Aria Wibisono
A practitioner of international affairs that strives to become both an astute analyst and a self-proclaimed academic. The views and opinions expressed are solely personal, and do not, in any way, reflect the views of the institutions to which he may be affiliated.
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However, the daily back and forth splattering of sensationalism on the pages of mainstream media in the region draws unneeded attention. The much anticipated decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that is expected to extend no value to historical affinity for territorial possessions has already been publicly rejected, a priori, by one of the claimants. This is no sign of willingness to uphold the primacy of international law. In fact, it’s a blatant undermining of the very institution that the new powers of the next international order are supposed to protect, and even advance for the sake of their own interests, right? So why undermine something that can, in fact, aggrandize one’s legitimacy as a power to be reckoned with in the new international order?
The answers lie, I think, in what I call an aberration of traditional norms and values that everyone in Asia has traditionally been accustomed to but seems to forget in stressful times. Quite paradoxical. And incredibly regrettable given that such norms and values of mutual respect and adherence to international law are what have kept the peace in Asia for almost half a century. In fact, things can really get ugly if no parameters exist to keep things within boundaries. The reality is that such parameters in the form of durable institutions exist and yet remain unused. But the real treason lies in the permissive culture of leaving such institutions remain idle.
The only existing power dynamics architectural framework in the whole of Asia Pacific lies within the confines of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and through the various inter-governmental forums such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting. Through the ASEAN nexus major powers were bound together in common hopes for peace through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. And of course, the true basis of all these regional mechanisms is the primacy of international law, including reverence to the principles contained in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Though imperfect, at least these institutions work – until the contentious issue surrounding the South China Sea. ASEAN, ARF, and UNCLOS were left stranded on the side-lines due to permissiveness. Apathy is the real disease plaguing the international community. And that’s the strategic irony. If those involved refrain from becoming disillusioned to dream in resolving outside of these parameters, progress could actually be charted.
If UNCLOS were to reign supreme, there would be no entertaining for a yearning of old stories going back ages ago. Everyone would be going by the same rulebook. Fair. And an even playing field. Economic rights are not contested. Everyone could then focus on building greater things, charting economic growth, and actually improving the lives and welfare of billions, instead of just maintaining a pie that was not really that big to start with. So the issue is why were the claimants allowed to play outside of the parameters?
I argue that the problem lies within the culture of permissiveness resulting in impunity when some tries to undo what many others have long toiled and struggled to build. The regimes enshrined in international law and upheld in daily life through ASEAN communities reverberating throughout the Asia Pacific stem from long and arduous process spanning generations of diplomats, policymakers, and decision makers. Countless hearts, minds, and souls went into this process.
These cannot all go in vain. Nor should they. Everyone has a say in the outcome of this question. That is why we must all care and reverse permissiveness into accountability and responsibility. All must do so publicly for the whole world to watch.
Those transgressing what they themselves have committed to abide shall be made accountable and made to make amends. Remember that an edge in military capabilities just merely buys time but still is no match in the long run to a collective condemnation by all. International law must reign supreme. Otherwise, the current drama might turn into a ridiculous circus that unravels the very basis of what we ourselves call civilization.
However, key policy question remains as to what extent must Indonesia exert itself in order to advance this mandate vis-à-vis its own considerations as a regular member of the community of nations instead of what some may views as a holier-than-thou exalter of world peace. This article argues that through strategic goals that transcend what would constitute ‘normal’ state objectives, Indonesia effectively, in turn, achieves its national interests. Allow an attempt at an explanation.
Indonesia’s support towards Palestine has been adamant and unwavering for decades. Indonesia acknowledged Palestinian statehood. In fact, Indonesia provided not just moral but material support for Palestine to establish itself diplomatically in Jakarta. Through the decades, in all forums, Indonesia’s position has been consistent in fully supporting Palestine. Anything having to do with the issue of Palestine, even if the resolution benefits Indonesia directly, Indonesia has always taken the high ground, sacrificed its own short-term gains, and voted for support to Palestine.
Though geographically and, aside from religious inclinations, even culturally unrelated, Indonesians have held sentiments deep in fervent determination unexplained when compared to those embraced by closer at heart neighbours in the vicinity. Indonesia has even gone beyond its call of duty, some may argue, in hosting the Fifth Extraordinary Organization of Islamic Countries Summit on Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif recently which reiterated calls for the end of occupation and the creation of the state of Palestine within the framework of a two-state solution, and reinvigorated international attention made dismal by the situation in Syria to the dire humanitarian situation in Palestine made worse by human rights violations in Jerusalem by the occupying power.
Indonesia’s actions seem to defy rational, state-centric, and political power constellation calculations normally embraced by states to define its state objectives through foreign policy. Calculations are indeed done not through the head but with the heart, it seems. This odd approach towards policy making gets even more interesting. Not only does the heart wavers, which Indonesia doesn’t seem to be suffering from, but the heart blinds all, which Indonesia also doesn’t seem to be impervious to the realities of international politics. So what can explain Indonesia’s attitude towards Palestine?
Love. Love towards Palestine? On the outset, yes, of course! But deeper analyses say that it is not. It is, rather, love towards principles. Hence it is safe to say that on the basis of empirical evidence of Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially when examined towards Palestine, that Indonesia loves principles. Further evidence has it that through this love affairs Indonesia becomes the strong power that it is. Through love, Indonesia has consistently taken the high ground for what realpolitiekers would consider naïve, idealistic, or just plainly impossible goals.
This love drives Indonesia’s decisions, its attitudes and perceptions of reality – ironically within balanced proportions. But this love puts the backbone in Indonesia’s foreign policy such that when the going gets really tough, Indonesia continues to stand tall – and in great pain understandably – and maintain its course even if its positions causes it harm to its national interest in the short-term. Indonesia sparses its national interests and can prioritize accordingly to its greater grand strategy in international relations.
In doing so Indonesia’s actions gain admiration, respect, and most importantly, credibility, in being the country the world can count on in providing influence and policy direction when things are difficult. In other words, Indonesia’s matrimony with the high principles of, “humanity and justice,” which I quote from its Constitution, gives it moral power unparalleled in the history of international relations even, if I could be so daring, almost to the levels achieved by the United Nations.
But Indonesia is not the United Nations. Just because its Constitution plainly states that the country’s mandate is to contribute to international peace, security, and prosperity doesn’t mean that Indonesia cannot act and behave like a ‘normal’ country guided directly by its ‘national interest’ contextualized within the narrow scope of costs and benefits surrounding its international issue that it faces. This is the crux of the aberration. Indonesia does behave like a ‘normal’ country in its steadfast towards protection its ‘national interest’ and yet this ‘normal’ behaviour seems to always coincide with being morally exalted in the world’s biggest toughest issues. It is an odd coincidence indeed albeit well suited to a country that embraces morality as the source of power for its great roles in the international arena.
Some would argue that morality has no place in the community of nations. Thucydides never gave the mantra, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” in the Peloponnesian War depicting reality additional adage in that “everyone must do what is right.” Power prevails. In an era where power is balanced by power, you get peace. But what is this balanced no longer exists. Instead you must multiple polarities. Any power race is still a race. There’s bound to be winners and losers. In the game of power, there will be a winner – and many losers. This would make for an awful world. Hence the brilliance of Indonesia’s approach towards this race. Transcend beyond it. Re-conceptualize it. Make power irrelevant by reigning wisdom supreme. Because as power is strenuously pitted against others and things will inevitably turn into a game of attrition, sagacity will not be just welcomed but will rather be the solution.
Conventional wisdom has it that, legally, territorial claims must be peacefully settled only by the parties involved unless there has been request for mediation by the parties. In other words, let disputing countries resolve their own disputes without having their disputes being internationalized. In the case between Indonesia and China, unless China clarifies and legally substantiate the basis for its “nine-dashed lines” territorial claim, legally at the conceptual-level this case is a non-issue.
Politically, however, it becomes incumbent upon all countries in the region – and some would even argue to include those beyond – to actively try to resolve this ‘mother of territorial disputes.’ Practically, nonetheless, conditions within Indonesian territorial sea involving actual conflict between Indonesian oceans ministry vessels and Chinese warships propelled this non-salient issue between Indonesia and China onto the grand stage that must see a conclusion if repetition of such conflict is to be avoided.
Therefore, this paper argues for Indonesia to take the lead in resolving this case not only for the sake of its own bilateral relationship with China but also as an example and inspiration for others in the region to follow suit.
Indonesia has two options. The first option is to push for clarification over China’s “nine-dashed lines” territorial claim which China submitted to the United Nations Secretary General. Indonesia was the only UN member state that had officially requested for Chinese clarification over its claims. Until now such request has remained unanswered, leading to current tensions as exemplified by the conflict experienced at sea. Indonesia must continue to, forgive the term, “badger” China until it issues an official clarification over its initial claim.
If China refuses to issue such an official clarification, this could be taken as a hostile act and hence deserves to be treated as such. If China cannot issue such an official clarification, then Indonesia must push for China to retract its initial claim from the UN Secretary General. China would, of course, lose face. But this option, would indeed be much better than being ganged up by everyone else over a claim that one is not even sure about!
So the ball is in China’s court. Domestically, any interinstitutional rivalries must be dampened so as to yield a coherent national policy such that China as a state can be held accountable to what it projects internationally as its “nine-dashed line” territorial claim in the South China Sea.
The second option is to sit down and bilaterally negotiate with China over respective claims over the northern Natura Islands. It is clear that the stake is no longer just a conceptual legal exercise but rather a tangible issue that must be resolved bilaterally at the soonest. The term ‘negotiate,’ is misleading, actually. The term ‘clarify’ is more apt. Indonesia must clarify to China that the disputed area is the exclusive economic zone of Indonesia under UNCLOS and that China must respect that, or otherwise, shall face grave consequences.
Irrespective of Indonesia’s current capability to enforce such ultimatums, it is important for China to understand that Indonesia is clear of its own sovereignty assertion and is willing to stand up for what it believes. After all, standing up to its principles has always been the hallmark of Indonesian foreign policy. Moreover, this exercise is useful for Indonesia in getting into the habit of identifying its threats to its interests which, until the incident with China, has largely been publicly communicated as none. While if it were true it is clearly laudable but if false would put the country at a great disadvantage as it cannot prepare and plan for what it must do to respond to such threat.
So the only way to official know is to get China to understand that there is nothing to ‘negotiate.’ Either China understands that the ‘disputed’ territory is de jure Indonesian exclusive economic zone, and if China does not accept such an understanding, Indonesia then must acknowledge that there is a real conflict, and must consequently prepare to follow through in asserting its position. This, of course, is done through a foreign policy that shall consists not only of diplomacy but also economic and military might. It is time for Indonesia to become a ‘normal’ power with the courage to accept the consequences of becoming one.
Obviously the consequences for Indonesia could be dire. But those are expected. In fact, these could even be good for Indonesia. After all, despite well-meaning intentions as embedded through work in the Declaration of the Code of Conduct and the ongoing Code of Conduct negotiations, though politically value added these efforts only delay related parties in answering the hard questions. This paper argues that for Indonesia specifically, having China and itself answer the hard questions is something that is good for Indonesia to move towards maturity in being a power to be reckoned with as opposed to being ignored.
However, the daily back and forth splattering of sensationalism on the pages of mainstream media in the region draws unneeded attention. The much anticipated decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that is expected to extend no value to historical affinity for territorial possessions has already been publicly rejected, a priori, by one of the claimants. This is no sign of willingness to uphold the primacy of international law. In fact, it’s a blatant undermining of the very institution that the new powers of the next international order are supposed to protect, and even advance for the sake of their own interests, right? So why undermine something that can, in fact, aggrandize one’s legitimacy as a power to be reckoned with in the new international order?
The answers lie, I think, in what I call an aberration of traditional norms and values that everyone in Asia has traditionally been accustomed to but seems to forget in stressful times. Quite paradoxical. And incredibly regrettable given that such norms and values of mutual respect and adherence to international law are what have kept the peace in Asia for almost half a century. In fact, things can really get ugly if no parameters exist to keep things within boundaries. The reality is that such parameters in the form of durable institutions exist and yet remain unused. But the real treason lies in the permissive culture of leaving such institutions remain idle.
The only existing power dynamics architectural framework in the whole of Asia Pacific lies within the confines of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and through the various inter-governmental forums such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting. Through the ASEAN nexus major powers were bound together in common hopes for peace through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. And of course, the true basis of all these regional mechanisms is the primacy of international law, including reverence to the principles contained in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Though imperfect, at least these institutions work – until the contentious issue surrounding the South China Sea. ASEAN, ARF, and UNCLOS were left stranded on the side-lines due to permissiveness. Apathy is the real disease plaguing the international community. And that’s the strategic irony. If those involved refrain from becoming disillusioned to dream in resolving outside of these parameters, progress could actually be charted.
If UNCLOS were to reign supreme, there would be no entertaining for a yearning of old stories going back ages ago. Everyone would be going by the same rulebook. Fair. And an even playing field. Economic rights are not contested. Everyone could then focus on building greater things, charting economic growth, and actually improving the lives and welfare of billions, instead of just maintaining a pie that was not really that big to start with. So the issue is why were the claimants allowed to play outside of the parameters?
I argue that the problem lies within the culture of permissiveness resulting in impunity when some tries to undo what many others have long toiled and struggled to build. The regimes enshrined in international law and upheld in daily life through ASEAN communities reverberating throughout the Asia Pacific stem from long and arduous process spanning generations of diplomats, policymakers, and decision makers. Countless hearts, minds, and souls went into this process.
These cannot all go in vain. Nor should they. Everyone has a say in the outcome of this question. That is why we must all care and reverse permissiveness into accountability and responsibility. All must do so publicly for the whole world to watch.
Those transgressing what they themselves have committed to abide shall be made accountable and made to make amends. Remember that an edge in military capabilities just merely buys time but still is no match in the long run to a collective condemnation by all. International law must reign supreme. Otherwise, the current drama might turn into a ridiculous circus that unravels the very basis of what we ourselves call civilization.
However, key policy question remains as to what extent must Indonesia exert itself in order to advance this mandate vis-à-vis its own considerations as a regular member of the community of nations instead of what some may views as a holier-than-thou exalter of world peace. This article argues that through strategic goals that transcend what would constitute ‘normal’ state objectives, Indonesia effectively, in turn, achieves its national interests. Allow an attempt at an explanation.
Indonesia’s support towards Palestine has been adamant and unwavering for decades. Indonesia acknowledged Palestinian statehood. In fact, Indonesia provided not just moral but material support for Palestine to establish itself diplomatically in Jakarta. Through the decades, in all forums, Indonesia’s position has been consistent in fully supporting Palestine. Anything having to do with the issue of Palestine, even if the resolution benefits Indonesia directly, Indonesia has always taken the high ground, sacrificed its own short-term gains, and voted for support to Palestine.
Though geographically and, aside from religious inclinations, even culturally unrelated, Indonesians have held sentiments deep in fervent determination unexplained when compared to those embraced by closer at heart neighbours in the vicinity. Indonesia has even gone beyond its call of duty, some may argue, in hosting the Fifth Extraordinary Organization of Islamic Countries Summit on Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif recently which reiterated calls for the end of occupation and the creation of the state of Palestine within the framework of a two-state solution, and reinvigorated international attention made dismal by the situation in Syria to the dire humanitarian situation in Palestine made worse by human rights violations in Jerusalem by the occupying power.
Indonesia’s actions seem to defy rational, state-centric, and political power constellation calculations normally embraced by states to define its state objectives through foreign policy. Calculations are indeed done not through the head but with the heart, it seems. This odd approach towards policy making gets even more interesting. Not only does the heart wavers, which Indonesia doesn’t seem to be suffering from, but the heart blinds all, which Indonesia also doesn’t seem to be impervious to the realities of international politics. So what can explain Indonesia’s attitude towards Palestine?
Love. Love towards Palestine? On the outset, yes, of course! But deeper analyses say that it is not. It is, rather, love towards principles. Hence it is safe to say that on the basis of empirical evidence of Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially when examined towards Palestine, that Indonesia loves principles. Further evidence has it that through this love affairs Indonesia becomes the strong power that it is. Through love, Indonesia has consistently taken the high ground for what realpolitiekers would consider naïve, idealistic, or just plainly impossible goals.
This love drives Indonesia’s decisions, its attitudes and perceptions of reality – ironically within balanced proportions. But this love puts the backbone in Indonesia’s foreign policy such that when the going gets really tough, Indonesia continues to stand tall – and in great pain understandably – and maintain its course even if its positions causes it harm to its national interest in the short-term. Indonesia sparses its national interests and can prioritize accordingly to its greater grand strategy in international relations.
In doing so Indonesia’s actions gain admiration, respect, and most importantly, credibility, in being the country the world can count on in providing influence and policy direction when things are difficult. In other words, Indonesia’s matrimony with the high principles of, “humanity and justice,” which I quote from its Constitution, gives it moral power unparalleled in the history of international relations even, if I could be so daring, almost to the levels achieved by the United Nations.
But Indonesia is not the United Nations. Just because its Constitution plainly states that the country’s mandate is to contribute to international peace, security, and prosperity doesn’t mean that Indonesia cannot act and behave like a ‘normal’ country guided directly by its ‘national interest’ contextualized within the narrow scope of costs and benefits surrounding its international issue that it faces. This is the crux of the aberration. Indonesia does behave like a ‘normal’ country in its steadfast towards protection its ‘national interest’ and yet this ‘normal’ behaviour seems to always coincide with being morally exalted in the world’s biggest toughest issues. It is an odd coincidence indeed albeit well suited to a country that embraces morality as the source of power for its great roles in the international arena.
Some would argue that morality has no place in the community of nations. Thucydides never gave the mantra, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” in the Peloponnesian War depicting reality additional adage in that “everyone must do what is right.” Power prevails. In an era where power is balanced by power, you get peace. But what is this balanced no longer exists. Instead you must multiple polarities. Any power race is still a race. There’s bound to be winners and losers. In the game of power, there will be a winner – and many losers. This would make for an awful world. Hence the brilliance of Indonesia’s approach towards this race. Transcend beyond it. Re-conceptualize it. Make power irrelevant by reigning wisdom supreme. Because as power is strenuously pitted against others and things will inevitably turn into a game of attrition, sagacity will not be just welcomed but will rather be the solution.
Conventional wisdom has it that, legally, territorial claims must be peacefully settled only by the parties involved unless there has been request for mediation by the parties. In other words, let disputing countries resolve their own disputes without having their disputes being internationalized. In the case between Indonesia and China, unless China clarifies and legally substantiate the basis for its “nine-dashed lines” territorial claim, legally at the conceptual-level this case is a non-issue.
Politically, however, it becomes incumbent upon all countries in the region – and some would even argue to include those beyond – to actively try to resolve this ‘mother of territorial disputes.’ Practically, nonetheless, conditions within Indonesian territorial sea involving actual conflict between Indonesian oceans ministry vessels and Chinese warships propelled this non-salient issue between Indonesia and China onto the grand stage that must see a conclusion if repetition of such conflict is to be avoided.
Therefore, this paper argues for Indonesia to take the lead in resolving this case not only for the sake of its own bilateral relationship with China but also as an example and inspiration for others in the region to follow suit.
Indonesia has two options. The first option is to push for clarification over China’s “nine-dashed lines” territorial claim which China submitted to the United Nations Secretary General. Indonesia was the only UN member state that had officially requested for Chinese clarification over its claims. Until now such request has remained unanswered, leading to current tensions as exemplified by the conflict experienced at sea. Indonesia must continue to, forgive the term, “badger” China until it issues an official clarification over its initial claim.
If China refuses to issue such an official clarification, this could be taken as a hostile act and hence deserves to be treated as such. If China cannot issue such an official clarification, then Indonesia must push for China to retract its initial claim from the UN Secretary General. China would, of course, lose face. But this option, would indeed be much better than being ganged up by everyone else over a claim that one is not even sure about!
So the ball is in China’s court. Domestically, any interinstitutional rivalries must be dampened so as to yield a coherent national policy such that China as a state can be held accountable to what it projects internationally as its “nine-dashed line” territorial claim in the South China Sea.
The second option is to sit down and bilaterally negotiate with China over respective claims over the northern Natura Islands. It is clear that the stake is no longer just a conceptual legal exercise but rather a tangible issue that must be resolved bilaterally at the soonest. The term ‘negotiate,’ is misleading, actually. The term ‘clarify’ is more apt. Indonesia must clarify to China that the disputed area is the exclusive economic zone of Indonesia under UNCLOS and that China must respect that, or otherwise, shall face grave consequences.
Irrespective of Indonesia’s current capability to enforce such ultimatums, it is important for China to understand that Indonesia is clear of its own sovereignty assertion and is willing to stand up for what it believes. After all, standing up to its principles has always been the hallmark of Indonesian foreign policy. Moreover, this exercise is useful for Indonesia in getting into the habit of identifying its threats to its interests which, until the incident with China, has largely been publicly communicated as none. While if it were true it is clearly laudable but if false would put the country at a great disadvantage as it cannot prepare and plan for what it must do to respond to such threat.
So the only way to official know is to get China to understand that there is nothing to ‘negotiate.’ Either China understands that the ‘disputed’ territory is de jure Indonesian exclusive economic zone, and if China does not accept such an understanding, Indonesia then must acknowledge that there is a real conflict, and must consequently prepare to follow through in asserting its position. This, of course, is done through a foreign policy that shall consists not only of diplomacy but also economic and military might. It is time for Indonesia to become a ‘normal’ power with the courage to accept the consequences of becoming one.
Obviously the consequences for Indonesia could be dire. But those are expected. In fact, these could even be good for Indonesia. After all, despite well-meaning intentions as embedded through work in the Declaration of the Code of Conduct and the ongoing Code of Conduct negotiations, though politically value added these efforts only delay related parties in answering the hard questions. This paper argues that for Indonesia specifically, having China and itself answer the hard questions is something that is good for Indonesia to move towards maturity in being a power to be reckoned with as opposed to being ignored.