Papers by Jens Kristian Larsen
Ancient Geek Dialectic and its Reception, 2023
In a crucial passage in the Parmenides, Parmenides states that the power of conversation (ten tou... more In a crucial passage in the Parmenides, Parmenides states that the power of conversation (ten tou dialegesthai dynamin) depends on forms (135b-c) and indicates that this power is a prerequisite for philosophy. In chapter xx Kristian Larsen raises the question what implications this passage has for Plato’s conception of dialectic and argues that the discussion of the thesis that knowledge is perception in the Theaetetus, and in particular the conclusion to this discussion found at 184b3-186e12, provides an explanation of Parmenides’ claims about the power of conversation. The chapter provides a detailed interpretation of the final refutation of Theaetetus’ thesis that knowledge is perception that highlights the way the dramatic features of the Theaetetus accentuate the argument Socrates develops in order to refute the thesis. Larsen argues that a central feature of the drama of the dialogue is Socrates’ attempt at redirecting Theaetetus from mathematics toward dialectic and philosophy. In particular, Socrates aims to make Theaetetus realize that being and the good or the beneficial are things that are what they are, themselves by themselves, that they are on a par, ontologically speaking, and that reaching for them, and attempting to come to grips with them, in thought, is a requirement for knowledge in general and for dialectic in particular.
This volume offers fresh perspectives on Platonic dialectic. For Plato, philosophy depends on, or... more This volume offers fresh perspectives on Platonic dialectic. For Plato, philosophy depends on, or is perhaps even identical with, dialectic. However, there is little agreement as to what Platonic dialectic is. Most studies of Platonic dialectic focus on only one aspect of this method that allegedly characterizes one specific period in Plato's development. The 13 chapters in this volume present a comprehensive picture of this crucial aspect of Plato's philosophy and seek to clarify what Plato takes to be proper dialectical procedures. They examine the ways that these procedures are related to each other and other aspects of his philosophy, such as ethics, psychology, and metaphysics.
This is a pre-published version of the introduction to the volume New Perspectives on
New Perspectives on Platonic Dialectic, 2022
Plato often depicts Socrates inquiring together with an interlocutor into a thing/concept by tryi... more Plato often depicts Socrates inquiring together with an interlocutor into a thing/concept by trying to answer the “What is it?” question about that thing/concept. This typically involves Socrates requesting that his discussion partner answer the question, and usually ends in failure. There are, however, instances in which Socrates provides the sort of answer, in relation to a more familiar thing/concept, that he would like to receive in relation to a more obscure thing/concept, thus furnishing his interlocutor with an example of how he would like him to answer. This chapter considers this dialectical tool by focusing on three instances of its use (Meno 73e3–76e4; Laches 191e9–192b3; Theaetetus 146e7–147c6). It argues, first, that in these instances Socrates provides true and adequate definitions of the things/concepts in question. It further argues that dialectic, for Plato, is just as much about the essences everyday things/concepts as it is about the essences of more obscure things/concepts; and that it is just as much about the meanings of the words we use to designate things, as it is about the essences of those things.
Phenomenological Interpretations of Ancient Philosophy
(1899-1978) was a student of Martin Heidegger and closely connected with Edmund Husserl. His enga... more (1899-1978) was a student of Martin Heidegger and closely connected with Edmund Husserl. His engagement with ancient science and philosophy and, in particular, with Plato, helped pave the way for what is now sometimes called continental readings of ancient philosophy, and his approach to ancient philosophy was influenced significantly by, and responded critically to, the thought of both Husserl and Heidegger. Nevertheless, few people today would think of him as an important member of the socalled phenomenological movement or consider his readings of the Western philosophical and scientific tradition an important aspect of the phenomenological movement's continuous dialogue with the Greek origins of this tradition. This is arguably an effect of the comparative obscurity of Klein's work. His main work, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, originally published as two articles in German in 1936 and translated into English in 1968, is a demanding study devoted to analyzing a change in concept formations characteristic of modern natural science. While praised by some for its profundity and insight, and while promising to contain a key for understanding modern conceptuality as such and the difference between modern and ancient science, the work has also been regarded as dry and "overly scholarly". 1 Moreover, compared with phenomenological masterpieces such as Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences or Heidegger's Being and Time and their differing discussions of the alleged crisis of modern science and philosophy, the subject Klein's work discusses-the ancient concept of arithmoi or 'counting numbers' and their re-interpretation as numbers in modernity-may seem far removed from our most pressing, existential concerns. As regards Klein's other work, which consists in a detailed
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2019
The digression of Plato’s Theaetetus (172c2–177c2) is as celebrated as it is controversial. A par... more The digression of Plato’s Theaetetus (172c2–177c2) is as celebrated as it is controversial. A particularly knotty question has been what status we should ascribe to the ideal of philosophy it presents, an ideal centered on the conception that true virtue consists in assimilating oneself as much as possible to god. For the ideal may seem difficult to reconcile with a Socratic conception of philosophy, and several scholars have accordingly suggested that it should be read as ironic and directed only at the dramatic character Theodorus. When interpreted with due attention to its dramatic context, however, the digression reveals that the ideal of godlikeness, while being directed at Theodorus, is essentially Socratic. The function of the passage is to introduce a contemplative aspect of the life of philosophy into the dialogue that contrasts radically with the political-practical orientation characteristic of Protagoras, an aspect Socrates is able to isolate as such precisely because he is conversing with the mathematician Theodorus.
Ancient Philosophy, 2020
In the second half of the Phaedrus, while Socrates and Phaedrus are discussing how one should spe... more In the second half of the Phaedrus, while Socrates and Phaedrus are discussing how one should speak and write nobly or beautifully, Socrates makes the following statement:
Now I am myself, Phaedrus, a lover of these divisions and collections, so that I may be able both to speak and think; and if I think anyone else has the capacity to look to one and to multiplicity as they are in nature, I pursue him ‘in his footsteps, behind him, as if he were a god.’ And furthermore, those who can do this – whether I give them the right name or not, god knows, but at any rate – up till now I call them dialectical. (266b3-c1).
This article defends three interrelated claims. First, that Socrates in this passage describes collection and division as procedures that underlie human speaking and thinking in general, as well as philosophical inquiry, without identifying them with either. More precisely, it argues that collection and division structure ordinary thinking and speaking, and that these procedures may, but need not, acquire a specific dialectical significance: a significance they acquire when they are used to clarify a subject matter by considering it as a natural whole with natural parts. Second, that the speeches found in the first half of the Phaedrus demonstrate that the difference between the ordinary and the dialectical uses of collection and division is not methodological or technical; what sets the dialectical use of these procedures apart from their ordinary use are philosophical suppositions independent of the procedures of collection and division themselves, and, for that reason, collection and division cannot be identified with dialectic as such, or with a philosophical method aimed at providing explanatory accounts. Third, that the second part of the Phaedrus, which ostensibly revolves around the question how rhetoric, as a kind of expertise, is related to dialectic, also revolves around the broader question how noble or beautiful speaking, in general, may be said to depend on dialectic; and the discussion of this broader question demonstrates that collection and division, even when they are aimed at clarifying a subject matter by considering it as a natural whole with natural parts and are, thus, used dialectically, are still only parts of a larger inquiry, in the precise sense that they may facilitate an inquiry into the nature of the subject matter under consideration without thereby coinciding with such an inquiry simpliciter. In particular, collection and division help facilitate the dialectical inquiry into the whole-part structure of the soul.
Sophistes
In this paper I investigate Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's "Sophist", in particular his no... more In this paper I investigate Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's "Sophist", in particular his notion of an ontological understudying of the good. It is a draft that will be published in a finalized version later this year. For the correct page numbers, as well as the correct bibliographical information, please contact me on [email protected]
New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Oct 2014
The “battle” between corporealists and idealists described in Plato’s Sophist 245e6–249d5 is of s... more The “battle” between corporealists and idealists described in Plato’s Sophist 245e6–249d5 is of significance for understanding the philosophical function of the dramatic exchange between the Eleatic guest and Theaetetus, the dialogue's main interlocutors. Various features of this exchange indicate that the Eleatic guest introduces and discusses the dispute between corporealists and idealists in order to educate Theaetetus in ontological matters. By reading the discussion between Theaetetus and the Eleatic guest in the light of these features, one comes to see that the primary audience for the proposal advanced by the Eleatic guest in
this passage, namely that being is power, is not any of the participants in the “battle,” as has been commonly assumed, but Theaetetus himself—a fact to bear in mind in any viable interpretation of the passage.
Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought, 2020
Plato’s Sophist and Statesman stand out from many other Platonic dialogues by at least two featur... more Plato’s Sophist and Statesman stand out from many other Platonic dialogues by at least two features. First, they do not raise a ti esti question about a single virtue or feature of something, but raise the questions what sophist, statesman, and philosopher are, how they differ from each other, and what worth each should be accorded. Second, a visitor from Elea, rather than Socrates, seeks to addressed these questions and does so by employing what is commonly referred to as the method of collection and division. Some scholars have argued that this so-called method is value neutral and therefore unable to address the question how philosophy differs from sophistry and statesmanship according to worth. This article contends that the procedures of collection and division does not preclude the visitor from taking considerations of worth into account, but rather helps establish an objective basis for settling the main questions of the dialogue.
Symbolae Osloenses, 2010
In this paper, I question a widespread reading of a passage in the last part of the Phaedrus deal... more In this paper, I question a widespread reading of a passage in the last part of the Phaedrus dealing with the science of dialectic. According to this reading, the passage announces a new method peculiar to the later Plato aiming at defining natural kinds. I show that the Phaedrus itself does not support such a reading. As an alternative reading, I suggest that the science of dialectic, as discussed in the passage, must be seen as dealing primarily with philosophical rhetoric and knowledge of human souls.
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift
In this paper I investigate the understanding of eros expressed in the speeches of Phaedrus and A... more In this paper I investigate the understanding of eros expressed in the speeches of Phaedrus and Agathon in Plato’s Symposium, two speeches often neglected in the literature. I argue that they contain crucial insights about the nature of eros that reappear in Diotima’s speech. Finally, I consider the relation of Socrates
and Alcibiades in light of these insights, arguing that the figure of Alcibiades should be seen as a negative illustration of the notion of erotic education described by Diotima.
Plato’s Parmenides- Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, 2022
This is a pre-peer review version of a chapter with the same title, published in Plato’s Parmenid... more This is a pre-peer review version of a chapter with the same title, published in Plato’s Parmenides- Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, Academia Verlag 2022, pp. 183-192.
Phenomenological Interpretations of Ancient Philosophy, 2021
Phenomenology and ancient Greek philosophy. The title of this book, indicating these topics as it... more Phenomenology and ancient Greek philosophy. The title of this book, indicating these topics as its two main subjects, could give the impression that the subjects are held together by a circumstantial "and." The title would then indicate a connection between phenomenology and a topic, ancient Greek philosophy, the way titles such as Art and Phenomenology, Phenomenology and Psychological Research, Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics do. This impression would be wrong. First, ancient Greek philosophers take pride of place in the dialogues initiated by many phenomenologists with various figures from the history of philosophy. Second, this is not just because phenomenological philosophers have tended to regard ancient Greek philosophy as the revered beginning of Western thought, reflection upon which may help illuminate any topic modern human beings wish to inquire into or give it a kind of historical dignity. It is first and foremost because ancient Greek philosophy, understood as the scientific attempt to understand the world, ourselves, and our place in the world, in the phenomenological tradition is regarded as one important origin of contemporary Western philosophy and science, even if contemporary philosophy and science is also determined by a new ideal of philosophy that emerges in early modernity. Indeed, for most phenomenologists, Greek philosophy can be regarded as the roots supporting this new idealeven if these roots are sometimes hidden from sight or forgotten. The main rationale for confronting ancient Greek philosophy phenomenologically is accordingly the attempt to bring to light in its full radicality the phenomenon "philosophy." Unearthing philosophy as it was originally understood by Greek thinkers may, according to many phenomenologists at least, help us understand what philosophy in the full sense of the word was, has been, and may be again, but also what it has become or even degenerated into in modern times, for instance positivism. It is this way of approaching ancient Greek philosophy that we wish to concentrate on in this book, in the hope that the volume will prove instructive both to people who have an interest in ancient Greek philosophy and wish to know more about the phenomenological approach to it and to people who work within phenomenology and wish to know more about the various approaches to ancient Greek philosophy characterizing the phenomenological movement. We have therefore sought to make the introduction and the individual chapters accessible to non-experts, for instance by transliterating all Greek text, and confining quotes in other languages than English to footnotes and glosses. The reader can still expect to notice a difference of emphasis across the different chapters. The first five chapters concentrate on particular aspects of Husserl's and Heidegger's approach to ancient philosophy, topics of considerable debate within the scholarly community, and they tend to be more specialized and technical and to engage directly with current debates; the following eight chapters concentrate on later phenomenologists, the particular approaches to ancient philosophy of whom are presumably less well known, and many of them serve as introductions to these approaches. It is our hope that the combined result will work both as a general overview and as insight into the current state of research in the field. Cross-references also allow the reader to follow up on elements that are touched upon in one chapter and more fully discussed in another, or in the introduction. The aim of the introduction is to give a brief overview of the way in which the phenomenological movement has attempted to bring the Greek roots of Western philosophy to light and to establish some basic themes of phenomenological approaches to ancient Greek philosophy, in order to ease the reading of the chapters following the introduction. For that purpose, we have found it necessary to give priority to Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976).
For Plato, philosophy depends on, or is perhaps even identical with, dialectic. Few will dispute ... more For Plato, philosophy depends on, or is perhaps even identical with, dialectic. Few will dispute this claim, but there is little agreement as to what Platonic dialectic is. According to a now prevailing view it is a method for inquiry the conception of which changed so radically for Plato that it "had a strong tendency ... to mean ‘the ideal method’, whatever that may be" (Richard Robinson). Most studies of Platonic dialectic accordingly focus on only one aspect of this method that allegedly characterizes one specific period in Plato’s development.
This volume offers fresh perspectives on Platonic dialectic. Its 13 chapters present a comprehensive picture of this crucial aspect of Plato’s philosophy and seek to clarify what Plato takes to be proper dialectical procedures. They examine the ways in which these procedures are related to each other and other aspects of his philosophy, such as ethics, psychology, and metaphysics. Collectively, the chapters challenge the now prevailing understanding of Plato’s ideal of method.
New Perspectives on Platonic Dialectic will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in Plato, ancient philosophy, philosophical method, and the history of logic.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Jens Kristian Larsen, Vivil Valvik Haraldsen, and Justin Vlasits
1. Socrates’ Dialectical use of Hypothesis
Hayden Ausland
2. The Dialectician and the Statesman in Plato’s Euthydemus
Emily Austin
3. Dialectic in Plato’s Parmenides: The Schooling of Young Socrates
Francisco Gonzalez
4. Dialectic as a paradigm in the Republic: On the role of reason in the just life
Vivil Valvik Haraldsen
5. Elenchus and the Method of Division in the Sophist
Cristina Ionescu
6. Using Examples in Philosophical Inquiry: Plato’s Statesman 277d1-278e2 and 285c4-286b2
Jens Kristian Larsen
7. Examples in the Meno
Peter D. Larsen
8. Between Variety and Unity. How to deal with Plato´s Dialectic
Walter Mesch
9. Dialectic and the Ability to Orient Ourselves: Republic V-VII
Vasilis Politis
10. Another Platonic Method: Four genealogical myths about human nature and their philosophical contribution in Plato
Catherine Rowett
11. Dialectic in Plato's Sophist: The relation between the question ‘What is being?’ and the question ‘What is there?’
Pauline Sabrier
12. Dialectic as Philosophical Divination in Plato’s Phaedrus
Marilena Vlad
13. Plato on the Varieties of Knowledge
Justin Vlasits
Plato Journal , 2021
This article argues that Plato's Republic identifies division, as it is described in supposedly l... more This article argues that Plato's Republic identifies division, as it is described in supposedly later dialogues, as a procedure that sets dialectic apart from quarreling and strife. It further argues that the procedure is crucial for establishing the ideal city of the Republic, since the correct assignment of various tasks to different types of human beings depend on it. Finally, it urges, division aids the philosopher in contemplating the forms and setting his or her soul in order: the forms are interwoven and division helps the philosopher recognize the order permeating the fabric of forms.
Phenomenological Interpretations of Ancient Philosophy, 2021
This book will be published by Brill in 2021.
Études platoniciennes, 2019
The Parmenides poses the question for what entities there are Forms, and the criticism of Forms i... more The Parmenides poses the question for what entities there are Forms, and the criticism of Forms it contains is commonly supposed to document an ontological reorientation in Plato. According to this reading, Forms no longer express the excellence of a given entity and a Socratic, ethical perspective on life, but come to resemble concepts, or what concepts designate, and are meant to explain nature as a whole. Plato’s conception of dialectic, it is further suggested, consequently changes into a value-neutral method directed at tracing the interrelation of such Forms, an outlook supposedly documented in certain passages on method from the Sophist and the Statesman as well.
The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the Parmenides the question for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages on method from the Sophist and Statesman neither encourage a non-normative ontology nor a value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues encourage us to do is rather to set common opinions about the relative worth and value of things aside when conducting ontological inquiries; and this attitude, the article concludes, demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a significant difference, between Plato’s Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers.
Filosofiske Studier 2007
This paper argues that the so-called 6th definition of the sophist found in the outer part of Pla... more This paper argues that the so-called 6th definition of the sophist found in the outer part of Plato's "Sophist" is a methodological passage meant to point out how the sophist is to be pursued properly if he is to be distinguished from the philosopher.
Filosofiske Studier 2007
En tolkning af “Sein und Zeit” (herefter SuZ) kræver en afklaring af værensspørgsmålets rolle i v... more En tolkning af “Sein und Zeit” (herefter SuZ) kræver en afklaring af værensspørgsmålets rolle i værket, thi holdningen hertil bestemmer vurderingen af de mange enkeltanalyser, der indgår deri. Essayets tese er, at værensspørgsmålet er bærende i hele SuZ – hvilket ikke er så indlysende, som det måske synes. En række tolkninger har søgt at vise, at værensspørgsmålet er et pseudo-spørgsmål, der bør glemmes, men at de enkelte analyser i SuZ i sig selv er interessante . Andre tolkninger går ud fra, at værensspørgsmålet selv aldrig bliver stillet i SuZ, men at der kun foretages en analyse af Dasein . Derfor bliver det et mål at vise, at de to hovedopgaver i SuZ, Daseinsanalysen og destruktionen af ontologiens historie, ikke er to hinanden uafhængige momenter, der hver især skal forberede grunden ud fra hvilken værensspørgsmålet skal stilles, men derimod er selve udfoldelsen af værensspørgsmålet.
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Papers by Jens Kristian Larsen
Now I am myself, Phaedrus, a lover of these divisions and collections, so that I may be able both to speak and think; and if I think anyone else has the capacity to look to one and to multiplicity as they are in nature, I pursue him ‘in his footsteps, behind him, as if he were a god.’ And furthermore, those who can do this – whether I give them the right name or not, god knows, but at any rate – up till now I call them dialectical. (266b3-c1).
This article defends three interrelated claims. First, that Socrates in this passage describes collection and division as procedures that underlie human speaking and thinking in general, as well as philosophical inquiry, without identifying them with either. More precisely, it argues that collection and division structure ordinary thinking and speaking, and that these procedures may, but need not, acquire a specific dialectical significance: a significance they acquire when they are used to clarify a subject matter by considering it as a natural whole with natural parts. Second, that the speeches found in the first half of the Phaedrus demonstrate that the difference between the ordinary and the dialectical uses of collection and division is not methodological or technical; what sets the dialectical use of these procedures apart from their ordinary use are philosophical suppositions independent of the procedures of collection and division themselves, and, for that reason, collection and division cannot be identified with dialectic as such, or with a philosophical method aimed at providing explanatory accounts. Third, that the second part of the Phaedrus, which ostensibly revolves around the question how rhetoric, as a kind of expertise, is related to dialectic, also revolves around the broader question how noble or beautiful speaking, in general, may be said to depend on dialectic; and the discussion of this broader question demonstrates that collection and division, even when they are aimed at clarifying a subject matter by considering it as a natural whole with natural parts and are, thus, used dialectically, are still only parts of a larger inquiry, in the precise sense that they may facilitate an inquiry into the nature of the subject matter under consideration without thereby coinciding with such an inquiry simpliciter. In particular, collection and division help facilitate the dialectical inquiry into the whole-part structure of the soul.
this passage, namely that being is power, is not any of the participants in the “battle,” as has been commonly assumed, but Theaetetus himself—a fact to bear in mind in any viable interpretation of the passage.
and Alcibiades in light of these insights, arguing that the figure of Alcibiades should be seen as a negative illustration of the notion of erotic education described by Diotima.
This volume offers fresh perspectives on Platonic dialectic. Its 13 chapters present a comprehensive picture of this crucial aspect of Plato’s philosophy and seek to clarify what Plato takes to be proper dialectical procedures. They examine the ways in which these procedures are related to each other and other aspects of his philosophy, such as ethics, psychology, and metaphysics. Collectively, the chapters challenge the now prevailing understanding of Plato’s ideal of method.
New Perspectives on Platonic Dialectic will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in Plato, ancient philosophy, philosophical method, and the history of logic.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Jens Kristian Larsen, Vivil Valvik Haraldsen, and Justin Vlasits
1. Socrates’ Dialectical use of Hypothesis
Hayden Ausland
2. The Dialectician and the Statesman in Plato’s Euthydemus
Emily Austin
3. Dialectic in Plato’s Parmenides: The Schooling of Young Socrates
Francisco Gonzalez
4. Dialectic as a paradigm in the Republic: On the role of reason in the just life
Vivil Valvik Haraldsen
5. Elenchus and the Method of Division in the Sophist
Cristina Ionescu
6. Using Examples in Philosophical Inquiry: Plato’s Statesman 277d1-278e2 and 285c4-286b2
Jens Kristian Larsen
7. Examples in the Meno
Peter D. Larsen
8. Between Variety and Unity. How to deal with Plato´s Dialectic
Walter Mesch
9. Dialectic and the Ability to Orient Ourselves: Republic V-VII
Vasilis Politis
10. Another Platonic Method: Four genealogical myths about human nature and their philosophical contribution in Plato
Catherine Rowett
11. Dialectic in Plato's Sophist: The relation between the question ‘What is being?’ and the question ‘What is there?’
Pauline Sabrier
12. Dialectic as Philosophical Divination in Plato’s Phaedrus
Marilena Vlad
13. Plato on the Varieties of Knowledge
Justin Vlasits
The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the Parmenides the question for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages on method from the Sophist and Statesman neither encourage a non-normative ontology nor a value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues encourage us to do is rather to set common opinions about the relative worth and value of things aside when conducting ontological inquiries; and this attitude, the article concludes, demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a significant difference, between Plato’s Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers.
Now I am myself, Phaedrus, a lover of these divisions and collections, so that I may be able both to speak and think; and if I think anyone else has the capacity to look to one and to multiplicity as they are in nature, I pursue him ‘in his footsteps, behind him, as if he were a god.’ And furthermore, those who can do this – whether I give them the right name or not, god knows, but at any rate – up till now I call them dialectical. (266b3-c1).
This article defends three interrelated claims. First, that Socrates in this passage describes collection and division as procedures that underlie human speaking and thinking in general, as well as philosophical inquiry, without identifying them with either. More precisely, it argues that collection and division structure ordinary thinking and speaking, and that these procedures may, but need not, acquire a specific dialectical significance: a significance they acquire when they are used to clarify a subject matter by considering it as a natural whole with natural parts. Second, that the speeches found in the first half of the Phaedrus demonstrate that the difference between the ordinary and the dialectical uses of collection and division is not methodological or technical; what sets the dialectical use of these procedures apart from their ordinary use are philosophical suppositions independent of the procedures of collection and division themselves, and, for that reason, collection and division cannot be identified with dialectic as such, or with a philosophical method aimed at providing explanatory accounts. Third, that the second part of the Phaedrus, which ostensibly revolves around the question how rhetoric, as a kind of expertise, is related to dialectic, also revolves around the broader question how noble or beautiful speaking, in general, may be said to depend on dialectic; and the discussion of this broader question demonstrates that collection and division, even when they are aimed at clarifying a subject matter by considering it as a natural whole with natural parts and are, thus, used dialectically, are still only parts of a larger inquiry, in the precise sense that they may facilitate an inquiry into the nature of the subject matter under consideration without thereby coinciding with such an inquiry simpliciter. In particular, collection and division help facilitate the dialectical inquiry into the whole-part structure of the soul.
this passage, namely that being is power, is not any of the participants in the “battle,” as has been commonly assumed, but Theaetetus himself—a fact to bear in mind in any viable interpretation of the passage.
and Alcibiades in light of these insights, arguing that the figure of Alcibiades should be seen as a negative illustration of the notion of erotic education described by Diotima.
This volume offers fresh perspectives on Platonic dialectic. Its 13 chapters present a comprehensive picture of this crucial aspect of Plato’s philosophy and seek to clarify what Plato takes to be proper dialectical procedures. They examine the ways in which these procedures are related to each other and other aspects of his philosophy, such as ethics, psychology, and metaphysics. Collectively, the chapters challenge the now prevailing understanding of Plato’s ideal of method.
New Perspectives on Platonic Dialectic will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in Plato, ancient philosophy, philosophical method, and the history of logic.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Jens Kristian Larsen, Vivil Valvik Haraldsen, and Justin Vlasits
1. Socrates’ Dialectical use of Hypothesis
Hayden Ausland
2. The Dialectician and the Statesman in Plato’s Euthydemus
Emily Austin
3. Dialectic in Plato’s Parmenides: The Schooling of Young Socrates
Francisco Gonzalez
4. Dialectic as a paradigm in the Republic: On the role of reason in the just life
Vivil Valvik Haraldsen
5. Elenchus and the Method of Division in the Sophist
Cristina Ionescu
6. Using Examples in Philosophical Inquiry: Plato’s Statesman 277d1-278e2 and 285c4-286b2
Jens Kristian Larsen
7. Examples in the Meno
Peter D. Larsen
8. Between Variety and Unity. How to deal with Plato´s Dialectic
Walter Mesch
9. Dialectic and the Ability to Orient Ourselves: Republic V-VII
Vasilis Politis
10. Another Platonic Method: Four genealogical myths about human nature and their philosophical contribution in Plato
Catherine Rowett
11. Dialectic in Plato's Sophist: The relation between the question ‘What is being?’ and the question ‘What is there?’
Pauline Sabrier
12. Dialectic as Philosophical Divination in Plato’s Phaedrus
Marilena Vlad
13. Plato on the Varieties of Knowledge
Justin Vlasits
The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the Parmenides the question for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages on method from the Sophist and Statesman neither encourage a non-normative ontology nor a value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues encourage us to do is rather to set common opinions about the relative worth and value of things aside when conducting ontological inquiries; and this attitude, the article concludes, demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a significant difference, between Plato’s Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers.