punishments (Study 2). People readily seek out and infer the communicative message inherent in a punishment (Study 3). And, people expect that learning from punishment depends on the ease with which its communicative intent can be inferred (Study 4). Taken together, these findings demonstrate that people expect punishment to ...
Knowledge of intention and outcome is integral to making judgments of responsibility, blame, and ... more Knowledge of intention and outcome is integral to making judgments of responsibility, blame, and causality. Yet, little is known about the effect of conflicting intentions and outcomes on these judgments. In a series of four experiments, we combine good and bad intentions with positive and negative outcomes, presenting these through everyday moral scenarios. Our results demonstrate an asymmetry in responsibility, causality, and blame judgments for the two incongruent conditions: well-intentioned agents are regarded more morally and causally responsible for negative outcomes than ill-intentioned agents are held for positive outcomes. This novel effect of an intention-outcome asymmetry identifies an unexplored aspect of moral judgment and is partially explained by extra inferences that participants make about the actions of the moral agent.
Punishment is traditionally modeled as a “constructed incentive”. Specifically, the person who pu... more Punishment is traditionally modeled as a “constructed incentive”. Specifically, the person who punishes is constructing a set of incentives that will motivate the person being punished to change her behavior. This model spans moral psychology, behavioral economics, artificial intelligence and comparative psychology. Yet, while it captures something important about the logic of punishment, it also misses important contours of how humans punish and how they learn from punishment. We argue that, in addition to understanding punishment as a form of incentive, we must also understand it as a form of communication. According to the constructed incentive model, a person learns from punishment the way she learns from other negative events: by trying to avoid the state or action that elicited it. In contrast, according to the communication model, a person can learn from punishment by attempting to infer the punisher’s communicative intent. Meanwhile, the punisher can choose punishments that ...
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Papers by Arunima Sarin