Filing Date: December 22, 2026 (Supreme Court Merits)
Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic
No. 25-1311
Pro Bono Authors: Jordan Hughes and Eric Konopka
Decision: TBD
Facts: Missionaries of Saint John the Baptist, Inc. (Missionaries), owns a church in a residential neighborhood in Park Hills, Kentucky, a suburb of Cincinnati. The church was built in 1930 and predates the zoning code, enabling its presence in a residential zone as a permissible nonconforming use. Missionaries desired to construct a grotto next to its church honoring the Virgin Mary, and acquired an adjoining tract for that purpose—acknowledging that the adjacent tract did not permit such development because it was not served by an arterial street. Although Missionaries could have built a smaller grotto on its existing tract under that property’s pre-existing nonconforming status, its Petition states that Missionaries “believes it is God’s will that petitioner construct a shrine to the Virgin Mary on its adjoining property.” In Missionaries’ view, “the shrine must be erected adjacent to the church because when the Virgin reportedly appeared in a grotto in Lourdes, France, in 1858, she requested that Saint Bernadette ‘tell the Priests that a chapel must be built’ next to the grotto.’ “The grotto would be built into the hill and ‘consist of a shrine to the Virgin Mary, a plaza, a walking path, and a retaining wall.’ It would be 16 feet by 39 feet—about the size of a backyard swimming pool.”
Litigation: The Park Hills Board of Adjustment approved a variance allowing Missionaries to build on the adjacent tract, over the objections of Joel and Elizabeth Frederic, who live across the street from the church and were concerned about increased traffic. The Frederics challenged the Board’s decision in state court, arguing that the Board lacked authority to issue the variance, because the Park Hills’ zoning ordinance empowers the Board to grant conditional-use permits only if it determines “[t]hat the proposed building … will comply with” the zoning ordinance. That limitation is codified in a Kentucky statute which provides that a zoning board “shall not possess the power to grant a variance to permit a use of any land, building, or structure which is not permitted by the zoning ordinance.” Kentucky’s appellate courts agreed with the Frederics.
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Missionaries’ argument that denial of its building a grotto on the adjacent tract interfered in its religious exercise, violating RLUIPA’s “substantial burden” clause, and treated churches less favorably than nonreligious buildings, violating RLUIPA’s “equal terms” provision. The Kentucky court relied significantly on Livingston Christian Schools v. Genoa Charter Township, 858 F.3d 996, 1003 (6th Cir. 2017) for it substantial burden analysis, citing factors including “whether the religious institution has a feasible alternative location” for its religious exercise and whether the institution “imposed a burden upon itself” by, for example, “obtain[ing] an interest in land without a reasonable expectation of being able to use that land for religious purposes.” Here, Missionaries failed to carry its burden under RLUIPA because it made only “conclusory statements that it has no other feasible alternative location for construction of the grotto” and “ha[d] not asserted that it could not construct a smaller grotto or shrine” on the Church Tract, which would not “run[] afoul” of the zoning ordinance—an accommodation which would cause a minimal burden at best. In addition, it held that Missionaries “imposed a burden on itself” by leasing the adjacent tract knowing that building a grotto there was “not directly permitted by the current local zoning ordinance.”
Supreme Court: Missionaries sought Supreme Court relief, arguing that courts around the country have applied vastly different interpretations of RLUIPA’s substantial burden and equal terms tests. The petition was granted on October 1, 2026, limited to the substantial burden issue:
Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.
RLUIPA: Congress enacted RLUIPA in 2000 to protect religious institutions from discriminatory and unduly burdensome land-use regulations. The statute’s definition of “land-use regulation” encompasses any “zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land).” The substantial burden provision prohibits state and municipal governments from imposing or implementing a “land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution,” unless the government demonstrates that the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and is “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Importantly, for purposes of this litigation, RLUIPA’s substantial burden subsection “applies in any case in which— . . . (C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.”
Given that both Kentucky state law and the City’s zoning ordinance do not allow the Board of Adjustment to make individualized assessments in scenarios such as Missionaries’ request for additional non-conforming use beyond the applicant’s existing property, the RLUIPA substantial burden requirement would not have been met. The petitioners argue that under the Supremacy Clause, RLUIPA supersedes any contrary result which might apply under Kentucky law.
Filing Date: November 23, 2026 (Supreme Court Merits)
Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D
No. 26-426
Pro Bono Authors: Richard Simpson and UNC Law Clinic
Decision: TBD
Facts. This case concerns the Department of Homeland Security’s immigration policy which allowed for “third-country removals,” -i.e., removing immigrants to countries that were neither designated in their removal orders nor identified in writing prior to removal proceedings (the “DHS Guidance”). A district court certified a class of noncitizens with final removal orders subject to the policy and then entered final judgment in favor of that class.
Relevant for our purposes, the court vacated and set aside the DHS Guidance as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act. Under 5 U.S.C. s. 706(2) of the APA, a reviewing court “shall…hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be – (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction…” The First Circuit largely affirmed the judgment, including the APA vacatur.
DHS argued that by vacating the guidance under the APA, the district court violated an immigration statute: 8 U.S.C. s. 1252(f)(1). That statute, which is captioned “Limit on injunctive relief,” states: “Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions [authorizing third-country removals] . . . other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.”
DHS is arguing that by vacating the Guidance under the APA, the district court violated this statute. The First Circuit rejected that argument, finding the statute related only to injunctions and not declaratory judgments or vacatur, which it called “milder” remedies. The court explained that under the APA, vacatur is mandatory once a court finds an agency action unlawful, highlighting the “shall” set aside language. The First Circuit also emphasized that Congress knows how to be specific when it wants to bar particular remedies and it only barred injunctive relief in this statute.
The federal government sought a stay with the United States Supreme Court of the district court’s order, which was granted. The Supreme Court also treated the application for a stay as a petition for certiorari and granted certiorari on several questions:
- Whether the district court had jurisdiction over Respondents’ claims.
- Whether the district court had authority to enter classwide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U. S. C. §1252(f)(1).
- Whether the Government’s Guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U. S. C. §1231(b), the Due Process Clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations.
- Such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case.
The federal government argues in its application for a stay to the Supreme Court that “universal vacatur” is “materially identical” to an injunction and it calls this “relabeling” an injunction. While the specific issue has to do with the application of APA vacatur to this immigration statute, which means the APA issue could be decided narrowly, the federal government’s arguments lend themselves to the potential unraveling of APA vacatur more broadly. After Trump v. Casa, which barred universal /nationwide injunctions, we have seen some use of APA vacatur to set aside unlawful agency action impacting local governments, but we have also seen hesitancy of courts to issue broader relief given Casa’s holding. This case could offer an opportunity to reaffirm that APA vacatur remains viable (and indeed, mandatory) where an agency acts unlawfully.
Filing Date: October 28, 2026 (Supreme Court Merits)
Viramontes v. Cook County
No. 25-238 (consolidated with Grant v. Higgins, no. 25-566)
Pro Bono Authors: John Korzen/Wake Forest University Appellate Law Clinic
Decision: TBD-argument December 2, 2026
Facts. Cook County, Illinois has banned assault rifles since 1993. Specifically, the ordinance makes it illegal to “manufacture, sell, offer or display for sale, give, lend, transfer ownership of, acquire, carry or possess” assault weapons and large-capacity magazines in Cook County. An “assault weapon” is defined as a semiautomatic firearm that can accept a detachable magazine and has one or more military style features, such as a folding or telescoping stock, a pistol grip without a stock, a barrel shroud, or a muzzle brake. The Ordinance also lists specific, but nonexclusive, examples of prohibited assault weapons.
Litigation: Viramontes and several others challenged the ordinance as facially invalid under the Second Amendment. Cook County developed a factual record demonstrating the dangerousness of the weapons at the district court and Viramontes largely did not present evidence in the case, recognizing that Seventh Circuit precedent likely precluded his arguments. While discovery was pending, the Supreme Court decided Bruen and Illinois passed a statewide assault-weapons ban. The Seventh Circuit issued a decision regarding a challenge to that Illinois ban in Bevis v. City of Naperville, 85 F.4th 1175 (7th Cir. 2023), holding that, at the preliminary injunction stage, the plaintiffs failed to show that the covered firearms in the Illinois ban were materially different from machine guns and military grade weaponry that can be banned under the Second Amendment pursuant to Bruen. The Seventh Circuit in this case then concluded that Viramontes did not develop the arguments or record necessary to overrule that precedent.
Supreme Court: Consolidating Viramontes with an appeal from the Second Circuit’s holding in Grant v. Higgins that Connecticut’s ban on assault weapons is consistent with historical limits on unusual and dangerous weapons and survives Second Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court frames the question presented as:
Whether the Second and 14th Amendments guarantee the right to possess AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: October 13, 2026 (Supreme Court Merits)
Jouppi v. Alaska
No. 25-246
Pro Bono Author: Nadia Sarkis
Decision: TBD-argument December 1, 2026
Facts: After significant study, the Alaska legislature in the 1980s gave local governments the option to ban alcohol in their communities. This was based on many of the unique difficulties Alaska communities face in combatting alcohol abuse, including the remoteness of these communities, the lack of public safety and law enforcement resources available to respond to alcohol-fueled violence, and the lack of public health resources in these communities. The legislative findings included studies demonstrating higher rates of criminal homicides and sexual assaults related to alcohol abuse and the economic consequences of alcohol abuse in the State, estimated at $2 billion in today’s dollars.
Beaver, a community of fewer than 100 people voted to ban the possession, sale, and importation of alcohol in 2004. The offense is a misdemeanor if the quantity is less than 12 gallons of malt beverages (or lower quantities of wine or distilled spirits). It is also illegal to attempt to transport alcohol into a local option community. If an aircraft is used in the commission of this crime, it is automatically subject to forfeiture under the criminal penalties of the law. The purpose of this requirement was to “strengthen[] the forfeiture law for bootlegging offenses” to better deter the unlawful importation of alcohol.
This case involves an Alaska pilot, Kenneth Jouppi, who in 2012 was preparing to fly a passenger from Fairbanks to Beaver–a “dry village” in which any importation, sale, or possession of alcohol is illegal. Jouppi was under investigation for potential bootlegging offenses and State troopers had a warrant to search his plane. After Jouppi loaded the plane and was about to take off, officers searched the plane and discovered several cases of beer in the passenger’s suitcases (totaling 9 gallons of beer). Jouppi claimed he was unaware of the beer on board, but the troopers testified that at least one six pack was visible in plain view.
A jury convicted Jouppi of violation of the statute. That infraction is a class A misdemeanor, which carries a maximum penalty of up to a year in prison and a fine up to $10,000. The district court sentenced Jouppi to 180 days of imprisonment with 177 days suspended and a $3,000 fine with $1,500 suspended (thus owing $1,500). Under the mandatory forfeiture provision for aircrafts, the State also sought to seize Jouppi’s 1969 Cessna, worth $95,000. This was Jouppi’s first conviction, though there are some facts to suggest as presented by Alaska that he engaged in this activity regularly, which is why he was under investigation. However, for the purposes of the case before the Supreme Court, it is best to assume a first-time offense and that only a six-pack of beer was at issue.
Alaska Supreme Court ruling: The trial court declined to allow the forfeiture. It held that taking the plane amounted to a fine under the Eight Amendment’s excessive fines clause, and that a $95,000 seizure for a minor first-time misdemeanant was disproportionate. Jouppi’s “culpability relative to other potential violators of the [law]” was low. The alcohol statute, the trial court remarked, “recognize[s] a hierarchy of seriousness among . . . offenses” based on the amount of alcohol involved and the recidivism of the offender, yet the airplane-forfeiture provision applies “with equal force to all.” And “[t]he gravity of the harm” was “low relative to other [alcohol code] offenses.”
The case ultimately reached the Alaska Supreme Court, which unanimously held that forfeiting Jouppi’s airplane was constitutional “as a matter of law.” The court was clear that its analysis hinged on Jouppi’s violation of the dry-village statute only as to one six-pack of beer (because whether he was aware of the rest of the alcohol required further fact finding). And it acknowledged that “Jouppi was convicted of only one instance of alcohol importation unconnected to other criminal activity,” but it was “not particularly relevant whether Jouppi’s offense was part of a larger pattern of criminal activity” because, whatever the degree of his wrongdoing, “a pilot knowingly transporting a passenger’s alcohol to a dry village is precisely the kind of person and conduct that the legislature was concerned about.”
In comparing the value of the seizure to the gravity of the crime, the court noted that the maximum fine for the worst of offenders under the dry-village statute was $10,000, so the plane’s value was “only” nine and a half times that amount, which “suggests that the forfeiture is not grossly disproportional.” And the court found further support for its holding in the legislative history behind the dry-village statute: “It is clear to us that the legislature determined that the harm from even a six-pack of beer knowingly imported into a dry village is severe enough to warrant forfeiture of an aircraft.” On that basis, the court held that “the forfeiture of Jouppi’s airplane is not grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense for which he has been convicted and, therefore, the forfeiture does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”
Issue: Whether, in determining whether a fine contravenes the excessive fines clause – which holds the amount of the fine “must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish” – courts may consider the gravity of the underlying offense purely in the abstract or should consider the gravity of the specific defendant’s wrongdoing.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: September 8, 2026 (Supreme Court Merits)
Grand v. City of University Heights
No. 25-965
Pro Bono Author: David Silverman
Decision: TBD-argument December 9, 2026
Facts: Daniel Grand, a resident of University Heights, Ohio, sought a permit to use his home as a “place of religious assembly” pursuant to the City’s zoning law. He is an Orthodox Jew and sent an email to a group of friends that he would like to open his home on the Sabath to pray with a group of ten men or more (a “minyan”). When he sent out an invitation for others to join him to pray he indicated people should feel free to forward it along to others who might be interested, and also mentioned that they could meet the Rabbi. He also referenced the entrance to the “shul” (i.e., his home) in the email. Some of those invitations went to his neighbors who complained to the City that he was violating the zoning laws.
The mayor had the Law Director draft a cease and desist letter directing him not to use his home as “a place of religious assembly.” That letter demanded that he immediately “cease and desist” using the premises as a place of religious assembly and/or a shul or synagogue. It also indicated he could be issued citations under the building code for violations and that the city could pursue additional remedies against him. Mr. Grand’s home is zoned U-1, and the letter informed him that this zoning prohibits the “use of the Premises as a place of religious assembly and/or in operation of a shul or synagogue.”
Mr. Grand then applied to the City’s Planning Commission for a Special Use Permit to allow him to have a “religious assembly” in his home. Under the zoning laws, if a property owner obtains a Special Use Permit, he may operate a “[h]ouse[] of worship” within a U-1 zone. UHCO § 1274.01(b)(1); see UHCO § 1250.02(g). Notably, it does not appear as though “house of worship” is defined under the code. Under the City’s process, the City’s Planning Commission issues the permits, and unsuccessful applicants may appeal to the City Council. UHCO § 1274.01(d)(2). A separate body, the Board of Zoning Appeals, “decide[s] any question involving the interpretation of any provision” in the zoning code. UHCO § 1244.03.
After Mr. Grand applied for a special use permit, the Planning Commission held a public hearing on that application. At that meeting, his counsel described his plans, including the fact that this was for a men’s only prayer group to meet once a week and on high holidays. Mr. Grand’s proposal underscored that this was not a “formal synagogue” and was intended for a small group particularly because his proposed use would not create traffic as the people who would attend do not drive on the Sabath. Several neighbors attended the hearing and spoke out against the proposal arguing that Mr. Grand was underselling the size of the proposed gatherings and arguing that the plan would create traffic and other
hazards in the area. The Planning Commission tabled the discussion, and after requesting more information from Mr. Grand, scheduled another hearing for a few days later.
However, just before that next meeting, Mr. Grand withdrew his application. The meeting went forward without Mr. Grand present and the mayor at the meeting reiterated that Mr. Grand could not “operate a house of worship” without a permit. He stated on the record “[l]et there be no confusion, congregating [at the address] or any other address located in a residence zoned U-1 without a special permit is a violation of the law.” The Commission never acted on the application due to its withdrawal.
About 18 months later, Mr. Grand sued in federal court, alleging violations of RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and other state and federal laws. In addition to the cease and desist letter, Mr. Grand emphasized the mayor’s statements at the second hearing and that other arms of the government that were involved seeking to chill of his rights. This included instruction to have police officers drive by his home to report citations, sending a housing inspector there, and the mayor suggesting to neighbors that they report any violations.
Sixth Circuit ruling: The Sixth Circuit held that Mr. Grand’s claims were not ripe for review because there was no concrete and final decision by the local authorities on the question of whether he could obtain a permit to use his home as a place of religious worship. As the court explained:
[Grand] contends that the cease-and-desist letter counts as a final decision. The problem with the argument is that it misapprehends the finality requirement. To ripen his claims, Grand needed a final decision from the agency with authority over the challenged regulations. That final decision would come from the Board of Zoning Appeals. McConville, the University Heights Law Director who sent the zoning-violation letter, has no role in the relevant agencies. And Mayor Brennan neither controls the Planning Commission nor sits on the Board of Zoning Appeals. Grand’s case, at bottom, turns on whether his proposed gatherings would render his home a “house[] of worship” under the ordinance. UHCO § 1274.01(b)(1). Only the zoning board, not Brennan or McConville, can answer that question. Due to Grand’s decision to withdraw his special use application, the zoning board had no application to act on, leaving us with “no idea” how the ordinance works in this setting.
The court also rejected Mr. Grand’s arguments that the City’s zoning rules chilled his First Amendment expression. Here, with little analysis, the court noted that Mr. Grand had still held a minyan at least once since he ended his application to the Planning Commission, which the court explained did not “sound like chill.” And the court explained that he was
the one who chose not to obtain a final decision and “he is [therefore] the author of any chilling effect on his First Amendment interests, not the City.”
Issue: Whether the First Amendment’s established chilling-effect doctrine, under which a credible government threat that deters the exercise of fundamental rights constitutes a complete and independently actionable constitutional injury, is displaced by Williamson Cty. Planning v. Hamilton Bank’s land-use finality requirement when a plaintiff alleges that government threats both before and after a Planning Commission meeting chilled religious exercise, worship, and assembly.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: August 24, 2026 (Supreme Court Merits)
St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy
No. 25-581
Pro Bono Author: Charles Rothfeld
Decision: TBD-argument November 3, 2026
Facts: Beginning with the 2023-24 school year, Colorado instituted a measure to fund the cost of fifteen hours per week of “preschool services” for all Colorado children “regardless of their economic circumstances.” (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 26.5-4-201 et seq. – the “UPK” statute). The UPK program’s primary purpose is “[t]o provide children in Colorado access to voluntary, high-quality, universal preschool services free of charge in the school year before a child enrolls in kindergarten,” and is open to both public and private schools. Schools seeking UPK participation must confirm that they “provide eligible children an equal opportunity to enroll and receive preschool services regardless of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, lack of housing, income level, or disability[.]”
Two Catholic parishes, two Catholic parents, and the Archdiocese of Denver sought to enjoin the UPK program on the basis that its policies requiring non-discrimination for sexual orientation or gender identity prevented them from participation in the program due to their religious principles, in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. In response to Colorado’s assertion that the UPK program was nondiscriminatory, applied with general applicability, and allowed no exceptions, they pointed to the program’s provisions emphasizing availability of the UPK benefits for disabled and economically-deprived children—arguing that, if these secular elements were prioritized, it inherently meant that other criteria were being de-emphasized and implicitly allowed discrimination. Those provisions meant that the UPK program was not a codification of general applicability in accordance with Employment Division v. Smith and required strict scrutiny analysis—which it would fail.
(Employment Division was a landmark 1990 Supreme Court brought by two counselors at an Oregon drug rehabilitation center who were fired for ingesting peyote as part of religious exercises; when their applications for unemployment benefits were denied due to work-related misconduct, they claimed violations of their Free Exercise rights. The Supreme Court, in 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Scalia, upheld Oregon’s denial of the benefits on the grounds that the prohibition against use of illegal drugs was a neutral, generally applicable measure which only incidentally burdened religious practices. Employment Division has been the subject of recurring attack by Justices Thomas and Alito and is disfavored by the Court’s more recent conservative appointees).
Tenth Circuit: The Tenth Circuit analyzed a wide range of Free Exercise cases proffered by the plaintiffs to support their argument that strict scrutiny applied, but found that the comparators involved laws or policies resulting in obvious religious discrimination, regardless of how subtly the measures may have been drafted or applied. The plaintiffs also pointed to Carson v. Makin, where “this Court articulated a clear rule: If religious groups are excluded from a government funding program ‘because of their religious exercise,’ strict scrutiny applies.” But the Tenth Circuit rejected that reading, concluding that Carson prohibits only exclusions that are “explicit[ly]” “targeted” at “religious use” or status. The plaintiffs also argued that the nondiscrimination requirement violated their freedom of expressive association, pointing to the Court’s decision in 303 Creative, which had upheld a website designer’s right not to produce websites for same-sex weddings on associational grounds. But the Tenth Circuit noted that expressive association rights are not infringed upon by the mandated inclusion of a person unless “the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.” (citation omitted).
In sum, the Circuit found no religious discrimination: the UPK program was a neutral, generally applicable program which did not allow for exceptions which might weaken its neutrality. Significantly, there were many Catholic schools in Colorado that had joined the UPK program, merely declining to inquire into the sexual orientation or gender preferences of students and parents.
The program satisfied rational basis review:
The Parish Preschools have not met their burden to show that their First Amendment rights have been violated and that strict scrutiny applies, and so we apply a rational basis standard of review. Under rational basis review, we will uphold government action “so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose[.]” (citation omitted). The Parish Preschools do not argue that the application of the nondiscrimination requirement fails to meet this standard, nor is there any basis for them to do so. The government has articulated not only a legitimate purpose, but an extraordinarily weighty one in protecting equal access to preschool education for Colorado children. And the application of the nondiscrimination requirement to all preschool providers, as mandated by state law, is rationally related to this purpose.
Issues: (1) Whether proving a lack of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith requires showing unfettered discretion or categorical exemptions for identical secular conduct; andEmployment Division v. Smith only when the government explicitly excludes religious people and institutions.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: August 3, 2026 (Supreme Court Merits)
Suncor Energy Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County
No. 25-170
Pro Bono Author: Robert Peck
Decision: TBD-argued October 5, 2026
Facts: This case is one of numerous litigations instituted by local governments seeking to hold the fossil fuel industry accountable for the deleterious effects of greenhouse gas emissions and resulting injuries to persons and property. Here, the City of Boulder and Boulder County (Boulder) brought state law claims against Suncor and ExxonMobil for public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy, seeking damages for “the substantial role that their production, promotion, refining, marketing and sale of fossil fuels played and continues to play in causing, contributing to and exacerbating alteration of the climate, thus damaging Plaintiffs’ property, and the health, safety and welfare of their residents.”
Boulder alleges that it has incurred and will continue to incur millions of dollars in costs to protect its property and residents from the impacts of climate change, and that these costs should be shared by defendants “because they knowingly caused and contributed to the alteration of the climate by producing, promoting, refining, marketing and selling fossil fuels at levels that have caused and continue to cause climate change, while concealing and/or misrepresenting the dangers associated with fossil fuels’ intended use.” These expenses include costs associated with wildfire response, management, and mitigation; repair and replacement of existing flood control and drainage measures and to repair flood damage; managing and responding to increased drought conditions; and repairing physical damage to Boulder’s buildings. Boulder does not seek to enjoin oil and gas operations or sales in Colorado or elsewhere, nor does it seek to enforce emissions controls.
Colorado Supreme Court Ruling: After failing to remove to federal court, the defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that Boulder’s claims were preempted–first, via federal common law, and second, under the terms of the Clean Air Act (CAA). The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s holdings in favor of Boulder:
Federal Common Law: Although there has been no generalized federal common law since 1938 (per the Supreme Court’s determination in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins), the Court originally recognized narrower, more specialized areas of federal common law such as “suits brought by one State to abate pollution emanating from another State.” While that exception initially covered suits regarding air pollution and water pollution, both of those have now been superseded by express statutory provisions—in the case of air pollution, the Colorado Supreme Court noted “since AEP [American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011)] was decided, courts have consistently reaffirmed its holding that the CAA displaced the federal common law of nuisance.” (citing, among other decisions, another climate case where NLC, USCM, and IMLA have subsequently filed as amici: Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 31 F.4th 178 (4th Cir. 2022)).
Clean Air Act: As in Monsanto v. Durnell, the Supreme Court merits case discussed earlier this month (and in which IMLA will file as an amicus, potentially joined by other LGLC affiliates), the Boulder defendants sought preemption based on a federal statute. The Colorado Supreme Court found none: Express preemption was not implicated because the CAA contains no provision expressly preempting state common law tort claims. Similarly, field preemption was inapplicable because “even if Boulder’s claims could be construed as seeking to regulate emissions, which, as we explain below, they do not, Congress has not completely occupied the field of emissions regulation. To the contrary, under the CAA, states retain regulatory authority to implement, maintain, and enforce CAA emissions standards through state implementation plans.”
Lastly, Boulder’s claims were not barred under conflict preemption principles—the defendants did not cite any facts “to indicate that it is impossible to comply with both the CAA and state tort law, that state tort law penalizes what the CAA requires, or that state tort law directly conflicts with the CAA.” And there was nothing in Boulder’s claims for damages that would undermine the CAA’s legislative declaration that one of the statute’s principal purposes is “to protect and enhance the quality of this country’s air resources in order to promote the public health and welfare, as well as the productive capacity of our population.”
Issues: (1) Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate; and (2) Whether this court has statutory and Article III jurisdiction to hear this case.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: April 1, 2026 (Supreme Court Merits)
Monsanto v. Durnell
Pro Bono Author: Robert Peck
Decision: June 25, 2026 – Reversed and remanded, 7-2 / Justice Kavanaugh: The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act expressly preempts John Durnell’s state-law failure-to-warn claim because the claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to its Roundup products’ label.
Facts: This case is an appeal in one of the tens of thousands of cases filed against Monsanto due the to its use of the carcinogen glyphosate in Roundup weed killer. Here, John Durnell sued Monsanto in St. Louis Circuit Court in 2019, alleging that he had developed non-Hodgkins lymphoma due to exposure to Roundup. Durnell brought claims under Missouri statutory and common law for strict liability defective design, strict liability failure to warn, and negligence. In September 2023, a jury awarded Durnell $1.25 million based on the strict liability failure to warn claim.
Monsanto appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, arguing that Missouri law was expressly and impliedly preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) – the federal statutory scheme which regulates the use, sale, and labeling of pesticides. The case brings to the fore a circuit split as to FIFRA’s preemptive scope over state-law based failure to warn cases.
Missouri Court of Appeal Ruling: Express Preemption – FIFRA contains an express preemption provision (7 U.S.C. section 136v(b) which provides that a “[s]tate shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under” FIFRA. The Missouri court read that provision to mean that FIFRA will preempt a state law requirement – including a common-law cause of action – that is not “fully consistent” with FIFRA’s requirements. And a state law requirement is “not fully consistent” with FIFRA’s requirements when that requirement is “(1) for labeling or packaging; and (2) in addition to or different from what FIFRA requires.”
Here, the court found that Durnell’s failure to warn claim did not impose a requirement “in addition to or different from” FIFRA’s labeling requirements. A FIFRA provision-7 U.S.C. section 136(q)(1)(G)-provides that “[a] pesticide is misbranded if . . . the label does not contain a warning or caution statement which may be necessary and if complied with . . . is adequate to protect health and the environment.” Accordingly, “Missouri’s strict liability failure to warn cause of action is fully consistent with federal requirements under section 136(q)(1)(G) of FIFRA. The court found that the “practical effect” of both FIFRA’s prohibition on misbranding under section 136(q)(1)(G) and a strict liability failure to warn claim under Missouri law are the same: “both require a pesticide manufacturer to adequately warn users of the potential dangers of using its product, regardless of the manufacturer’s knowledge or intent.” Based on the foregoing, a strict liability failure to warn claim in Missouri does not impose a requirement “in addition to or different from” the requirements of FIFRA, and section 136v(b) of FIFRA does not expressly preempt Plaintiff’s strict liability failure to warn claim.
Implied preemption: Monsanto also argued that implied preemption also barred Durnell’s failure to warn claim. Implied preemption can arise in two ways: field preemption, where a pervasive scheme of federal regulation implicitly precludes supplementary state regulation, or conflict preemption when simultaneous compliance with both federal and state regulations is impossible. Monsanto argued the latter, pointing out that federal law requires warnings on pesticide labels to be approved by the EPA (“EPA”), making it impossible for Monsanto to simultaneously comply with warnings that would be required under Missouri law.
The court highlighted the considerable hurdle facing Monsanto under its implied preemption argument: in order to establish an irreconcilable conflict between Missouri’s law and federal law, it needed to present clear evidence that: (1) Monsanto fully informed the EPA of the justifications for the warning that Missouri law would impose; (2) the EPA informed Monsanto that it would not approve changing the label to include the warning; and (3) the EPA undertook its action pursuant to authority that carries the force of law.
Here, Monsanto did not satisfy the “demanding burden” of showing an irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law. The record contained no evidence that Monsanto either informed the EPA of the justifications for a change to its warning label or that the EPA informed Monsanto it would not approve such a warning, and Monsanto does not specifically make these arguments on appeal. Accordingly, conflict preemption did not bar Durnell’s failure to warn claim in this case.
(The Court’s grant of certiorari will resolve a circuit split regarding the preemptive scope of FIFRA in state law failure to warn cases. In 2021, the Ninth Circuit held in a personal injury claim in Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., that FIFRA did not preempt failure to warn claims. It found that federal and state labeling requirements were considered parallel and non-conflicting and upheld a $5.2 million verdict, including punitive damages, even though the EPA had approved the Roundup label without a cancer warning. It further held that FIFRA prohibited manufacturers from unilaterally altering the label to include a cancer warning and advised them that adding a cancer warning could render the product “misbranded” and subject to litigation. In 2024, the Third Circuit reached a different conclusion in Schaffner v. Monsanto Corp. holding that preemption applied. It emphasized that the EPA had approved a label for Roundup without a cancer warning, and manufacturers were required under federal law to submit any proposed label changes for agency approval).
Issue: Whether FIFRA preempts a label-based failure-to-warn claim where EPA has not required the warning.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: April 1, 2026 (Supreme Court Merits)
Chatrie v. United States
Pro Bono Author: Thomas McCarthy & Tiffany Bates
Decision: June 29, 2026 – Reversed and remanded / 6-3, Justice Kagan: Police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Okello Chatrie’s location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cellphone location information.
Facts: This case involves a warrant served on Google. For google users, location services is turned off. If a user opts in, Google keeps a digital log of their movements and stores this data on its servers. Once a user enables Location History, Google constantly monitors their location through GPS, even when the person isn’t using their phone.
On May 20, 2019, an armed suspect robbed a Federal Credit Union in Midlothian, Virginia, taking $195,000 from the vault. The initial investigation into the robbery did not lead to any suspects. Then, a detective applied for a geofence warrant from the Virginia circuit court. Google has created a 3-step process on how to handle law enforcement geofence warrants, which it followed in this case. The warrant in this case drew a geofence with a 150-meter radius covering the bank. It then laid out the three-step process by which law enforcement would obtain location information from Google. At Step One, the warrant sought from Google anonymized Location History information for all devices that appeared within the geofence from thirty minutes before to thirty minutes after the bank robbery. Then, at Step Two, law enforcement would “attempt[ ] to narrow down that list” to a smaller number of accounts and provide the narrowed list to Google. Google would then disclose anonymized location data for all those devices from one hour before to one hour after the robbery, but this information was unbounded by the geofence. Finally, at Step Three, law enforcement would again attempt to shorten the list, and Google would provide the username and other identity information for the requested accounts.
This ultimately resulted in the arrest of Chatrie who was then indicted by a grand jury. Chatrie sought to suppress the location data from the geofence warrant, claiming the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth Circuit Ruling: While the district court denied the motion to dismiss, relying on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the Fourth Circuit upheld the motion to suppress but based on its view that Chatrie did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in two hours’ of Location History data that he voluntarily exposed to Google—meaning there was no search by the government under the Fourth Amendment.
Issue: Whether the execution of a geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: January 20, 2026 (Supreme Court Merits)
Pung v. Isabella County
Pro Bono Author: Meaghan VerGow
Decision:June 23, 2026 – Vacated and remanded, 9-0 / Justice Alito: The proper baseline for measuring “just compensation” following a fairly conducted tax sale is the auction sale price, not the property’s hypothetical fair market value; Isabella County did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause by failing to compensate the taxpayer for his property’s fair market value.
Facts: Pung v. Isabella County sprang from a dispute about survivors’ entitlement to a property tax exemption, in this case Michigan’s Principal Residence Exemption (PRE), which provides that a property owner may claim an exemption from local school district taxes if the owner occupies the property as his or her principal residence. In 1994, Timothy Pung had been granted a PRE exemption for his property in Union Township, Isabella County, Michigan. He died in 2004, and was survived by his wife and two children, who occupied the home as their primary residence (his wife died in 2008, but one of his children continued to reside there).
In 2010, the Union Township tax assessor retroactively denied the PRE for the Pung property for tax years 2007, 2008, and 2009 given that no one was listed on the deed after Pung’s death and there having been no subsequent affidavits for a new PRE filed for the property, and continued to deny the PRE for 2010 and 2011. Although Pung’s son ultimately successfully appealed the PRE denials through 2011, the property’s 2012 PRE was revoked because no new affidavit had been filed for that year. While the parties dispute whether Pung received written notice of revocation of the 2012 PRE, they agree that Pung received verbal notice of the revocation when he was paying his tax bill in February 2013. Pung challenged his 2012 tax assessment and refused to pay the deficit, leading to a $2,241.93 unpaid tax bill.
The County Treasurer initiated foreclosure proceedings in June 2014; when Pung failed to appear, the court entered judgment in favor of the County. While Pung moved to set aside the foreclosure, arguing he didn’t hear about it until it had been finalized, the Michigan Court of Appeals ultimately ruled in favor of the County and upheld the foreclosure. The County, now record owner of the property, sold it at a public auction for $76,008. The District Court awarded Pung the surplus remaining after deducting the tax debt, which yielded slightly less than $74,000, but it deferred consideration of Pung’s argument that compensation for the County’s taking should have been far greater, based on the property’s fair market value when title transferred to the County.
Sixth Circuit Ruling: On appeal, Pung resumed his fair market value argument, pointing to the fact that the auction purchaser had resold his home for $194,000—a price close to the County’s tax assessment for the property. He asserted that the County’s failure to remit the fair market balance-based proceeds to him, nearly $120,000, violated the Takings Clause. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, affirming the court below and ruling that a plaintiff whose property is foreclosed and sold at public auction for failure to pay taxes is entitled only to the auction price surplus after deducting taxes and expenses, not reimbursement based on fair market value of the property. The Circuit also rejected Pung’s Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines claim, holding that the Michigan law does not punish property owners for failing to pay their taxes, but rather “its aim is to encourage the timely payment of property taxes.”
Issues: (1) Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment when the compensation is based on the artificially depressed auction sale price rather than the property’s fair market value; and (2) whether the forfeiture of real property worth far more than needed to satisfy a tax debt but sold for a fraction of its real value constitutes an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, particularly when the debt was never actually owed.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: October 21, 2025 (Supreme Court Merits)
First Choice Women’s Resource Center v. Donovan
Pro Bono Author: John Korzen
Decision: April 29, 2026 – Reversed and Remanded, 9-0 / Justice Gorsuch: In a Section 1983 suit challenging a subpoena issued by the New Jersey attorney general demanding documents and donor information, First Choice has established a present injury to its First Amendment associational rights sufficient to confer Article III standing.
Facts: Here, New Jersey Attorney General Matthew Platkin (“AG”) served an investigatory subpoena (“Subpoena”) on First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc., a faith-based pregnancy organization (“First Choice”) based on concerns that First Choice was violating various New Jersey statutes including the state’s Consumer Fraud Act (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-3 to -6). The Subpoena was non-self-executing and required the AG to seek an order enforcing it from the New Jersey Superior Court, the sole forum with power to require compliance. Before the AG had taken further action, and before contesting the Subpoena in state court, First Choice challenged the Subpoena under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in federal court, alleging violation of its First Amendment rights to free association. First Choice argued that requiring it to litigate its federal claims in state court will result in the likely loss of a federal forum once the state court rules on the federal constitutional issues. In this way, First Choice framed the issue similar to Knick v. Township of Scott, where the Supreme Court overruled Williamson County, which had required property owners to exhaust state remedies through an inverse condemnation procedure in state court before proceeding to federal court, often resulting in the federal claim being barred under preclusion principles.
Third Circuit Ruling: The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that First Choice’s constitutional claims were not ripe for federal review pending further litigation in the state courts.
Issue: Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court?
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: October 20, 2025 (Supreme Court Merits)
Olivier v. City of Brandon
Pro Bono Author: Trent McCotter
Decision: March 20, 2026 – Reversed and Remanded, 9-0 / Justice Kagan: Petitioner Gabriel Olivier’s suit seeking purely prospective relief – an injunction stopping officials from enforcing an ordinance in the future – can proceed, notwithstanding his prior conviction for violating that ordinance. Heck v. Humphrey does not hold otherwise.
Facts: In 2019, Brandon, Mississippi passed an ordinance (Section 50-45 of the Brandon Code of Ordinances) to reduce traffic around the Brandon Amphitheater during live events. The ordinance redirects “protests” and “demonstrations” to a designated protest area three hours before an event, and one hour after, and bans the use of loudspeakers that are “clearly audible more than 100 feet” from the protest area. The restrictions apply “regardless of the content and/or expression” of the broadcast. Gabriel Olivier, a street preacher who uses a microphone to broadcast his messages, initially abided by the distancing requirement but then moved to a sidewalk near the amphitheater during a performance and was arrested for violating the ordinance, which is a misdemeanor. He pleaded out, paid a fine, and agreed not to violate the ordinance again for a year, receiving a suspended sentence and no jail time. Soon after, he brought an action against the city under Section 1983, claiming damages and seeking to enjoin the ordinance on First- and Fourteenth Amendment grounds so that he could again evangelize near the Amphitheater.
Fifth Circuit Ruling: Olivier lost at district court and appealed to the Fifth Circuit, dropping his claim for money damages and seeking only injunctive relief. That claim implicated issues under the longstanding Supreme Court holding in Heck v. Humphrey that limits the rights of state court prisoners from suing for damages in federal court under Section 1983 if granting such relief would imply the invalidity of the underlying charges. Under Heck, the conviction below must have been overturned or otherwise invalidated, whether via a reversal, an executive pardon, an expungement, or a writ of habeas corpus. Here, the question was whether allowing Olivier’s claim for prospective injunctive relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his initial conviction for violating the ordinance, and whether he could even bring such a claim given that he had never been incarcerated. The Fifth Circuit found that Heck barred Olivier’s claim, a decision conflicting with other circuits and narrowly upheld in its denial of en banc review, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issues: (1) Whether this court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey bars claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking purely prospective relief where the plaintiff has been punished before under the law challenged as unconstitutional; and (2) whether Heck v. Humphrey bars Section 1983 claims by plaintiffs even where they never had access to federal habeas relief.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: September 10, 2025 (Supreme Court Merits)
Case v. Montana
Pro Bono Author: Nadia Sarkis & James Nikraftar
Decision: January 14, 2026 – Affirmed, 9-0 / Justice Kagan: Under the standard set in Brigham City v. Stuart, the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that someone inside needs emergency assistance; that standard was met here.
Facts: In September 2021, during a phone call with his girlfriend, William Case threatened to commit suicide. Case told her that he was “going to get a note,” after which she heard a clicking sound, followed by a pop, which she interpreted as a gunshot because he was uncommunicative afterwards. She called law enforcement, notifying them that he had threatened to hurt any police who came to his house.
Four officers responded. Case did not answer their knocks on his door or calls for him to come out, and given his threats, they were initially hesitant to enter; they also knew of Case’s prior attempted “suicide by cop.” After 40 minutes passed, they ultimately entered Case’s home, coming through an unlocked door. They announced themselves, yelling repeatedly, but could not find him. Case suddenly ripped aside a closet curtain, startling an officer who saw a “dark object” near Case’s waist and shot him in the abdomen. Police immediately administered aid; as they were doing so, they found a handgun in a laundry hamper outside the closet, next to Case. He was charged with “knowingly or purpose fully caus[ing] reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury in [the officer] when he pointed a pistol, or what reasonably appeared to be a pistol, at [the officer.]”
Case filed motions to dismiss for lack of probable cause and to suppress evidence obtained from the “illegal search of Defendant and his residence.” The district court denied both motions, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.
Montana Supreme Court Ruling: On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the lower court’s denial of the motion to suppress under the “community caretaker” doctrine, which justifies police entry without a warrant when they reasonably believe that a person is in danger. The Montana court found that officers had “objective, specific, and articulable facts” to conclude that Case required assistance, justifying their warrantless entry.
In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), the Supreme Court held that before police officers enter a home without a warrant, they must have “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.” But state courts and federal Circuits are divided on whether the “objectively reasonable basis” standard requires police making a warrantless entry to have probable cause to believe an emergency exists or some lesser level of suspicion. In its 4-3 decision, the Montana Supreme Court joined three other state high courts, as well as the First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, in rejecting the probable cause requirement for warrantless entry. It found that police must have a “reasonable belief” that the person inside is in need of immediate aid or protection.
On June 2, 2025, the Supreme Court granted the petition. As the petition puts it, “This case gives the Court the opportunity to clarify ‘the contours of the exigent circumstances doctrine as applied to emergency-aid situations,’ an issue that has consistently confused and divided the lower courts.”
Issue: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: March 5, 2025 (Supreme Court Merits)
Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission
Pro Bono Author: John Baker & Alison Zoschak
Decision: June 5, 2025 – Reversed, 9-0 / Justice Sotomayor: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision denying Catholic Charities Bureau a tax exemption available to religious entities under Wisconsin law on the grounds that they were not “operated primarily for religious purposes” because they neither engaged in proselytization nor limited their charitable services to Catholics violated the First Amendment.
Facts: Under Wisconsin’s unemployment insurance statute, religious entities are exempt from paying unemployment taxes based on the purpose and nature of their operations. Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h) provides that “employment” for the purpose of paying the insurance, does not include those “in the employ of an organization operated primarily for religious purposes and operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” The petitioners in this case are several sub-entities of Catholic Charities (hereinafter “Catholic Charities”) which provides services to individuals with developmental and mental health disabilities. Catholic Charities paid unemployment taxes for decades but recently sought an exemption based on their religious mission. Catholic Charities’ mission is “to provide service to people in need, to advocate for justice in social structures and to call the entire church and other people of good will to do the same.” Catholic Charities maintain they are “operated primarily for religious purposes” and that any contrary interpretation of the unemployment statute would violate the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses. The Labor and Industry Review Commission concluded Catholic Charities was not exempt from paying the unemployment tax and Catholic Charities appealed the case, ultimately to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Wisconsin Supreme Court Ruling: The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that under the plain text of the statute; to meet the exemption, courts must examine both the motivation and activities of the organization. And that in this case, while the court did not question the sincerely held religious motivation of Catholic Charities, it concluded that its activities were not “operated primarily for religious purposes” within the meaning statute. The court reasoned that if it agreed with Catholic Charities’ position and looked “to the church’s purpose in operating the organization only, then any religiously affiliated organization would always be exempt.”
As to Catholic Charities’ operations, the court concluded that the activities were primarily charitable and secular and were not imbued with religious faith. The court explained that the services provided by Catholic Charities were not religious in nature and if they had been provided by secular groups would not have differed in any sense. Per the court, Catholic Charities, which is organized as a separate corporation from the church itself, did not attempt to imbue any program participants with the Catholic faith or supply religious materials to participants or employees. The court reasoned these factors would have been strong indicators that the activities were primarily religious in nature.
The court also found that the statute, as applied to Catholic Charities, did not violate either the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The court rejected the argument advanced by Catholic Charities that the court was excessively entangling the state with religion by examining its activities via an “intrusive inquiry into the operations of religious organizations.” The court similarly rejected the argument that the Bureau’s interpretation of the law violates the Free Exercise Clause by penalizing Catholic Charities for its “beliefs regarding how [they] must serve those most in need.” The court reasoned that “[T]he Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens the claimant’s freedom to exercise religious rights.” And here, the court concluded that Catholic Charities has not “identified how the payment of unemployment tax prevents them from fulfilling any religious function or engaging in any religious activities.” And finally, the court noted that “the decrease in the money available for religious or charitable activities that comes with paying a generally applicable tax is not a constitutionally significant burden.”
The dissent concluded that the interpretation of the unemployment statute violated the First Amendment by “[i]mpermissibly entangling the government in church doctrine,” and explained that:
[b]y focusing on whether a nonprofit primarily engages in activities that are ‘religious in nature,’ the majority transforms a broad exemption into a denominational preference for Protestant religions and a discriminatory exclusion of Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Hare Krishna, and the Church of Latter Day Saints, among others. The First Amendment forbids the government from such religious discrimination and commands neutrality among religions in the provision or denial of a government benefit. ¶114 The majority’s misinterpretation also excessively entangles the government in spiritual affairs, requiring courts to determine what religious practices are sufficiently religious under the majority’s unconstitutional test. The majority says secular entities provide charitable services, so such activities aren’t religious at all, even when performed by Catholic Charities.
Issue: Does a state violate the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state’s criteria for religious behavior?
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: January 22, 2025 (Supreme Court Merits)
Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services
Pro Bono Author: Nadia Sarkis & Kelly Delvac
Decision: June 5, 2025 – Vacated and Remanded, 9-0 / Justice Jackson: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule — which requires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII discrimination claim — cannot be squared with either the text of Title VII or the Supreme Court’s precedents.
Facts: Ames, a heterosexual woman, worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services beginning in 2004. In 2014, the Department made her its Administrator of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) where she was an at-will employee. In 2017, Ames was assigned a new supervisor, Ginine Trim, who is gay. Trim reported to Assistant Director Julie Walburn, who is heterosexual. In a December 2018 performance evaluation, Trim said that Ames met “expectations” in ten competencies and exceeded them in only one. In January 2019, Ohio’s governor appointed Ryan Gies, who is heterosexual, to be the Department’s Director.
In April 2019, Ames applied and interviewed to be the Department’s Bureau Chief of Quality. The Department chose not to hire her for that position and hired a gay woman instead. She was then demoted to her previous position, which came with a significant reduction in pay. The Department selected a 25-year-old gay man for the position of PREA Administrator (Ames’ former position). The Department indicated she was demoted because of her performance as they wanted someone who did more than meet expectations for the position.
Ames later filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming discrimination based on her sexual orientation. Ames sought to prove her discrimination claims by indirect evidence, which required her to show the following: (1) that she was a member of a protected class; (2) that she was subject to an adverse employment decision; (3) that she was qualified for the relevant position; (4) and that her employer treated more favorably a similarly qualified person who was not a member of the same protected class.
Sixth Circuit Ruling: The Sixth Circuit found she met these factors for a typical prima facie case. But, because Ames is heterosexual and part of the majority group, the Sixth Circuit required that she also show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” The court explained that plaintiffs typically make the additional showing with evidence that a member of the relevant minority group (here, gay people) made the employment decision at issue, or with statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination by the employer against members of the majority group. The court concluded she could not meet that burden as she conceded the ultimate decisionmakers were heterosexual and she pointed to no statistical evidence to support her claim.
Issue: Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: January 15, 2025 (Supreme Court Merits)
Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’ Research
Pro Bono Author: Tillman Lay & Gregory Caffas
Decision: June 27, 2025 – Reversed and Remanded, 6-3 / Justice Kagan: The universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine; Congress sufficiently guided and constrained the discretion that it lodged with the Federal Communications Commission to implement that scheme, and the FCC has retained all decision-making authority within that sphere, relying on the Universal Service Administrative Company only for non-binding advice.
Facts: This case was brought by a group (Consumers’ Research) challenging a program by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) that collects funds from telecom providers and redistributes them to localities lacking telecom and broadband access, utilizing an intermediary administrative entity which it appointed to facilitate the program. The challengers argued that such a mechanism was an unconstitutional delegation of Congress’s taxing authority. Established by Congress in the Communications Act of 1934 (Act), the FCC’s core missions include promoting affordable telecommunications access throughout the United States. The FCC initially achieved “universal service” primarily by regulating rates; for example, it required telephone monopolies to charge below-cost rates in rural areas, while allowing them to charge above-cost rates in cities. In essence, urban customers subsidized the provision of telephone service to rural customers.
In 1996, Congress overhauled the Act and directed the FCC to establish a set of programs known as the Universal Service Fund (USF), requiring carriers to “contribute” to the USF “on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis.” To help it implement the USF, the FCC enlisted the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), a private not for profit corporation subject to the FCC’s oversight and control. USAC provides financial projections that the FCC uses to calculate the percentage of revenues that carriers must contribute to the USF; USAC then issues bills, collects the contributions, and disburses the USF money among four universal service programs, providing telecom and broadband to (1) remote areas-the “High Cost” program; (2) low-income consumers-the “Lifeline” program; (3) schools and libraries-the “E-rate” program; and (4) rural healthcare providers-the “Rural Health” program.
In November 2021, based on data from USAC, the FCC proposed a contribution factor of 25.2%. The challengers resisted, arguing that the universal service program was unlawful because Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the FCC, which in turn had unconstitutionally redelegated power to USAC.
Fifth Circuit Ruling: The Fifth Circuit initially rejected the challengers’ claim of unconstitutional delegation. But on rehearing, the Circuit reversed itself. It found that Congress “purported to confer upon FCC the power to tax without supplying an intelligible principle to guide FCC’s discretion,” characterizing Congressional limits on FCC authority as “minimal,” “contentless,” “a hollow shell,” and “so amorphous that no reviewing court could ever possibly invalidate any FCC action.” The FCC had compounded the problem by vesting significant authority in the USAC, a private entity. The Fifth Circuit found that this “double-layered delegation” violated the Constitution’s Legislative Vesting Clause, a holding that conflicted with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits.
Supreme Court Reversal: On June 27, 2025, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, in a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kagan, with a dissent by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. Justice Kagan did not find a violation of nondelegation principles: “We hold that no impermissible transfer of authority has occurred. Under our nondelegation precedents, Congress sufficiently guided and constrained the discretion that it lodged with the FCC to implement the universal-service contribution scheme. And the FCC, in its turn, has retained all decision-making authority within that sphere, relying on the [USAC] only for non-binding advice.”
Congressional delegation to the FCC: Central to Justice Kagan’s analysis was confirmation that Congress had satisfied the so-called “intelligent principle test”—by imposing “ascertainable and meaningful guideposts for the FCC to follow when carrying out its delegated function of collecting and spending contributions from carriers.” While Consumers’ Research argued that Congress was required to issue quantitative financial parameters to the FCC, the majority held that a qualitative standard satisfied the intelligent principle test—the FCC should raise funds “sufficient” to support its universal service programs. And against arguments by Consumers’ and the dissent that the Act gave the FCC unbridled discretion as to how funds should be deployed, the majority pointed to the four specific programs which USF is mandated to support: Lifeline, High Cost, E-rate, and Rural Health.
FCC’s delegation to USAC: Consumers’ also contended that the FCC had impermissibly conferred governmental power on a private party, violating the “private nondelegation doctrine.” But the majority’s analysis of the actual FCC-USF-USAC decision-making process rebutted Consumers’ allegations that USAC had carte blanche to set the contribution factor and dictate how much individual carriers paid into the program. The USAC role was limited to making calculations and submitting proposed figures to the FCC, which maintained final decision-making authority regarding contribution percentages and amounts.
Double-layered Delegation: As a final matter, Justice Kagan laid to rest the Fifth Circuit’s “double-layered delegation” analysis: the USF program did not delegate a legislative function to the FCC, the FCC did not cede authority to private entity; and the combination of the two did not morph into an unconstitutional whole: “If a regulatory scheme authorizes neither executive legislation nor private governance, it does not somehow authorize an unlawful amalgam. Contra the Fifth Circuit, a meritless public nondelegation challenge plus a meritless private nondelegation challenge cannot equal a meritorious ‘combination’ claim.”
Issues: (1) Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund; (2) Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator’s financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates; and (3) Whether the combination of Congress’s conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission’s delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: December 6, 2024 (Supreme Court Merits)
Perttu v. Richards
Pro Bono Author: Richard Simpson & Andrew Hessick
Decision: June 18, 2025 – Affirmed, 5-4 / Justice Roberts: Parties are entitled to a jury trial on the issue of exhaustion of remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
Facts: This case arises from a complaint by Kyle Richards (Richards), an inmate in the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) that Thomas Perttu (Perttu), a Resident Unit Manager (RUM) employed by the MDOC, sexually harassed Richards and other inmates, retaliated against them, and destroyed their property, in violation of the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.
Decades ago, such a claim would have proceeded directly to federal court in a section 1983 action. But the meteoric rise in inmate claims clogging the courts (in 1995, nearly 40,000 such lawsuits were filed, including many non-meritorious claims) moved Congress to pass the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (PLRA), which now requires inmates to first exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing their actions into a federal courtroom:
The PLRA states in applicable part: (a) No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
Against the constraints of the PLRA, however, Richards is relying on his right to go to court and obtain a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. His argument is that, in this case, the very elements that would determine whether he has exhausted his administrative remedies are inextricably bound up in the material facts of his section 1983 claim—including his allegations that Perttu’s actions in retaliating and taking Richards property prevented him from pursuing the very administrative remedies intended by the PLRA.
Sixth Circuit Ruling: The Sixth Circuit, overruling a lower court, agreed with Richards, finding that where material factual elements which would otherwise require determination by a jury are intertwined with the PLRA-mandated administrative process, the inmate’s Seventh Amendment rights are superior, and a federal jury proceeding is appropriate. In so holding, the Sixth Circuit conflicts with the only other Circuit to examine the issue. In Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008) the Seventh Circuit held that prisoners had no right to a jury trial to determine whether they had exhausted their administrative remedies under the PLRA, regardless of whether the exhaustion issue is intertwined with the merits of the case. As that court put it “Juries decide cases, not issues of judicial traffic control” Pavey, 544 F.3d at 741.
Perttu and the MDOC argue that the Seventh Circuit analysis is more consistent with the intent of the PLRA, and that the Sixth Circuit approach completely undermines Congressional intent, essentially granting inmates a preliminary jury trial to determine if they are entitled to a jury trial. In their petition for cert, they pointed to the Circuit split and argued that there are various other elements in litigation (such as a court’s grant of summary judgment) where a jury’s determination is not called for:
Of course, the Seventh Amendment will not yield to a statute. But it need not here, as the Constitution does not entitle a prisoner to a jury trial to determine whether the prisoner has exhausted administrative remedies any more than a jury is necessary to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Threshold issues such as exhaustion do not implicate the Seventh Amendment.
Issue: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: November 25, 2024 (Supreme Court Merits)
McGlaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp.
Pro Bono Author: Bryan Weir & Tiffany Bates
Decision: June 20, 2025 – Reversed and remanded, 6-3 / Justice Kavanaugh: The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law’s meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.
Facts: This case involves a statutory interpretation by the FCC. While the specific statute may not be particularly germane to local government, the ability to challenge other FCC statutory interpretations, or those by other agencies, is of great significance. At stake is the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), which was enacted to protect consumers and businesses from aggressive telemarketing practices, prohibiting unsolicited fax advertising to “telephone facsimile machines” unless the sender has provided an opt-out notice whereby recipients can decline to receive future solicitations. The statute provides a private right of action and minimum damages of $500 per violation with a potential for treble damages, meaning that liability in class action litigation for noncompliance can be substantial. Over a two-year period, McKesson Corporation (McKesson) sent unsolicited solicitations to medical offices including McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates (McLaughlin), without the required opt-out notices. In 2014, McLaughlin sued McKesson in the Northern District of California, seeking injunctive relief and damages, and sought to represent a class of other plaintiffs who had received McKesson advertisements, whether on traditional fax machines or via online faxes services. That class was certified by the District Court without distinguishing between the two types of faxes.
Ninth Circuit Ruling: During the pendency of McLaughlin’s suit, the FCC issued a final order defining the term “telephone facsimile machine” in the TCPA to exclude online fax services. Because Ninth Circuit precedent holds that under the Hobbs Act, FCC final orders are only reviewable in the Courts of Appeals, the District Court deemed the FCC order to be binding and granted summary judgment to McKesson on all claims involving online fax services. That meant only the 12 class members who received McKesson’s ads on traditional fax machines had a TCPA claim, limiting McKesson’s damages to a mere $6,000. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. McLaughlin successfully petitioned for Supreme Court review on the question of whether the Hobbs Act binds district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency’s interpretation of a statute.
Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the majority and joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, reversed, answering the question in the negative-district courts in enforcement proceedings are not foreclosed from independently assessing whether an agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute is correct. It is true that the Hobbs Act significantly limits pre-enforcement review of an agency’s final order, requiring challenge at the appropriate Circuit Court within 60 days after the order is issued. Pre-enforcement review under the Hobbs Act “allows regulated and affected parties to obtain greater clarity about their legal rights and obligations—rather than taking their chances and hoping to prevail in later enforcement proceedings.” The Hobbs Act thus requires parties who want to challenge the legality of agency rules or orders in a pre-enforcement proceeding to do so both promptly and in a court of appeals—a process that avoids “delays and uncertainty that otherwise could ensue from multiple pre-enforcement suits filed across time in multiple district courts and from subsequent appeals in the courts of appeals.”
But those same mandates do not necessarily apply in an enforcement scenario. To illustrate, Justice Kavanaugh describes three types of pre-enforcement statutes: those, such as the Clean Water Act, which expressly preclude judicial review in subsequent civil or criminal enforcement proceedings; those, like the Toxic Substances Control Act which clearly authorize later judicial review in enforcement actions; and those, such as the Hobbs Act, which provide for pre-enforcement review “but are silent on the question of whether a party may contest the agency’s legal interpretation in subsequent enforcement proceedings.”
The third category raises a question—in the absence of express language on the issue, what should the default rule be regarding subsequent judicial review? Here, the majority finds a clear answer: “Fundamental principles of administrative law establish the proper default rule: In an enforcement proceeding, a district court must independently determine for itself whether the agency’s interpretation of a statute is correct, “ a result that is consistent with the Court’s broader holding in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 402 (2024) requiring district courts to “determine the meaning of the law under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.”
As the Kavanaugh opinion states, that result also follows the relevant language in the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides in Section 703 that “[e]xcept to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement.”
The majority supports its legal analysis with a common-sense observation about the posture urged by McKesson (and the US, in its amicus brief):
Requiring all those potentially affected parties to somehow predict the future and bring a pre-enforcement challenge within 60 days or otherwise lose their right to challenge an agency’s interpretation of a statute down the road in an enforcement proceeding would be highly unusual—and would rightly strike many affected parties as grossly unfair.
In dissent, Justice Kagan is joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. She poses an example: if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues an order prohibiting the transport of radioactive plutonium on airplanes, can an entity ignore pre-enforcement challenge to the directive, ship the plutonium, and then challenge the order when the agency brings an enforcement action, potentially years later? (The majority argues that this order would nevertheless be subject to later review under the provisions of APA § 703 referenced above). And Justice Kagan challenges the majority’s reliance on “a novel ‘default rule,’ which demands that Congress use a certain form of words—really, that Congress create statutory redundancy—to preclude parties from bringing down-the-road challenges to agency action. That rule has no foundation in our law; it emerges fully formed today from the majority’s head.”
McLaughlin v. McKesson expands the rights of litigants, including local governments, to challenge an agency’s final order interpreting a statute. Instead of being required to challenge the final order in Circuit Court in a pre-enforcement proceeding within 60 days after the agency issues the order–a significant hurdle for most would-be challengers–parties may challenge the order in a federal District Court in subsequent enforcement proceedings. District Courts are not bound by the agency’s final order interpreting the statute in question and may independently assess whether the agency’s interpretation is correct.
Issue: Whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the FCC’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: November 19, 2024 (Supreme Court Merits)
Stanley v. City of Sanford
Pro Bono Author: Meaghan VerGow
Decision: June 20, 2025 – Affirmed, 8-1 / Justice Gorsuch: To prevail under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer’s alleged act of disability-based discrimination; the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit is affirmed.
Facts: Stanley served the City of Sanford, Florida as a firefighter from 1999 until shortly after she was diagnosed with Parkson’s disease in 2016. Although she was initially able to work for approximately 2 more years, her disease left her incapable of performing her job and she was forced to take disability retirement in November 2018. Under the policy in place when Stanley joined the fire department, she was entitled to receive free healthcare through the City until age 65 if she retired for a qualified disability reason (which she did). Unbeknownst to Stanley, the City changed its policy in 2003 and under the new policy, disability retirees are only entitled to free health insurance for 24 months after retiring. She sued, arguing the City’s decision to jettison the health insurance subsidy discriminated against her because of her disability.
Title I of the ADA provides that it is unlawful to “discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . employee compensation, . . . and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 331-32 (1990). The statute defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as someone “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Id. § 101(8), 104 Stat. 331.
Eleventh Court Ruling: The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged a circuit split on the issue, but relied on its own prior precedent to conclude that a former employee does not qualify under the ADA as a “qualified individual with a disability” and therefore cannot bring suit for discrimination in postemployment distribution of fringe benefits. The court reasoned that the ADA only applies to those individuals who “hold or desire to hold a job” and they must be able to “perform the essential functions of a job.” To hold otherwise, per the Eleventh Circuit, would render the statute’s definition of qualified individual “meaningless.” The court rejected Stanley’s arguments that the subsequent amendments to the ADA (the ADAAA) or the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act changed the analysis as those statutes did not amend the relevant term – qualified individual.
Issue: Whether, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, a former employee—who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed—lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: August 19, 2024 (Supreme Court Merits)
E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera
Pro Bono Author: Patrick Kane & Morgan Reece
Decision: January 15, 2025 – Reversed and Remanded, 9-0 / Justice Kavanaugh: The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies when an employer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Facts: Generally, the FLSA provides that employers must pay overtime pay at a rate of time and a half for work done above 40 hours per week. There are many exemptions, however, to the overtime requirement. In this case, the employer, a grocery store distributor, claimed the employees – who worked outside the office servicing stores on their assigned routes – fell into the “outside sales” exemption, and so even though they regularly worked 60 hours a week, the employer did not pay them overtime. The employees sued, claiming they did not meet the definition for the exemption and should have been paid overtime for all hours worked over 40 hours.
The employer argued that the proper standard to demonstrate the exemption applied was a preponderance of the evidence – or more than 51%. The employees, on the other hand, argued that the employer must meet a “clear and convincing” standard of proof for the exemption to apply, a much higher burden. The case went to a bench trial and the district court found in favor of the plaintiffs, using the “clear and convincing” evidence standard, and concluding the employer had not met its burden to show the plaintiffs were covered by the exemption.
Fourth Circuit Ruling: The Fourth Circuit affirmed, also utilizing the clear and convincing standard. The court also concluded that double damages were appropriate though did not require the payment of treble damages in this case. (According to the petition, 6 other circuits have concluded that employers need only prove the exemption by the lower preponderance of the evidence standard).
Issue: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of a Fair Labor Standards Act exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: July 26, 2024 (Supreme Court Merits)
City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency
Pro Bono Author: Andre Monette & Shawn Hagerty
Decision: March 4, 2025 – Reversed, 5-4 / Justice Alito: The challenged end-result permitting provisions “which make the permittee responsible for the quality of the water in the body of water into which the permittee discharges pollutants” exceed the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority under the Clean Water Act.
Facts: The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., was enacted in 1972 to protect the “integrity of the Nation’s waters” and create a scheme that would clearly define individuals’ obligations to control pollution. Congress expected EPA and the States to issue National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits containing pollutant limits that would create “clear and identifiable requirements” to “provide manageable and precise benchmarks for enforcement.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 81 (1971); among other things, NPDES permits must set “effluent limitations”—end-of-pipe restrictions “on quantities, rates, and concentrations of . . . constituents . . . discharged from point sources.” (The EPA has exclusive jurisdiction to issue NPDES permits for discharges more than three miles offshore, while the States may issue NPDES permits for discharges within three miles of shore).
Contrary to the requirements of the CWA and EPA guidance, NPDES permits routinely deviate from the use of specific effluent limitations to ensure that water quality standards are met, instead imposing generic prohibitions against discharging in a manner that causes or contributes to exceeding applicable water quality standards.
San Francisco’s Water Treatment: Like local governments across the nation, SF owns and operates wastewater treatment facilities that accept sewage and stormwater generated citywide, treat it to required standards, and discharge treated effluent. Part of that infrastructure, known as “Oceanside Facilities,” serves more than 250,000 people living in the western portion of SF and discharges into the Pacific Ocean at several locations, including one that extends 4.5 miles from the shoreline. As one of hundreds of older cities where combined wastewater and stormwater overflows (CSOs) periodically exceed the sewer system’s capacity, SF has invested heavily in water quality; its multibillion-dollar citywide investment has reduced CSO frequency from the Oceanside Facilities by 94%.
In December 2019, the EPA approved issuance of the Oceanside Facilities’ NPDES permit, comprising more than 100 pages of detailed requirements. That permit included numeric limitations and comprehensive management requirements, but also added two unspecific, generic prohibitions: a discharge may “not cause or contribute to a violation of any applicable water quality standard. . . .” and no “discharge of pollutants shall create pollution, contamination, or nuisance as defined by California Water Code section 13050.” (Generic Prohibitions). The second item is particularly problematic: SF’s compliance turns on whether, after the fact, it is determined that the City’s discharge unreasonably impacted one of the Pacific Ocean’s broad beneficial uses, such as recreation.
Ninth Circuit Ruling: SF filed for review with EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) to challenge the Generic Prohibitions (and others). After denial by the EAB, SF sought review in the Ninth Circuit. There, a divided panel concluded that the Generic Prohibitions are “consistent with the CWA and its implementing regulations.” The majority found that CWA provisions empower the EPA and States to impose generic prohibitions against violating water quality standards anytime they find it “necessary” to do so. They determined that these regulations, despite imposing a mandatory process for translating water quality standards into specific limitations, nonetheless leave EPA and States free to impose generic prohibitions. In dissent, Judge Collins found the Generic Prohibitions to be “inconsistent with the text of the CWA.” By broadly demanding that SF not violate water quality standards without specifying how to do so, the Generic Prohibitions “ignore this critical distinction by making the ultimate, overall ‘water quality standards’ themselves the applicable limitation for” SF. The panel majority, in Judge Collins’ view, authorized EPA to “abdicate[] the regulatory task assigned to it under the CWA” to define the extent to which permittees must control their discharges to comply with the CWA.
Issue: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in NPDES permits that subject permitholders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: July 2, 2024 (Supreme Court Merits)
Bondi v. VanDerStok
Pro Bono Author: John Korzen
Decision: March 6, 2025 – Reversed, 7-2 / Justice Gorsuch: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ 2022 Rule interpreting the Gun Control Act of 1968 to cover certain products that can readily be converted into an operational firearm or a functional frame or receiver is not facially inconsistent with the act.
Facts: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq., imposes licensing, background-check, recordkeeping, and serialization requirements on persons engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. In the Act, Congress delegated to the Attorney General the authority to promulgate “such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out” the Act. 18 U.S.C. 926(a). The Attorney General has in turn delegated that authority to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).
The Act defines a “firearm” to include “any weapon … which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” as well as “the frame or receiver of any such weapon.” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) and (B), and requires all manufacturers and dealers of firearms to comply with certain requirements, including conducting background checks, recording the transfer or sale, and serializing the firearm.
Technology has allowed companies to manufacture and sell “firearm parts kits” that allow anyone with access to the internet and basic tools to assemble a functional firearm “quickly and easily,” often in just minutes. Known colloquially as ghost guns, some manufacturers sold these kits without complying with the Act’s requirements by claiming that they were not “firearms” regulated by the Act. These kits are then sold without the required background checks or records of sale and the assembled firearms lack serial numbers.
In 2022, the ATF issued a regulation to clarify that the definition of firearm under the Act includes products and kits that can “readily be converted” into an operational firearm or a functional frame or receiver. See 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (codified in relevant part at 27 C.F.R. 478.11, 478.12(c)). The Rule also explained that the statutory term “frame or receiver” under the definition of firearm includes “a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver, including a frame or receiver parts kit, that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver.”
The Solicitor General explained the scope of the rule and its impact in its brief as follows:
The Rule’s interpretation of the Act does not prohibit the manufacture of any firearm or the sale of a firearm to any individual lawfully entitled to possess one. Nor does it prohibit such a person from making a firearm at home. Instead, the Rule simply clarifies that the Act requires commercial manufacturers and sellers of covered weapon parts kits and partially complete frames or receivers to obtain licenses, mark their products with serial numbers, conduct background checks, and keep transfer records. Those are the same “conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms,” that around 80,000 manufacturers and distributors of firearms comply with in millions of transactions each year.
Fifth Circuit Ruling: The Fifth Circuit held the ATF’s Rule was inconsistent with the statutory text and exceeded the agency’s authority and therefore violated the Administrative Procedure Act.
Issues: (1) Whether “a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a “firearm” regulated by the Act; and (2) Whether “a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver” that is “designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver,” 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a “frame or receiver” regulated by the Act.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: June 27, 2024 (Supreme Court Merits)
Lackey v. Stinnie
Pro Bono Author: Joshua Skinner & Benjamin Gibbs
Decision: February 25, 2025 – Vacated and Remanded, 7-2 / Justice Roberts: Plaintiffs who gain only preliminary injunctive relief before their action becomes moot do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988(b) because no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring relief on the merits that altered the legal relationship between the parties.
Facts: Five named plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles to challenge the constitutionality of a (now repealed) law, Section 46.2-395 of the Virginia Code. This law required courts to automatically suspend a convicted criminal’s driver’s license if they failed to pay certain court fines and fees. The plaintiffs alleged the law was unconstitutional by violating their procedural and substantive due process rights as well as other claims. They sought preliminary and permanent relief to prevent enforcement of the statute and sought reinstatement of the licenses for the Virginians’ whose licenses had been suspended.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits as to their procedural due process claims (one of the five claims brought). The court set the case for a bench trial, but before the trial, the Virginia General Assembly passed a Budget Amendment that suspended the enforcement of the law for one year. The court then stayed the case pending the next legislative session, which the Commissioner represented to the court was likely to result in a full repeal of the law. That subsequent repeal took place, and the court then dismissed the action as moot. The court therefore never issued a permanent injunction or declared the law unconstitutional (it was only ever found to be “likely” unconstitutional). After the case was dismissed, the plaintiffs sought attorney’s fees totaling more than $767,000 under Section 1988.
Legal Background: Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), in certain civil rights cases, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.” In Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001), the Supreme Court held for a party to “prevail” under Section 1988 for the purposes of attorney’s fee awards, the relief must be “judicially sanctioned.” In other words, “[a] defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change” to have prevailed under the statute. Id. at 605. Then, in Sole v. Wyner, the Court held that a party has not “prevailed” under Section 1988 through the award of a preliminary injunction if that injunction is later reversed by a final decision in the case. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, (2007).
Fourth Circuit Ruling: The district court had denied the attorney’s fees, following the Fourth Circuit’s case law at the time which had a bright line rule indicating that preliminary injunction awardees are not entitled to attorney’s fees as they are not prevailing parties under the statute. The Fourth Circuit, bound by its own case law, initially affirmed. It then reheard the case en banc and reversed, creating a new rule for when a party may obtain attorney’s fees after the award of a preliminary injunction. That rule states:
When a preliminary injunction provides the plaintiff concrete, irreversible relief on the merits of her claim and becomes moot before final judgment because no further court-ordered assistance proves necessary, the subsequent mootness of the case does not preclude an award of attorney’s fees. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 77 F.4th 200, 210 (4th Cir. 2023).
The court then explained that “all preliminary injunctions” are “solidly merits-based” and will satisfy the “judicial imprimatur” necessary under Buckhannon. (Though the court did leave open the possibility that not all preliminary injunction awardees will be entitled to attorney’s fees, but the result is that most will be). The court found in this case there was “little question that [the] preliminary injunction’s ‘alternation of the legal relationship of the parties’” satisfied the necessary standard as it provided precisely the relief the plaintiffs sought – the reinstatement of their licenses.
Issues: (1) whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (2) whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties’ legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under Section 1988.
Read the amicus brief here.
Filing Date: March 12, 2024 (Supreme Court Merits)
Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon
Pro Bono Author: Greg Garre & Jordan Goldberg
Decision June 20, 2024 – Vacated and Remanded, 6-3 / Justice Kagan: The presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge.
Facts: Chiaverini managed a jewelry store in Napoleon, Ohio. He purchased a men’s ring and diamond earring from Burns for $45. Burns claimed to be the owner and Chiaverini had him fill out a “buy card” certifying to that effect. That same day, David and Christina Hill called Chiaverini to see if anyone had sold him their stolen ring. He told them to make a police report and denied buying the ring.
Both the Hills and Chiaverini called the police. Chiaverini indicated “he believed he may have had the Hills’ property” but clarified that he did not know if it had been stolen but that he wanted an officer to come help sort it out. Mr. Hill arrived at the store with two officers. The officers confirmed that the items were stolen and told Chiaverini not to sell them.
Officer Steward wrote an initial report on the incident and later added to the report that Chiaverini had said he thought the ring had been stolen when he bought it. Chiaverini denies making this statement. The police sent a “hold letter” to Chiaverini telling him to “hold” the item as it is evidence in a crime, but the letter also said to “release it to David and Christina Hill.” Chiaverini thought this was inconsistent and did not know what to do so he did not return the ring to the Hills even though they asked for it back. The police also returned in person and instructed him to release the items back to the Hills, but he refused.
Chiaverini then confronted the police chief about the contradictory information in the letter. In talking to the Chief, Chiaverini alluded to the fact that he did not have a precious metal license. After this conversation, the Chief confirmed on the Ohio Department of Commerce’s website that Chiaverini’s precious-metals-dealers license was inactive. The officers sent the police reports to the City’s law director who reviewed them and concluded Chiaverini’s potential criminal offenses of receiving stolen property, operating without a valid license, and money laundering.
One of the officers then applied for a search warrant and a municipal judge signed search and arrest warrants. The officers searched Chiaverini’s store and seized the Hills’ stolen jewelry as well as items related to sales, purchases, and licenses. Chiaverini spent 3 days in jail. Ten days later, the same municipal judge held a preliminary hearing and concluded that probable cause existed for all charges and bound them over for trial. Later, however, a court dismissed the charges without prejudice for failure to be timely presented to a grand jury.
Sixth Circuit Ruling: Chiaverini then sued the officers and the City under Section 1983 for malicious prosecution. The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on the existence of probable cause to arrest Chiaverini. The Sixth Circuit also found that if probable cause supports one or more of the three charges, then dismissal of the claim for all charges is appropriate. The court reasoned: “If probable cause did exist for at least one of the charges, we can conclude that he was “no more seized when [he was] detained to await prosecution for several charges than if he were seized for just one valid charge. For that reason, even tacked-on meritless charges . . . [do] not change the nature of the seizure.”
The Sixth Circuit found that probable cause supported the charges of receipt of stolen property (because under Ohio law, retention of stolen property falls under the statute so even if he did not know it was stolen when he received it, he had notice it was stolen and refused to return it) and the license violation. The court did not reach the question of probable cause for the money laundering charge, finding it did not need to decide that issue based on the “any charge” rule. (Money laundering is a felony while the other two charges are misdemeanors).
Issue: Whether Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims are governed by the charge-specific rule, under which a malicious prosecution claim can proceed as to a baseless criminal charge even if other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause, or by the “any-crime” rule, under which probable cause for even one charge defeats a plaintiff’s malicious-prosecution claims as to every other charge, including those lacking probable cause.
Filing Date: March 4, 2024 (Supreme Court Merits)
City of Grants Pass v. Johnson
Pro Bono Author: Brandon Rain, Seattle City Attorney’s Office
Decision June 28, 2024 – Reversed and Remanded, 6-3 / Justice Gorsuch: Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause does not prohibit the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property. The Court explained the “Constitution’s Eighth Amendment serves many important functions, but it does not authorize federal judges to wrest … [the] rights and responsibilities from the American people” to decide “how best to handle a pressing social question like homelessness” and “in their place dictate this Nation’s homelessness policy.” The decision highlighted the complexities of the homeless crisis and noted that five years ago, the Ninth Circuit “took one of [the] tools [needed to address homelessness] off the table” in Martin v. Boise, 920 F. 3d 584 (2019).
This case centers on ordinances passed in Grants Pass, a city in Oregon with a population of 38,000 people, of whom approximately 600 are individuals experiencing homelessness. To understand the case, we need to travel back to 2019 when the Ninth Circuit decided Martin v. Boise. Martin involved an ordinance in Boise that made it a misdemeanor to use “streets, sidewalks, parks, or public places” for “camping.” The Ninth Circuit held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.” Boise (and all other local governments in the Ninth Circuit), therefore could not enforce public-camping ordinances against homeless individuals who lacked “access to alternative shelter.”
Back to Grants Pass. The city passed several ordinances after the Martin decision related to the regulation of sleeping outside, which taken together made it nearly impossible to sleep outside with any form of bedding or shelter on public land in the city. See GPMC 5.61.020; GPMC 5.61.030; GPMC 6.46.090. A violation of these ordinances resulted in fines, which would escalate if left unpaid. The “park exclusion” ordinance allowed police officers to bar someone from a city park for 30 days if they received 2 more citations for violating park ordinances within one year. GPMC 6.46.350(A). If someone had received a park exclusion ordinance and was later found in a park, that could result in criminal trespass. The city amended its camping ordinance after Martin to make it clear that the involuntary act of sleeping in a park was not prohibited, rather what was prohibited was “camping” – i.e., sleeping with any bedding / shelter.
Two homeless individuals in Grants Pass filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of those that are “involuntarily homeless” against the city, arguing its ordinances are unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s class certification of all “involuntarily homeless” in Grants Pass. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s holding that “the anti-camping ordinances violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to the extent they prohibited homeless individuals from ‘taking necessary minimal measures to keep themselves warm and dry while sleeping when there are no alternative forms of shelter available.’” Although the city had four temporary shelters, none were “adequate” for the city’s homeless population.
In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Gorsuch, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s “Martin experiment.” In doing so, the Court explained that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause addresses “the method or kind of punishment a government may impose for the violation of criminal statutes.” (internal quotations omitted). Noting that the Court has previously discussed the history of the clause, the majority simply explained that the clause was adopted to ensure the new Nation would not resort to certain types of “barbaric punishments” which had been tolerated in English law. The question of what type of behavior may be criminalized is not addressed by the Eighth Amendment. The Court noted instead that other provisions of the Constitution may speak to those matters. And in terms of the “method and kind[s]” of punishments at issue in this case, which included fines and up to 30 days in jail, do not qualify as cruel or unusual.
The plaintiffs argued that Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962) should apply because the city, in their view, is criminalizing the status of being homeless. In Robinson, the Court held that a California law that criminalized the status of narcotics addiction constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Court in Robinson noted that if the government punishes “status,” “[e]ven one day in prison would be . . . cruel and unusual.”
Here, the Court declined to extend Robinson beyond true “status” crimes. Public camping laws like the one in Grants Pass do not criminalize status, but instead make certain actions a crime, and the crime applies to any defendant, as the Court puts it, whether the person is homeless or a backpacker on vacation. The majority rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Robinson should apply to laws banning public camping as applied to the homeless because they apply to an “involuntary” action and the homeless person “cannot help but do what the law forbids.” The Court explained that its decision in Powell v. Texas already rejected this argument and the Court refused to “extend Robinson beyond its narrow holding.” The Court reiterated that other constitutional provisions may apply and individuals may have certain defenses (like necessity).
The Court not only rejected the plaintiffs’ legal arguments, but also underscored the important federalism and separation of powers issues inherent in these decisions noting “federal courts [are] removed from realities on the ground, [and the] rules have produced confusion.” The Court further noted that the Ninth Circuit’s decisions have interfered with “‘essential considerations of federalism,’ taking from the people and their elected leaders difficult questions traditionally ‘thought to be the[ir] province.’”
The majority also highlighted the unworkability of the Martin decision explaining:
…Martin exemplifies much of what can go wrong when courts try to resolve matters like those unmoored from any secure guidance in the Constitution. Start with this problem. Under Martin, cities must allow public camping by those who are “involuntarily” homeless. But how are city officials and law enforcement officers to know what it means to be “involuntarily” homeless, or whether any particular person meets that standard? Posing the questions may be easy; answering them is not. Is it enough that a homeless person has turned down an offer of shelter? Or does it matter why? Cities routinely confront individuals who decline offers of shelter for any number of reasons, ranging from safety concerns to individual preferences. How are cities and their law enforcement officers on the ground to know which of these reasons are sufficiently weighty to qualify a person as “involuntarily” homeless? If there are answers to those questions, they cannot be found in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Nor do federal judges enjoy any special competence to provide them.
Additionally, the Court called the Ninth Circuit’s shelter availability test “all but impossible to administer in practice.” Citing several amicus briefs as evidence of the complexities of the problem, including the fact that it can take thousands of volunteers multiple days to count the homeless population in large cities. The Court also emphasized the line drawing problems the decisions present in terms of a lack of a definition for “adequate” and “available” shelter as well as the uncertainty as to what other biological necessities might be covered under Martin.
Justice Sotomayor authored the dissent, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. The dissent argued that because sleep is a biological necessity, for people who sleeping outside is their only option, it cannot be a crime. The dissent viewed the ordinances at issue as criminalizing status under Robinson and would find they violate the Eighth Amendment.
The majority noted that “an exceptionally large number of cities and States have filed [amicus briefs] in the case,” and cited to many of those briefs, including citing and quoting the one filed by the Local Government Legal Center (IMLA, NACo, & NLC), which was drafted by Brandon Rain with the City of Seattle, multiple times. The Court used the amicus briefs to highlight everything from the scope of the homelessness problem, to how Martin is being interpreted in lower courts to hamstring local governments, to some of the solutions that local governments are seeking to address homelessness. One of the points the LGLC made in its amicus brief which was cited by the Court is that “these public-camping regulations are not usually deployed as a front-line response to criminalize homelessness. Instead, they are used to provide [local government] employees with the legal authority to address encampments that pose significant health and safety risks and to encourage their inhabitants to accept other alternatives like shelters, drug treatment programs, and mental-health facilities.”
The Court and many amici agree that the problem of homelessness is complex. This case returns the hard task of solving the homeless crisis to state and local policymakers, where it belongs. Rather than spending significant time, money, and resources litigating Martin claims, local governments can focus on expending resources to help the homeless community while ensuring their public spaces are safe and clean in a manner consistent with local needs.
Filing Date: January 31, 2024 (Supreme Court Merits)
Gonzalez v. Trevino
Pro Bono Author: Harker Rhodes & Mariel Brookins
This case concerns a question left open by the 2019 Supreme Court decision, Nieves v. Bartlett. In Nieves, the Supreme Court held that probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law, except in a small subset of cases. The Court is now poised to answer what the exception from Nieves means and what type of evidence is necessary.
Background
In Nieves, officers arrested a partygoer, Bartlett, at an extreme sporting event after a heated exchange whereby the officers took Bartlett’s actions to be hostile and aggressive. The prosecutor found there was probable cause to arrest, but Bartlett sued (after charges were dismissed) claiming the arrest was in retaliation for his speech, in violation of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must generally plead and prove the absence of probable cause to move forward with a retaliatory arrest claim under the First Amendment. However, the Court left open a “narrow qualification” for the situation where an officer has probable cause to arrest but where officers “typically exercise their discretion not to do so.” The Court provided an example of someone who is complaining about the police and then jaywalks. The Court goes on to explain that because so few people are actually arrested for jaywalking, if a plaintiff can demonstrate “objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been” then the plaintiff cam proceed with a retaliatory arrest claim even if the officer had probable cause to arrest.
Facts
In this case, Sylvia Gonzalez was elected to a seat on the city council for Castle Hills, Texas, a town with fewer than 5,000 residents. As her first act in office, she called for the removal of the city manager by organizing a nonbinding petition. During her first city council meeting, a resident submitted the petition to remove the city manager to council. The council meeting grew contentious.
he meeting, Gonzalez left her belongings on the dais and went to speak to a constituent. The Mayor, Edward Trevino, who was supposed to have the petition, asked Gonzalez to look for the petition in her belongings and they found the petition there. The Mayor informed the police that he wished to file a criminal complaint against Gonzalez for taking the petition without consent. (A resident during the meeting had indicated that Ms. Gonzalez had gotten her to sign the petition under false pretenses so the Mayor believed Ms. Gonzalez had taken the petition as a result of that accusation). The police officer investigating the allegation determined that Gonzalez violated Texas Penal Code §§37.10(a)(3) and (c)(1), which provide that “[a] person commits an offense if he … intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity, legibility, or availability of a governmental record.” The investigation took over a month.
The officer secured a warrant and instead of issuing a summons for a nonviolent crime, booked her into the jail, where she spent the day.
Gonzalez sued under Section 1983, claiming that she was arrested in retaliation for her protected speech. Gonazlez claims that this criminal statute has not been used in the county to criminally charge someone trying to steal a nonbinding or expressive document in the last decade. While there were 215 grand jury indictments under the statute, she claims none remotely resembled the facts of this case.
Fifth Circuit Decision
The Fifth Circuit held that this case does not fall within the Nieves exception because Gonzalez did not present “objective evidence that she was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.” The court reasoned that she failed to provide evidence of others who had mishandled a government petition and were not prosecuted. Instead, she provided evidence of who was prosecuted under the statute and argued their offenses were different than hers. The Fifth Circuit rejected her invitation to infer that because nobody else was prosecuted for similar conduct her arrest must have been motivated by her speech. The court emphasized that the Supreme Court requires “objective evidence” of “otherwise similarly situated individuals” who engaged in the same criminal conduct but were not arrested. And here, she came up short.
Issues: (1) Whether the probable-cause exception in Nieves v. Barlett can be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened; and (2) whether Nieves is limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests.
Click here to see the brief.
Filing Date: December 22, 2023 (Supreme Court Merits)
Murthy v. Missouri
Pro Bono Author: Meaghan VerGow
Decision: June 26, 2024 – Reversed and remanded, 6-3 / Justice Barrett: Plaintiffs/appellees cannot demonstrate injury in fact and lack Article III standing. This case involves communications between the federal government (the White House, Surgeon General, CDC, and FBI) and private social media companies, and what constitutes legitimate government speech versus governmental threats and coercion which converts private speech to state action. Individuals and two states sued the federal government, claiming the Administration’s communications with social media sites crossed the line into coercion and “significant entanglement,” converting the private social media platforms into state actors and interfering in the states’ First Amendment rights when the private social media companies removed certain information from their sites. As discussed more fully below, although there are political overtones to the litigation, IMLA believes that the case merits our amicus participation because of the potential implications for local government speech.
Background: The action was initially brought by a group of medical professionals after their social media posts criticizing governmental Covid policies and mandates were replaced by federal government Covid messaging. Missouri and Louisiana then joined, alleging that they and their residents were harmed by the social media platforms’ censorship of their speech. While the Administration contended that it was merely attempting to “mitigate the hazards of online misinformation” by flagging content that violated the social media platforms’ own policies, the plaintiffs argued that the government “coerced, threatened, and pressured” the social media platforms into suppressing their views, making the platforms state actors and violating the First Amendment.
Lower Court Determinations: In July 2023, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana agreed with the plaintiffs and entered a preliminary injunction limiting communications by the White House and numerous federal agencies with private social media platforms, finding that the Administration “apparently engaged in a massive effort to suppress disfavored conservative speech.”
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit limited the order to the White House, the Surgeon General, the FBI, and the CDC, but otherwise largely upheld it. The Circuit applied a four-factor test to distinguish “attempts to convince” from “attempts to coerce,” evaluating “(1) the speaker’s ‘word choice and tone’; (2) ‘whether the speech was perceived as a threat’; (3) ‘the existence of regulatory authority’; and, ‘perhaps most importantly, (4) whether the speech refers to adverse consequences.’ “(citation omitted). It found that the White House had coerced: “[T]he officials threatened—both expressly and implicitly—to retaliate against inaction. Officials threw out the prospect of legal reforms and enforcement actions while subtly insinuating it would be in the platforms’ best interests to comply.” The White House had also “encouraged” its policies by becoming entangled in the social media sites’ operations.
While the Circuit referenced a significant factual record in analyzing White House communications, its review of FBI activity was much more cursory. It found that the FBI had implicit power to coerce, and that “the platforms clearly perceived the FBI’s messages as threats.” For example, before the 2022 congressional election, “the FBI warned the platforms of ‘hack and dump’ operations from ‘state-sponsored actors’ that would spread misinformation through their sites. In doing so, the FBI officials leaned into their inherent authority.”
In September, Solicitor General Prelogar asked the Supreme Court to put the injunction on hold, arguing that it put “unprecedented limits on the ability of the President’s closest aides to use the bully pulpit to address matters of public concern, on the FBI’s ability to address threats to the Nation’s security, and on the CDC’s ability to relay public-health information at platforms’ request.” In late October, the Court granted the Administration’s request for a stay until the case is heard later in the Term.
Constitutional Standards: The government’s coercion of a private party’s speech occurs when the government makes a “threat of invoking legal sanctions” or employs “other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963). The Court has since remarked that when the government has coerced a private party’s action, that party is treated as a state actor subject “to the constraints of the First Amendment.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1933 (2019). Apart from coercion, governmental offers or implications of significant benefits for accommodating the government’s viewpoint can also be impermissible state action: See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (private conduct will constitute state action if the government “has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement . . . that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State”).
Filing Date: December 22, 2023 (Supreme Court Merits)
National Rifle Association v. Vullo
Pro Bono Author: Meaghan VerGow
Decision: May 30, 2024 – Vacated and Remanded, 9-0 / Justice Kagan: NRA plausibly alleged that NY State official coerced businesses into ceasing relationships with NRA, infringing on NRA’s First Amendment rights.
In September 2017, the New York County DA’s Office advised the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) of the possible illegality of an NRA-endorsed affinity insurance program called “Carry Guard.” Carry Guard provided coverage for losses caused by licensed firearm use, including criminal defense costs resulting from using a firearm with excessive force to protect persons or property, even if the insured was found to have acted with criminal intent. The next month, DFS opened an investigation into Carry Guard, focusing on Lockton and Chubb (the insurance companies). The investigation revealed that Carry Guard and at least two other NRA-endorsed programs violated New York insurance law for providing, among other things, insurance coverage for intentional criminal acts. By November 17, 2017, both Lockton and Chubb suspended the Carry Guard program and stopped offering it to New York residents for purchase.
The investigation also revealed that a third entity, the insurance marketplace Lloyd’s of London (“Lloyd’s”), served as underwriter for at least eleven other NRA-endorsed programs with similar policy coverages, including providing liability defense coverage for criminal proceedings resulting from firearm use even where the insured acted with criminal intent. Lockton administered these insurance programs for Lloyd’s.
On February 14, 2018, while the investigation was ongoing, the Parkland school shooting occurred.
Just before the shooting, Vullo, the then Superintendent of DFS, met with senior executives of Lloyd’s where she “presented [her] views on gun control and [her] desire to leverage [her] powers to combat the availability of firearms.” She also explained the basis for her belief that Lloyd’s was violating several provisions of New York insurance law. She then explained how Lloyd’s could come into compliance and “avoid liability” for its regulatory infractions, including by no longer “providing insurance to gun groups” like the NRA. Vullo also sought Lloyd’s aid in “DFS’s campaign against gun groups.”
Two months after the Parkland shooting and six months after DFS opened its investigation into the NRA-endorsed insurance programs — Vullo weighed in publicly on the issue of gun violence. She issued a pair of guidance letters addressed to DFS-regulated insurance entities and DFS-regulated financial institutions (the “Guidance Letters”). The Guidance Letters referenced the Parkland shooting and other mass shootings and condemned the increasing “tragic devastation caused by gun violence” as a “public safety and health issue.” The Guidance Letters encouraged DFS-regulated entities to “continue evaluating and managing their risks, including reputational risks, that may arise from their dealings with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations, if any, as well as continued assessment of compliance with their own codes of social responsibility.” The Guidance Letters did not refer to any ongoing investigations or enforcement.
In May 2018, Lockton and Chubb entered into consent decrees with DFS and they agreed that some NRA-endorsed insurance programs they offered violated New York insurance law, they would no longer provide those or other illegal insurance programs to the NRA or New York residents, and they would pay fines. Notably, each Consent Decree expressly allowed the entities to continue to do business with the NRA.
The NRA sued Vullo, arguing she “established an unconstitutional implicit censorship regime in an effort to chill the NRA’s protected speech” and that she “unconstitutionally retaliated against the NRA for its protected speech.”
Second Circuit Decision: The Second Circuit concluded that Vullo did not violate the First Amendment because none of her statements in any of the meetings, guidance letters, or consent decrees amounted to “implied threats to employ coercive state power to stifle protected speech.” The court noted there are two sets of free speech rights implicated by the case, those of the NRA and those of the government officials. And the court emphasized that “the First Amendment does not impose a viewpoint-neutrality requirement on the government’s own speech” which the court noted would “antithetical to a healthy representative democracy.”
However, the court explained there are circumstances where government speech may go too far and infringe on private speech, where the government “engages in unjustified threats or coercion to stifle speech.” Thus, governments must refrain from speech that “can reasonably be interpreted as intimating that some form of punishment or adverse regulatory action will follow the failure to accede to the official’s request.” The Second Circuit looks at four factors to determine if the government official’s speech crosses the constitutional line into coercion: “(1) word choice and tone; (2) the existence of regulatory authority; (3) whether the speech was perceived as a threat; and, perhaps most importantly, (4) whether the speech refers to adverse consequences.”
Here the court found Vullo’s statements could not “reasonably be construed as being unconstitutionally threatening or coercive.” The court highlighted the language she employed in each instance and found it was all permissible governmental speech. The court noted she did have regulatory authority over the audience of her statements (in so far as the guidance letters were concerned) but the letters did not refer to any possible regulatory action or investigations and thus the mere fact that she could regulate them was not sufficient to be unconstitutionally coercive.
The court did note the meeting with Lloyd’s leading up to the consent decree was a “closer call.” But importantly, because the investigation started months before the consent decrees and were triggered from a referral from the DA, her statements did not violate the NRA’s First Amendment rights.
Issue: Whether the First Amendment allows a government regulator to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory actions if they do business with a controversial speaker, as a consequence of (a) the government’s own hostility to the speaker’s viewpoint or (b) a perceived “general backlash” against the speaker’s advocacy.
Filing Date: December 19, 2023 (Supreme Court Merits)
Sheetz v. County of El Dorado
Pro Bono Authors: Austin Yang, Kristen Jensen, San Francisco City Attorney’s Office
Decision April 12, 2024 – Vacated and remanded, 9-0 / Justice Barrett: Legislatively derived permitting conditions must meet the same Nollan/Dolan essential nexus / rough proportionality standards as administrative exactions.
Facts: This case was brought by a California landowner who is challenging El Dorado County’s impact fees (here, for traffic impact mitigation-“TIM”), as exactions that violate the Fifth Amendment Takings clause.
Mr. Sheetz paid a TIM fee of $23,420 to obtain a single-family building permit for his property. He then sued, arguing that the TIM fee was an unconstitutional exaction under Nollan and Dolan because the County did not make an individualized determination that an “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” existed between the traffic impacts caused by his project and the need for improvements to state/local roads.
The California Court of Appeals held that the Nollan and Dolan tests do not apply to legislative exactions that are generally applicable to a broad class of property owners, distinguishing such legislatively derived fees from those imposed administratively on an ad hoc or individual basis. Dolan. It also examined the process whereby the TIM was established, noting the significant nexus and proportionality studies undertaken by the California legislatuere
Issue: The question presented is whether a permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan and Dolan simply because it is authorized by legislation.
Significance to Local Governments: Exactions or impact fees have become an important tool to help local governments balance the need for smart growth with the impacts of that growth on the community. Impact fees often cover things like roads, utilities, sewers, schools, parks, police and fire stations. When done prudently, impact fees can help each new development pay for their pro-rata share of the costs of this infrastructure which allows communities to grow and have the growth help pay for itself without burdening the remainder of the community. These fees can lessen the impact of growth on taxpayers. They can also sometimes help offset some of the negative effects of development by addressing them, such as by helping to fund affordable housing.
There is currently a circuit split on whether legislatively enacted impact fees are subject to the more rigorous standards of Nolan and Dollan. Because of the importance of impact fees to those communities that utilize them, we believe IMLA should participate in this case. A ruling in favor of the homeowner in this case would negatively impact all local governments’ ability to assess impact fees as they would have to meet more demanding legal standards than most states currently require.
Due Date: October 18, 2023 (Supreme Court Merits)
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis
Pro Bono Author: Amanda Karras, Erich Eiselt, Deanna Shahnami & Ravinder Arneja
On June 30, 2023, the Supreme Court granted cert in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, a case in which the Eighth Circuit upheld a district court finding that a female police officer who was transferred to a position she considered less prestigious did not state a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII because she did not experience an adverse employment action. The question presented is:
Does Title VII prohibit discrimination in transfer decisions absent a separate court determination that the transfer decision caused a significant disadvantage?
Facts: In 2017, the newly appointed interim police commissioner of the City of St. Louis (City) announced various staffing changes as he took over the City Police Department (Department). A total of seventeen male and five female officers were transferred to new assignments. One such transferee was Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow (Muldrow), a police sergeant and one of four officers—two male and two female—transferred out of the Intelligence Division. Muldrow was laterally transferred to the Fifth District, where the Department needed additional sergeants. She retained her pay and rank, a supervisory role, and responsibility for investigating violent crimes. Soon after, Muldrow informally sought a transfer to the Second District, where she would have been an administrative aide. But she was transferred back to her former position in the Intelligence Division, having spent eight months in the Fifth District.
Muldrow then brought a gender-discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She asserted that her transfer to the Fifth District, and the alleged failure to approve her transfer request to the Second District thereafter, violated § 703(a)(1) of the Act, which makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s … sex[.]”
Holdings Below: The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City, agreeing with the lower court that Muldrow failed to submit evidence allowing a jury to find that “she experienced an adverse employment action.” It held that “An adverse employment action is a tangible change in working conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage…[M]inor changes in duties or working conditions, even unpalatable or unwelcome ones, which cause no materially significant disadvantage, do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.”
The Circuit listed factors to be considered when examining whether an “involuntary transfer” or “denial of a sought-after transfer” rises to the level of an adverse employment action: whether it results in (or would have resulted in) “a change in supervisory duties, prestige, schedule and hours, or promotion potential.” The differences between positions must be “material” to give rise to a discrimination claim, not “minor” or “trivial.” The Eighth Circuit held that Muldrow failed to support her assertion that Fifth District work was “more administrative and less prestigious,” or that she “suffered a significant change in working conditions or responsibilities.” Her requests for transfer to an administrative-aide position were never formalized and never reached senior decision makers. In sum, the supposed denial of Muldrow’s transfer request did not amount to an adverse employment action.
Certiorari: Muldrow filed for certiorari, arguing that nothing in the Title VII provision at issue requires an “adverse employment action” and that the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of Title VII is not faithful to the statutory text. The Court granted cert on June 30, 2023 asking the parties whether a Title VII job transfer claim requires a court determination that the transfer caused a “significant disadvantage.”
Due Date: August 21, 2023 (Supreme Court Merits)
United States v. Rahimi
Pro Bono Author: Lawrence Rosenthal
The Supreme Court will hear a case next Term in which the Fifth Circuit held that under Bruen, a federal law prohibiting possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic violence restraining orders violates the Second Amendment. The question presented is:
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.
Facts: In 2020, a Texas court issued a domestic violence restraining order against Zackey Rahimi (Rahimi) after he assaulted his girlfriend and warned her that he would shoot her if she told authorities about the attack. The court found that Rahimi had “committed family violence” and that such violence was “likely to occur again in the future.” The order barred Rahimi from possessing a firearm and notified him that, while the order was in effect, his gun possession might constitute a felony under federal law.
Rahimi acknowledged receipt of the restraining order and its prohibition against gun possession but did not comply. In August 2020, he approached the girlfriend’s house in the middle of the night, prompting state police to arrest him. In November 2020, he threatened another woman with a gun, leading the State of Texas to charge him with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Rahimi was subsequently involved in five separate shooting incidents in Arlington, Texas. When officers searched his house pursuant to a warrant, they found numerous weapons and ammunition.
A federal grand jury indicted Rahimi for possessing a firearm while under a domestic violence restraining order in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8), which makes it unlawful for any person subject to a court order that “includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner or child” to possess “any firearm or ammunition…” (The statute requires that the person subject to the order have the opportunity to participate in a hearing regarding the order). Rahimi pleaded guilty, receiving a sentence of more than six years behind bars.
Fifth Circuit Reversal: The Fifth Circuit initially upheld the lower court conviction, but shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court released its opinion in New York Pistol and Rifle Club v. Bruen. Rahimi appealed his conviction, asserting a facial challenge to §922(g)(8), claiming the statute violated the Second Amendment. In March 2023, applying Bruen, the Fifth Circuit reversed itself and vacated its prior order.
The federal government raised numerous arguments which were rejected. Its assertion that the Second Amendment only applies to “law abiding, responsible citizens” failed; references to “law-abiding,” “responsible,” and “ordinary” citizens in Heller and Bruen did not create “an implied gloss that constricts the Second Amendment’s reach.” The panel found that deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right cannot be based on the relatively lower procedural protections afforded defendants in civil proceedings: “[t]he distinction between a criminal and civil proceeding is important because criminal proceedings have afforded the accused substantial protections throughout our Nation’s history,” and that §922(g)(8) disarms individuals “subject merely to civil process.” Accordingly, while Heller suggested that “felons” may be deprived of gun possession, Rahimi’s restraining order was merely a civil disposition; if the Second Amendment meant that Rahimi could be deprived of firearm possession merely because he was not “law-abiding,” could “speeders” or “[p]olitical nonconformists” also be stripped of their Second Amendment rights?
Bruen’s new paradigm also clearly required an analysis of whether § 922(g)(8) fell within the nation’s historical tradition regarding gun possession. As the Fifth Circuit put it:
Enter Bruen. Expounding on Heller, the Supreme Court held that ‘[w]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2129–30. In that context, the Government bears the burden of ‘justify[ing] its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.’ Id. at 2130. Put another way, ‘the [G]overnment must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.’ Id. at 2127.
The Circuit analyzed three classes of historical analogues proffered by the government, seeking antecedents that imposed “comparable burdens” and were “comparatively justified” as the current law: “(1) English and American laws (and sundry unadopted proposals to modify the Second Amendment) providing for disarmament of ‘dangerous’ people, (2) English and American ‘going armed’ laws, and (3) colonial and early state surety laws.” It found that none applied; they were either too old, too unspecific, too focused on terrorism, or did not actually result in forfeiture of gun possession.
As the Fifth Circuit summarized it, “the Government’s argument fails because (1) it is inconsistent with Heller, Bruen, and the text of the Second Amendment, (2) it inexplicably treats Second Amendment rights differently than other individually held rights, and (3) it has no limiting principles.”
Petition for Certiorari: The government petitioned for Supreme Court review, supported by seven amicus briefs, including one by the District Attorney of Tarrant County signed by DAs from more than twenty other Texas counties.
The government’s petition points out that more than one million instances of domestic violence occur each year and that the presence of firearms significantly increases the likelihood of death in such interactions: “All too often, * * * the only difference between a battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a gun.” (citing United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 160 (2014).
Due Date: August 21, 2023 (Supreme Court Merits)
Culley v. Attorney General of Alabama / Sutton v. Town of Leesburg
Pro Bono Author: Gilbert Dickey
Facts: Each of these cases involves the seizure and forfeiture of cars that were involved in illegal activity. In both, the person driving the car was found with drugs and arrested; in each, the owner of the vehicle was not in the car, was not involved in the crime, and was not arrested. Instead, they were made defendants under Alabama’s Civil Asset Forfeiture (“CAF”) statute. Ala. Code § 20-2-93 and deprived of the possession of their vehicles for extended periods.
Proceedings Below: In both CAF cases in Alabama state courts, the plaintiffs prevailed on summary judgment by asserting the innocent owner defense available under the CAF statute. However, they had to wait many months in order to prevail on the merits in the underlying CAF cases. (The plaintiffs could have retrieved their vehicles by posting a bond equal to twice the vehicles’ value but did not do so).
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both District Courts, holding that the Sixth Amendment “speedy trial” standard articulated in United States v. $8850, 461 U.S. 553 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) allows the State to retain property seized incident to arrest without holding a prompt post-deprivation probable cause hearing to determine whether the property will ultimately be forfeitable. In so doing, the Eleventh Circuit departed from virtually every other circuit to review the issue (the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth) which have applied the three-part due process analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Issues: The Supreme Court granted certiorari; the issues presented to the Court are: 1) Whether the Due Process clause requires a state or local government to provide a post-seizure probable-cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial-forfeiture proceeding, and 2) if so, when such a hearing must take place, should it apply the “speedy trial” test employed in United States v. $8,850 and Barker v. Wingo or the Mathews v. Eldridge three-part due process framework.
The respondents’ brief points to the availability of relief under the State’s bond provisions. They also argue that the outcome under either test, Mathews or Barker, would be the same.
Filing Date: June 30, 2023 (Supreme Court Merits)
Lindke v. Freed
Pro Bono Author: Caroline Mackie, Robert Hagemann, Andrea Liberatore & Rohun Shah
Facts: James Freed (Freed) had a Facebook page, which started out as private, but once he had more than 5,000 friends, he converted it to a “page” which allows for unlimited followers. His page was public (anyone could follow it) and for the page category, he chose “public figure.” In 2014 (after he created the public Facebook page), he was appointed to City Manager of Port Huron, Michigan and he added that information to his Facebook page. He listed his contact information as Port Huron’s, including linking to the city website, city email, etc. He used the page to post about personal and professional itemss, including things like his daughter’s birthday pictures, but also the town’s COVID-19 policies and articles on public-health measures as the pandemic continued.
Kevin Lindke (Lindke) was a citizen of Port Huron and unhappy with the City’s COVID policies. Lindke would post negative comments on Freed’s Facebook page and Freed would delete those comments. Freed eventually blocked Lindke from the page. Lindke sued, claiming blocking him from the Facebook page was “state action” for the purposes of a Section 1983 claim and that Freed had violated his First Amendment rights in doing so.
Proceedings Below: The Sixth Circuit concluded that Freed was not acting “under the color of state law” for the purposes of bringing a Section 1983 action. The Sixth Circuit applies what it calls the “state-official test,” which asks if the official “is performing an actual or apparent duty of his office or if he could not have behaved as he did without the authority of his office.” In concluding that Freed was not acting as a state official in using his Facebook post, the court emphasized that you must look at the page as a whole, not at individual posts in isolation. The court reasoned that the Facebook page did not derive from his duties as City Manager nor did it depend on his authority as City Manager. Freed also used no state or city funds or resources to run the page, no government employees helped him maintain it, and it was clear the page belonged to him and not the office of City Manager (i.e., it will stay with him when he leaves his job).
The court rejected the argument that the page helped him fulfill an official duty of communicating with constituents, pointing out that he is free to go to the hardware store in town and talk about this job and he is not engaging in official state action when he does that. The court also distinguished the case from the Trump case of several years ago where the former President was also sued for blocking critics on Twitter. The Sixth Circuit explained that the way that then-President Trump had used the account created “substantial and pervasive governmental involvement with and control over” the Twitter account and that Freed was not using his account in the same manner.
Issue: Whether a public official’s social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.
Filing Date: June 30, 2023 (Supreme Court Merits)
O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier
Pro Bono Author: Robert Hagemann
Facts: In this case, two school district officials created public Facebook and Twitter pages to promote their campaigns for office. They maintained separate private accounts for family/friends. After they won their elections, they used their public social media pages generally to promote school board business, solicit input on board decisions, invite the public to school board meetings, etc. The “about” section on the pages lists their positions as school trustees, and links to official trustee emails. Only the trustees themselves could post on their public pages, but members of the public could comment on a post or react to it (like, dislike, etc.).
Christopher and Kimberly Garnier (Garniers) were members of the community with children in the school district. They would frequently write repetitive and critical comments on the school board officials’ pages. For example, within ten minutes of the officials’ posting a message on their pages, the Garniers would post over 200 identical replies. The school board officials deleted and hid the posts and then eventually blocked them from their social media accounts.
The Garniers sued under Section 1983, claiming the school board officials had violated their First Amendment rights by blocking them from their social media pages.
Proceedings Below: The Ninth Circuit concluded that the school board officials were acting under the color of state law for the purposes of Section 1983 and that therefore blocking the Garniers from their account because of the message the Garniers were promoting violated the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit analogized the situation to off-duty governmental employees, explaining that the question is whether the public official’s conduct even if “seemingly private,” is sufficiently related to the performance of his or her official duties to create “a close nexus between the State and the challenged action,” or whether the public official is instead “pursu[ing] private goals via private actions.” The Ninth Circuit concluded that the social media pages were “overwhelmingly” geared toward providing official information and soliciting feedback on the same. The court also rejected the argument that these were personal campaign pages even though that is how they started out.
Issue: Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official’s personal social-media account, when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or duty.
Filing Date: April 5, 2023 (Supreme Court Merits)
Groff v. DeJoy
Pro Bono Author: Andrew Hessick & Richard Simpson
Groff was hired by USPS as a Rural Carrier Associate, which is a non-career employee who provides coverage for absent employees. The work for a RCA is as needed and the job requires flexibility. RCAs do not accrue leave and any absences are unpaid. During Groff’s employment, there was a shortage of RCAs in his region. Also, during this time, USPS contracted with Amazon to deliver packages, including on Sundays. USPS indicated that the success of the Amazon Sunday delivery was critical to USPS.
Plaintiff’s sincere religious beliefs dictate that Sunday is meant for a day of worship and rest. He therefore informed USPS that he was unable to work on Sundays. USPS told him that during peak season (November – January) he would have to work Sundays or find another job. But they offered other accommodations, including that he could start later on Sunday after attending services and work after. USPS also offered to find employees to swap shifts with him. USPS was able to find other employees to cover his Sunday shifts for some of the time, but there were at least 20 Sundays where no co-workers could swap, and Groff did not work (there were only 2 other individuals who could cover his shifts for some of time time). Groff was disciplined for failing to work on those days and ultimately left USPS.
Groff sued alleging violations of Title VII for failing to accommodate his religion.
Title VII makes it unlawful “to discriminate against an individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s…religion.” To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, Groff must show he has 1) a sincere religious belief that would prohibit work on Sunday; 2) informed his employer of the conflict; and 3) was disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting job requirement. The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate either that “it made a good-faith effort to reasonably accommodate the religious belief, or such accommodation would work an undue hardship upon the employer and its business.”
The first issue is whether the employer offered a reasonable accommodation. If the employer did, the statutory inquiry ends. In the Third Circuit, to demonstrate a legally sufficient accommodation, it must eliminate the conflict between the job duty and the sincerely held religious belief. The Third Circuit concluded that “even though shift swapping can be a reasonable means of accommodating a conflicting religious practice, here it did not constitute an “accommodation” as contemplated by Title VII because it did not successfully eliminate the conflict.”
If the good faith attempts to accommodate the religious practice are unsuccessful, the next step in the analysis under Title VII asks whether providing the accommodation would work an undue hardship on the employer. “An undue hardship is one that results in more than a de minimis cost to the employer.” USPS provided evidence that Groff’s absences created more work for the postmaster and Groff’s superiors, created burdens for his co-workers who had to do extra work, and created a tense atmosphere amongst other employees and hostility toward management. The Third Circuit concluded that Groff’s requested accommodation to be exempt from working Sundays caused “more than a de minimis cost on USPS because it actually imposed on his coworkers, disrupted the workplace and workflow, and diminished employee morale…”
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following issues: (1) Whether the court should disapprove the more-than-de-minimis-cost test for refusing religious accommodations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 stated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison; and (2) whether an employer may demonstrate “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business” under Title VII merely by showing that the requested accommodation burdens the employee’s coworkers rather than the business itself.
Filing Date: April 5, 2023 (Supreme Court Merits)
Tyler v. Hennepin County
Pro Bono Author: John Baker & Katherine Swenson
Under Minnesota law, property taxes become a lien against the property once they are assessed. Minn. Stat. § 272.31. If property taxes are not paid during the year in which they are due, they become delinquent the following year, at which point, a county may obtain a judgment against the property. Minn. Stat. § 279.03 subd. 1. As a matter of notice and procedure, each year, the county auditor creates a delinquent tax list, which identifies the properties on which taxes are owed, the taxpayer(s), and the amount of taxes/penalties owed. The delinquent tax list is published twice and mailed to all delinquent taxpayers. A lawsuit is commenced against delinquent taxpayers and if there is no answer, the court enters a judgment against the property.
Delinquent taxpayers have several avenues to avoid forfeiture. First, while title in the property vests in the state after judgment is entered, that title is subject to the right of redemption, which is a 3-year period during which the taxpayer may redeem the property for the amount of delinquent taxes, penalties, costs, and interest. Minn. Stat. §§ 281.01–281.02, 281.17. Second, a property owner seeking to avoid forfeiture who cannot afford to redeem the property, can make a “confession of judgment,” which then allows the property owner to consolidate the debt /tax delinquency and pay in installments over five to ten years. If a property owner fails to pursue either of these avenues, absolute title vests in the state and all outstanding taxes, penalties, interest, etc. are canceled. Even after absolute title vests, the state still provides additional procedures for the property owner to repurchase his/her property. Under Minnesota’s tax foreclosure scheme, former property owners have no way to claim any proceeds from the sale of the property in excess of the tax debt.
The Plaintiff in this case owned a condominium in Minneapolis and stopped paying taxes in 2010. At the time the County sought judgment under the aforementioned statutory scheme, the Plaintiff owed $15,000 in unpaid state property taxes, penalties, costs, and interest. The Plaintiff received the statutorily prescribed notice of foreclosure, failed to answer, and then never tried to redeem the property during the 3-year period. She also did not seek to repurchase the property. Thereafter, Hennepin County sold the property for $40,000, and kept the surplus and distributed it in a manner pursuant to state statute.
Tyler sued, claiming the County violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause by keeping the value of her property in excess of the tax debt that she owed. As to the Taking’s inquiry, the Eighth Circuit explained that for Tyler to succeed, she “must show that she had a property interest [under Minnesota law] in the surplus equity after the county acquired the condominium.” The Eighth Circuit found that under Minnesota law, there is no right to surplus equity in a property and “where state law recognizes no property interest in surplus proceeds from a tax-foreclosure sale conducted after adequate notice to the owner, there is no constitutional taking.”
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the County’s retention of her surplus equity was not an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. The district court explained that whether the forfeiture is a “fine” turns on the question of whether it is a form of punishment. The district court agreed with the County that the forfeiture at issue here was remedial as it related to helping the government recoup its costs associated with non-payment of property taxes and was therefore not a fine under the Eighth Amendment. The court rejected the argument that the forfeiture was punitive simply because the County received more than what was needed to make it whole.
Issues: (1) Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause; and (2) whether the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt, plus interest, penalties, and costs, is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
Filing Date: February 24, 2023 (Supreme Court Merits)
United States v. Hansen
Pro Bono Author: Jaime Huling Delaye & Molly Alarcon
In this case, th Ninth Circuit found a portion of a criminal statute, 8 USC 1324, unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment. This same statute was used by ICE under the prior administration to threaten local governments and local government officials with prosecution. Local governments were also forced to certify compliance with the statute (among others) in their Byrne Jag grant applications or forego millions of dollars, which resulted in significant litigation between local governments and the federal government. The concern with this case is that a broad reading of the statute could implicate health and welfare programs that local governments offer their residents regardless of citizenship status. Three years ago, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in a case involving the precise issue raised in this case (the constitutionality of this statute), but the Court did not decide the issue on technical grounds.
In this case, Hansen was convicted of encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for private financial gain in violation of 8 USC § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). That statute provides: that any person who “encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.” Hansen argued that 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is overly broad in violation of her First Amendment free speech rights.
The Ninth Circuit previously decided that the statute was overly broad in violation of the First Amendment in United States v. Sineng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in that case, but vacated and remanded the case instead of deciding the question because the Ninth Circuit “departed so drastically from the principle of party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion” by deciding the case on arguments originally raised by amici instead of the parties.
Now, three years later in this case, the Ninth Circuit once again held that 1324(a) is overly broad in violation of the First Amendment as it “criminalizes a substantial amount of protected expressive activity.” (Presumably this time the parties made these arguments). The Ninth Circuit pointed out numerous examples of protected speech that would be prosecutable under the statute, including “encouraging an undocumented immigrant to take shelter during a natural disaster [and] advising an undocumented immigrant about available social services…”
Whether the federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), is facially unconstitutional on First Amendment overbreadth grounds.
IMLA filed an amicus brief involving this same issue in 2019 where we explained the relevance of this statute to local governments:
The federal government has [] made clear its view that local governments and their officials might violate the criminal prohibitions of Section 1324 merely by pursuing legitimate state and local prerogatives. … For instance, throughout his tenure in 2017 and 2018, then-Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Thomas Homan frequently referenced Section 1324 when asked about jurisdictions that decide not to expend resources to assist federal immigration enforcement efforts.
Furthermore, many local governments were involved in litigation over immigration related conditions that were attached to formula grants under the prior administration. One of those conditions centered around 1324 and there was significant ambiguity as to its scope and application to local governments.
That said, apparently ICE has never accused local governments specifically of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (which includes the “encouraging” or “inducing” language). Instead, ICE (under the prior administration) had apparently accused at least San Francisco of possibly violating portions of § 1324 that relate to “harboring” and “transporting” “aliens,” which is 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). However, it is not such a stretch to imagine that the federal government could interpret a local government declaring itself a sanctuary or welcoming jurisdiction as “encouraging” or “inducing” “aliens” to come to the United States and their locality in particular. In its prior decision, the Ninth Circuit underscored this point:
A speech addressed to a gathered crowd, or directed at undocumented individuals on social media, in which the speaker said something along the lines of “I encourage all you folks out there without legal status to stay in the U.S.! We are in the process of trying to change the immigration laws, and the more we can show the potential hardship on people who have been in the country a long time, the better we can convince American citizens to fight for us and grant us a path to legalization,” could constitute inducement or encouragement under the statute.
While this statute and its interpretation would seem to be an issue for so-called sanctuary jurisdictions, it also could present problems for other local governments who simply want to provide services to residents in their community, regardless of immigration status. This was another argument we made in the previous amicus brief. For example, if a person comes to a municipal foodbank and tells the person working there that he or she is undocumented, if the municipality has a policy to nonetheless provide food for hungry people regardless of immigration status, there is a concern that the municipality could be found to have violated the “induce” or “encourage” portion of this statute. The same could be said for a program that provides immunizations for free to community members or a community that provides shelters for domestic violence victims or individuals experiencing homelessness regardless of their immigration status. In each example, in theory, the federal government could argue that by providing these services to undocumented immigrants, the local government has “encouraged” that person to stay in violation of the statute.
Filing Date: August 10, 2022 (Supreme Court Merits)
Wilkins v. United States
Pro Bono Author: Daniel Bromberg & Jeffrey W. Mikoni
Larry Wilkins and Jane Stanton both live along Robbins Gulch Road in rural Montana. The road runs near a National Forest and crosses private property for approximately one mile (including their property). Wilkins and Stanton acquired their properties in 1991 and 2004, respectively. The previous owners had granted the United States an easement for Robbins Gulch Road in 1962.
In September 2006 the Forest Service put up a sign on Robbins Gulch Road indicating public access on the road was allowed. Since then, Wilkins and Stanton claim trespassers have been on their land, causing serious disruptions to the homeowners (including shooting one of their cats). In August 2018, Wilkins and Stanton sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act “to confirm that the easement does not permit public use of the road and to enforce the government’s obligations to patrol and maintain the road against unrestricted public use.”
The Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. §2409a provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for the United States, stating: “The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights.” The Act provides for a 12-year statute of limitations, indicating that accrual occurs “on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States.” § 2409a(g).
The United States argued that the Act’s 12-year limitation period renders the petitioners’ suit jurisdictionally barred as they sued more than 12 years after they knew or should have known about the claim. The Petitioners argued that the time limit is a non-jurisdictional claims processing rule, which would allow their suit to proceed.
In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Supreme Court agreed with the Petitioners and held that the statute is a non-jurisdictional claims processing rule. The Court noted that a procedural rule “seek[s] to promote the orderly progress of litigation” while “[l]imits on subject-matter jurisdiction…have a unique potential to disrupt the orderly course of litigation.” Jurisdictional bars go straight to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and can therefore be raised at any time and such bars also preclude doctrines seeking to ensure efficiency and fairness in litigation, like waiver and estoppel. The Court explained that given the disruption to litigation if a rule is labeled jurisdictional rather than claims processing, Congress must provide a clear statement that it wishes to treat a procedural requirement as jurisdictional, and here, no such clear statement was present.
Filing Date: August 12, 2022 (Supreme Court Merits)
National Pork Producers Council v. Ross
Pro Bono Author: John Korzen
California’s Proposition 12 prevents the sale of “[w]hole pork meat” in the state unless the meat was produced in compliance with “specified sow confinement restrictions.” Proposition 12 is intended to “prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm animal confinement, which also threaten the health and safety of California consumers and increase the risk of foodborne illness and associated negative fiscal impacts on the State of California.” The National Pork Producers Council claims that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
The plaintiffs allege that the pork industry is highly interconnected and that “[t]o ensure they are not barred from selling their pork products into California, all the producers and the end-of-chain supplier will require assurances that the cuts and pork products come from hogs confined in a manner compliant with Proposition 12.” The result, they claim, is that all suppliers will either have to comply with California’s law or incur additional costs to segregate their products. The plaintiffs claim the law will result in a 9.2 % increase in production cost for pork. In their suit, the plaintiffs allege that the California law violated the dormant commerce clause by impermissibly regulating extraterritorial conduct outside of the State and imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce.
The Ninth Circuit held Proposition 12 does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. According to the Ninth Circuit, citing to South Dakota v. Wayfair (2018), there are “two primary principles that mark the boundaries of a State’s authority to regulate interstate commerce.” “First, state regulations may not discriminate against interstate commerce; and second, States may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce.” The Supreme Court in Wayfair also reiterated the holding of a previous case that state law may violate the dormant Commerce Clause when it has “extraterritorial effects.”
Regarding “extraterritorial effects” the National Pork Producers argued that Proposition 12 impermissibly regulates the price of pork in other states. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court cases cited by the plaintiffs “used broad language.” But the Ninth Circuit has interpreted those cases narrowly holding that the extraterritoriality principle is “not applicable to a statute that does not dictate the price of a product and does not tie the price of its in-state products to out-of-state prices.” According to the Ninth Circuit: “[i]t is undisputed that Proposition 12 is neither a price-control nor price-affirmation statute, as it neither dictates the price of pork products nor ties the price of pork products sold in California to out-of-state prices.”
The National Pork Producers next argued that Proposition 12 imposes a burden on interstate commerce which is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits” in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. According to the Ninth Circuit “the crux of the allegations supporting the Council’s substantial burden claim is that the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 makes pork production more expensive nationwide.” But, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, “alleged cost increases to market participants and customers do not qualify as a substantial burden to interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause.” Per the Ninth Circuit:
“[A] loss to [some specific market participants] does not, without more, suggest that the [state] statute impedes substantially the free flow of commerce from state to state.” Even if producers will need to adopt a more costly method of production to comply with Proposition 12, such increased costs do not constitute a substantial burden on interstate commerce. Nor do higher costs to consumers qualify as a substantial burden on interstate commerce.
The issues in this case are: (1) Whether allegations that a state law has dramatic economic effects largely outside of the state and requires pervasive changes to an integrated nationwide industry state a violation of the dormant commerce clause, or whether the extraterritoriality principle described in the Supreme Court’s decisions is now a dead letter; and (2) whether such allegations, concerning a law that is based solely on preferences regarding out-of-state housing of farm animals, state a claim under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
Filing date: August 19, 2022 (Supreme Court Merits)
303 Creative LLC v. Elenis
No. 21-476
Pro Bono Author: Aileen McGrath & Juliana DeVries
Lorie Smith designs websites for her company 303 Creative. She wants to start creating wedding websites, but she does not want to create websites that celebrate same-sex marriage due to her religious beliefs. She also wants to publish a statement on her website that she will not create wedding websites for same-sex couples as doing so would compromise her religious beliefs.
Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act’s (CADA) “accommodation clause” prohibits public accommodations from refusing to provide services based on a number of protected characteristics, including sexual orientation. CADA’s “communication clause” prevents public accommodations from communicating that someone’s patronage is unwelcome because of sexual orientation.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that Colorado’s statute that requires Smith to create websites for same-sex marriages and prohibits her from publishing a statement explaining why doing so violates her religious beliefs does not violate the First Amendment’s free speech or free exercise clauses.
Regarding free speech and the “accommodations clause” of CADA, the Tenth Circuit concluded the clause compels speech and is a content-based restriction, but that it is nevertheless constitutional and survives strict scrutiny. The court reasoned that the “accommodation clause” is “narrowly tailored to Colorado’s interest in ensuring ‘equal access to publicly available goods and services.’” The Tenth Circuit also concluded the “communication clause” did not violate Smith’s free speech rights because, the court reasoned, the State could “prohibit speech that promotes unlawful activity, including discrimination.”
The Tenth Circuit also concluded that CADA did not violate the free exercise clause, but the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on this issue and that issue is therefore not before the Court.
The issue in this case is whether applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay silent violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment.
This is the third time the Supreme Court has tried to resolve the tension between the First Amendment and anti-discrimination laws. In the two prior cases IMLA filed an amicus brief. When we filed our brief in Masterpiece Cakeshop on this issue more than three years ago, we noted that 21 States and more than 100 local governments have anti-discrimination provisions that protect citizens from discrimination based on sexual orientation (presumably more have these laws now).
Filing Date: April 18, 2022 (Supreme Court Merits)
Sackett v. EPA
No. 21-454
Pro Bono Author: Andre Monette & Roderick Walston
The Supreme Court has agreed to take up a case pertaining to the definition of “waters of the U.S.” (WOTUS) under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The case will allow the Court to address the question of the proper test for determining whether wetlands are considered WOTUS under the CWA. Baked into that question is whether the Court should adopt the Scalia test or the Kennedy test from the Rapanos decision. Because we believe local governments may be split on that question, we do not plan to weigh in on what the proper test is. Instead, IMLA plans to file a brief that will focus on limiting the Court’s definition to exclude municipally owned facilities and infrastructure, such as those related to drinking water, wastewater, and stormwater control features.
Given the arguments we would make, the facts are largely irrelevant for our purposes. They involve a landowner that purchased a “soggy residential lot” near Idaho’s Priest Lake. To the north of their lot, with a road in between, is a wetland that drains to a tributary that feed into a creek that flows southwest of the Sacketts’ property and empties into Priest Lake. The Sackett’s property is 300 feet from the lake.
After obtaining permits from the county the Sacketts began backfilling the property with sand and gravel to create a stable grade. EPA ultimately issued the Sacketts a “formal administrative compliance order” explaining that “the Sacketts’ placement of fill material onto half an acre of their property without a discharge permit constituted a violation of the CWA.”
By way of background, the CWA extends to all “navigable waters,” defined as “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,” and it prohibits any person who lacks a permit from discharging pollutants, including rocks and sand, into those waters. The CWA regulations define “waters of the United States” to include “wetlands” that are “adjacent” to traditional navigable waters and their tributaries.
Rapanos v. United States concerned the “governing standard for determining CWA jurisdiction over wetlands.” There was no majority opinion in Rapanos. Justice Scalia, writing for four Justices, stated that “waters of the United States” extends only to “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water” and to wetlands with a “continuous surface connection” to such permanent waters. According to Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the judgment only, “jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.” This “significant nexus” inquiry would turn on whether the wetlands, “either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”
The Ninth Circuit held that Justice Kennedy’s definition of WOTUS from Rapanos v. United States (2006) is controlling. According to the Ninth Circuit, while the Scalia plurality did not entirely reject the concept of a “significant nexus,” it opined that only wetlands with a “physical connection” to traditional navigable waters had the requisite nexus to qualify as “waters of the United States.”
The issue in this case is whether the Ninth Circuit set forth the proper test for determining whether wetlands are “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. §1362(7).
Filed April 1, 2022 (Supreme Court Merits)
Kennedy v. Bremerton School District
No. 21-418
Pro Bono Author: Michael Dreeben & Jenya Godina
This case presents a free speech and free exercise claim by a football coach at a public school. For IMLA’s purposes, we would focus on the first issue in the case, which involves questions of public employee speech. This case presents important issues for local governments because they are all public employers and because this case could offer an opportunity to prevent expansion of lawsuits by public employees who create disruptions in the workplaces.
Kennedy was an assistant football coach at a public school who felt compelled by his religious beliefs to kneel and pray at the 50-yard line immediately after each game concluded. At first, he did this by himself, but over the years, students would join him while he knelt, said prayers, and gave motivational speeches involving religious themes. The group that joined Kennedy eventually grew to be the majority of the team. At least one parent complained to the principal that his son “felt compelled to participate” in the prayers, even though the student was an atheist, because he worried about his playing time.
The school had a policy entitled “Religious-Related Activities and Practices.” Pursuant to that policy, “[a]s a matter of individual liberty, a student may of his/her own volition engage in private, non-disruptive prayer at any time not in conflict with learning activities.” Additionally, “[s]chool staff shall neither encourage nor discourage a student from engaging in non-disruptive oral or silent prayer or any other form of devotional activity.” The school contacted Kennedy regarding what it indicated was a breach of this policy and told Kennedy that he was free to continue to engage in religious activity, but that activity should not interfere with his job responsibilities and should be “physically separate from any student activity, and students may not be allowed to join such activity.”
At first Kennedy complied with this directive, but shortly thereafter, he sent a letter from his attorney challenging it and indicating he planned to kneel and pray at the 50-yard line after the conclusion of the next game and that he would allow students to join him. Kennedy widely publicized his plan to pray following the football game in a number of media outlets and interviews. A Satanist religious group contacted the school district and indicated that it would conduct ceremonies on the field after football games if others were allowed to exercise their religious beliefs on the football field after games.
After the game, Kennedy went to the 50-yard line and knelt and prayed with students, coaches, a state elected official, and other members of the public, who had apparently jumped the fence to get on the field, all joining him. Kennedy continued appearing in the media after this to “spread the word of what was going on in Bremerton.”
The school district then sent Kennedy a letter telling him that it would accommodate his religious exercise, providing several suggestions on how to do so in private, but that the school could not be perceived as endorsing it. Kennedy’s response was through the media indicating that the only outcome he would accept was allowing him to pray on the fifty-yard line immediately after games.
Kennedy’s behavior resulted in disruption at the school including the head coach ultimately resigning due to concerns about his own safety (resulting from public backlash at the school). The school sent Kennedy a letter indicating he had “failed to follow district policy”, “his actions demonstrated a lack of cooperation with administration,” he “contributed to negative relations between parents, students, community members, coaches and the school district,” and he “failed to supervise student-athletes after games due to his interactions with [the] media and [the] community.” Kennedy did not apply for a 2016 coaching position and instead sued the school district alleging violations of both the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit applied Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. to his free speech claim and ultimately concluded that when he was engaging in the prayer activity, he was speaking as a public employee and not a private citizen. The court concluded that because he was speaking as a public employee, his speech was not protected, and his behavior was therefore not insulated from discipline under Pickering and Garcetti. The court reasoned “his expression on the field—a location that he only had access to because of his employment—during a time when he was generally tasked with communicating with students, was speech as a government employee.” The Ninth Circuit also concluded that even if Kennedy were speaking as a private citizen, the school district had an adequate justification under Pickering to treat him differently due to the school’s Establishment Clause concerns.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit also rejected Kennedy’s Free Exercise arguments, finding that the district could satisfy strict scrutiny in this case. (The school conceded that the rule was not neutral and generally applicable and therefore under Church of Lukumi, strict scrutiny would apply). The court reasoned that a school’s interest in avoiding Establishment Clause violations was a compelling interest and the policy was narrowly tailored because, according to the court, there was no other way to accomplish the objective, particularly given Kennedy’s refusal to accept any accommodations offered by the school.
The issues the Supreme Court granted certiorari on are: (1) Whether a public-school employee who says a brief, quiet prayer by himself while at school and visible to students is engaged in government speech that lacks any First Amendment protection; and (2) whether, assuming that such religious expression is private and protected by the free speech and free exercise clauses, the establishment clause nevertheless compels public schools to prohibit it.
Filed March 7, 2022 (Supreme Court Merits)
Filed November 3, 2021 (Supreme Court Petition Stage)
Vega v. Tekoh
No. 21-499
Pro Bono Author Petition Stage: Harker Rhodes & Annie Chang
Pro Bono Author Merits Stage: Harker Rhodes
IMLA filed an amicus brief in this case at the petition state and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and IMLA again filed an amicus brief at the merits stage.
This case involves a deputy sheriff’s investigation of sexual assault allegations. Deputy Vega, who responded to the incident, did not Mirandize the suspect—Terence Tekoh—prior to asking questions about what had happened. Deputy Vega reasonably believed his questioning was non-custodial and did not require Miranda warnings. Tekoh’s facts are significantly different than the Sheriff’s, though both agree that Miranda warnings were not provided. Tekoh ultimately agreed to write down what happened, confessing to the crime both in writing and in conversation. Tekoh was arrested and charged in state court for the sexual assault. The prosecutor introduced the confession against him at trial as evidence of his guilt, and the judge admitted the confession—holding that the statement was not taken in violation of Miranda. Nonetheless, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.
After his acquittal, Tekoh sued Deputy Vega under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. This resulted in two civil trials. At the first trial, the district court refused to instruct the jury that it needed to find Deputy Vega liable for the Fifth Amendment claim if it determined that Vega violated Miranda when obtaining the incriminating statements that were later used against the suspect at his criminal trial. In doing so, the trial court held that Miranda announced a “prophylactic rule” and that a Section 1983 plaintiff could not “use a prophylactic rule to create a constitutional right” triggering Section 1983 liability. The jury returned a verdict for Deputy Vega, concluding that there had been no unconstitutional coercion of the confession.
After the first trial, the court determined it had erred in instructing the jury on a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, rather than a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination violation. It therefore ordered a new trial. This time, the court instructed the jury to consider the circumstances of the questioning—including its location, length, and manner, as well as whether Vega provided a Miranda warning—to determine whether Vega had “improperly coerced or compelled” Tekoh’s confession. Once again, the jury rejected the Fifth Amendment claim and returned a verdict for Deputy Vega.
Tekoh appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that introduction of his un-Mirandized statement at his criminal trial constituted a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights remediable under Section 1983. The panel agreed. Acknowledging a clear circuit split on the issue, the panel nevertheless held that “the use of an un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal proceeding violates the Fifth Amendment and may support a § 1983 claim” against a law enforcement officer. Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles, 985 F.3d 713, 724 (9th Cir. 2021). The panel rooted its holding in Dickerson, which held that “Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc over a dissent by Judge Bumatay, joined by six other judges. Judge Bumatay contested the panel’s determination that Section 1983 supports liability for failing to adhere to the prophylactic rule announced in Miranda even when the un-Mirandized statements were freely and voluntarily given. Judge Bumatay explained that Dickerson confirmed the “constitutional underpinnings” of Miranda, but did not upset “the long line of cases characterizing Miranda as a prophylactic rule and not a ‘constitutional right.’” Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles, 997 F.3d 1260, 1270 (9th Cir. 2021) (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
The issue in this case is whether a plaintiff may state a claim for relief against a law enforcement officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on an officer’s failure to provide the warning prescribed by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona.
Filed December 22, 2021 (Supreme Court Merits)
Shurtleff v. City of Boston
No. 20-1800
Pro Bono Author: Daniel Bromberg
Boston owns three flagpoles in front of City Hall. Boston flies the United States and the POW/MIA flag on one flagpole, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts flag on the second flagpole, and its own flag on the third flagpole. Third parties may request to fly their flag instead of the City’s flag in connection with an event taking place near the flagpoles.
Camp Constitution seeks “to enhance understanding of the country’s Judeo-Christian moral heritage.” It asked the City twice to fly its Christian flag while it held an event near the flag. The City refused its requests, explaining that “the City’s policy was to refrain respectfully from flying non-secular third-party flags in accordance with the First Amendment’s prohibition of government establishment of religion.”
Over a 12-year period, the City approved 284 flag-raising events and until the Camp Constitution request, never rejected one. However, the Camp Constitution request, was the first request made by a religious organization to fly a flag at City Hall. Broadly speaking, the third-party flags that the City approved were for “the flags of other countries, civic organizations, or secular causes.” Shortly after litigation commenced, Boston memorialized its policy to comport with its past practices of only flying “the flags of other countries, civic organizations, or secular causes.”
Camp Constitution sued Boston for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The First Circuit held that the City is engaging in government speech when it flies third-party flags in front of City Hall and it therefore did not violate the First Amendment. In coming to its conclusion, the First Circuit relied on Pleasant Grove City v. Summum and Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., which set forth a three-part test for determining when speech is government speech. The Court looks at the history of governmental use, whether the message conveyed would be ascribed to the government, and whether the government “effectively controlled” the messages because it exercised “final approval authority over their selection.”
Regarding the history of governments using flag, the First Circuit stated: “that a government flies a flag as a ‘symbolic act’ and signal of a greater message to the public is indisputable.” The First Circuit also concluded that an observer would likely attribute the message of a third-party flag on the City’s third flagpole to the City, explaining:
… an observer would arrive in front of City Hall, “the entrance to Boston’s seat of government.” She would then see a city employee replace the city flag with a third-party flag and turn the crank until the third-party flag joins the United States flag and the Massachusetts flag, both “powerful governmental symbols,” in the sky (eighty-three feet above the ground). A faraway observer (one without a view of the Plaza) would see those three flags waiving in unison, side-by-side, from matching flagpoles.
That the third-party flag is part of a broader display cannot be understated. … The sky-high City Hall display of three flags flying in close proximity communicates the symbolic unity of the three flags.
The First Circuit also concluded that city controlled the flags based on its practice of reviewing requests and approving or rejecting them.
The First Circuit rejected the argument that the City created a public forum for flying third-party flags, reasoning the government creates a public forum “only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on the City’s final approval authority and the fact that the City had criteria that limited approval only to flags of other countries, civic organizations, or secular causes.
The petition raises three long questions, which can generally be summarized as follows:
- Whether Boston created a public forum based on both its policy and the fact that it approved hundreds of third-party flags on a city flagpole outside of city hall and did not reject any requests except this one;
- Whether the First Circuit properly classified a brief display of a private religious organization’s flag on a city flagpole as government speech; and
- Whether Boston discriminated based on viewpoint or content in violation of the First Amendment in denying the religious organization’s permit to briefly display its flag on the city flagpole.
Filed October __, 2021 (Supreme Court Merits)
Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller
No. 20-219
Pro Bono Author: Richard Simpson
Jane Cummings has been deaf since birth and is legally blind. She communicates mostly through American Sign Language (ASL). She contacted Premier Rehab, which offers physical therapy services, to treat her chronic back pain. She repeatedly requested Premier provide an ASL interpreter, but they refused. (They offered other accommodations, but she said they would not be effective for her). She sued Premier under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Car Act for disability discrimination and sought emotional distress damages.
By way of background, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Federal-funding recipients “must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement, in the most integrated setting appropriate to the person’s needs.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2).
The Fifth Circuit held that emotional distress damages are not available under the Rehabilitation Act or the ACA. The Rehabilitation Act and the ACA are Spending Clause legislation. According to the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly” likened Spending Clause legislation to contract law—”in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”
In Barnes v. Gorman (2002), the Supreme Court explained compensatory damages are available under Spending Clause legislation because federal-funding recipients are “on notice” that accepting such funds exposes them to liability for monetary damages under general contract law. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that punitive damages are not available under Spending Clause legislation because they are not generally available for breach of contract claims so federal funding recipients are not “on notice” that they could be liable for such damages.
The Fifth Circuit extrapolated the Barnes rationale to emotional distress damages, concluding “Premier was not ‘on notice’ that it could be held liable, under the [Rehabilitation Act] or the ACA, for Cummings’s emotional distress damages…[b]ecause emotional distress damages, like punitive damages, are traditionally unavailable in breach-of-contract actions…”
The issue in this case is whether the compensatory damages available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the statutes that incorporate its remedies for victims of discrimination, such as the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act, include compensation for emotional distress. While this case arose under the ACA, what is at stake is whether emotional-distress damages are categorically unavailable under Title VI and the statutes that incorporate its remedies. Those statutes include for our purposes: The Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA. A rule that would preclude emotional distress damages under these statutes would financially benefit local governments.
Filed September 10, 2021 (Supreme Court Merits)
CVS Pharmacy v. Doe
No. 20-1374
Pro Bono Author: Michael McGinley
Status: The parties stipulated dismissal in this case and it was taken off the Supreme Court’s docket.
The Does are individuals living with HIV/AIDS who rely on employer-sponsored health plans for their medications. They claim that a change to CVS Pharmacy’s specialty pharmacy program amounts to discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act and the ACA. They do not allege intentional discrimination, but rather claim the change in policy discriminates against them on the basis of their disability under a disparate impact theory of liability.
By way of background, Section 1557 of the ACA provides that individuals “shall not . . . be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination” under any federally funded health program or activity on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability.
The ACA provides a private right of action to enforce this equal-access guarantee, but it does not define a new, standalone cause of action. Instead, Section 1557 of the ACA incorporates the anti-discrimination provisions of various civil rights statutes–Title VI (race and color), ADA (age), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (disability).
According to the Petition, three of the four statutes incorporated by the ACA reach only intentional discrimination and do not create a disparate-impact cause of action. The Petition also indicates that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Choate (1985) “expressly left open whether the fourth statute, the Rehabilitation Act, provides a disparate-impact claim for disability discrimination.”
The Ninth Circuit does not acknowledge the question of whether disparate impact liability is viable under the Rehabilitation Act and instead said: “In Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme Court concluded that not all disparate-impact showings qualify as prima-facie cases under Section 504.” The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to apply the “test outlined in Choate.” Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Plaintiffs had stated a claim for disability discrimination under the ACA because they had “adequately alleged that they were denied meaningful access to their prescription drug benefit under their employer-sponsored health plans because the Program prevents them from receiving effective treatment for HIV/AIDS.”
Filed August 23, 2021 (Supreme Court Merits)
Thompson v. Clark
No. 20-659
Pro Bono Author: Julian Henriques, Jr. & Myriam Kasper
Larry Thompson’s sister-in-law, Camille, who was temporarily living with him, called 911 to report that Thompson was sexually abusing his one-week-old daughter. Paramedics arrived at the scene first and the sister-in-law let them into the apartment, but then Thompson told them to leave, which they did. The paramedics then relayed to the police that Thompson would not let them inside and that there was a possible situation of child abuse inside. Four armed police officers then tried to enter Thompson’s home without a warrant. Thompson refused to let them in without a warrant, but the police insisted that they be allowed in and when they tried to enter, Thompson blocked their path and allegedly shoved an officer. The officers then rushed in and pushed Thompson to the ground to handcuff him and he allegedly resisted arrest by flailing his arms preventing them from handcuffing him.
It turned out that the relative who called 911 suffered from mental illness which the officer “sensed” when they were in the apartment. The newborn was brought to the hospital where it was determined she had a diaper rash and was not being harmed. Meanwhile, Thompson was arrested and charged with obstruction of governmental administration and resisting arrest. He spent 2 days in jail after which point, he was arraigned and released on his own recognizance. At his hearing several months later the charges against him were dropped “in the administration of justice.”
Thompson brought a malicious prosecution case against police officers, among other claims not relevant here.
The Second Circuit dismissed Thompson’s “malicious prosecution” claim against the officers, holding that he failed to show a favorable termination of his criminal case. In a 2018 case, Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, the Second Circuit held that section 1983 malicious prosecution claims require “affirmative indications of innocence to establish favorable termination.” In this case Thompson innocence was not established because the only reason the prosecutor gave for dismissing charges against him was “the interests of justice.”
The issue in this case is whether the rule that a plaintiff must await favorable termination before bringing a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process requires the plaintiff to show that the criminal proceeding against him has “formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided in Laskar v. Hurd, or that the proceeding “ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit decided in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls;
Filed August 20, 2021, (Supreme Court Merits Stage)
Filed February 8, 2021 (Supreme Court Petition Stage)
Reagan National Advertising of Austin v. City of Austin
No. 20-1029
Pro Bono Author Petition Stage: Amanda Karras, Erich Eiselt, Deanna Shahnami
Pro Bono Author Merits Stage: John Korzen
Status: The Supreme Court granted certiorari and the case is now pending at the Supreme Court.
At issue in this case is the City of Austin’s sign code (before it was amended) which defined an “off-premise[s] sign” as “a sign advertising a business, person, activity, goods, products, or services not located on the site where the sign is installed, or that directs persons to any location not on that site.” The Sign Code did not expressly define “on-premise[s] sign,” but it did use the term “on-premise[s] sign” in some of its provisions.
The Sign Code permitted “on-premise[s] signs” to be “electronically controlled changeable copy signs” (i.e., “digital signs”). As a result, on-premises non-digital signs could be digitized, but off-premises non-digital signs could not. The City’s stated general purpose in adopting the Sign Code is to protect the aesthetic value of the city and to protect public safety.
The City of Austin denied the applications for sign digitization of commercial messages to the plaintiffs in this case because its Sign Code did not allow the digitization of off-premises signs. The plaintiffs sued, claiming the distinction between on and off-premise signs was unconstitutional under Reed.
The district court denied the plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory judgment, concluding that the City’s sign code was content neutral and applied intermediate scrutiny in upholding the sign code. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the distinction between “on-premise” and “off-premise” is content based and therefore “presumptively unconstitutional” under Reed and subject to strict scrutiny. The Fifth Circuit noted that Justice Alito’s concurrence in Reed, which was joined by two other Justices, specifically listed distinctions between on-premise and off-premise signs as those that would not be considered content based. The court, however, rejected Justice Alito’s concurrence in Reed and explained that in order to determine if a sign is on-premise or off-premise, “one must read the sign and ask: does it advertise ‘a business, person, activity, goods, products, or services not located on the site where the sign is installed, or that directs persons to any location not on that site’”? The court rejected the idea that this was a time / place / manner restriction, indicating that just because you have to determine the location of the sign does not render it content neutral because you must also ask who the speaker is and what the speaker is saying, which are both hallmarks of content based inquiries. The Fifth Circuit then concluded that the City failed to meet strict scrutiny.
Filed April 7, 2021 (Supreme Court Merits)
PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey
No. 19-1039
Pro Bono Author: Vivek Tata & Caitlin Halligan
PennEast Pipeline Company, a private company, intends to build a pipeline through Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The Natural Gas Act (NGA) authorizes private gas companies like PennEast, to obtain necessary rights of way through eminent domain, as long as three conditions are met, including receiving a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Upon PennEast receiving the certificate, it asked a federal district court to condemn 131 properties—42 of which belong to New Jersey. New Jersey argued that Eleventh Amendment immunity prevents it from being haled into court by a private company.
The Third Circuit ruled in favor of New Jersey holding that PennEast couldn’t bring an eminent domain action against it. The 11th Amendment prohibits states from being sued in federal court unless they have consented to suit, but an exception applies to the federal government. New Jersey argued that “the federal government cannot delegate its exemption from state sovereign immunity to private parties like PennEast.” The Third Circuit agreed, offering three reasons why it “doubt[ed]” the federal government can delegate its exemption to state sovereign immunity from lawsuits:
First, there is simply no support in the caselaw for PennEast’s “delegation” theory of sovereign immunity. Second, fundamental differences between suits brought by accountable federal agents and those brought by private parties militate against concluding that the federal government can delegate to private parties its ability to sue the States. Finally, endorsing the delegation theory would undermine the careful limits established by the Supreme Court on the abrogation of State sovereign immunity.
The issues in this case are: (1) Whether the Natural Gas Act delegates to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission certificate-holders the authority to exercise the federal government’s eminent-domain power to condemn land in which a state claims an interest; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit properly exercised jurisdiction over this case.
Filed March 3, 2021 (Supreme Court Merits)
City of San Antonio v. Hotels.com
No. 20-334
Pro Bono Author: Richard Simpson
The City of San Antonio filed a federal class action lawsuit claiming that online travel companies (OTCs) must collect taxes on the “retail rate” for a hotel room—the amount they collect for the room rate plus the service fee. While jury ruled in San Antonio’s favor, shortly after, a Texas state court of appeals came to the opposite conclusion in a different case.
On appeal the Fifth Circuit ruled against San Antonio reasoning that the state court’s decision was “on point” and its “interpretation control[ling],” therefore “the hotel occupancy tax applies only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel.”
The OTCs sought $905.60 in appellate court costs and an additional $2,008,359.00 for “post-judgment interest” and “premiums paid for the supersedeas bonds required to secure a stay of execution and preserve rights pending appeal.” The district court ordered San Antonio to pay the over $2 million in costs, claiming it lacked the discretion to lower this amount.
The Fifth Circuit held that San Antonio had to pay $2 million in costs applying Rule 39(e).
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 39(e) lists the costs that are “taxable in the district court for the benefit of the party entitled to costs under this rule.” San Antonio argued that the district court in this case “applied the wrong legal standard, thinking it lacked discretion to deny or reduce the award when in reality it could have done so. As San Antonio points out, most other circuits to have considered this issue have held—or at least implied—that a district court retains discretion to deny or reduce a Rule 39(e) award.”
In a previous Fifth Circuit case from 1991, In re Sioux Ltd., Sec. Litig., the Fifth Circuit held Rule 39(e) is mandatory and “[t]he district court ha[d] no discretion whether, when, to what extent, or to which party to award costs of the appeal.” San Antonio argued that Sioux is no longer good law because it relied on an older version of Rule 39(e), which was amended in 1998. The old version stated appellate costs “shall be taxed in the district court” whereas the current version states appellate costs “are taxable in the district court.”
The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, but noted that even if San Antonio was correct, the panel was bound by the Circuit’s prior precedent rule since Sioux had not been overruled.
The issue in this case is whether district courts “lack[] discretion to deny or reduce” appellate costs deemed “taxable” in district court under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e).
Filed January 17. 2021 (Supreme Court Merits)
Caniglia v. Strom
No. 20-157
Pro Bono Author: John Korzen
This case involves the contours of the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and a claim for damages under Section 1983. In this case, Kim Caniglia and her husband got in a fight during which he went and got a gun, threw it on their dining room table and said something like “shoot me now and get it over with.” She then left and stayed at a hotel. The next morning, she called the non-emergency line for the Cranston, Rhode Island police department and asked the police to accompany her to her home, recounting the fight from the evening before and her concern about “what she would find” when she got home. The police accompanied her and spoke to her husband, Edward Caniglia, on the porch of their home. The ranking officer determined Edward was “imminently dangerous to himself and others” and convinced him to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. Edward claims he only agreed to go because the officers told him his firearms wouldn’t be confiscated if he went.
After Edward went to the hospital police seized his firearms. According to the First Circuit, “The parties dispute both whether Kim indicated that she wanted the guns removed and whether the officers secured her cooperation by telling her that her husband had consented to confiscation of the firearms. There is no dispute, though, that the officers understood that the firearms belonged to the plaintiff and that he objected to their seizure.” Edward sued, claiming that he and his guns were unconstitutionally seized without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The First Circuit found no Fourth Amendment violation in this case relying on the community care exception. In explaining the contours of the community caretaking function, the First Circuit explained it was derived from:
Cady [v. Dombrowski (1973)], a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of a disabled vehicle when the police reasonably believed that the vehicle’s trunk contained a gun and the vehicle was vulnerable to vandals. The Cady Court explained that police officers frequently engage in such “community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Police activity in furtherance of such functions (at least in the motor vehicle context) does not, the Court held, offend the Fourth Amendment so long as it is executed in a reasonable manner pursuant to either “state law or sound police procedure.”
The Supreme Court has never extended the “community caretaking exception” beyond the context of cars. The First Circuit decided to do so because of the “special role that police officers play in our society.” The court went on to reason that “a police officer — over and above his weighty responsibilities for enforcing the criminal law — must act as a master of all emergencies, who is “expected to aid those in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent potential hazards from materializing, and provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and protect community safety.”
The First Circuit held that sending Edward for a psychiatric evaluation fell within the community caretaker exception because “no rational factfinder could deem unreasonable the officers’ conclusion that the plaintiff presented an imminent risk of harming himself or others.” In terms of the warrantless entry into Edwards home and seizure of the firearms, the First Circuit also concluded the seizure fell within the community caretaker exception. “We conclude that the officers could reasonably have believed, based on the facts known to them at the time, that leaving the guns in the plaintiff’s home, accessible to him, posed a serious threat of immediate harm.” In coming to this conclusion, the court reasoned that police officers must “be granted some measure of discretion when taking plausible steps to protect public safety, particularly when human life may be at stake and the margin for error is slight.”
The issue in this case is whether the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extends to the home.
Filed January 7, 2021 (Supreme Court Merits)
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid
No. 20-107
Pro Bono Author: Matthew Littleton
This case involves an important Takings issue that will be decided by the Supreme Court. At issue is the California Agriculture Labor Relations Act (ALRA), which allows union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer worksites. The union organizers, under the Act, have access to employer worksites for four thirty-day periods each year for up to three hours each day. If/when they plan to access the property, the union organizers must give notice to employers.
The employers brought a claim against the California agency in charge of administering the ALRA claiming, among other things, that the Act amounted to an uncompensated per se physical Taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Ninth Circuit ruled against the agriculture employers, finding no permanent physical invasion in this case. The court compared this case to Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987), where the California Coastal Commission sought to condition the grant of a permit to rebuild a house on a transfer to the public of an easement across beachfront property. In that case the Supreme Court required the Coastal Commission to pay for an easement. Here, “[t]he regulation significantly limits organizers’ access to the Growers’ property. Unlike in Nollan, the Ninth Circuit reasoned the Act “does not allow random members of the public to unpredictably traverse their property 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.”
A dissenting judge opined that the regulation causes a physical taking because it prevents growers from excluding people from their property regardless of the duration: “In my view, the Access Regulation allowing ongoing access to Growers’ private properties, multiple times a day for 120 days a year (four 30-day periods per year) is a physical, not regulatory, occupation because the “right to exclude” is “one of the most fundamental sticks” in the bundle of property rights. The Growers need not allege that the Access Regulation affects more property right “sticks” beyond this single, fundamental property right.”
The issue in the case is whether the uncompensated appropriation of an easement that is limited in time effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment.
IMLA’s brief did not opine on the law in question. Instead, we filed an amicus brief in support of neither party in order to prevent an expansive ruling int his case. Specifically, our concern is that local governments conduct many kinds of inspections (schools, restaurants, hospitals, code enforcement, etc.) where they temporarily go into private property. Likewise, police officers and other government officials frequently go onto private property to investigate crimes and perform other public safety functions. There may also be situations where the government in highly regulated industries have inspectors on site regularly if not full-time and these are necessary to the regulation of the industry, whether food processing, nuclear power or similar highly regulated activities. The distinction to be drawn involves the intrusion by government for health and safety reasons vs. the forced intrusion offered to third parties that may benefit a governmental program, but unrelated to health or safety. Our main interest in this case is to ensure any holding is limited to the particular facts and would not create onerous and expensive constitutional challenges for local governments in their day-to-day work.
Filed January 4, 2021 (Supreme Court Merits)
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid
Pro Bono Author: Matthew Littleton
At issue in this case is the California Agriculture Labor Relations Act (ALRA), which allows union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer worksites. The union organizers, under the Act, have access to employer worksites for four thirty-day periods each year for up to three hours each day. If/when they plan to access the property, the union organizers must give notice to employers.
The employers brought a claim against the California agency in charge of administering the ALRA claiming, among other things, that the Act amounted to an uncompensated per se physical Taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Ninth Circuit ruled against the agriculture employers, finding no permanent physical invasion in this case. The court compared this case to Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987), where the California Coastal Commission sought to condition the grant of a permit to rebuild a house on a transfer to the public of an easement across beachfront property. In that case the Supreme Court required the Coastal Commission to pay for an easement. Here, “[t]he regulation significantly limits organizers’ access to the Growers’ property. Unlike in Nollan, the Ninth Circuit reasoned the Act “does not allow random members of the public to unpredictably traverse their property 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.”
A dissenting judge opined that the regulation causes a physical taking because it prevents growers from excluding people from their property regardless of the duration: “In my view, the Access Regulation allowing ongoing access to Growers’ private properties, multiple times a day for 120 days a year (four 30-day periods per year) is a physical, not regulatory, occupation because the “right to exclude” is “one of the most fundamental sticks” in the bundle of property rights. The Growers need not allege that the Access Regulation affects more property right “sticks” beyond this single, fundamental property right.”
The issue in the case is whether the uncompensated appropriation of an easement that is limited in time effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment.
Filed December 22, 2020 (Supreme Court Merits)
BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
No. 19-1189
Pro Bono Author: Robert Peck
The issue in this case is whether 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) permits a court of appeals to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s order remanding a removed case to state court when the removing defendant premised removal in part on the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, or the civil-rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443.
While this issue is technical / procedural, the substantive issues underlying the case involve important questions of federalism and preemption. By way of background, a number of cities and counties have sued major oil and gas companies for damages related to climate change and resulting resiliency measures that the cities and counties have had to undertake. The cities and counties claim the oil and gas companies knew for decades that their products caused climate change but denied or downplayed the threat while promoting their products. The complaints claim that the defendants engaged in an overt public relations campaign intended to cast doubt on climate science. These lawsuits have been brought under state common law (including public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, etc.). The suits seek damages or compensation for current and future costs associated with climate change (such as health related deaths, flooding due to sea-level rise, etc.).
The oil and gas companies want to be in federal court even though the cases are brought under state law because they want to argue the state claims are preempted by federal common law claims for climate change, which are in turn displaced by federal statute. They presumably believe these federal preemption arguments will be more persuasive in federal court. In American Electric Power v. Connecticut (2011) the Supreme Court held a federal common law public nuisance lawsuit seeking an injunction against power companies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), brought by cities and states, was displaced by the Clean Air Act, which delegates authority to regulate GHGs to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (The current lawsuits are not seeking to reduce greenhouse gases, but are seeking money damages under state law).
In this case, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the only ground for removal that was reviewable by the appellate court was the federal officer removal statute, § 1447(d) and it therefore did not consider the oil and gas companies other arguments for removal beyond federal officer removal. The court, citing to Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229 (2007), explained that “[t]he authority of appellate courts to review district-court orders remanding removed cases to state court is substantially limited by statute,” namely, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).” The court then concluded that there was no basis for federal officer removal in this case.
Filed November 25, 2020 (Supreme Court Merits)
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski
Pro Bono Author: Patrick Kane
Held: A request for nominal damages satisfies the redressability element necessary for Article III standing where a plaintiff’s claim is based on a completed violation of a legal right.
Chike Uzuegbunam was a student at Georgia Gwinnett College. In 2016 campus police told him he could not distribute religious literature in an open, outdoor plaza on campus per the college’s policy. Later Uzuegbunam distributed religious literature and spoke about his religious beliefs in one of two designated speech zones he reserved per the college’s policy. The campus police told him he “had only reserved the speech zone for certain specific purposes, not including ‘open-air speaking,’ and that he was in violation of GGC’s ‘Student Code of Conduct’ because his speech constituted ‘disorderly conduct.’”
Uzuegbunam and fellow student Joseph Bradford who also wanted to share his religious beliefs on campus sued seeking injunctive relief and nominal damages. While the lawsuit was pending the college revised its policy “such that students would be permitted to speak anywhere on campus without having to obtain a permit except in certain limited circumstances.”
The district court concluded that Uzuegbunam’s claims for injunctive relief were moot because he graduated and Bradford’s claims for injunctive relief were moot because the college changed its policy. Uzuegbunam and Bradford do not challenge these conclusions. Instead, they seek to continue their suit based on their claim for nominal damages (and attorney’s fees).
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiffs’ claims for nominal damages do not keep this case alive because nominal damages would not “have a practical effect on the parties’ rights or obligations.” According to the Eleventh Circuit, circuit precedent held that nominal damages have no practical effect absent “a well-pled request for compensatory damages.” Uzuegbunam and Bradford did not ask for compensatory damages; the parties disagree over whether they may have been entitled to them.
The issue in this case is whether a government’s post-filing change of an unconstitutional policy moots nominal-damages claims that vindicate the government’s past, completed violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional right.
Filed August 20, 2020 (Supreme Court Merits)
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia
Pro Bono Author: John Korzen
When a child in need of foster care comes into the City of Philadelphia’s custody, Human Services refers that child to one of the foster care agencies with which the City has a contractual relationship. Once the City refers a child to an agency, that agency selects an appropriate foster parent for the child.
The City of Philadelphia learned that two of its agencies would not work with same sex couples as foster parents, which it considered a violation of the City’s anti-discrimination laws. When the agencies confirmed that, because of their religious views on marriage, they would not work with gay couples, the City ceased referring foster children to them (though still continued to work with them in other capacities).
One of those agencies, Catholic Social Services (“CSS”), brought this action claiming that the City has violated its rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses. It seeks an order requiring the City to renew their contractual relationship while permitting it to turn away same-sex couples who wish to be foster parents.
The Third Circuit concluded that, at least at the preliminary injunction stage, CSS had failed to show that the City violated the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clauses by requiring that an agency that provides foster care services for the City comply with its anti-discrimination laws protecting same-sex couples. The Third Circuit noted that there was no evidence of religious bias or hostility (as was present in Masterpiece Cakeshop where the Supreme Court found evidence of hostility toward religion), nor was there any evidence that the City had treated CSS differently because of its religion.
The Third Circuit relied on Employment Division v. Smith, in coming to its conclusion that the agency must comply with the City’s valid and neutral law of general applicability. On this point, the Third Circuit explained:
CSS’s theme devolves to this: the City is targeting CSS because it discriminates against same-sex couples; CSS is discriminating against same-sex couples because of its religious beliefs; therefore the City is targeting CSS for its religious beliefs. But this syllogism is as flawed as it is dangerous. It runs directly counter to the premise of Smith that, while religious belief is always protected, religiously motivated conduct enjoys no special protections or exemption from general, neutrally applied legal requirements. That CSS’s conduct springs from sincerely held and strongly felt religious beliefs does not imply that the City’s desire to regulate that conduct springs from antipathy to those beliefs. If all comment on religiously motivated conduct by those enforcing neutral, generally applicable laws against discrimination is construed as ill will against the religious belief itself, then Smith is a dead letter, and the nation’s civil rights laws might be as well.
Third Circuit framed the issue as follows: did the City have the authority to insist, consistent with the First Amendment and Pennsylvania law, that CSS not discriminate against same-sex couples as a condition of working with it to provide foster care services? Or, inversely, has CSS demonstrated that the City transgressed fundamental guarantees of religious liberty?
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari on three issues, of which two are relevant for our purposes: (1) whether Employment Division v. Smith should be revisited; and (2) whether the government violates the First Amendment by conditioning a religious agency’s ability to participate in the foster care system on taking actions and making statements that directly contradict the agency’s religious beliefs.
IMLA joined an amicus brief filed by the SLLC focused solely on the question of whether the Supreme Court should overrule Employment Division v. Smith.
Filed April 8, 2020 (Supreme Court Merits)
Trump v. Pennsylvania
No. 19-454
Pro Bono Author: Lisa Soronen
Holding: The Court did not reach the nationwide injunction issue.
Our sole interest in this case is the issue of nationwide injunction. Although we did not file on issues 1 and 2 in this case, the issues in the case are: (1) Whether the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor and the Treasury had statutory authority under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 to expand the conscience exemption to the contraceptive-coverage mandate; (2) whether the agencies’ decision to forgo notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing the interim final rules rendered the final rules – which were issued after notice and comment – invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act; and (3) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit erred in affirming a nationwide preliminary injunction barring implementation of the final rules.
Filed March 20, 2020 (Supreme Court Merits)
McGirt v. Oklahoma
No. 18-9526
Pro Bono Author: Paul Koster
Holding: For purposes of the Major Crimes Act, land throughout much of eastern Oklahoma reserved for the Creek Nation since the 19th century remains a Native American territory.
The issue in this case was whether the prosecution of an enrolled member of the Creek Tribe for crimes committed within the historical Creek boundaries is subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court heard argument last term in Sharp v. Murphy, which presented this exact same issue, but failed to decide the case. (Justice Gorsuch was recused so they were likely deadlocked 4-4). Instead of affirming by a divided court, the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in a case that came up from Oklahoma state court presenting the exact same issue, which meant that Justice Gorsuch could participate.
This case presented a hugely important question for the entire state of Oklahoma and its local governments as to whether the Creek Nation’s reservation was disestablished. In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court held that it was not, thereby effectively stripping a huge swath of Oklahoma (and the majority of Tulsa) of jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by Native Americans. More concerning for local governments, the case has implications for the state and local governments’ taxing, land use regulations, code enforcement, law enforcement, and other authority, though the holding does not directly address those issues.
Filed March 9, 2020 (Supreme Court Merits)
Torres v. Madrid
No. 19-292
Pro Bono Author: Elizabeth Prelogar
Status: The application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not subdued.
Two police officers were going to arrest a woman at her apartment. They noticed two people standing in front of her apartment next to a Toyota Cruiser and decided to talk to them as one of them may have been the person the officers were seeking to arrest. The officers were wearing tactical vests with police markings. One of the people, Roxanne Torres, got into the car. She claims she was “tripping out” from meth. One of the officers told Torres several times to show her hands. The officers couldn’t see Torres clearly because of tinted windows.
When Torres heard the flicker of the car door, she started to drive thinking she was being carjacked. Torres drove at one of the officers who fired at Torres through the wind shield. The other officer shot at Torres as well to avoid being crushed between two cars and to stop Torres from hitting the other officer.
Torres was shot twice. She hit another car, got out of the Cruiser, and tried to “surrender” to the “car jackers.” She asked a bystander to call the police but left the scene as she had an outstanding warrant. She then stole a car, drove 75 miles, and checked into a hospital. She claims the officers used excessive force.
The Tenth Circuit held that Torres wasn’t seized under the Fourth Amendment because they “failed to ‘control her ability to evade capture or control.’” There was therefore no excessive force in this case. The Tenth Circuit relied on its own precedent stating:
… Torres failed to show she was seized by the officers’ use of force. Specifically, the officers fired their guns in response to Torres’s movement of her vehicle. Despite being shot, Torres did not stop or otherwise submit to the officers’ authority. … She was not taken into custody until after she was airlifted back to a hospital in Albuquerque and identified by police.
These circumstances are governed by Brooks v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2010), where this court held that a suspect’s continued flight after being shot by police negates a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim. This is so, because “a seizure requires restraint of one’s freedom of movement.” Thus, an officer’s intentional shooting of a suspect does not effect a seizure unless the “gunshot . . . terminate[s] [the suspect’s] movement or otherwise cause[s] the government to have physical control over him.”
The issue in this case is whether an unsuccessful attempt to detain a suspect by use of physical force is a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 8th, 9th and 11th Circuits and the New Mexico Supreme Court hold, or whether physical force must be successful in detaining a suspect to constitute a “seizure,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals hold.
Filed March 2, 2020 (Supreme Court Merits)
Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc.
No. 19-631
Pro Bono Author: John Baker
Holding: The exception for calls to collect government debt from a federal ban on robocalls to cellphones violates the First Amendment, but the exception is severable from the rest of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.
While this case has no factual relevance to local governments, the legal issue centered on Reed v. Town of Gilbert, and it is therefore of significant interest to local governments.
This case involved the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, which prohibits automatic dialing or prerecorded calls to cell phones with three exceptions—emergency, consent, and debt collection owed to or guaranteed by the United States. The American Association of Political Consultants claims the third exception violates the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court held that the debt-collection exemption violates the First Amendment. Applying Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Court concluded that this exception was content-based and could not satisfy strict scrutiny. The Court concluded that the debt-collection exemption was severable from the rest of the TCPA.
At least three Justices seem poised to cabin Reed. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, noting:
The problem with [the majority’s] approach, which reflexively applies strict scrutiny to all content-based speech distinctions, is that it is divorced from First Amendment values. This case primarily involves commercial regulation—namely, debt collection. And, in my view, there is no basis here to apply “strict scrutiny” based on “content-discrimination.”
Filed February 10, 2020
Filed October 17, 2019 (Supreme Court Petition Stage)
City of Chicago v. Fulton
No.
Pro Bono Author: Alex Dugan, Scott Smith, Stephen Parsley
Status: IMLA filed a petition stage amicus brief and certiorari was granted on December 18, 2019. This case was originally part of the 2019 term but was postponed to the 2020 term due to COVID-19. It will be argued October 13, 2020.
The case involves 4 bankruptcy cases that were consolidated on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. In each, the City of Chicago impounded the debtor’s respective vehicles based on significant accumulated unpaid fines and penalties for parking tickets, moving violations, and driving with suspended licenses. The City has an ordinance which provides that the City may impound vehicles of individuals with three or more unpaid violations for the “purpose of enforcing” its traffic regulations until the owner of the vehicle pays the outstanding fines and penalties. The Chicago Municipal Code further provides that “[a]ny vehicle impounded by the City or its designee shall be subject to a possessory lien in favor of the City in the amount required to obtain release of the vehicle.”
In each of the 4 cases at issue here, after the City had impounded the owner’s vehicles, each owner filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision provides that a petition for bankruptcy operates as a stay of “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The City did not release the debtor’s vehicles back to the trustee of the bankruptcy estate and each bankruptcy court held that the City violated the stay by “exercising control” over property of the bankruptcy estate and ordered the City to turn over the vehicles immediately.
The City of Chicago argued that holding a vehicle that was impounded before the debtors filed their bankruptcy petitions did not violate the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision. Further, the City argues that the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism for a debtor to seek the turnover of property being held by a creditor through a possessory lien through an adversary proceeding and the court should therefore find an exception for the City’s retention of the vehicles from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3). The City also argued that subsection (b)(4) which provides that the stay authorized by the Act does not extend to:
. . . the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit . . ., to enforce such governmental unit’s or organization’s police and regulatory power, including the enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by the governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s or organization’s police or regulatory power;
This police power exception often arises in bankruptcy proceedings where a debtor seeks to avoid local regulations affecting its business.
The Seventh Circuit rejected these arguments and held in favor of the debtors. By way of background, the Seventh Circuit had previously addressed this issue in Thomson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., which had held in a case where a creditor had repossessed a vehicle prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition that a “creditor must comply with the automatic stay and return a debtor’s vehicle upon her filing of a bankruptcy petition.” The City requested the Seventh Circuit overrule Thomson, which the court in this case declined to do. The Seventh Circuit explained that the “[t]he primary goal of reorganization bankruptcy is to group all of the debtor’s property together in his estate such that he may rehabilitate his credit and pay off his debts; this necessarily extends to all property, even property lawfully seized pre‐petition.”
The issues in this case are:
- Whether passively holding a vehicle after a chapter 13 case is filed violates the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision.
- Whether the exception to the automatic stay in sections 362(b)(3) and (b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code for acts to maintain or continue the perfection of an interest in property allows the City to retain an impounded vehicle after a chapter 13 case is filed.
Filed January 28, 2020 (Supreme Court Merits)
Carney v. Adams
No. 19-309
Pro Bono Author: Kirti Datla & Kristina Alekseyeva
Held: Because Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he has failed to show a “personal,” “concrete” and “imminent” injury necessary for Article III standing.
The relevant issue in this case for IMLA is whether the First Amendment invalidates a longstanding state constitutional provision that limits judges affiliated with any one political party to no more than a “bare majority” on the state’s three highest courts, with the other seats reserved for judges affiliated with the “other major political party.”
The Delaware Constitution deals with appointments of judges in a way that attempts to ensure that courts are not stacked with people from the same party. Per the Delaware Constitution, to be on the Delaware Supreme Court, judicial candidates must be a member of Delaware’s two major political parties. Only a bare majority of these judges may be from the same major political party. The Constitution addresses other courts but in such a complex way that the lower court and 3rd Circuit each found that the Plaintiff lacked Article III standing to challenge them whereas they found both Article III and prudential standing to challenge the limitation on serving on the Supreme Court. The issue is whether limiting government service in a position to membership in one of two political parties violates the Constitution. It may. But, because the case found no standing where the Plaintiff was not limited in applying for a position where the limitation was a prohibition on having more than a bare majority from one political party, that issue will be significant as well.
This impacts local governments because there are likely a host of elections boards that have members who must be of one major party or another. Another example is that certain local governments prohibit their Ethics Commission from having more than a simple majority of members from the same political party.
Filed January 22, 2020 (Supreme Court Merits)
United States v. Sineneng-Smith
No. 19-67
Pro Bono Author: Erin Kuka
Holding: The Court did not reach the merits of the case and instead remanded it based on the Ninth Circuit’s unusual decision to invite amici to brief separate issues not presented by Sineneng-Smith and then to decide the case based on those arguments presented by amici.
Evelyn Sineneng-Smith worked as an “immigration consultant” helping undocumented workers obtain green cards. From 2001-2008 she signed retainer agreements with her clients and told them that they could obtain green cards via Labor Certifications. But the Labor Certifications program expired on April 30, 2001—which she knew. A jury found her guilty of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) & § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i).
1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) provides that any person who “encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.”
1324(a)(1)(B)(i) is a sentence enhancement, which increases the sentence for any person who violates subparagraph (A)(ii), (iii), or (iv) “for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.”
She argued that 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is overly broad in violation of her First Amendment free speech rights.
In a three-part analysis the Ninth Circuit held that 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. First, the court concluded that the statutes implicate speech (not just conduct). According to the Ninth Circuit “the structure of the statute, and the other verbs in the separate subsections, do not convince us to stray from the plain meaning of encourage and induce – that they can mean speech, or conduct, or both.” Second, the Ninth Circuit concluded that speech covered by these statutes is “protected” speech. Specifically, it doesn’t involve “incitement” and isn’t “integral to criminal conduct.” Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the amount of protected speech the statute restricts is substantial in relation to its legitimate sweep.” The court cites the example “a loving grandmother who urges her grandson to overstay his visa,” by telling him “I encourage you to stay.” According to the Ninth Circuit: “Nothing in Subsection (iv) would prevent the grandmother from facing felony charges for her statement.”
The issue in this case is whether the federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), is facially unconstitutional.
Although this case involves a criminal statute and its application to an individual, federal government officials have indicated that so-called “sanctuary cities” may be violating 1324. According to the Ninth Circuit:
Additionally, the City and County of San Francisco in its amicus brief represents that the government has repeatedly threatened its officials with violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. For example, “ICE Director Thomas Homan announced that he had asked Attorney General Sessions to determine whether sanctuary cities like San Francisco are ‘committing a statutory crime’ under section 1324.” Further, San Francisco relates that “Director Homan renewed his threat in even starker terms. According to Director Homan, ‘when a sanctuary city intentionally or knowingly shields an illegal alien from federal law enforcement, that is a violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324.’ Director Homan announced that he was ‘putting together a response plan’ with ‘the highest levels of the Department of Justice,’ and ominously declared, ‘This is not over.’” True, San Francisco reports that “[t]o the extent these threats have been tied to any specific prong of section 1324, they have been tied to the ‘harboring’ or ‘transporting’ prongs of that statute.” Id. But not all of the threats were tied to a specific subsection, and the government might well turn to Subsection (iv).
On one hand, apparently ICE has never accused local governments specifically of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (which includes the “encouraging” or “inducing” language). Instead ICE has apparently accused at least San Francisco of possibly violating portions of § 1324 that relate to “harboring” and “transporting” “aliens,” which is 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). However, it is not such a stretch to imagine that the federal government could interpret a city declaring itself a sanctuary or welcoming city as “encouraging” or “inducing” “aliens” to come to the United States and their city in particular. As stated by the Ninth Circuit on this point:
A speech addressed to a gathered crowd, or directed at undocumented individuals on social media, in which the speaker said something along the lines of “I encourage all you folks out there without legal status to stay in the U.S.! We are in the process of trying to change the immigration laws, and the more we can show the potential hardship on people who have been in the country a long time, the better we can convince American citizens to fight for us and grant us a path to legalization,” could constitute inducement or encouragement under the statute.
While this statute and its interpretation would seem to be an issue for so-called sanctuary jurisdictions, it also could present problems for other local governments who simply want to provide services to residents in their community, regardless of immigration status. For example, if a person comes to a municipal foodbank and tells the person working there that he or she is undocumented, if the municipality has a policy to nonetheless provide food for hungry people regardless of immigration status, there is a concern that the municipality could be found to have violated the “induce” or “encourage” portion of this statute. The same could be said for a program that provides immunizations for free to community members or a community that provides shelters for domestic violence victims regardless of their immigration status. In each example, in theory, the federal government could argue that by providing these services to undocumented immigrants, the local government has “encouraged” that person to stay in violation of the statute.
IMLA’s amicus brief focused on these broader issues and implications for local governments without delving into politically sensitive ones.
Filed January 22, 2020 (Supreme Court Merits)
Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez
No. 18-8369
Pro Bono Author: Misha Tseytlin
Holding: A Prison Litigation Reform Act provision that generally prevents a prisoner from bringing suit in forma pauperis — that is, without first paying the filing fee — if he has had three or more prior suits “dismissed on the ground[ ] that [they] … fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” refers to any dismissal for failure to state a claim, whether with prejudice or without.
Arthur Lomax had previously filed three lawsuits alleging a variety of constitutional violations stemming from his expulsion from the Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program at Centennial Correctional Facility. The federal district court dismissed the first and second lawsuits as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, holding that a litigant cannot bring a § 1983 claim challenging a conviction’s legitimacy until that conviction has been dismissed. The third lawsuit was dismissed for a failure to state a claim. The first two cases were dismissed without prejudice.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of the PLRA states:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
This provision is known as the “three strikes rule.” Once a prisoner has three strikes, he can no longer proceed in forma pauperis and must pay any applicable court fees if he wishes to bring further lawsuits against prison officials.
Lomax filed suit in federal district court a fourth lawsuit against prison officials alleging various constitutional violations. Lomax argues he should be able to bring this lawsuit in forma pauperis regardless of the three-strikes rule in the PLRA because two of his previous lawsuits were dismissed without prejudice.
The trial court rejected his argument that two of his previous lawsuits did not count as strikes under the PLRA and held that if he wanted to proceed with the lawsuit, he must pay the $400 filing fee or show he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury (a requirement under the statute to proceed in forma pauperis despite 3 strikes). The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the fact that two of the previous dismissals were without prejudice was “immaterial.”
The issue in this case was whether a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g).
Filed October 4, 2019 (Supreme Court Merits)
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California
No. 18-587
Pro Bono Author: Mike Dundas
Holding: The Department of Homeland Security’s decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act
In 2012, then President Obama adopted the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program or DACA to postpone deportation of undocumented immigrants brought to America as children if they met certain conditions. DACA also allowed them to obtain work permits, social security numbers, pay taxes, and become part of the mainstream economy. In 2017, the Trump administration rescinded DACA, arguing that it was illegal from its inception, and therefore could no longer continue in effect. The decision to rescind DACA was based on a 2015 Fifth Circuit decision concluding that the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans or DAPA, a similar program to DACA, exceeded DHS’ statutory authority.
Challengers including state and local governments brought suit, arguing that rescinding DACA was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The federal government argued that the decision to rescind DACA is not reviewable and even if it is, it did not violate the APA.
Three lower courts have concluded ending the policy is both reviewable and likely unlawful. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the decision to rescind DACA is not committed to agency discretion and is therefore reviewable by courts. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to show that the decision to rescind the policy was arbitrary and capricious under the APA because it was based on a flawed legal premise. The Ninth Circuit emphasized:
To be clear: we do not hold that DACA could not be rescinded as an exercise of Executive Branch discretion. We hold only that here, where the Executive did not make a discretionary choice to end DACA—but rather acted based on an erroneous view of what the law required—the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under settled law. The government is, as always, free to reexamine its policy choices, so long as doing so does not violate an injunction or any freestanding statutory or constitutional protection.
The issues in this case are: 1) whether the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is judicially reviewable; and (2) whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA policy is lawful.
Filed August 12, 2019 (Supreme Court Merits)
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York
Pro Bono Author: Lawrence Rosenthal
Holding: Petitioners’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the City’s old rule on transporting firearms is moot, and any claim for damages with respect to that rule may be addressed in the first instance by the court of appeals and the district court on remand.
A New York City administrative rule allows residents to obtain a “carry” or “premises” handgun license. The “premises” license allows a licensee to “have and possess in his dwelling” a pistol or revolver. A licensee may only take his or her gun to specific shooting ranges located in the city.
In 2008 in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a firearm for purposes of self-defense in the home. Among many questions left unanswered the Court did not state whether an individual has a Second Amendment right to possess a gun outside the home.
Challengers want to bring their handgun to their second home and to target practice outside the city and claim the premises license violates their Second Amendment rights (they also bring challenges under the First Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the constitutional right to travel). The Second Circuit held the law is constitutional on all accounts.
Applying intermediate scrutiny on the Second Amendment claim, the Second Circuit held the rule was “substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest.” It seeks to “protect public safety and prevent crime.” And the court agreed with the former Commander of the License Division that premises license holders “are just as susceptible as anyone else to stressful situations,” including driving situations that can lead to road rage, “crowd situations, demonstrations, family disputes,” and other situations “where it would be better to not have the presence of a firearm.” The Second Circuit concluded the rule doesn’t discriminate against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause or violate a constitutional right to travel because nothing in the law prevents the plaintiffs from attending shooting tournaments outside the city (and renting a gun there) or purchasing a separate gun for a residence outside the city.
The issue before the Supreme Court is whether New York City’s ban on transporting a handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits violates the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the constitutional right to travel.
Filed April 3, 2019 (Supreme Court Merits)
Mitchell v. Wisconsin
No. 18-6210
Pro Bono Author: Lauren Kuley
Held: in a 4-1-4 opinion, the Supreme Court held that where a driver is unconscious and therefore cannot give a breath test, the exigent circumstances rule almost always permits a blood test even absent a warrant.
Police officers responded to a call that a driver, who appeared intoxicated, got into a van and drove away. Forty-five minutes later an officer found Gerald Mitchell walking near a beach. He appeared to be intoxicated and admitted to the officer that he had been drinking and his van was parked nearby. A preliminary breath test, insufficient evidence for trial, indicated Mitchell had a blood alcohol level of .24. The officer took Mitchell to the police station for an evidentiary breath test, but Mitchell had passed out. His blood was drawn at the hospital where he remained unconscious throughout the procedure.
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) allows the taking of a person’s blood if the person is unconscious and the police have probable cause to suspect drunk driving. Mitchell argued that the blood draw constituted an unlawful search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious person the police have probable cause to suspect was driving drunk doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment.
The issue on appeal was whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
Filed April 1, 2019 (Supreme Court Merits)
Department of Commerce v. New York
No. 18-966
Pro Bono Author: John Korzen
Held: The secretary of the Department of Commerce did not violate the enumeration clause or the Census Act in deciding to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 census questionnaire, but the district court was warranted in remanding the case back to the agency where the evidence tells a story that does not match the secretary’s explanation for his decision.
In March 2018 Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross issued a memorandum stating he would add a citizenship question to the Census (for the first time since 1960). He claimed the Department of Justice (DOJ) wanted the data to enforce the Voting Rights Act’s prohibition against diluting the voting power of minority groups. The Census Bureau “strenuously” objected to adding the question, warning “that adding a citizenship question would harm the quality of census data and increase costs significantly and that it would do so for no good reason because there was an alternative way to satisfy DOJ’s purported needs that would not cause those harms.”
A number of state and local governments and nonprofits sued the Secretary claiming that adding this question is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The federal government argued that the state and local governments do not have standing to sue and that the decision by Secretary Ross is not judicially reviewable.
After concluding the state and local governments had standing, the court found numerous APA violations in the manner in which the question was added to the census. For example, “[Ross] failed to consider several important aspects of the problem; alternately ignored, cherry-picked, or badly misconstrued the evidence in the record before him; acted irrationally both in light of that evidence and his own stated decisional criteria; and failed to justify significant departures from past policies and practices — a veritable smorgasbord of classic, clear-cut APA violations.”
Judge Furman summarizes the significance of having an accurate census for state and local governments in his 277-page opinion: “By its terms, therefore, the Constitution mandates that every ten years the federal government endeavor to count every single person residing in the United States, whether citizen or noncitizen, whether living here with legal status or without. The population count derived from that effort is used not only to apportion Representatives among the states, but also to draw political districts and allocate power within them. And it is used to allocate hundreds of billions of dollars in federal, state, and local funds. Given the stakes, the interest in an accurate count is immense. Even small deviations from an accurate count can have major implications for states, localities, and the people who live in them — indeed, for the country as a whole.”
IMLA filed an amicus brief focused solely on the issue that local governments have standing to pursue their claims against the Department.
Filed March 23, 2019 (Supreme Court Merits)
McDonough v. Smith
No. 18-485
Pro Bono Author: Geoffrey Eaton
Held: The statute of limitations for Edward McDonough’s Section 1983 fabricated-evidence claim against his prosecutor began to run when the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor – that is, when he was acquitted at the end of his second trial.
Edward McDonough, former Democratic Commissioner of Rensselaer County Board of Elections, approved forged absentee ballot applications, which he claims he didn’t know had been falsified. Smith investigated and prosecuted McDonough. McDonough claimed Smith “engaged in an elaborate scheme to frame McDonough for the crimes by, among other things, fabricating evidence.”
McDonough’s first trial ended in a mistrial. McDonough was then retried, again with Smith as the prosecutor. That trial ended in McDonough’s acquittal on December 21, 2012. On December 18, 2015, just under three years later, McDonough filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the Defendants (including Smith): (1) had violated his right to due process by fabricating evidence and later using it against him before the grand jury and in his two trials; and (2) were liable for malicious prosecution.
McDonough argued fabrication of evidence was most analogous to a malicious prosecution, for the purposes of the statute of limitations, which does not accrue until a favorable termination of the prosecution. The Second Circuit held that McDonough’s due process claim was time barred because the three-year statute of limitations started running when the fabricated evidence had been disclosed to him (which may have been as early as when he was indicted) not on the day of his acquittal.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fabrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those proceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor, as the majority of circuits have held, or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of the tainted evidence and its improper use, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit held below.
Filed March 8, 2019 (Supreme Court Merits)
Lamone v. Benisek
Rucho v. Common Cause
No. 18-726 / 18-422
Pro Bono Author: Michael Parsons
Held: Partisan gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable political questions.
These cases involved claims of partisan gerrymandering. Rucho challenges the North Carolina Congressional Redistricting Plan as an unconstitutional gerrymander. A three-judge district court struck down North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map, ruling first that the challengers do have standing under the framework set forth in Gill v. Whitford (2018) and then concluding that the map was the product of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. The three-judge district court blocked the state from using the map after November 2018. The challengers of the map argue that the North Carolina Republicans had an “official state policy to maximize” their party’s representation in Congress, and under the plan, Republicans in 2016 won 10 out of the state’s 13 congressional seats “even though the statewide vote was nearly tied”, which according to the challengers was the “the worst partisan asymmetry” in the United States that year. The three-judge court held that the Plan constituted an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, and Article I of the Constitution
Benisek v. Lamone involves a challenge brought by Republicans arguing that the Democratic election officials violated the Constitution when they redrew Maryland’s 6th congressional district to flip it from Republican to strongly Democratic, in retaliation for the challengers’ support for Republican candidates and in violation of the First Amendment.
The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) Whether plaintiffs have standing to press their partisan gerrymandering claims; (2) whether plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable; and (3) whether North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map is, in fact, an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander; and (4) whether the legal claims articulated by the three-judge panel in the Benisek case are unmanageable.
Filed March 4, 2019 (Supreme Court Merits)
Fort Bend County v. Davis
No. 18-525
Pro Bono Author: Collin Udell
Held: The charge-filing precondition to suit set out in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not a jurisdictional requirement and is therefore waivable.
Lois Davis complained to her former employer, Fort Bend County, that the IT director sexually harassed and assaulted her. Davis also claimed that her supervisor retaliated against her for complaining about the IT director (supervisor and IT director were friends) by terminating her when she told him that she could not work on a Sunday because of a religious observance. Alleging sexual harassment and retaliation, Davis submitted her intake questionnaire and filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission (state equivalent of the EEOC). She amended the questionnaire to include religious discrimination, but she didn’t amend the charge (she added the word “religion” in the box labeled “employment harms or actions”). After the Texas Workforce Commission issued her a right-to-sue letter, Davis brought both a retaliation and a religious discrimination lawsuit under Title VII.
Before bringing an employment discrimination lawsuit under Title VII an employee must exhaust his or her administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC (or equivalent state agency).
The Fifth Circuit held that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a rule the employer can waive and not a jurisdictional rule that would bar the lawsuit from proceeding. In this case, the employer waited five years before claiming the religious discrimination claim was barred by her failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the employer had therefore waived that defense. The court reasoned: “Here, Congress did not suggest—much less clearly state—that Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, and so we must treat this requirement as nonjurisdictional in character. The statute says nothing about a connection between the EEOC enforcement process and the power of a court to hear a Title VII case.”
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Title VII’s administrative-exhaustion requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, as three circuits have held, or a waivable claim-processing rule, as eight circuits have held.
Filed January 31, 2019 (Supreme Court Merits)
Kisor v. Wilkie
No. 18-15
Pro Bono Author: Allyson Ho
Held: Auer v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co – under which deference is given to an agency’s reasonable reading of its own genuinely ambiguous regulations – are not overruled.
The facts of the case are largely irrelevant and involve a Marine veteran, who sought disability benefits for his service-related post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Although the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) agreed that he suffered from service-related PTSD, it refused to award him retroactive benefits. That decision by the VA turned on the meaning of the term “relevant” as used in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1), a regulation promulgated by the VA.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the veteran and the VA both offered reasonable constructions of the term “relevant” under the regulation and on that basis alone, the court held that the regulation is ambiguous. Therefore, pursuant to Auer, the court deferred to the VA’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation.
The issue was whether the Supreme Court should overrule Auer v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., which direct courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation. Although the Supreme Court declined to overrule these cases, it did provide courts with guidance on deference and cabined the holdings of Auer and Seminole Rock.
Filed January 15, 2019 (Supreme Court Merits)
PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic Inc
No. 17-1705
Pro Bono Author: Ashley Johnson
Held: The extent to which a 2006 Federal Communications Commission order interpreting the term “unsolicited advertisement” binds lower courts may depend on the resolution of two preliminary questions that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit should address in the first instance: (1) whether the order is the equivalent of a legislative rule, which has the force and effect of law, or an interpretative rule, which does not; and (2) whether PDR Network, LLC had a “prior” and “adequate” opportunity to seek judicial review of the order.
Carlton & Harris, a chiropractor group, sued PDR Network in federal district court, asserting a claim under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) based on a fax it received from PDR. Specifically, PDR offers the Physician’s Desk Reference Book for free and it sent an unsolicited fax offering a free copy of the book. The TCPA prohibits the use of a fax machine (or text messages) to send “unsolicited advertisements.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). PDR moved to dismiss, arguing that the offer was for a free book, and therefore could not be considered an unsolicited advertisement. In response, Carlton & Harris pointed to a 2006 FCC rule interpreting the term “unsolicited advertisement” under the TCPA as one that includes the promotion of goods or services even at no cost.
Carlton & Harris also argued that under the Hobbs Act, the district court was required to defer to the 2006 FCC’s Rule regardless of any Chevron deference principles. The Hobbs Act, also known as the Administrative Orders Review Act, provides a mechanism for judicial review of certain administrative orders, including all final orders of the FCC, as well as final rules by other agencies, including the Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Agriculture, Federal Maritime Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, and others. If a party seeks to challenge a final order to enjoin it, set it aside, suspend it, or determine the validity of it, they must do so in the federal courts of appeals in the first instance within 60 days of the final rule.
The district court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments, concluding that the Hobbs Act did not compel it to defer to the FCC’s interpretation in this case because the TCPA is an unambiguous statute. The court reasoned under Chevron, it was not required to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if the statute is unambiguous. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not stated a valid claim under the TCPA and dismissed the complaint.
The Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the Hobbs Act precluded the district court from reaching step-one in the Chevron analysis (i.e., determining whether the statute is ambiguous) and instead, the Act required the district court to simply accept the agency’s interpretation of the TCPA. The court reasoned that Congress, through the Hobbs Act, stripped district courts of their jurisdiction to review these final agency determinations. “The district court had no power to decide whether the FCC rule was entitled to deference. By refusing to defer to the FCC rule and applying Chevron analysis instead, the court acted beyond the scope of its congressionally granted authority.” Importantly, the court also noted that the Hobbs Act not only prevents the district court from “questioning the validity of the 2006 FCC Rule,” but it likewise stripped the circuit court of its ability to question the validity of the rule outside the statutory time period and process established in the Act; i.e., once final and not challenged the Order could not be reviewed. After making this determination, the court concluded that under the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA, PDR’s fax offering a free good was an advertisement.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the Federal Communication Commission’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
Filed December 21, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Filed July 28, 2018 (Supreme Court Petition Stage)
American Humanist Association v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission
No. 18-18
Pro Bono Author: Paul Zidlick & Michael Buschbacher
In 1925, the American Legion and a group of bereaved mothers erected a memorial to honor the 49 residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland, who perished in World War I. To evoke the grave markers on the battlefields in Europe, the memorial bears the shape of a cross. The cross is 40 feet tall and a large plaque affixed to the memorial dedicates it to and lists the names of the 49 county residents who fell in World War I. The sides of the memorial are inscribed with the words “valor,” “endurance,” “courage,” and “devotion.” The memorial is situated in Veterans Memorial Park, which also contains monuments to the War of 1812, World War II, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Korean and Vietnam wars, and the events of September 11, 2001. The WWI memorial / cross is by far the largest memorial in the park.
Until the present suit, no person challenged the legality of the monument, which from its beginning has been consistently used by the community and the local American Legion as the site of patriotic events to honor veterans. The community has never used the memorial for a religious ceremony, and the only mention of a religious event in connection with the memorial occurred 87 years ago. However, there are some invocations that occur during war memorial events, which have been predominantly Christian. These invocations are offered by private citizens during Veteran’s Day or Memorial Day events commemorating veterans.
In 1961, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission acquired the memorial and the roadway median on which it sits due to traffic safety concerns arising from the placement of the Cross in the middle of a busy intersection. From that date until present, the Commission has expended $117,000 in costs associated with maintenance and repair of the memorial.
In 2014, the American Humanist Association and three individuals filed suit against the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. Respondents contended that, because of its cross shape, the memorial constitutes an unconstitutional endorsement of Christianity. The American Legion and its local affiliates were subsequently permitted to intervene as defendants. The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, explaining that it is “uncontroverted” that the maintenance and display of the memorial is not “driven by a religious purpose whatsoever,” and that the memorial’s “history and context” would lead any reasonable observer to conclude that the monument does not “hav[e] the effect of impermissibly endorsing religion,” but instead serves exclusively as a war memorial.
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that under Lemon v. Kurtzman, the cross violated the Establishment Clause as its primary / principal effect was endorsing Christianity and because it represented excessive entanglement between the government and religion. The panel acknowledged that the Commission had “articulated legitimate secular purposes for displaying and maintaining” the monument. But the court reasoned that “[t]he Latin cross is the ‘preeminent symbol of Christianity,’” and that the cross lacks any meaningful “connection” to “our Nation’s history and government” and is so inherently “sectarian” that it “overwhelm[s]” the monument’s numerous “secular elements.” Further, the panel reasoned that, by making even “de minimis” expenditures to maintain the memorials, the Commission “entangl[ed]” itself in religion and led “any reasonable observer” to believe that “the Commission either places Christianity above other faiths” or “views being American and Christian as one in the same.”
Judge Gregory dissented and explained that in light of its history and context, it is plain that the monument is “a war memorial built to celebrate the forty-nine Prince George’s County residents who gave their lives in battle.” He further noted that the majority’s decision to the contrary “would lead to per se findings that all large crosses are unconstitutional despite any amount of secular history and context.” The Fourth Circuit voted 8-6 to deny rehearing en banc. Chief Judge Gregory, Judge Wilkinson, and Judge Niemeyer each filed dissents objecting to the majority’s legal errors and describing its dramatic implications for other monuments and memorials throughout the country.
The issue is whether the establishment clause requires the removal or destruction of a 93-year-old memorial to American servicemen who died in World War I solely because the memorial bears the shape of a cross.
Filed November 20, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Byrd
No. 18-96
Pro Bono Author: Richard Simpson
Tennessee law requires anyone receiving a retailer-alcoholic-beverages license to be a Tennessee resident for at least two years. A number of alcohol retailers sued, claiming the residency requirement violates the dormant commerce clause by discriminating against interstate commerce.
The Sixth Circuit ruled that Tennessee’s durational-residency requirements are “facially discriminatory and there is no evidence that Tennessee cannot achieve its goals through nondiscriminatory means” and therefore the law is unconstitutional in violation of the dormant commerce clause. The court concluded the Tennessee’s durational-residency requirement isn’t “inherent” to the three-tier system of regulating alcohol and that the Twenty-first Amendment “does not give a state the power to dictate where individuals live, because a state’s alcoholic-beverages laws ‘cannot deprive citizens of their right to have access to the markets of other States on equal terms.’”
The issue in this case is whether the 21st Amendment empowers states, consistent with the dormant commerce clause, to regulate liquor sales by granting retail or wholesale licenses only to individuals or entitles that have resided in-state for a specified time.
Filed November 1, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Gamble v. United States
No. 17-646
Pro Bono Author: Gordon Todd & Spencer Driscoll
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
Gamble was prosecuted for and convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under both Alabama and United States law. Gamble appealed his conviction arguing that under the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, which provides “nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb…”, the federal government was prohibited from prosecuting him for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced by Alabama.
The Eleventh Circuit held in favor of the United States, noting that “the Supreme Court has determined that prosecution in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal government are separate sovereigns.”
The court added that “unless and until the Supreme Court overturns” its precedent, the double jeopardy claim must fail based on the dual sovereignty doctrine. The lower court pointed to Puerto Rico v. Sanchez-Valle (2016) where the Supreme Court stated: “the States possessed separate and independent sources of power and authority” before forming the Union “which they continue to draw upon in enacting and enforcing criminal laws.” In Sanchez-Valle the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars both Puerto Rico and the United States from prosecuting a single person for the same conduct under equivalent criminal laws because Puerto Rico isn’t a sovereign distinct from the United States because it had derived its authority from the U.S. Congress.
The issue is whether the Supreme Court should overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Filed October 11, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Timbs v. Indiana
No. 17-1091
Pro Bono Author: Lawrence Rosenthal
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
Indiana forfeited Tyson Timbs’ Land Rover under its Civil Asset forfeiture law because he used the Land Rover to buy and transport heroin. Timbs eventually pleaded guilty to a Class B felony. The maximum statutory fine for a Class B felony in Indiana was $10,000, while the value of the Land Rover when Timbs purchased it several months earlier was $42,058.30. Timbs argued that the forfeiture of the Land Rover was excessive under the Eighth Amendment and disproportional to the gravity of his offense.
The Indiana Supreme Court held that because the United States Supreme Court has never enforced the “excessive fines” clause of the Eighth Amendment against the States, the court declined to do so in this case. The Indiana court reasoned that although certain amendments from the Bill of Rights are “incorporated” into the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore applicable to the states, there are also several amendments that the Supreme Court has held are not applied to the states. The Indiana court concluded that despite some discussion of applying the Eighth Amendment to the states in 2001, the Supreme Court had declined to definitively decide whether the Excessive Fines Clause applied to the states. The Indiana court noted a split of authority on this issue. Somewhat incongruously, the state court did not discuss the difference between a civil asset forfeiture as was the case before it in contradistinction with a criminal proceeding in which forfeitures and fines might be applied as punishment. Instead, it addressed Timbs’ argument head on as if the 8th Amendment applied to civil forfeitures, finding that since the Court had not applied incorporation to the 8th Amendment “excessive fines” clause it did not apply, but without analyzing whether the 8th Amendment applies to civil forfeitures.
The issue in the case is whether the Eight Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states and therefore local governments.
Filed August 27, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Nieves v. Bartlett
No. 17-1174
Pro Bono Author: Bennett Cohen
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
The Artic Man is a multi-day festival centered around high-speed ski and snowmobile races that attracts thousands of people to a remote portion of Alaska every year. Bartlett was attending and when Trooper Nieves encountered him at a large outdoor party where it appeared minors were drinking, Bartlett refused to speak to Nieves. Meanwhile, Trooper Weight spotted a minor drinking alcohol and began to speak with him. Bartlett, who was intoxicated and weighs 240 lbs, then moved over to Trooper Weight and the minor. The video footage shows that all 3 individuals were standing very closely together exchanging words and that Bartlett’s right hand was roughly at shoulder height and within inches of Trooper Weight.
Trooper Weight, who took Bartlett’s actions as hostile and aggressive, “created space for himself” by pushing Bartlett back. Trooper Nieves saw all this and ran over. The troopers subdued Bartlett and he was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. Bartlett alleges that after the arrest, Trooper Nieves said: “bet you wish you would have talked to me now.”
The prosecutor determined there was probable cause for the arrest but dismissed the charges for budgetary reasons.
Bartlett brought suit under §1983 claiming excessive force, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and retaliatory arrest. The district court found in favor of the officers on all the charges on summary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed on the retaliatory arrest charge.
The Ninth Circuit reiterated that in that circuit, a plaintiff can prevail on a retaliatory arrest claim even if the officers had probable cause to arrest. In this case, because Bartlett alleged that Nieves said, “bet you wish you would have talked to me now,” a reasonable jury could have found that the arrest was in retaliation for his refusal to answer questions earlier in the evening and summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.
The issue in this case is whether probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Filed August 6, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Knick v. Scott Township, Pennsylvania
No. 17-647
Pro Bono Author: Matthew Zinn & Andrew Schwartz
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
Knick owns approximately 90 acres of property in Scott Township, Pennsylvania. In 2012, the Township enacted an ordinance addressing the operation and maintenance of cemeteries, which applies to public and private cemeteries, and requires that cemeteries be properly maintained and accessible to the public during daylight hours. The ordinance also permits the Township’s Code Enforcement Officers to enter the property for determining the existence/ location of a cemetery and to ensure compliance with the ordinance. Anyone who violates the ordinance is subject to a fine. In 2013, Knick was determined to be in violation of the ordinance on her private property due to a private burial ground on the property.
Knick filed for declaratory / injunctive relief in Pennsylvania state court. Knick did not institute an inverse condemnation action against the Township in state court. After Knick filed her complaint in state court, the Township withdrew its notice of violation and the court concluded that until the Township evidenced an intent to enforce the ordinance against Knick there was nothing before the court to act upon. Thereafter, Knick sued in federal court claiming, among other things, an unlawful taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment based on both the facial terms of the ordinance and as it was originally applied to her. Specifically, she argues that the ordinance effectuates an uncompensated taking of her private property by requiring her to hold her land open to the public and to Township inspectors.
By way of background, in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Supreme Court held that before a takings claim is prudentially ripe, plaintiffs need to comply with state law procedures and remedies that are enacted to provide just compensation in a takings case, provided those procedures are adequate. Id. at 194
In this case, the Third Circuit agreed with the Township that Knick failed to comply with the Williamson County exhaustion of state-law compensation remedies, because Knick did not pursue inverse-condemnation proceedings under Pennsylvania’s Eminent Domain Code. The court concluded that her Fifth Amendment claims were therefore not ripe until she has sought and been denied just compensation using Pennsylvania’s inverse condemnation procedures.
The issue in this case is whether the Supreme Court should reconsider the portion of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank that requires property owners to exhaust state court remedies to ripen federal takings claims.
Filed July 30, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Carpenter v. Murphy
No. 17-1107
Pro Bono Author: Sarah Shalf
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
Patrick Murphy, who is Native American, was found guilty of killing George Jacobs in Oklahoma state court and sentenced to death. By federal statute, states lack jurisdiction to prosecute Native Americans who commit murder in “Indian country.” The parties disagree over whether the murder took place in “Indian country.”
By way of background, the section of the Major Crimes Act’s definition of “Indian country” is as follows: “all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation.” Congress may disestablish or diminish Indian reservations. In Solem v. Barlett (1984), the Supreme Court established a three-part test to determine Congress has diminished a reservation. Per Solem: “[o]nce a block of land is set aside for an Indian Reservation and no matter what happens to the title of individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise.” 465 U.S. at 470.
The Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of Murphy concluding that the Solem factors do not indicate the Creek reservation was disestablished. “Instead, the relevant statutes contain language affirmatively recognizing the Creek Nation’s borders.” The result is that the court concluded that the crime occurred on the Creek Reservation and therefore the Oklahoma courts lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Murphy.
Oklahoma argues that Congress’s series of actions through a number of late 1800s/early 1900s statutes effectively constitute disestablishment and specifically by forming the state of Oklahoma, “Congress systematically dismantled tribal governments and their communal ownership of lands.”
The issue in this case is whether the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation within the former Indian Territory of eastern Oklahoma constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
Filed May 14, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido
No. 17-587
Pro Bono Author: Collin O’Connor Udell
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
John Guido was 46 and Dennis Rankin was 54 when their employment was terminated by the Mount Lemmon Fire District due to budgetary constraints. They were the oldest of the district’s 13 employees.
By way of background, the ADEA applies only to an “employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) defines the term “employer” as follows: “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . . The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency, but such term does not include the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States.”
29 U.S.C. § 630(a): The term “person” means one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, corporations, business trusts, legal representatives, or any organized groups of persons.
The Ninth Circuit held that the 20-employee minimum does not apply to a political subdivision of the state, contrary to every other circuit court to consider the issue has held. The Ninth Circuit reasoned, that “employer” means [A—person] and also means (1) [B—agent of person] and (2) [C—State-affiliated entities].” The sentence describing state-affiliated entities contains no size requirement. The Ninth Circuit said that the word “also” supports its interpretation. “The word ‘also’ is a term of enhancement; it means ‘in addition; besides’ and ‘likewise; too.’” As used in this context, ‘also’ adds another definition to a previous definition of a term—it does not clarify the previous definition.”
The issue in this case is whether, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the same 20-employee minimum that applies to private employers also applies to political subdivisions of a state.
Filed April 30, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service
No. 17-71
Pro Bono Author: Thomas McCarthy
Only about 100 adult dusky gopher frogs are known to exist in the wild. Historically, the frog was found in parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, today, the frog exists only in Mississippi. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service designated private land owned by the Weyerhaeuser Company in Louisiana as “critical habitat” for the dusky gopher frog under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). It made this designation based on special breeding ponds located on the land, which it deemed “essential for the conservation of the species,” notwithstanding the fact that the Louisiana land where the ponds were located lacked other necessary qualities to make the land currently habitable for the frog.
The Weyerhaeuser Company holds a long-term timber lease on all of the land that does not expire until 2043. The Weyerhaeuser Company sued the Fish and Wildlife Service challenging the designation of its land as a critical habitat.
The Firth Circuit ruled in favor of the Fish and Wildlife Service, deferring to the Service’s determination that the areas owned by the Company were “essential for the conservation of the species.” The court noted that the final critical-habitat designation was the culmination of two proposed rules, economic analysis, two rounds of notice and comment, a scientific peer-review process including responses from six experts, and a public hearing.
The Weyerhaeuser Company claims that the land in question is “uninhabitable” by the frog “barring a radical change in the land’s use by its private owners.” More technically, the company claims that the land “is not currently supporting the conservation of the species in any way and the Service has no reasonable basis to believe that it will do so at any point in the foreseeable future.”
The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that there is no habitability requirement in the ESA and no temporal requirement the frog can live on the land in the foreseeable future in the statute.
After designating land as “critical habitat,” the ESA mandates that the Service “tak[e] into consideration the economic impact . . . of specifying any particular area as critical habitat.” After it takes this impact into consideration, the Service “may exclude any area from critical habitat if [it] determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the critical habitat, unless [it] determines, based on the best scientific and commercial data available, that the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the species concerned.”
Here the Service’s concluded the economic impacts on the land “are not disproportionate.” The potential loss of development value in the land is up to $33.9 million over twenty years. Weyerhaeuser Company claims because the land isn’t currently habitable by the dusky gopher frog it provides no biological benefit to the frog and thus the benefits of excluding the designation should outweigh the benefits of specifying the area as critical habitat.
The Fifth Circuit refused to review the Service’s decision opining there are no “judicially manageable standards” to judge the Service’s decision:
The Service argues that once it has fulfilled its statutory obligation to consider economic impacts, a decision to not exclude an area is discretionary and thus not reviewable in court. The Service is correct. Under the APA, decisions “committed to agency discretion by law” are not reviewable in federal court. An action is committed to agency discretion when there is “no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” “[I]f no judicially manageable standards are available for judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion, then it is impossible to evaluate agency action for ‘abuse of discretion.’”
The issues in this case are: (1) Whether the Endangered Species Act prohibits designation of private land as unoccupied critical habitat that is neither habitat nor essential to species conservation; and (2) whether an agency decision not to exclude an area from critical habitat because of the economic impact of designation is subject to judicial review.
IMLA filed an amicus brief focused solely on the second issue.
Filed March 28, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Trump v. Hawaii
No. 17-965
Pro Bono Author: Stuart Banner
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
The third “travel ban” indefinitely bans immigration from six countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Yemen. Persons from some of these countries and Venezuela also may not receive particular non-immigrant visas.
The Ninth Circuit ruled against the travel ban. It issued a nationwide injunction applying to “foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” The court’s reasoning was brief: “Because this case implicates immigration policy, a nationwide injunction was necessary to give Plaintiffs a full expression of their rights.”
There are a number of issues in this case, including whether the travel ban is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause or a lawful use of Presidential Power. The sole issue IMLA filed an amicus brief on is whether the global injunction barring enforcement of the proclamation’s entry suspensions worldwide, except as to nationals of two countries and as to persons without a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States, is impermissibly overbroad. IMLA’s amicus brief argued that it is properly within the discretion of a district court judge to issue nationwide injunctions, particularly where an unconstitutional federal law is at issue (though we took no position as to the constitutionality of the Executive Order in this case).
Filed March 2, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Filed November 2, 2017 (Supreme Court Petition Stage)
South Dakota v. Wayfair
No. 17-494
Pro Bono Author: Tillman Breckenridge
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
The issue in this case is whether the Supreme Court should abrogate Quill Corp. v. North Dakota’s sales-tax-only, physical-presence requirement.
After calls from Justice Kennedy to reconsider Quill’s continued application in the modern internet-era, South Dakota enacted a law to challenge Quill’s physical-presence requirement. Because the law South Dakota enacted squarely conflicted with Supreme Court precedent (which was the intention), the South Dakota Supreme Court ruled the state law was unconstitutional.
Filed February 27, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra
No. 16-1140
Pro Bono Author: John Baker
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
NIFLA is a national religiously affiliated non-profit organization, composed of numerous pregnancy centers in California including both licensed and unlicensed clinics. NIFLA is strongly opposed to abortion. NIFLA and other similar organizations brought suit against the California Attorney General, claiming that the FACT Act violates its First Amendment free speech and free exercise rights.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of NIFLA’s requested preliminary injunction. Regarding the free speech argument, the court held that although the Act is content-based, it does not discriminate on viewpoint and therefore strict scrutiny does not apply. The court expressly held that even though it found that the act was content-based, Reed v. Town of Gilbert did not require that every content-based regulation be subject to strict scrutiny. The court concluded that intermediate scrutiny was applicable as the Act regulated professional speech, and the court found that the Act survived intermediate scrutiny. The panel also concluded that the notice for unlicensed facilities survived any level of scrutiny, including strict scrutiny.
The question presented is whether the disclosures required by the California Reproductive FACT Act violate the protections set forth in the free speech clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment.
Filed February 12, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky
No. 16-1435
Pro Bono Author: Charles Rothfeld
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
Minnesota Statute § 211B.11 prohibits wearing a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia . . . at or about the polling place on primary or election day.” To help determine which materials were political, Minnesota election officials distributed an Election Day Policy with examples including: “Issue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting” and “Material promoting a group with recognizable political views (such as the Tea Party, MoveOn.org, and so on).” Election judges were instructed to ask anyone wearing an item violating the Policy to remove or cover it. If a person refused, the election official should allow the person to vote, but record the person’s name and address for potential misdemeanor prosecution.
A number of political associations brought suit claiming First Amendment violations. The district court granted the state’s summary judgment motion on the plaintiff’s as-applied First Amendment challenge (after previously dismissing its facial challenge).
The Eighth Circuit ruled that Minnesota’s statute does not violate the First Amendment, citing Burson v. Freeman (1992). In that case the Supreme Court upheld a Tennessee statute that banned the “solicitation of votes” and “campaign materials” within 100 feet of the polling place.
The court didn’t address whether the statute is overbroad. Instead it opined that polling places are nonpublic forums and that the regulation is viewpoint neutral and facially reasonable.
The plaintiffs argued that banning Tea Party apparel at polling places is unreasonable because the tea party isn’t a political party. According to the Eighth Circuit the statute prohibits election-related apparel more generally. And even if Tea Party apparel isn’t election related it is not unreasonable to prohibit it in a polling place. “In order to ensure a neutral, influence-free polling place, all political material is banned. To demonstrate that the Tea Party is political, Minnesota provided polling data and media coverage supporting the public perception that the Tea Party is political. It also noted that as of July 2010, the Tea Party was a recognized caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives.”
The question presented is whether Minnesota statute Section 211B.11, which broadly bans all political apparel at the polling place, is facially overbroad under the First Amendment.
Filed January 29, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach
No. 17-21
Pro Bono Author: Bennett Cohen / Britton St. Onge
Lozman was an outspoken critic of the City after he learned of its eminent domain plans for the Marina area where he lived on a floating home. After the City passed, via emergency session, a bill that approved the redevelopment plan, Lozman filed suit against the City seeking to invalidate it. A few months later at a regular public City Council meeting, Lozman was granted permission to speak during the “non-agenda” public comments portion of the meeting. He began by criticizing public officials as corrupt and a Councilperson interjected and told him to stop his comments and when he did not, she had him arrested. (He was informed if he left the meeting, he would not be arrested, but he refused to leave).
He was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. The state’s attorney determined there was probable cause for the arrest, but dismissed the charges. Lozman subsequently filed a Section 1983 action against the City claiming that the arrest was retaliatory in violation of the First Amendment. The case went to trial and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the City.
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the jury verdict, concluding that the officer had probable cause to arrest Lozman, which therefore defeated his claim of First Amendment retaliatory arrest as a matter of law.
The issue in this case is whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law.
Filed January 29, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Benisek v. Lamone
No. 17-333
Pro Bono Author: Michael Parsons
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
This case involves the issue of partisan gerrymandering and is the second Supreme Court case in the 2017 term to address the issue (the first being Gill v. Whitford). In this case, Republicans in Maryland challenged the Democrats’ redistricting of Maryland’s Sixth Congressional district. Voters elected a Republican to the district in the 2010 election, but since it was redrawn in 2011, the District has consistently elected Democrats. The redrawn map resulted in more than a 90,000 voter swing in favor of Democrats and the share of registered Republicans went from 47% to 33%. Republicans brought suit, claiming that they were retaliated against for voting Republican, in violation of the First Amendment.
The issues in this case are: (1) Whether the majority of the three-judge district court erred in holding that, to establish an actual, concrete injury in a First Amendment retaliation challenge to a partisan gerrymander, a plaintiff must prove that the gerrymander has dictated and will continue to dictate the outcome of every election held in the district under the gerrymandered map; (2) whether the majority erred in holding that the Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyleburden-shifting framework is inapplicable to First Amendment retaliation challenges to partisan gerrymanders; and (3) whether, regardless of the applicable legal standards, the majority erred in holding that the present record does not permit a finding that the 2011 gerrymander was a but-for cause of the Democratic victories in the district in 2012, 2014, or 2016.
Filed January 22, 2018 (Supreme Court Merits)
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. SolarCity Corp.
No. 17-368
Pro Bono Author: Tillman Lay / Katharine Mapes / Jessica Bell
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
In this case, the Salt River Power District, a political subdivision of Arizona, is the only traditional supplier of power near where many SolarCity customers and prospective customers live. SolarCity sells and leases rooftop solar-energy panels. SolarCity claims that to prevent it from installing more panels the Power District introduced a new pricing structure. Under the structure if a customer obtains power from his or her own system he or she must pay a “prohibitively large penalty.”
SolarCity sued the Salt River Power District claiming it violated federal antitrust law. The Power District argued it is immune from federal antitrust lawsuits per the state-action doctrine. The district court denied the Power District’s motion to dismiss “citing uncertainties about the specifics of the Power District’s state-law authority and business.” The Power District sought to immediately appeal the court’s denial of state-action immunity.
Acknowledging a circuit split, the Ninth Circuit held that an order denying state-action immunity is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The Supreme Court has only allowed interlocutory (immediate) appeals for immunities from suit (as opposed to immunities from liability) including 11th Amendment immunity, absolute immunity, and qualified immunity. This is because “[u]nlike immunity from suit, immunity from liability can be protected by a postjudgment appeal.” The Ninth Circuit determined that state-action immunity is an immunity from liability, rather than suit, and therefore denials of the immunity should not be immediately appealable.
The issue in this case is whether orders denying state-action immunity to public entities are immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
Filed November 20, 2017 (Supreme Court Merits)
City of Hays v. Vogt
No. 16-1495
Pro Bono Author:
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
Matthew Vogt worked as a police officer for the City of Hays. In an interview with a different city, Vogt disclosed he had kept a knife he obtained in the course of his work as a Hays police officer. The new city offered Vogt the job on the condition that he tell the City of Hays about the knife and return it. Vogt did so. The Hays police chief told Vogt to write a report about the knife, and Vogt wrote a vague one-sentence statement. The Hays police chief then told Vogt to write a more detailed statement or he would be fired. That statement was used to locate more evidence and Hays was charged with two felonies related to possessing the knife.
Vogt alleges that, at the probable cause hearing, his statements about the knife and the resulting information were “used against him.” Charges were ultimately dismissed at the probable cause hearing and Vogt was never prosecuted for the crimes.
Vogt brought a Section 1983 claim against both cities and four police officers, claiming that they violated his Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically, he alleged that: (1) by threatening to terminate his employment if he did not provide additional statements about the knife, the defendants compelled him to make incriminating statements; and (2) those statements were used against him in a criminal case when they were used at the probable cause hearing.
By way of background, Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) held that statements “obtained under threat of removal from office” are compelled statements for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause.
The Tenth Circuit held, in conflict with a number of other circuits, that the Fifth Amendment is violated when compelled self-incriminating statements are used at a probable cause hearing and thus, Vogt could proceed with his claims against the City of Hays. The Tenth Circuit found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity as the law was not clearly established and also dismissed the claim against the other city that had made a conditional offer of employment.
The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The question in this case is what does criminal case mean? Specifically, the question presented is whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when statements are used at a probable cause hearing, but not at a criminal trial.
Filed October 30, 2017 (Supreme Court Merits)
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
No. 16-111
Pro Bono Author: Bruce LaPierre
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
In July 2012, a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado open to the public, and requested that the owner create a cake for their wedding. The owner declined, telling them that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. He offered to sell them other baked goods in his store and the couple left without purchasing anything.
The couple filed a complaint alleging that Masterpiece had discriminated against them in a place of public accommodation because of their sexual orientation in violation of Colorado’s public accommodation law, which includes sexual orientation as a protected class.
Masterpiece argued that requiring it to create a wedding cake violates its rights to freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion. Masterpiece also argued that its refusal to create a wedding cake for the couple was not “because of” their sexual orientation, rather it claimed its refusal to create the cake was “because of” its opposition to same-sex marriage (based on its religious beliefs).
The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding it was a distinction without a difference. The court noted that distinguishing between a person’s status and conduct closely correlated with that status is inappropriate in the context of discrimination. Further, the court concluded that merely requiring that Masterpiece not to discriminate against potential customers consistent with the public accommodation statute, even if compelled by the government, is not sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment speech protections. Regarding the religious expression claim, the court concluded that the statute was a neutral law of general applicability; it was not requiring Masterpiece to support or endorse a particular religion, but rather the law merely prohibited Masterpiece from discriminating against a potential customer on account of a protected status. The Colorado Court of Appeals applied rational basis to Colorado’s law and “we easily conclude that it is rationally related to Colorado’s interest in eliminating discrimination in places of public accommodation.”
The issue before the Supreme Court is whether applying Colorado’s public accommodations law to compel the petitioner to create expression that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.
Filed September 5, 2017 (Supreme Court Merits)
Gill v. Whitford
No. 16-1161
Pro Bono Author: Paul Diller
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
In 2011, Wisconsin legislators redrew state assembly districts to reflect population changes recorded in the 2010 census. Map makers used a model designed to predict the likelihood that various proposed districts would elect a Republican. In the 2015 election, Republican candidates received less than 49% of the statewide vote and won seats in more than 60% of the state’s assembly districts; and, in 2014, 52% of the vote yielded 63 seats for Republicans. In 2015, Wisconsin voters filed a lawsuit claiming that Wisconsin’s election map was the result of partisan gerrymandering and violated their constitutional rights.
A divided panel of three federal judges ruled in favor of the challengers, finding that the map enacted by the Wisconsin legislature was a result of partisan gerrymandering and prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The three-judge panel had ordered that new legislative districts be drawn by this November for the 2018 elections, but the Supreme Court stayed that order until it has a chance to rule on the case.
The challengers in Whitford proposed a 3-part standard for determining the influence of partisan gerrymandering in the district-drawing process. The first prong is whether there was discriminatory intent. The second prong is whether there was a discriminatory effect. To determine discriminatory effect, the challengers proposed a standard based on “wasted votes”–votes in each district cast for a non-winning party’s candidate. By dividing the difference between the sums of each party’s wasted votes by the total number of votes cast, the proposed standard yields an efficiency gap. The challengers in Whitford argued that efficiency gaps over 7% would demonstrate a discriminatory effect. The efficiency gap in Wisconsin was 13.3% in 2012 and 9.6% in 2014, according to the proposed standard. The third prong in the proposed analysis is whether the redistricting plan’s “partisan effect can be explained by the legitimate state prerogatives and neutral factors that are implicated in the redistricting process.”
The issues in this case are whether partisan gerrymandering cases are justiciable and if so, by what standard should the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering claims be measured?
Filed September 5, 2017 (Supreme Court Merits)
Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
No. 16-476
Pro Bono Author: Richard Simpson
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
Instead of directly prohibiting sports betting under federal law, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), which prohibits state-sanctioned sports gambling. PASPA makes it “unlawful” for “a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact” sports wagering (28 U.S.C. § 3702(1)). In 2012, New Jersey amended its constitution to allow some sports gambling. New Jersey was sued by the NFL and other sports leagues for violating PASPA.
New Jersey argued PASPA is unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine because it requires the states “to affirmatively keep a prohibition against sports wagering on their books, lest they be found to have authorized sports gambling by law by repealing the prohibition.”
The Supreme Court has only struck down laws on anti-commandeering grounds twice. In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down a “take-title” provision whereby states were required to take title to radioactive waste by a specific date, at the waste generator’s request, if they did not adopt a federal program. And in Printz v. United States, the Court struck down a federal law requiring state officers to conduct background checks on prospective gun owners.
In Christie I, the Third Circuit responded that New Jersey’s position “‘rest[ed] on a false equivalence between repeal and authorization,’ implying that a repeal is not an authorization.” At the time, New Jersey petitioned the Supreme Court and the United States submitted an amicus in opposition, arguing that under the Third Circuit’s construction of PASPA, States were free to repeal their prohibitions on sports wagering “in whole or in part.”
Thus, after losing at the Third Circuit, in 2014 New Jersey passed a law repealing restrictions on sports gambling (as opposed to affirmatively allowing it and setting up a state regulatory scheme). New Jersey was sued again by many of the same parties, and in Christie II, New Jersey again argued that PASPA unconstitutionally commandeers states, this time by not allowing New Jersey to repeal its own laws. The Third Circuit characterized New Jersey’s argument as follows: “’We told you so’”—if the legislature cannot repeal New Jersey’s prohibition as it attempted to do in the 2014 law, then it is required to affirmatively keep the prohibition on the books, and PASPA unconstitutionally commandeers the states.”
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit in Christie II again rejected the state’s anti-commandeering argument. The Third Circuit distinguished PASPA from the laws at issue in New York and Printz, noting that PASPA did “not present states with a coercive choice to adopt a federal program” or “require states to take any action.”
The Supreme Court will decide whether a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeers the regulatory power of states in contravention of New York v. United States.
Filed August 18, 2017 (Supreme Court Merits)
Artis v. District of Columbia
No. 16-460
Pro Bono Author: Katharine Mapes
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
This case arises out of an employment discrimination suit against the District of Columbia. On December 16, 2011, the plaintiff sued in federal court claiming a Title VII violation. The federal district court had supplemental jurisdiction over her claims based on the District’s Whistleblower Act, False Claims Act, and her common law claim for wrongful termination against public policy. On June 27, 2014, the district court granted DC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to her federal employment discrimination claims and therefore dismissed the remaining claims as that was the sole federal claim creating jurisdiction for the federal court.
59 days later, the plaintiff filed her remaining claims arising under District of Columbia law in superior court. DC filed a motion to dismiss / for summary judgment based on the claims being time barred under their respective statute of limitations and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d). The trial judge agreed, finding 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) does not suspend state statutes of limitations at the time of the unsuccessful federal filing, but rather creates a thirty-day period (the “grace period”) for a claimant to file actions over which the U.S. District Court lacked jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) provides: “[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”
There were nearly two years remaining on the statute of limitations when the plaintiff filed her suit in the United States District Court, and she asserts she had that period (plus thirty days) to file her claims in the Superior Court. DC argues that “tolled” means a thirty-day “grace period,” meaning that because the limitations period had expired while the federal suit was pending, the appellant had only thirty days to file in Superior Court.
The DC Circuit held that the statute regarding tolling is ambiguous, but in light of its context and purpose, the “grace period” approach advocated by DC was the correct interpretation and thus, the plaintiff/appellant’s claims arising under DC law were time-barred. The DC Circuit also reasoned that this approach better balances federalism concerns.
The issue the Supreme Court will decide is whether the tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for the state-law claim while the claim is pending and restarts the limitations once the federal case is dismissed and allows an additional 30 days after the claim is dismissed, or whether the tolling provision stops the limitations period from applying to the state law claims for the duration of the suit and if expired or having less than thirty days left to run, allows 30 days beyond the dismissal for the plaintiff to refile.
Filed August 7, 2017 (Supreme Court Merits)
Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute
No. 16-980
Pro Bono Author: Joshua Davis
CLICKHERE to view the Amicus Brief.
To comply with list maintenance duties required by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), Ohio compiles a list of people who haven’t engaged in “voter activity” for two years and sends them a confirmation notice. If they don’t respond to the notice and don’t vote in the next two federal election cycles, they are removed from the voter rolls.
The NVRA says that voters can’t be removed from the polls because they failed to vote. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) modified it to say that states may remove voters if they don’t respond to a notice and don’t vote in the next two federal election cycles.
The Sixth Circuit held the Ohio scheme violates NVRA and HAVA. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Ohio scheme “constitutes perhaps the plainest possible example of a process that ‘result[s] in’ removal of a voter from the rolls by reason of his or her failure to vote.” According to the court, the “trigger” for someone being kicked off the rolls is failure to vote.
Ohio argues that it doesn’t remove voters “by reason of” their failure to vote; it removes voters “by reason of” their failure to respond to a notice. They argue that the NVRA doesn’t regulate what triggers the confirmation notice.
The issue in this case is whether Ohio’s list-maintenance process, which uses a registered voter’s voter inactivity as a reason to send a confirmation notice to that voter, violates the NVRA or the HAVA.
Filed May 11, 2017 (Supreme Court Merits)
Filed July 8, 2016 (Supreme Court Petition-stage)
District of Columbia v. Wesby
No. 15-1485
Pro Bono Author Petition Stage: Kymberly Evanson (2017 Amicus Service Award Recipient)
Pro Bono Author Merits: John Korzen
CLICK HERE to view the Amicus Brief.
In this case, the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department received a late- night complaint about a loud party and possible illegal activities inside a house that reportedly had been vacant for several months. Officers soon arrived at the home and heard music coming from inside. When the officers knocked and entered, the people inside scattered into different rooms and hid. Police found twenty-one people throughout the house. The officers observed activity like that “conducted in strip clubs for profit.” Consistent with being a vacant property, the house was in “disarray” and essentially unfurnished.
Police gathered information and interviewed all persons present. No one present owned the house or knew its owner. Some told police that they were there for a birthday party, while others claimed it was a bachelor party. No one could identify the guest of honor. Several said that they had been invited by other people, and some said that a woman known as “Peaches” had given them permission to be in the home. “Peaches,” though, was not present.
Officers called “Peaches” on the phone several times but she was evasive and repeatedly hung up. When an officer asked her to come to the home, she refused, explaining that she would be arrested if she did so. “Peaches” told police she had told the partiers that they could use the home. She also initially claimed to police that the owner had given her permission to use the home and that she was “possibly renting” it from him. Soon, though, “Peaches” admitted to police that, contrary to her initial claim, she lacked the owner’s permission to use the home. Police then spoke with the homeowner, who confirmed that the house was vacant and that no one, including “Peaches,” had permission to be there.
Police arrested all the partygoers inside for criminal trespass (and disorderly conduct – though the petition will focus on criminal trespass), although prosecutors ultimately did not pursue charges.
The partiers brought a Section 1983 claim, alleging the officers lacked probable cause to arrest them for criminal trespass. The district court granted the partiers’ motion for summary judgment, finding that their arrests were without probable cause and that the two defendant officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. After a damages-only trial, the district court entered a judgment against the officers (and jointly against the District of Columbia) totaling nearly $1 million.
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in a 2-1 decision. It reasoned that the officers did not have “conflicting information” that would overcome the partiers’ claim that they had been invited to the house by “Peaches” and therefore no reasonable officer could have believed that the partiers knew or should have known that their entry was unauthorized. (The DC statute for trespass required a culpable mens rea on the part of the trespassers). Thus, according to the Circuit Court, a reasonable officer could not have believed that there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs.
The DC Circuit next concluded that the law was clearly established, for qualified immunity purposes, because the legal elements of criminal trespass were clearly established, even though no case had invalidated an arrest for trespassing under similar circumstances.
The issues before the Court are: (1) Whether police officers who found late-night partiers inside a vacant home belonging to someone else had probable cause to arrest the partiers for trespassing under the Fourth Amendment, and in particular whether, when the owner of a vacant home informs police that he has not authorized entry, an officer assessing probable cause to arrest those inside for trespassing may discredit the suspects’ questionable claims of an innocent mental state; and (2) whether, even if there was no probable cause to arrest the apparent trespassers, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established in this regard.
IMLA submitted an amicus brief at the certiorari stage, framing the issues more broadly. Specifically: (1) whether a police officer assessing probable cause is entitled to credit one set of conflicting statements over another; and (2) even if the officer cannot, whether the law was clearly established on this point. IMLA joined a brief submitted by the SLLC at the merits stage as well.
Filed March 3, 2017 (Supreme Court Merits)
Filed December 2, 2016 (Supreme Court Petition Stage)
No. 16-605
Town of Chester, New York v. Laroe Estates, Inc.
Pro Bono Author: Sarah Shalf (2017 Amicus Service Award Recipient)
Holding: A litigant seeking to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) must meet the requirements of Article III standing if the intervenor wishes to pursue relief not requested by a plaintiff.
The original plaintiff in this case was a property developer (Sherman) who sued the Town of Chester for, among other things, an alleged regulatory taking due to the Town’s failure to approve a subdivision that Sherman planned to build on real property that he owned. Laroe Estates, Inc. (Laroe), the potential intervenor was one of two entities that held mortgages on Sherman’s property. The other entity was a bank, and it had the senior mortgage. After Sherman defaulted on his repayments, the bank foreclosed on the property and took possession following a foreclosure sale.
Laroe subsequently moved to intervene in Sherman’s suit against the Town pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Laroe argued that it was a “contract vendee” (essentially, a mortgagee) of Sherman’s real property and therefore had a sufficient equitable interest in the property to assert a taking claim against the Town. The district court disagreed. It denied Laroe’s motion to intervene.
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The panel identified the relevant question on appeal as whether “a party seeking to intervene as of right must independently have standing.” The Second Circuit noted that a circuit split exists on this issue and joined the majority of circuits in holding that standing is not a prerequisite for intervention under Rule 24.
The issue in this case was whether a party seeking to intervene as a matter of right needs independent Article III standing to do so.
IMLA submitted an amicus brief at the certiorari stage and joined a brief filed by the SLLC at the merits stage.
The Supreme Court held: (1) A litigant seeking to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) must meet the requirements of Article III standing if the intervenor wishes to pursue relief not requested by a plaintiff; and (2) the court of appeals is to address on remand the question whether Laroe Estates seeks different relief than Steven Sherman: If Laroe wants only a money judgment of its own running directly against the town of Chester, then it seeks damages different from those sought by Sherman and must establish its own Article III standing in order to intervene.
Filed January 25, 2017 (Supreme Court Merits)
No. 16-369
Los Angeles County v. Mendez
Pro Bono Authors: Daniel Collins (2017 Amicus Service Award Recipient)
Holding: The Fourth Amendment provides no basis for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s “provocation rule.”
In Mendez, a team of police officers, including Conley and Pederson, responded to a call that a wanted parolee, Ronnie O’Dell, had entered a grocery store. Per the standard parolee at large classification, O’Dell had been classified as armed and dangerous. During a debrief after not finding O’Dell in the store, a confidential informant told police a man matching O’Dell’s description was on a bike outside a residence owned by Paula Hughes. Officers were told a man and a pregnant woman lived in Hughes’s backyard. Officers proceeded to the Hughes property in order to search it as well as another house down the street. The officers did not have a warrant for their search.
While other officers searched the Hughes’s residence, Officers Pederson and Conley were assigned to clear the backyard. They searched three storage sheds and found nothing. Then they encountered a shed surrounded by an A/C unit, electrical cord, clothes locker, etc. Officer Conley opened the shed’s door and pulled back a blanket used to insulate the shed. The officers saw a silhouette of an adult male holding what looked like a gun. They yelled “gun,” and fired a number of shots, seriously injuring both individ