Papers by Shailendra Mehta
The Law of One Price and a Theory of the Firm
The Rand Journal of Economics, 1998
I use a hierarchical perspective to explain the pattern of interindustry wages and capital intens... more I use a hierarchical perspective to explain the pattern of interindustry wages and capital intensities. Industries that have more productive technologies pay more than less-productive ones, and are more capital intensive as well. Results on size of the hierarchy, effort levels, and span of control are presented as well. The key insight is that supervisors both monitor and coordinate their subordinates, and time spent on one of these activities reduces the time available for the other. Several stylized facts are explained thereby.
Why is Harvard #1? Governance and the Dominance of US Universities
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Preparation for Entrepreneurship
The Journal of Private Equity, 2006
Using Agent-Based Simulation to Evaluate Technology and Concepts for the National Airspace System
2006 IEEE Aerospace Conference, 2006
... Shailendra Mehta ac, Liviu Nedelescu b, Michael Nolan ac, Kyle Krull c, Jim Whitford c, Mike ... more ... Shailendra Mehta ac, Liviu Nedelescu b, Michael Nolan ac, Kyle Krull c, Jim Whitford c, Mike Pfleiderer b, Cheemun Foong c aPurdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907 b Lockheed Martin ,9231 Corporate Boulevard, Rockville, MD 20850 301-640-2159 cSimulex, 3000 Kent ...
The Law of One Price and a Theory of the Firm: A Ricardian Perspective on Interindustry Wages
The RAND Journal of Economics, 1998
Managing Inventory Over a Short Season: Models with Two Procurement Opportunities
M&som-manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2009
Abstract Motivated by many recent applications reported in the literature, we examine the impact ... more Abstract Motivated by many recent applications reported in the literature, we examine the impact of a second procurement opportunity on inventory management of products with short selling seasons. In our framework, the first order is placed at the start of the ...
Privacy and pricing personal information
European Journal of Operational Research, 2008
Abstract The issues we address here are – How,should,a firm (e.g. Internet service provider,(ISP)... more Abstract The issues we address here are – How,should,a firm (e.g. Internet service provider,(ISP)) that is capable of collecting personal information (browsing information, purchase history, etc.) about consumers, price its service, given that consum- ers vary in their valuation for privacy, and also vary in terms of the value of their personal information to a third party (firms that need
This paper seeks to address the sharp increase in public debate about privacy issues, particularl... more This paper seeks to address the sharp increase in public debate about privacy issues, particularly on the issues of Internet privacy and the value of personal information. The research questions we are addressing here are -How should an Internet Service Provider (ISP) price its service given that the consumers vary in their valuation for privacy and also vary in terms of the value of their personal information to a third party? Should the ISP have a blanket policy of never collecting, or a policy of always collecting and revealing information? We calculate the separating and pooling strategies for the ISP under asymmetric information and compare them with the full information benchmarks. We find that in some cases the ISP may be no worse off than in the full information case while in other cases it may have to restrict the set of contracts so that they are incentive compatible and individually rational.
In this paper we create an experimental 'information market' where consumers can trade in potenti... more In this paper we create an experimental 'information market' where consumers can trade in potentially useful personal information. We study how a market where trade in information takes place compares experimentally with a market where there is no trade in information. We test the impact of trading in information and the impact of stricter privacy laws on consumers and sellers, and also the impact from a social perspective. Total surplus was found to be significantly higher in a higher privacy regime than in a lower privacy regime. Although our theoretical predictions showed that sellers would be better off in a higher privacy regime, the results from the experiment did not support it significantly. Consumers were found to be better off in the higher privacy regime although, the theoretical results made no such predictions. There was partial support for the efficiency being higher in a higher privacy regime.
Uploads
Papers by Shailendra Mehta