Books by Matthew Nini
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3AnzypX2sU
(If you are having difficulty obtaining a copy of Fi... more https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3AnzypX2sU
(If you are having difficulty obtaining a copy of Fichte in Berlin, do not hesitate to contact me)
When the celebrated German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte lost his position at the University of Jena and moved to Berlin, it looked as if his career was over. In 1799 Berlin had no university, and Fichte was consigned to lecturing in his home.
In Fichte in Berlin Matthew Nini breaks with scholarly consensus, arguing it was there that Fichte finally reached maturity, and the only way to understand Fichte’s mature philosophy is to perform it for oneself. The book focuses on the philosopher’s 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre - an untranslatable neologism for his theories on the pursuit of insight - claiming that they are one of the most exemplary versions of the philosophical project that Fichte reconfigured some seventeen times throughout his life. While the 1804 lectures offer a more robust approach, they remain faithful to the insight at the heart of the original philosophy. Fichte’s work always emphasized the practical over the theoretical, and his 1804 work goes even further: to think with Fichte is to bring one’s own philosophy to life. Nini guides the reader step by step through the complex arguments Fichte made in 1804 and goes on to examine some of his other works produced in their wake, arguing that Fichte’s output from 1804 to 1806, his first Berlin period, forms an organic whole.
Fichte in Berlin is not only an introduction to Fichte’s later philosophy, but also an original philosophical work that makes a unique contribution to the study of German Idealism.
Published Papers by Matthew Nini
Acta Iadertina, 2024
Schellingova ključna rasprava Spis o slobodi (Filozofska istraživanja o biti ljudske slobode i pr... more Schellingova ključna rasprava Spis o slobodi (Filozofska istraživanja o biti ljudske slobode i predmetima koji su s tim u vezi) iz 1809. godi- ne odgovor je na percipirane optužbe za panteizam te je stoga i prilika za Schellinga da preispita vlastiti monizam ili „„nauk o svejedinstvu“ (All-Einheitslehre). U pokušaju da kreativno reinterpretira pantei- stički trop iskazan izrazom „Bog je sve stvari“, Schelling će početne stranice svoje rasprave O biti ljudske slobode posvetiti ponovnomu či- tanju načela identiteta. Ovaj rad nastoji razjasniti razvoj Schellingove teorije identiteta, obraćajući posebnu pozornost na njezine najstarije izvore, posebice Platonovu teoriju o „duši svijeta“, Kantovu teleologiju i logiku Gottfrieda Ploucqueta. Tvrdit ćemo da Schelling daje jednaku važnost teoriji identiteta i revidiranoj verziji načela dovoljnoga razlo- ga koju ćemo nazvati „načelom temelja“ (Grund). To će dovesti do ključne distinkcije u raspravi o ljudskoj slobodi iz 1809. godine, tj. do ideje da Bog ima temelj koji je u njemu, ali koji valja razlikovati od njega utoliko što postoji. Stoga reći „Bog je sve stvari“ opis je načina na koji dijelovi i cjeline međusobno djeluju u organskome sustavu, ili, točnije, kako se mikrokozmički sustavi odnose prema sveobuhvatno- mu makrokozmosu kojemu pripadaju.
Prolegomena, 2024
sažetak: Fichte je napustio profesuru u Jeni 1799. godine i preselio u Berlin, gdje će njegova gl... more sažetak: Fichte je napustio profesuru u Jeni 1799. godine i preselio u Berlin, gdje će njegova glavna filozofska teorija – “nauk o znanosti” (Wissenschaftslehre) – doživjeti radikalnu transformaciju. Odlazak iz Jene u Berlin odgovara “prijelazu” (Übergang) iz Fichteova ranijeg u kasnije razdoblje, što je glavni pomak u njegovu filozofskom razvoju. U ovom radu istražuju se čimbenici koji pridonose tom prijelazu u njihovu povijesnom kontekstu. Riječ je o trima događajima koji su imali velik utjecaj na evoluciju Fichteova razmišljanja: (1) prijepor oko ateizma iz 1799. koji je doveo do napuštanja profesure u Jeni; (2) spor s Jacobijem koji je nastao zbog navedenoga prijepora, a kulminirao u Fichteovu djelu Određenje čovjeka (Die Bestimmung des Menschen, 1800) i (3) filozofska rasprava sa Schellingom između 1800. i 1802, koju su pratile duboke promjene u misli obojice filozofa. Fichteov odgovor na taj trostruki napad na nauk o znanosti bio je povratak na ono što bi se moglo nazvati temeljnim uvidom djela, a to je “djelotvorna radnja” (Tathandlung), pretvarajući taj uvid u ideju “postanka” (Genesis). Ta transformacija, koja ostaje vjerna temeljnim uvidima nauka o znanosti, dovršena je 1804. i označava kraj tranzicije u berlinsko razdoblje.
Science et Esprit, 2024
Les Recherches philosophiques sur l’essence de la liberté humaine et les sujets qui s’y rattachen... more Les Recherches philosophiques sur l’essence de la liberté humaine et les sujets qui s’y rattachent (1809), texte central dans l’œuvre de Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, est une réponse aux accusations de panthéisme et par conséquent, l’occasion pour l’auteur de repenser son monisme ou « All-Einheitslehre ». Dans une tentative de réinterprétation créative du motif panthéiste évoqué par la phrase « Dieu est toutes choses », Schelling consacrera les premières pages de ses Recherches à une relecture du principe d’identité. Ici, nous tenterons d’élucider cette relecture, en accordant une attention particulière à la manière dont elle est façonnée par un certain nombre de sources plus anciennes, en particulier la théorie de l’âme du monde de Platon, la téléologie de Kant et la logique de Gottfried Ploucquet. Nous affirmerons que la théorie de l’identité de Schelling incorporera le principe de la raison suffisante comme son égal, les deux consti- tuant ce que nous appellerons « le principe du fondement ». Cela donnera lieu à la distinction fondatrice des Recherches de 1809, l’idée que Dieu a un fondement qui est en lui, mais qui ne doit pas être confondu avec lui dans la mesure où il existe. Dire que « Dieu est toutes choses », c’est décrire comment les parties et le Tout interagissent dans un système organique, ou plus précisément, comment les systèmes microcosmiques se rapportent au macrocosme global auquel ils appartiennent.
in Fichte’s 1804 Wissenschaftslehre: Essays on the ‘Science of Knowing,’ ed. Gabriel Gottlieb and... more in Fichte’s 1804 Wissenschaftslehre: Essays on the ‘Science of Knowing,’ ed. Gabriel Gottlieb and Benjamin D. Crowe. Albany: SUNY Press, 2024, 97-117.
Fichte-Studien, 2023
This article argues that Fichte's second set of lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre in 1804 offers... more This article argues that Fichte's second set of lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre in 1804 offers a theory of transcendental arguments, and is itself a protracted transcendental argument. Foundationally, it employs the transcendental argument form that is common to much of Fichte's work: the agreement of a truth-statement (what is said, sagen) and its enactment (what it does, tun). WL-1804-II will expand this twofold structure into a threefold and then into a fivefold one. The first expansion arises from the need to prove that the transcendental argument of the WL is genetic: it does not introduce an implicit third term between the content of a proposition and its enactment in discourse. The argument must be able to move from the immediacy of experience (what Fichte will call Evidenz), to its elaboration in discourse, and then back to the initial experience. What is elaborated in discourse is what is found in experience. The expansion into a fivefold structure arises from the need to prove that the standpoint from which one makes a transcendental argument must be internal to the argument itself. Fichte will claim that the contingent terms in an argument are reversible, highlighting the necessary internal relations that the juxtaposition of contingent terms always evokes. This can be summarized in the formula [1. (a + b); 2. (b + a); 3. their unity]. The result is that reason's norms are found within the act of thinking: there is no discourse outside of reason.
In: “The System Must Construct Itself. Manifestation and Autopoiesis in Fichte’s 1804 Wissenschaf... more In: “The System Must Construct Itself. Manifestation and Autopoiesis in Fichte’s 1804 Wissenschaftslehre,” in Perspectives on the Self – Reflexivity in the Humanities [New Studies in the History and Historiography of Philosophy], ed. Vojtěch Kolman and Tereza Matějčková. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022.
If Fichte's 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre present a monist system in which consciousness is the outward face of an ineffable totality or Absolute, the methods for arriving at this monism are rigorously transcendental, affirming that consciousness is inescapable and experience inevitably credible. Fichte's new system is therefore a transcendental monism, containing an autopoietic or self-creating element, and a narrative one, accounting for subjectivity from within this self-creating system. Fichte's reconciliation of the two elements is presented by means of a theory of manifestation: "The Absolute manifests itself to itself by means of consciousness." Fichte argues for this transcendentally, and this argument structure itself leads to a transcendental monism. This paper traces Fichte's argument in three steps: first, the immediate credibility of experience, or Evidenz; second, identifying this immediacy with the Absolute in order to ground transcendental monism; and third, the realisation that understanding is only possible when intelligibility has already been presumed. Crucial to this threefold argument is the fact that one's attention to it is itself a constitutive element: to be aware of the system as self-elaborating is to participate in it.
Annali online della Didattica e della Formazione Docente, 2020
While Bildung, as Gadamer affirms, was in the 19 th century the element in which the sciences liv... more While Bildung, as Gadamer affirms, was in the 19 th century the element in which the sciences lived, there is traditionally no epistemological ground to justify its status. This leads to an aporia: Bildung as self-cultivation is meant to be an end in itself, yet must also provide for the unity of particular sciences and their separate goals. This paper sees a solution in Fichte's middle period via the cultivation of Attention, allowing one simultaneously to stay within the realm of Bildung and conceive of the particulars that are its manifestations. Attention first appears in the Wissenschaftslehre (1804), where it is an existential mood and prerequisite for entering the system. Varying degrees of it then come to qualify the standpoints found in the Anweisung zum Seligen Leben (1806). Finally, in the life of the Anweisung's Johannine Christ and the finished Scholar of the Über das Wesen des Gelehrten (1805), Fichte presents us with a model of Bildung grounded in Attention, one whose priorities are transmission and initiation.
ARC: The Journal of the School of Religious Studies, McGill University, 2016
Arc: The Journal of the School of Religious Studies, McGill University, Volume 44 (2016), pp. 119... more Arc: The Journal of the School of Religious Studies, McGill University, Volume 44 (2016), pp. 119-135.
Talks by Matthew Nini
Presentation at the Institut za filozofiju of the University of Zagreb, Croatia. December 21, 202... more Presentation at the Institut za filozofiju of the University of Zagreb, Croatia. December 21, 2023.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gcX43l7clYk
The work of J.G. Fichte (1762-1814) can be summarized in one word: Wissenschaftslehre (WL). This neologism represents the name that Fichte gave to his philosophical system, continually revised and extended in the works that bear it as their title. In all, there are some seventeen versions of the WL. Varying in form, structure, and style, each of these is a unique philosophical work. In particular, Fichte’s WL is often seen as being divided into two periods: those produced in Jena before the turn of the century, and those in Berlin after 1800. Using one of the most robust and comprehensive versions of the WL, I would like to argue that while Fichte’s Berlin period does indeed do something new, addressing concerns and making arguments that were not made in Jena, it is still a version of the same system. Every version of the WL is grounded in a deceptively simple insight: that conscious and self-conscious are inseparable in the act of knowing. In every version of WL, Fichte will expand this insight into a transcendental argument and deploy it in order to meet some philosophical challenge. In 1804, this transcendental argument is faced with its greatest challenge yet: the reconciliation of being and knowing in human consciousness. Addressing this question is facilitated by a key realization, one first present in the 1804 WL: that language is not external to the foundational insight, but itself part of its unfolding: in other words, to ask “What is the WL?” means that one is already doing it. This will lead Fichte to deepen the structure of his transcendental argument to include an element of self-awareness. In this way, the philosophical exercise that is WL is one whose conclusions coincide with its performance.
Paper read at the Cambridge Centre for the study of Platonism on October 17th, 2023.
Paper given at McGill's Philosophy of Religion Informal Seminar Online Edition, Spring 2020 [ n.b... more Paper given at McGill's Philosophy of Religion Informal Seminar Online Edition, Spring 2020 [ n.b.-This paper is a draft intended for private circulation. Owing to circumstances, the footnotes are provisional. Nor have citations been translated. As ever, written comments and suggestions are most welcome.-M.N. ]
Presented at McGill's Philosophy of Religion Informal Seminar (PRIS), February 16th, 2018.
Book Reviews by Matthew Nini
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy, 2023
Schüz, Simon. Transzendentale Argumente bei Hegel und Fichte. Das Problem objektiver Geltung und ... more Schüz, Simon. Transzendentale Argumente bei Hegel und Fichte. Das Problem objektiver Geltung und seine Auflösung im nachkantischen Idealismus. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022, pp. 515 + xiii. Reviewed in: Transcendental Journal of Philosophy, 2023
ARC: The Journal of the School of Religious Studies, McGill Univiersity, 2018
Review of Jon Stewart's "Hegel's Interpretation of the Religions of the World: The Logic of the G... more Review of Jon Stewart's "Hegel's Interpretation of the Religions of the World: The Logic of the Gods." Oxford: OUP, 2018. Published in Arc: The Journal of the School of Religious Studies, McGill University, Volume 46 (2018), pp. 91-96.
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Books by Matthew Nini
(If you are having difficulty obtaining a copy of Fichte in Berlin, do not hesitate to contact me)
When the celebrated German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte lost his position at the University of Jena and moved to Berlin, it looked as if his career was over. In 1799 Berlin had no university, and Fichte was consigned to lecturing in his home.
In Fichte in Berlin Matthew Nini breaks with scholarly consensus, arguing it was there that Fichte finally reached maturity, and the only way to understand Fichte’s mature philosophy is to perform it for oneself. The book focuses on the philosopher’s 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre - an untranslatable neologism for his theories on the pursuit of insight - claiming that they are one of the most exemplary versions of the philosophical project that Fichte reconfigured some seventeen times throughout his life. While the 1804 lectures offer a more robust approach, they remain faithful to the insight at the heart of the original philosophy. Fichte’s work always emphasized the practical over the theoretical, and his 1804 work goes even further: to think with Fichte is to bring one’s own philosophy to life. Nini guides the reader step by step through the complex arguments Fichte made in 1804 and goes on to examine some of his other works produced in their wake, arguing that Fichte’s output from 1804 to 1806, his first Berlin period, forms an organic whole.
Fichte in Berlin is not only an introduction to Fichte’s later philosophy, but also an original philosophical work that makes a unique contribution to the study of German Idealism.
Published Papers by Matthew Nini
If Fichte's 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre present a monist system in which consciousness is the outward face of an ineffable totality or Absolute, the methods for arriving at this monism are rigorously transcendental, affirming that consciousness is inescapable and experience inevitably credible. Fichte's new system is therefore a transcendental monism, containing an autopoietic or self-creating element, and a narrative one, accounting for subjectivity from within this self-creating system. Fichte's reconciliation of the two elements is presented by means of a theory of manifestation: "The Absolute manifests itself to itself by means of consciousness." Fichte argues for this transcendentally, and this argument structure itself leads to a transcendental monism. This paper traces Fichte's argument in three steps: first, the immediate credibility of experience, or Evidenz; second, identifying this immediacy with the Absolute in order to ground transcendental monism; and third, the realisation that understanding is only possible when intelligibility has already been presumed. Crucial to this threefold argument is the fact that one's attention to it is itself a constitutive element: to be aware of the system as self-elaborating is to participate in it.
Talks by Matthew Nini
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gcX43l7clYk
The work of J.G. Fichte (1762-1814) can be summarized in one word: Wissenschaftslehre (WL). This neologism represents the name that Fichte gave to his philosophical system, continually revised and extended in the works that bear it as their title. In all, there are some seventeen versions of the WL. Varying in form, structure, and style, each of these is a unique philosophical work. In particular, Fichte’s WL is often seen as being divided into two periods: those produced in Jena before the turn of the century, and those in Berlin after 1800. Using one of the most robust and comprehensive versions of the WL, I would like to argue that while Fichte’s Berlin period does indeed do something new, addressing concerns and making arguments that were not made in Jena, it is still a version of the same system. Every version of the WL is grounded in a deceptively simple insight: that conscious and self-conscious are inseparable in the act of knowing. In every version of WL, Fichte will expand this insight into a transcendental argument and deploy it in order to meet some philosophical challenge. In 1804, this transcendental argument is faced with its greatest challenge yet: the reconciliation of being and knowing in human consciousness. Addressing this question is facilitated by a key realization, one first present in the 1804 WL: that language is not external to the foundational insight, but itself part of its unfolding: in other words, to ask “What is the WL?” means that one is already doing it. This will lead Fichte to deepen the structure of his transcendental argument to include an element of self-awareness. In this way, the philosophical exercise that is WL is one whose conclusions coincide with its performance.
Book Reviews by Matthew Nini
FICHTEANA 23 can be read online for free here:
https://sites.google.com/view/fichteana/latest-issue
https://sites.google.com/view/fichteana?pli=1
(If you are having difficulty obtaining a copy of Fichte in Berlin, do not hesitate to contact me)
When the celebrated German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte lost his position at the University of Jena and moved to Berlin, it looked as if his career was over. In 1799 Berlin had no university, and Fichte was consigned to lecturing in his home.
In Fichte in Berlin Matthew Nini breaks with scholarly consensus, arguing it was there that Fichte finally reached maturity, and the only way to understand Fichte’s mature philosophy is to perform it for oneself. The book focuses on the philosopher’s 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre - an untranslatable neologism for his theories on the pursuit of insight - claiming that they are one of the most exemplary versions of the philosophical project that Fichte reconfigured some seventeen times throughout his life. While the 1804 lectures offer a more robust approach, they remain faithful to the insight at the heart of the original philosophy. Fichte’s work always emphasized the practical over the theoretical, and his 1804 work goes even further: to think with Fichte is to bring one’s own philosophy to life. Nini guides the reader step by step through the complex arguments Fichte made in 1804 and goes on to examine some of his other works produced in their wake, arguing that Fichte’s output from 1804 to 1806, his first Berlin period, forms an organic whole.
Fichte in Berlin is not only an introduction to Fichte’s later philosophy, but also an original philosophical work that makes a unique contribution to the study of German Idealism.
If Fichte's 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre present a monist system in which consciousness is the outward face of an ineffable totality or Absolute, the methods for arriving at this monism are rigorously transcendental, affirming that consciousness is inescapable and experience inevitably credible. Fichte's new system is therefore a transcendental monism, containing an autopoietic or self-creating element, and a narrative one, accounting for subjectivity from within this self-creating system. Fichte's reconciliation of the two elements is presented by means of a theory of manifestation: "The Absolute manifests itself to itself by means of consciousness." Fichte argues for this transcendentally, and this argument structure itself leads to a transcendental monism. This paper traces Fichte's argument in three steps: first, the immediate credibility of experience, or Evidenz; second, identifying this immediacy with the Absolute in order to ground transcendental monism; and third, the realisation that understanding is only possible when intelligibility has already been presumed. Crucial to this threefold argument is the fact that one's attention to it is itself a constitutive element: to be aware of the system as self-elaborating is to participate in it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gcX43l7clYk
The work of J.G. Fichte (1762-1814) can be summarized in one word: Wissenschaftslehre (WL). This neologism represents the name that Fichte gave to his philosophical system, continually revised and extended in the works that bear it as their title. In all, there are some seventeen versions of the WL. Varying in form, structure, and style, each of these is a unique philosophical work. In particular, Fichte’s WL is often seen as being divided into two periods: those produced in Jena before the turn of the century, and those in Berlin after 1800. Using one of the most robust and comprehensive versions of the WL, I would like to argue that while Fichte’s Berlin period does indeed do something new, addressing concerns and making arguments that were not made in Jena, it is still a version of the same system. Every version of the WL is grounded in a deceptively simple insight: that conscious and self-conscious are inseparable in the act of knowing. In every version of WL, Fichte will expand this insight into a transcendental argument and deploy it in order to meet some philosophical challenge. In 1804, this transcendental argument is faced with its greatest challenge yet: the reconciliation of being and knowing in human consciousness. Addressing this question is facilitated by a key realization, one first present in the 1804 WL: that language is not external to the foundational insight, but itself part of its unfolding: in other words, to ask “What is the WL?” means that one is already doing it. This will lead Fichte to deepen the structure of his transcendental argument to include an element of self-awareness. In this way, the philosophical exercise that is WL is one whose conclusions coincide with its performance.
FICHTEANA 23 can be read online for free here:
https://sites.google.com/view/fichteana/latest-issue
https://sites.google.com/view/fichteana?pli=1