Papers by Marcin Podbielski
Forum Philosophicum, 1970
<jats:p>Russian Philosophy has long been studied and admired in countries of what may broad... more <jats:p>Russian Philosophy has long been studied and admired in countries of what may broadly be termed the West. Translations into English, German, or French, of authors like Semyon Frank, Nikolai Berdayev, and Vladimir Solovyov, and of writers like Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Mikhail Bulgakov, are readily available these days. It is only natural that the works of these figures should have attracted the interest of Christian thinkers, who are able to see in them an excellent example of reflection being not only inspired by faith but also applied to areas rarely at the focal point of theology—such as, for instance, proposals for organizing societies on the basis of personal ties, as advocated by Frank. Moreover, thinkers who have grown up in a Christian environment may find in their texts an important example of how faith can serve as an inspirational source of ideas that carry a significant appeal for non-believers, too. In this issue of Forum Philosophicum, we offer our readers some papers in which ideas of this kind, such as the kenotic theory of freedom of Berdayev, are discussed by scholars, and various influences in Russian philosophy are traced back to their antecedent influences.</jats:p>
Forum Philosophicum, Jan 5, 2014
<jats:p>Russian Philosophy has long been studied and admired in countries of what may broad... more <jats:p>Russian Philosophy has long been studied and admired in countries of what may broadly be termed the West. Translations into English, German, or French, of authors like Semyon Frank, Nikolai Berdayev, and Vladimir Solovyov, and of writers like Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Mikhail Bulgakov, are readily available these days. It is only natural that the works of these figures should have attracted the interest of Christian thinkers, who are able to see in them an excellent example of reflection being not only inspired by faith but also applied to areas rarely at the focal point of theology—such as, for instance, proposals for organizing societies on the basis of personal ties, as advocated by Frank. Moreover, thinkers who have grown up in a Christian environment may find in their texts an important example of how faith can serve as an inspirational source of ideas that carry a significant appeal for non-believers, too. In this issue of Forum Philosophicum, we offer our readers some papers in which ideas of this kind, such as the kenotic theory of freedom of Berdayev, are discussed by scholars, and various influences in Russian philosophy are traced back to their antecedent influences.</jats:p>
International journal of the Platonic tradition, Mar 17, 2009
Forum Philosophicum, 2013
Russian Philosophy has long been studied and admired in countries of what may broadly be termed t... more Russian Philosophy has long been studied and admired in countries of what may broadly be termed the West. Translations into English, German, or French, of authors like Semyon Frank, Nikolai Berdayev, and Vladimir Solovyov, and of writers like Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Mikhail Bulgakov, are readily available these days. It is only natural that the works of these figures should have aracted the interest of Christian thinkers, who are able to see in them an excellent example of reflection being not only inspired by faith but also applied to areas rarely at the focal point of theology-such as, for instance, proposals for organizing societies on the basis of personal ties, as advocated by Frank. Moreover, thinkers who have grown up in a Christian environment may find in their texts an important example of how faith can serve as an inspirational source of ideas that carry a significant appeal for non-believers, too. In this issue of Forum Philosophicum, we offer our readers some papers in which ideas of this kind, such as the kenotic theory of freedom of Berdayev, are discussed by scholars, and various influences in Russian philosophy are traced back to their antecedent influences. Still, our main reason for devoting an entire issue of Forum Philosophicum to Russian philosophy has come from a quite different direction. We wanted to give contemporary Russian authors an opportunity to express their views in a way that, when placed alongside the above, would help to reflect the distinctive characteristics of their approach to philosophy. In so doing, we were seizing the opportunity to respond to the concerns voiced by our Russian colleagues during a conference previously held in Cracow at Ignatianum on the 27ᵗʰ and 28ᵗʰ of June, 2013, entitled "e Reception of Russian ought in Europe. " Russian scholars gathered at this event were frequently heard complaining about their not having been properly understood in the West. Moreover, they were not just claiming that West
International Journal of the Platonic Tradition, 2009
The study of Maximus the Confessor’s thought has flourished in recent years: annual international... more The study of Maximus the Confessor’s thought has flourished in recent years: annual international conferences, publications and articles, new critical editions and translations mark a torrent of interest in the work and influence of the most sublime of the Byzantine Fathers. It has been repeatedly stated that the Confessor’s thought is of eminently philosophical interest, and his work has been approached from a philosophical point of view in a number of monographs. However, no dedicated collective scholarly engagement with Maximus the Confessor as a Philosopher has taken place – and this volume will attempt to start such a discussion. Apart from Maximus’ relevance and importance for philosophy in general, a second question arises: should towering figures of Byzantine philosophy like Maximus the Confessor be included in an overview of the European continent’s history of philosophy, or rather excluded from it – as happens today with most histories of European philosophy? Maximus’ historical presence challenges our understanding of what European philosophy is. In this volume, we begin to address these issues and to examine numerous aspects of Maximus’ philosophical ‘system’: the logoi doctrine, Maximus’ anthropology and the human will’s freedom, the theory of motion, his understanding of time and space etc. – thereby also stressing the interdisciplinary character of Maximian studies.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2021
ABSTRACT In this article, the issue of corporeal reality in Evagrius is discussed in abstraction ... more ABSTRACT In this article, the issue of corporeal reality in Evagrius is discussed in abstraction – to the extent that this is possible – from its soteriological purpose. An analysis of Evagrius’ statements about corporeal reality reveals a world that cannot be known in itself, but which is established through a hierarchy of qualifications. Evagrius’ account of the elements and their features, of the relationship of qualities to matter, and of the process in which the intellect apprehends bodies, appears to be deeply indebted to the Stoic account of bodily reality. Evagrius differs, however, in that the corporeal reality he describes is inherently unknowable and lifeless. As he develops Stoic intuitions about the commanding faculty into a vision of an intellect holding within itself a model of its bearer’s body, and as he moves the logoi of judgement and providence outside of corporeal reality, the latter turns into a desert from which life and rationality are absent. An intellect, as a soul, is only liminally present in corporeal reality. Focused on itself, it becomes a subjectivity that only interacts with the external bodily world through a model of the latter that it constructs within the boundaries of the soul itself.
Forum Philosophicum, 2014
This paper offers a comprehensive examination of the language of "prosōpon" in Maximus the Confes... more This paper offers a comprehensive examination of the language of "prosōpon" in Maximus the Confessor. It emerges that "prosōpon" almost never has an autonomous meaning in Maximus' Christology and anthropology. While "person" is either a synonym for "hypostasis" or a term expressing heretical Christological doctrines, it may be used in its own right when Maximus emphasizes the fact that human actions make each of us recognizable as a unique individual. This usage cannot be separated from the colloquial meanings of "face" and "character, " or from instances of "prosōpon" in Maximian Biblical exegesis. "The face of the intellect, " identified with "the face of Christ" within us and reflected in our actions as "the face of the soul, " is the perfect image of the eternal Divine logoi of virtues, impressed by grace in the intellect of saints and reflected in their actions. Possessing one's own "persona" or "face, " and building one's uniqueness through one's own decisions, is of less interest to Maximus than assimilation of oneself to Christ. Keywords Byzantine philosophy; hypostasis; Maximus the Confessor; person 1. "[I]l n'est pas méthodologiquement correct de vouloir juger de l'usage ancien à partir de l'usage actuel,"
Analogia, 2020
This essay grows from a sense of bewilderment: A Catholic who encounters Orthodoxy starts wonderi... more This essay grows from a sense of bewilderment: A Catholic who encounters Orthodoxy starts wondering why there seems to be almost no room in contemporary Catholic spirituality for silence and isolation. Reliving two experiences, those of Mount Athos and Mount Jamna—the latter apparently a failed attempt by a Dominican monk to create a Catholic mount of solitude—I try to understand them from the per- spective of an ordinary believer who happens to be familiar with philosophical language. Comparing the experience of silence at Athos, described in terms of an absence of Heideggerian dwelling, and Pascal’s divertissement, with the much more ordinary life going on at Jamna, I seek to present them both using a theoretical scheme drawn from Plato that opposes participation, icons, and idols. Viewed through the incomplete metaphor that this scheme provides, Athos and Jamna emerge as two different realizations of an icon given to us by Christ himself, as human instruments, which we create to point to true partici- pation in the Divine presence of the New Jerusalem. Though imperfect, they are still true icons because they lead to true sacramental participation while anticipating the transformative , the view from the Mount which alters the one who has attained it. While similar in this respect, the two icons also differ deeply: whereas the Catholic experience tries to bring everyone into participation in the life of the New Jerusalem, the Orthodox Athos, in its silent uniqueness, testifies to a unique and ineffable transcendence.
Papers presented at the Eighteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2019, edited by Sotiris Mitralexis, Volume 18, Individuality, Knowledge, Virtue and Existence in Maximus the Confessor, 2021
The consistency of the work of Maximus the Confessor is examined in this article through a double... more The consistency of the work of Maximus the Confessor is examined in this article through a double focus. On the one hand, various proposals elaborated by Maximian commentators will be treated as constructed on the basis of a principle of ‘deep consist- ency’, the assumption being that every piece of Maximian work is consistent with all other claims that he put forward. The result of that approach is that various mutually inconsistent commentaries have emerged, and while Maximus is credited by such com- mentators with having adopted complex philosophical stances, the Maximian commen- taries themselves turn out to still be open to interpretation. At the same time, Maximus’ work is rarely scrutinized as regards the internal consistency (or inconsistency) of its arguments, and an analysis of this kind, focused on the crucial passage of Ambiguum 10.89-90 (Chapter 37), reveals a twofold set of inconsistencies that show up in the course of just two paragraphs; the inner logic of the argument, identified as Stoic in origin, does not match the logic of the conclusion. In spite of this, Maximus’ argument works as a whole, since his aim was to bring an idea to light, and render it fully open to view, rather than seeking to prove a philosophical claim. The conclusions of this analysis are considered in the final section of the article, placing them in the larger context furnished by the multiplicity of Maximian sources of inspiration. Maximus’ works emerge as instantiating a form of poly-consistency consisting of multiple voices, through which a theological vision of reality emulating the divine point of view is put forward. As long as this vision, expressed through a multiplicity of voices, is not subjected to a synthetic philosophical reading, his work can be viewed as advancing a message of hope, to the effect that we may one day be presented with an account of the created world that amounts to a truly explanatory theory without eliminating the divine perspective, and which shows all reality as pointing to God.
Russian Philosophy has long been studied and admired in countries of what may broadly be termed t... more Russian Philosophy has long been studied and admired in countries of what may broadly be termed the West. Translations into English, German, or French, of authors like Semyon Frank, Nikolai Berdayev, and Vladimir Solovyov, and of writers like Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Mikhail Bulgakov, are readily available these days. It is only natural that the works of these figures should have aracted the interest of Christian thinkers, who are able to see in them an excellent example of reflection being not only inspired by faith but also applied to areas rarely at the focal point of theology—such as, for instance, proposals for organizing societies on the basis of personal ties, as advocated by Frank. Moreover, thinkers who have grown up in a Christian environment may find in their texts an important example of how faith can serve as an inspirational source of ideas that carry a significant appeal for non-believers, too. In this issue of Forum Philosophicum, we offer our readers some papers in w...
For Socrates of the Republic, true philosophers are those whose souls are philosophical by nature... more For Socrates of the Republic, true philosophers are those whose souls are philosophical by nature. This is also the case of each profession. As he claims, the principle of Division of Labor is established as a strict observance of nature. Every one is born (370a, 374b) for an occupation and this is for Plato’s Socrates identical to possessing a specific nature (370b). Thus, he merely turns a rule of beauty (370c3–5) into a law (456b–c).
Roczniki Humanistyczne, 2003
The article discusses a definition of catharsis which is seldom passed over by scholars dealing ... more The article discusses a definition of catharsis which is seldom passed over by scholars dealing with various aspects of pollution and purification in ancient Greek culture and philosophy (the Sophist 226 d 5-10).
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2021
In this article, the issue of corporeal reality in Evagrius is discussed in abstraction – to the ... more In this article, the issue of corporeal reality in Evagrius is discussed in abstraction – to the extent that this is possible – from its soteriological purpose. An analysis of Evagrius’ statements about corporeal reality reveals a world that cannot be known in itself, but which is established through a hierarchy of qualifications. Evagrius’ account of the elements and their features, of the relationship of qualities to matter, and of the process in which the intellect apprehends bodies, appears to be deeply indebted to the Stoic account of bodily reality. Evagrius differs, however, in that the corporeal reality he describes is inherently unknowable and lifeless. As he develops Stoic intuitions about the commanding faculty into a vision of an intellect holding within itself a model of its bearer’s body, and as he moves the logoi of judgement and providence outside of corporeal reality, the latter turns into a desert from which life and rationality are absent. An intellect, as a soul, is only liminally present in corporeal reality. Focused on itself, it becomes a subjectivity that only interacts with the external bodily world through a model of the latter that it constructs within the boundaries of the soul itself.
Studia Patristica, 2017
This article reconstructs the philosophical picture of hypostatical being that is presupposed in ... more This article reconstructs the philosophical picture of hypostatical being that is presupposed in Maximus the Confessor’s Christological commentary in Ambigua ad Thomam. In this picture, hypostasis emerges as an independent reality that is a bearer of natures and the ultimate source of their actuality. The latter involves self-movement, and the
reaching of a definite realisation of a hypostasis’ nature through this movement. This picture is scrutinised in respect of both its consistency and its possible philosophical implications with respect to the notion that hypostasis is a mode of being. The latter implications are rejected, as being impossible to justify consistently with reference to Maximus’ text. In consequence, a reading of the expression tropos tou pōs einai is
proposed, which does not involve elucidating it as referring to a modality, but emphasises the uniqueness of the way in which Christ exists. It thus becomes apparent that what Maximus offers us is a pre-theoretical picture, even if it uses some philosophical vocabulary and has some Aristotelian inspirations. While it is not inconsistent, any theological commentary on this picture should itself also aim at completeness and consistency. Even though paradoxes are an integral part of theological discussions, their description, conducted in ordinary human language, cannot avoid philosophical presuppositions, and requires consistency and clarity, even from the point of view of the need to do justice to the paradoxes that theologians seek to verbalise.
Roczniki Humanistyczne, 2003
contains a definition of catharsis which is seldom passed over by scholars dealing with various a... more contains a definition of catharsis which is seldom passed over by scholars dealing with various aspects of pollution and purification in ancient Greek culture and philosophy. Some of the scholars no more than just mention it, 1 others treat it as one of important passages, 2 and there are some who regard it as the essential passage for understanding the Platonic idea of purification, as well as the Aristotelian concept of catharsis in tragedy. 3 The definition itself is very simple despite the fact that Plato divided it between two utterances of the Stranger. It says that each separation which leaves what is better and rejects what is worse is called καθαρµ ς (Soph. 226 d 5-10
Forum Philosophicum, 2014
This paper offers a comprehensive examination of the language of "prosōpon" in Maximus the Confes... more This paper offers a comprehensive examination of the language of "prosōpon" in Maximus the Confessor. It emerges that "prosōpon" almost never has an autonomous meaning in Maximus' Christology and anthropology. While "person" is either a synonym for "hypostasis" or a term expressing heretical Christological doctrines, it may be used in its own right when Maximus emphasizes the fact that human actions make each of us recognizable as a unique individual. This usage cannot be separated from the colloquial meanings of "face" and "character, " or from instances of "prosōpon" in Maximian Biblical exegesis. "The face of the intellect, " identified with "the face of Christ" within us and reflected in our actions as "the face of the soul, " is the perfect image of the eternal Divine logoi of virtues, impressed by grace in the intellect of saints and reflected in their actions. Possessing one's own "persona" or "face, " and building one's uniqueness through one's own decisions, is of less interest to Maximus than assimilation of oneself to Christ.
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Papers by Marcin Podbielski
reaching of a definite realisation of a hypostasis’ nature through this movement. This picture is scrutinised in respect of both its consistency and its possible philosophical implications with respect to the notion that hypostasis is a mode of being. The latter implications are rejected, as being impossible to justify consistently with reference to Maximus’ text. In consequence, a reading of the expression tropos tou pōs einai is
proposed, which does not involve elucidating it as referring to a modality, but emphasises the uniqueness of the way in which Christ exists. It thus becomes apparent that what Maximus offers us is a pre-theoretical picture, even if it uses some philosophical vocabulary and has some Aristotelian inspirations. While it is not inconsistent, any theological commentary on this picture should itself also aim at completeness and consistency. Even though paradoxes are an integral part of theological discussions, their description, conducted in ordinary human language, cannot avoid philosophical presuppositions, and requires consistency and clarity, even from the point of view of the need to do justice to the paradoxes that theologians seek to verbalise.
reaching of a definite realisation of a hypostasis’ nature through this movement. This picture is scrutinised in respect of both its consistency and its possible philosophical implications with respect to the notion that hypostasis is a mode of being. The latter implications are rejected, as being impossible to justify consistently with reference to Maximus’ text. In consequence, a reading of the expression tropos tou pōs einai is
proposed, which does not involve elucidating it as referring to a modality, but emphasises the uniqueness of the way in which Christ exists. It thus becomes apparent that what Maximus offers us is a pre-theoretical picture, even if it uses some philosophical vocabulary and has some Aristotelian inspirations. While it is not inconsistent, any theological commentary on this picture should itself also aim at completeness and consistency. Even though paradoxes are an integral part of theological discussions, their description, conducted in ordinary human language, cannot avoid philosophical presuppositions, and requires consistency and clarity, even from the point of view of the need to do justice to the paradoxes that theologians seek to verbalise.