
Andrew Soltau
Andrew Soltau
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Papers by Andrew Soltau
Such a frame of reference can only be a fundamental property of the unitary system as a whole, of different logical type to the quantum state. Thus an ontological category in addition to physical existence is required to complete the science. At this level of logical type, all multiply instantiated copies of an inside view constitute a single entity. Thus the superposition proposed in Part 1 is inevitably effected; and the nature of physical reality on the inside view is as described in QBism.
As described by Tegmark (1997), Everett defines the relationship between two fundamentally different views of the world, different types of frame of reference. The outside view is defined by the unitary wave function, the inside view by the record of observations. As Lockwood (1989) states, the preferred basis problem is fully resolved if the latter is taken as the basis. Taken literally, only that defined by the record of observations is determinate in the physical world of this inside view. The reality of QBism is the result. The same can be derived from first principles in the no-collapse universe. Taking the outside view to define all possible decoherent quasi-classical worlds, the physical world of the inside view is the superposition of all such worlds in which it is instantiated. In this quantum mechanical frame of reference only that observed is determinate.
The quantum state as ontology is questioned because it defines only the linear dynamics and cannot account for collapse. No deeper reality is required, however: the inside view, and the collapse dynamics that operates in this type of frame of reference, are emergent properties of the system, and operate at a different level of logical type. The world operates as described by QBism, but is nonetheless defined by the quantum state.
Such a frame of reference can only be a fundamental property of the unitary system as a whole, of different logical type to the quantum state. Thus an ontological category in addition to physical existence is required to complete the science. At this level of logical type, all multiply instantiated copies of an inside view constitute a single entity. Thus the superposition proposed in Part 1 is inevitably effected; and the nature of physical reality on the inside view is as described in QBism.
As described by Tegmark (1997), Everett defines the relationship between two fundamentally different views of the world, different types of frame of reference. The outside view is defined by the unitary wave function, the inside view by the record of observations. As Lockwood (1989) states, the preferred basis problem is fully resolved if the latter is taken as the basis. Taken literally, only that defined by the record of observations is determinate in the physical world of this inside view. The reality of QBism is the result. The same can be derived from first principles in the no-collapse universe. Taking the outside view to define all possible decoherent quasi-classical worlds, the physical world of the inside view is the superposition of all such worlds in which it is instantiated. In this quantum mechanical frame of reference only that observed is determinate.
The quantum state as ontology is questioned because it defines only the linear dynamics and cannot account for collapse. No deeper reality is required, however: the inside view, and the collapse dynamics that operates in this type of frame of reference, are emergent properties of the system, and operate at a different level of logical type. The world operates as described by QBism, but is nonetheless defined by the quantum state.