Papers by Sergi Kapanadze
Human Rights Documents Online
OSCE Yearbook 2015, 2016
Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common... more Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project
Executive Summary
1. Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementatio... more Executive Summary
1. Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementation of international agreements on arms control and confidence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs) in disputed territories under the effective control of de facto regimes. These grey areas have resulted in uncertainties about the capabilities and
activities of irregular and stationed forces, produced unchecked risk perceptions and aggravated sub-regional instability and insecurity.
2. At the same time, disputes over the status of de facto regimes and host nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces in disputed territories have also obstructed the development of all-European arms control mechanisms and produced spillover effects detrimental to security and stability.
3. There is no unified opinion in international law about the position of de facto regimes. In ceasefire agreements and informal talks, de facto regimes are sometimes referred to as “parties to the conflict”, with limited rights and obligations. It is an incontrovertible fact that, in the absence of international recognition, only recognized
central governments are entitled to carry out state functions in international relations
and to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations of States Parties to international agreements, such as arms control treaties and CSBMs. However, de facto regimes can
also be included in agreements if there is the political will to do so.
4. De facto regimes categorically reject central governments’ claims to implementing these rights in territories under their actual control, such as acting as the host state for observations of or collecting and distributing data on armaments, which are subject to international information exchanges or limitations and are held by
irregular forces. De facto regimes either want to exercise such rights themselves or deny that the disputed territories belong to the area of application of arms control and CSBM agreements.
5. Third states that have not recognized de facto regimes are not permitted by international law to neglect the positions of central governments seeking to implement such agreements in disputed territories, even if de facto regimes do not object to inspections on the spot. Thus, third states are not allowed to elevate their status by agreeing to procedures that would cede to their representatives' state functions, such as the rights of a “host state” (e.g. determining the points of
entry/exit, providing escort teams, signing inspection reports etc.).
6. Consequently, state-centric CSBMs can be implemented in disputed territories only if all sides involved are prepared to make compromises that value transparency and stability more highly than status-related positions. In practice, almost all attempts to bring about a compromise on mutually acceptable procedures have
failed.
7. The recognition by certain states of the independence of breakaway regions and
their claim that de facto regimes have provided “host nation consent” to the stationing
of forces in such territories have complicated the situation. By contrast, central
6 | CORE Working Paper 28
governments of internationally recognized states categorically reject this
interpretation and regard stationing in disputed territories as unlawful occupation in
violation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
8. Ceasefire agreements usually have only limited transparency and limitation
provisions, which are mainly confined to small, partially demilitarized, “security
zones” or “restricted weapon zones”. However, wider geographical areas, which are
relevant to transparency and the restraint of military capabilities and activities in the
sub-region, remain unrestricted and inaccessible. In the case of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has access only to areas controlled by
the Georgian government adjoining the two breakaway regions.
9. Against this background, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs aim at enhancing
sub-regional security in and around disputed territories and creating a peaceful and
stable environment for talks without detriment to status-related positions of
principle by parties involved and without pre-empting the outcome of conflict
settlement processes, which will ultimately define the eventual political status of
such territories.
10. To that end, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs avoid any procedures and
terms that could be interpreted as providing political status, such as references to
state functions or rights and obligations reserved for states (“inspecting”/“inspected
state”, “host state”, official titles of persons, “borders” or contested geographical
names of disputed territories, etc.).
11. Consequently, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should be formulated
beyond the existing framework of state-related international agreements. This
requires facilitation by an impartial third party that is trusted by both sides, such as a
neutral state, an international organization or a private enterprise. In such a
framework, status-bound functions and personnel would be replaced by statusneutral
functions and personnel.
12. Status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should provide for information,
observation and, as far as possible, limitation of certain military capabilities and
activities, particularly in areas close to the Lines of Contact. In such areas, reciprocity
of rights and obligations may be an indispensable condition for an agreement,
provided it can be attained without compromising government positions that reject
equality vis-à-vis breakaway regions. At the same time, both sides may see the value
of increasing trust and stability and, thus, enhancing security in a fragile political
environment without relinquishing status-related positions of principle.
13. To ensure smooth implementation, avoid misunderstandings and prevent
escalation, the establishment of an impartial coordination and conflict resolution
mechanism is advisable. It can be linked to existing informal formats geared to
enhancing the implementation of ceasefire agreements or other relevant mechanisms
to prevent and respond to incidents.
14. This paper discusses the limitations of existing international arms control and
CSBM agreements and outlines, in considerable detail, a status-neutral approach
towards increasing security and stability in and around disputed territories. An
illustrative example of how such an approach could be modelled is given in the
annex.
The role of socialisation and conditionality instruments in the process of Europe-anisation and t... more The role of socialisation and conditionality instruments in the process of Europe-anisation and the EU's use of these instruments in its enlargement policy towards Eastern neighbours have been widely discussed in European integration literature. However, few studies have dealt with the differentiated impact of these two instruments on the internal European integration coordination structures in Eastern neighbours. The proposed paper aims to evaluate the impact of the use of socialisa-tion and / or conditionality-based instruments by the EU towards its Eastern neighbours on the formation and transformation of European integration coordination structures. The paper looks at European integration coordination structures of CEEC countries in a comparative case study, to examine how the EU's use of condi-tionality and socialisation instruments generates different responses with regard to the formation and transformation of European integration coordination structures. We argue that conditionality stimulates the formation and transformation of coordinating structures in Eastern neighbours, while socialisation-based instruments do not prompt such a response.
Interim Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Comm... more Interim Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project
Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common... more Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project
This article discusses how trade between Turkey and Abkhazia increased recently,
to the detriment... more This article discusses how trade between Turkey and Abkhazia increased recently,
to the detriment of trust between Georgia and Turkey. As Turkish vessels continue
violating Georgia’s territorial integrity, Tbilisi has no appetite for seeing Turkey
play a stronger role in conflict resolution and confidence building in Abkhazia.
Georgia, angered with the blatant violation of its restrictive legal regime over trade
with Abkhazia, started capturing Turkish vessels in 2010. This situation increased
the interest of Turkish politicians, and led to negotiations between Ankara and
Tbilisi over the modalities of trade between Turkish and Abkhaz ports. While no
agreement was reached in 2010, the author believes that an agreement is still
within reach if both sides have sufficient political will and creativity.
This paper analyses the various economic, political, and military pressure points that Russia can... more This paper analyses the various economic, political, and military pressure points that Russia can target. Georgia has decreased its dependency on Moscow substantially since its last dramatic conflict with Moscow in 2007. However, this memo argues that Russia still has the means to influence Georgia’s foreign policy choices by attacking strategic bilateral
vulnerabilities that include wine exports, remittances, investment, winter oil supplies, domestic divisions, and the occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While few of the pressure points that Russia can push are lethal in and of themselves, their cumulative impact could have a profound effect on Georgia’s domestic political stability and economic viability. All the more worrisome after the Crimean annexation is Moscow’s substantial sway in Georgia’s occupied regions, which provides the Kremlin with great destabilising potential. Therefore, the Georgian government’s confidence that it is better able to withstand Russian pressure than Ukraine is misguided and deeply dangerous.
The role of socialization and conditionality instruments in the process of Europeanization and EU... more The role of socialization and conditionality instruments in the process of Europeanization and EU's use of these instruments in its enlargement policy towards Eastern neighbors have been widely discussed in the European integration literature. However, few studies have dealt with the differentiated impact of these two instruments on the internal European integration coordination structures in Eastern Neighbors. The proposed paper aims at evaluating the impact of the use of socialization and/or conditionality-based instruments by the EU towards its Eastern neighbors on the formation and transformation of European integration coordination structures. The paper observes European integration coordination structures of CEEC countries in a comparative case study to examine how EU's use of conditionality and socialization instruments generates different responses with regards to formation and transformation of European integration coordination structures. We argue that conditionality stimulates formation and transformation of coordinating structures in Eastern neighbors, while socialization based instruments do not prompt such response.
Students' Best Papers Meilleurs travaux d'étudiants, Jan 1, 2006
... When the first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted in 1992 and the war started out in Abk... more ... When the first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted in 1992 and the war started out in Abkhazia, Abashidze closed bor-ders with the rest of Georgia under the pretext of preventing the conflict from spilling over to Adjara. ...
EuroJournal. org-Journal of Foreign Policy of Moldova, Jan 1, 2004
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Papers by Sergi Kapanadze
1. Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementation of international agreements on arms control and confidence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs) in disputed territories under the effective control of de facto regimes. These grey areas have resulted in uncertainties about the capabilities and
activities of irregular and stationed forces, produced unchecked risk perceptions and aggravated sub-regional instability and insecurity.
2. At the same time, disputes over the status of de facto regimes and host nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces in disputed territories have also obstructed the development of all-European arms control mechanisms and produced spillover effects detrimental to security and stability.
3. There is no unified opinion in international law about the position of de facto regimes. In ceasefire agreements and informal talks, de facto regimes are sometimes referred to as “parties to the conflict”, with limited rights and obligations. It is an incontrovertible fact that, in the absence of international recognition, only recognized
central governments are entitled to carry out state functions in international relations
and to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations of States Parties to international agreements, such as arms control treaties and CSBMs. However, de facto regimes can
also be included in agreements if there is the political will to do so.
4. De facto regimes categorically reject central governments’ claims to implementing these rights in territories under their actual control, such as acting as the host state for observations of or collecting and distributing data on armaments, which are subject to international information exchanges or limitations and are held by
irregular forces. De facto regimes either want to exercise such rights themselves or deny that the disputed territories belong to the area of application of arms control and CSBM agreements.
5. Third states that have not recognized de facto regimes are not permitted by international law to neglect the positions of central governments seeking to implement such agreements in disputed territories, even if de facto regimes do not object to inspections on the spot. Thus, third states are not allowed to elevate their status by agreeing to procedures that would cede to their representatives' state functions, such as the rights of a “host state” (e.g. determining the points of
entry/exit, providing escort teams, signing inspection reports etc.).
6. Consequently, state-centric CSBMs can be implemented in disputed territories only if all sides involved are prepared to make compromises that value transparency and stability more highly than status-related positions. In practice, almost all attempts to bring about a compromise on mutually acceptable procedures have
failed.
7. The recognition by certain states of the independence of breakaway regions and
their claim that de facto regimes have provided “host nation consent” to the stationing
of forces in such territories have complicated the situation. By contrast, central
6 | CORE Working Paper 28
governments of internationally recognized states categorically reject this
interpretation and regard stationing in disputed territories as unlawful occupation in
violation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
8. Ceasefire agreements usually have only limited transparency and limitation
provisions, which are mainly confined to small, partially demilitarized, “security
zones” or “restricted weapon zones”. However, wider geographical areas, which are
relevant to transparency and the restraint of military capabilities and activities in the
sub-region, remain unrestricted and inaccessible. In the case of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has access only to areas controlled by
the Georgian government adjoining the two breakaway regions.
9. Against this background, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs aim at enhancing
sub-regional security in and around disputed territories and creating a peaceful and
stable environment for talks without detriment to status-related positions of
principle by parties involved and without pre-empting the outcome of conflict
settlement processes, which will ultimately define the eventual political status of
such territories.
10. To that end, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs avoid any procedures and
terms that could be interpreted as providing political status, such as references to
state functions or rights and obligations reserved for states (“inspecting”/“inspected
state”, “host state”, official titles of persons, “borders” or contested geographical
names of disputed territories, etc.).
11. Consequently, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should be formulated
beyond the existing framework of state-related international agreements. This
requires facilitation by an impartial third party that is trusted by both sides, such as a
neutral state, an international organization or a private enterprise. In such a
framework, status-bound functions and personnel would be replaced by statusneutral
functions and personnel.
12. Status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should provide for information,
observation and, as far as possible, limitation of certain military capabilities and
activities, particularly in areas close to the Lines of Contact. In such areas, reciprocity
of rights and obligations may be an indispensable condition for an agreement,
provided it can be attained without compromising government positions that reject
equality vis-à-vis breakaway regions. At the same time, both sides may see the value
of increasing trust and stability and, thus, enhancing security in a fragile political
environment without relinquishing status-related positions of principle.
13. To ensure smooth implementation, avoid misunderstandings and prevent
escalation, the establishment of an impartial coordination and conflict resolution
mechanism is advisable. It can be linked to existing informal formats geared to
enhancing the implementation of ceasefire agreements or other relevant mechanisms
to prevent and respond to incidents.
14. This paper discusses the limitations of existing international arms control and
CSBM agreements and outlines, in considerable detail, a status-neutral approach
towards increasing security and stability in and around disputed territories. An
illustrative example of how such an approach could be modelled is given in the
annex.
to the detriment of trust between Georgia and Turkey. As Turkish vessels continue
violating Georgia’s territorial integrity, Tbilisi has no appetite for seeing Turkey
play a stronger role in conflict resolution and confidence building in Abkhazia.
Georgia, angered with the blatant violation of its restrictive legal regime over trade
with Abkhazia, started capturing Turkish vessels in 2010. This situation increased
the interest of Turkish politicians, and led to negotiations between Ankara and
Tbilisi over the modalities of trade between Turkish and Abkhaz ports. While no
agreement was reached in 2010, the author believes that an agreement is still
within reach if both sides have sufficient political will and creativity.
vulnerabilities that include wine exports, remittances, investment, winter oil supplies, domestic divisions, and the occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While few of the pressure points that Russia can push are lethal in and of themselves, their cumulative impact could have a profound effect on Georgia’s domestic political stability and economic viability. All the more worrisome after the Crimean annexation is Moscow’s substantial sway in Georgia’s occupied regions, which provides the Kremlin with great destabilising potential. Therefore, the Georgian government’s confidence that it is better able to withstand Russian pressure than Ukraine is misguided and deeply dangerous.
1. Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementation of international agreements on arms control and confidence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs) in disputed territories under the effective control of de facto regimes. These grey areas have resulted in uncertainties about the capabilities and
activities of irregular and stationed forces, produced unchecked risk perceptions and aggravated sub-regional instability and insecurity.
2. At the same time, disputes over the status of de facto regimes and host nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces in disputed territories have also obstructed the development of all-European arms control mechanisms and produced spillover effects detrimental to security and stability.
3. There is no unified opinion in international law about the position of de facto regimes. In ceasefire agreements and informal talks, de facto regimes are sometimes referred to as “parties to the conflict”, with limited rights and obligations. It is an incontrovertible fact that, in the absence of international recognition, only recognized
central governments are entitled to carry out state functions in international relations
and to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations of States Parties to international agreements, such as arms control treaties and CSBMs. However, de facto regimes can
also be included in agreements if there is the political will to do so.
4. De facto regimes categorically reject central governments’ claims to implementing these rights in territories under their actual control, such as acting as the host state for observations of or collecting and distributing data on armaments, which are subject to international information exchanges or limitations and are held by
irregular forces. De facto regimes either want to exercise such rights themselves or deny that the disputed territories belong to the area of application of arms control and CSBM agreements.
5. Third states that have not recognized de facto regimes are not permitted by international law to neglect the positions of central governments seeking to implement such agreements in disputed territories, even if de facto regimes do not object to inspections on the spot. Thus, third states are not allowed to elevate their status by agreeing to procedures that would cede to their representatives' state functions, such as the rights of a “host state” (e.g. determining the points of
entry/exit, providing escort teams, signing inspection reports etc.).
6. Consequently, state-centric CSBMs can be implemented in disputed territories only if all sides involved are prepared to make compromises that value transparency and stability more highly than status-related positions. In practice, almost all attempts to bring about a compromise on mutually acceptable procedures have
failed.
7. The recognition by certain states of the independence of breakaway regions and
their claim that de facto regimes have provided “host nation consent” to the stationing
of forces in such territories have complicated the situation. By contrast, central
6 | CORE Working Paper 28
governments of internationally recognized states categorically reject this
interpretation and regard stationing in disputed territories as unlawful occupation in
violation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
8. Ceasefire agreements usually have only limited transparency and limitation
provisions, which are mainly confined to small, partially demilitarized, “security
zones” or “restricted weapon zones”. However, wider geographical areas, which are
relevant to transparency and the restraint of military capabilities and activities in the
sub-region, remain unrestricted and inaccessible. In the case of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has access only to areas controlled by
the Georgian government adjoining the two breakaway regions.
9. Against this background, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs aim at enhancing
sub-regional security in and around disputed territories and creating a peaceful and
stable environment for talks without detriment to status-related positions of
principle by parties involved and without pre-empting the outcome of conflict
settlement processes, which will ultimately define the eventual political status of
such territories.
10. To that end, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs avoid any procedures and
terms that could be interpreted as providing political status, such as references to
state functions or rights and obligations reserved for states (“inspecting”/“inspected
state”, “host state”, official titles of persons, “borders” or contested geographical
names of disputed territories, etc.).
11. Consequently, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should be formulated
beyond the existing framework of state-related international agreements. This
requires facilitation by an impartial third party that is trusted by both sides, such as a
neutral state, an international organization or a private enterprise. In such a
framework, status-bound functions and personnel would be replaced by statusneutral
functions and personnel.
12. Status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should provide for information,
observation and, as far as possible, limitation of certain military capabilities and
activities, particularly in areas close to the Lines of Contact. In such areas, reciprocity
of rights and obligations may be an indispensable condition for an agreement,
provided it can be attained without compromising government positions that reject
equality vis-à-vis breakaway regions. At the same time, both sides may see the value
of increasing trust and stability and, thus, enhancing security in a fragile political
environment without relinquishing status-related positions of principle.
13. To ensure smooth implementation, avoid misunderstandings and prevent
escalation, the establishment of an impartial coordination and conflict resolution
mechanism is advisable. It can be linked to existing informal formats geared to
enhancing the implementation of ceasefire agreements or other relevant mechanisms
to prevent and respond to incidents.
14. This paper discusses the limitations of existing international arms control and
CSBM agreements and outlines, in considerable detail, a status-neutral approach
towards increasing security and stability in and around disputed territories. An
illustrative example of how such an approach could be modelled is given in the
annex.
to the detriment of trust between Georgia and Turkey. As Turkish vessels continue
violating Georgia’s territorial integrity, Tbilisi has no appetite for seeing Turkey
play a stronger role in conflict resolution and confidence building in Abkhazia.
Georgia, angered with the blatant violation of its restrictive legal regime over trade
with Abkhazia, started capturing Turkish vessels in 2010. This situation increased
the interest of Turkish politicians, and led to negotiations between Ankara and
Tbilisi over the modalities of trade between Turkish and Abkhaz ports. While no
agreement was reached in 2010, the author believes that an agreement is still
within reach if both sides have sufficient political will and creativity.
vulnerabilities that include wine exports, remittances, investment, winter oil supplies, domestic divisions, and the occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While few of the pressure points that Russia can push are lethal in and of themselves, their cumulative impact could have a profound effect on Georgia’s domestic political stability and economic viability. All the more worrisome after the Crimean annexation is Moscow’s substantial sway in Georgia’s occupied regions, which provides the Kremlin with great destabilising potential. Therefore, the Georgian government’s confidence that it is better able to withstand Russian pressure than Ukraine is misguided and deeply dangerous.