
Anthony Etuk
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Papers by Anthony Etuk
claims not supported by scientific evidence. Motivated by the assumption that only
the empirical investigation of reality leads to the truth, the scientific sceptics often
maintain that only scientific method is best suited for this purpose. Claims found
to be wanting in scientific evidence are considered untrue, and of little or no
epistemic consequence. Using the analytical and critical methods, this paper
interrogates this epistemic criterion of justification of scientific scepticism. It
shows the inherent epistemic deficits in this criterion of the scientific sceptics, and
how absolutizing its demands in such a manner as to undermine the veracity and
epistemic significance of claims outside the mainstream discipline of science is not
only to entrap themselves in many epistemic burdens, but also to sink under the
unsavoury weight of criteriological egocentrism, detrimental to cognitive progress.
As a credible alternative, this paper explores the epistemic fecundity of
contextualistic pluralism – the pluralism of contextually underwritten cognitive
positions – in truth and knowledge justification. It concludes with the relevance of
this approach in epistemic justification as evident in its inclusive nature as well as
its shift of the focus of philosophical thinking from identity to diversity in an
interculturality society.
claims not supported by scientific evidence. Motivated by the assumption that only
the empirical investigation of reality leads to the truth, the scientific sceptics often
maintain that only scientific method is best suited for this purpose. Claims found
to be wanting in scientific evidence are considered untrue, and of little or no
epistemic consequence. Using the analytical and critical methods, this paper
interrogates this epistemic criterion of justification of scientific scepticism. It
shows the inherent epistemic deficits in this criterion of the scientific sceptics, and
how absolutizing its demands in such a manner as to undermine the veracity and
epistemic significance of claims outside the mainstream discipline of science is not
only to entrap themselves in many epistemic burdens, but also to sink under the
unsavoury weight of criteriological egocentrism, detrimental to cognitive progress.
As a credible alternative, this paper explores the epistemic fecundity of
contextualistic pluralism – the pluralism of contextually underwritten cognitive
positions – in truth and knowledge justification. It concludes with the relevance of
this approach in epistemic justification as evident in its inclusive nature as well as
its shift of the focus of philosophical thinking from identity to diversity in an
interculturality society.