What legitimates constitutions? One standard answer is that constitutions are legitimate only if ... more What legitimates constitutions? One standard answer is that constitutions are legitimate only if they represent the people they govern. This article identifies two different conceptions of representation. Representation can be grounded either in the consent or the will of the citizens or when the constitution reflects the ‘real’ identity of the members of the nation. Alternatively, it is sometimes stated that the constitution is legitimate because it promotes justice or, more generally, is grounded in reason. While constitutions are typically grounded both in claims to represent the people and in claims concerning the justness and wisdom of the constitutional provisions, we establish that there are two types of constitutions: constitutions that are primarily representational (e.g. the US Constitution) and constitutions that are primarily reason-based (e.g. the German Constitution). We also show that this distinction has important ramifications for how constitutions are drafted and r...
A central task of comparative constitutional law scholarship is categorization and classification... more A central task of comparative constitutional law scholarship is categorization and classification of constitutions. Recent scholarship, no doubt informed by the populist tide, has sought to develop the concept of a mixed constitution. Broadly speaking, a mixed constitution is a constitution that integrates liberal and illiberal elements, elements that are usually separate and not found under the same constitution. The study of “mixed constitutions” encompasses both descriptive and normative aspects. First, an attempt to ascertain what, exactly, makes a constitution “mixed.” Second, an attempt to analyze either the desirability of such a system or an attempt to figure out how to harness mixed constitutions in the service of particular normative goals, for example the protection of human rights. This article has two goals. First, an inquiry into the descriptive aspect of mixed constitutions. My aim is to show that given the seeming consensus of what constitutes a mixed constitution, t...
תקציר בעברית: האם ראוי "לפצל" את קולה של הרשות המבצעת למספר קולות שונים במסגרת הליכים מ... more תקציר בעברית: האם ראוי "לפצל" את קולה של הרשות המבצעת למספר קולות שונים במסגרת הליכים משפטיים להם המדינה היא צד? האם גופים שונים, בתוך הרשות המבצעת, רשאים להציג בפני בית המשפט הדן בסכסוך עמדות שונות מעמדתו של היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, או שמא על המדינה לדבר בקול אחד? בעוד שעמדתם המסורתית של בית המשפט העליון והיועץ המשפטי לממשלה היא כי "המדינה מדברת בקול אחד", תשובה זו אינה ברורה מאליה, וכפי שאטען במאמר זה, אף אינה רצויה.המאמר טוען כי שיקולים מתחום חופש הביטוי, יחד עם שיקולים מתחום הדמוקרטיה הדליברטיבית והמשפט המינהלי, מצדיקים, בנסיבות מסוימות, מתן מעמד לגוף שלטוני אשר מבקש להציג בפני בית משפט דעה שונה מהדעה אותה מציגה ה"מדינה". למעשה, הטענה כי המדינה "מדברת בקול אחד", איננה מתאימה למדינה הרגולטורית המודרנית. היא מונעת זרימת מידע חשוב מתוך הרשות המבצעת אל הרשות השופטת והציבור בכללותו ופוגעת בשקיפותו של ההליך המינהלי. מנגד, מתן מעמד לרשות חולקת צפוי להעשיר את המידע שבידי בית המשפט, יאפשר פיקוח נוסף על ההליך המינהלי, ויטייב את מבחני הסבירות והמידתיות. ...
Under the India "Housing for all" scheme, 20 million urban houses have to be constructed by 2022,... more Under the India "Housing for all" scheme, 20 million urban houses have to be constructed by 2022, which requires the rate of construction to be around 8000 houses/day. Previous results by the team show that present design methods for affordable buildings and structures in India need improvement. The challenges are the disposal of solid waste generated from agro-industrial activities and the energy peak demand in extremely hot and cold seasons. The development of bio-based urban infrastructure which can adapt to the climatic conditions has been proposed. Inclusion of sustainable materials such as agro-industrial by-products and insulation materials has resulted in effective environmental sustainability and climate change adaptability. Precast components are highlighted as a suitable solution for this purpose as well as to fulfil the need of mass housing. India has a lesser record in implementing this prefab technology when compared to a global view. For the first time, a novel and sustainable prefab housing solution is tested for scale-up using industrial waste of co-fired blended ash (CBA) and the results are presented here. A model house of real scale measuring 3 × 3 × 3 m 3 was considered as a base case and is compared with 17 other combinations of model house with varying alignment of prefab panels. Comparison was made with commercially available fly ash brick and CBA brick with a conventional roof slab. A simulation study was conducted regarding cost and energy analysis for all the 18 cases. Various brick and panel compositions with CBA for housing were tried and the superior composition was selected. Similarly, 18 model houses of real scale were simulated, with different combinations of walls made of bricks or panels and different building orientations, to check the impact on energy peak cooling and cost. Results show that peak cooling load can be reduced by six times with bio-based prefab panels. Prefab construction can be considered for mass housing ranging above 100 housing units, each consisting of an area of 25 m 2 .
This chapter, written for the Book “Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Realism and I... more This chapter, written for the Book “Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Realism and Idealism” (forthcoming, CUP), investigates three distinct, though interrelated, questions. First, what do the concepts of idealism and realism mean in the context of constitutional law? Second, what can the Israeli constitutional regime teach us, if anything, about the supposed gap between idealism and realism? Third, should a constitutional system work toward bridging the ideal and the real? The common intuition is that the gap between idealism and realism, however those terms are understood, should be bridged. The chapter will critically examine this proposition in the Israeli context, but will also provide some general insights. I make two overarching claims. One is that the categories of idealism and realism, though seemingly intuitive, turn out to be quite complicated to disentangle. The second claim is that the existence of a gap between the ideal and the real, though seemingly problematic at first blush, might have, on closer examination, limited normative significance. To demonstrate my claims, I examine three areas of Israel’s constitutional structure: constitution-making, rights protection, and institutional image. For each area, I discuss the ideal and the real, and especially the gap between the two. Regarding constitution-making, I show how today’s constitutional settlement looks very different from the one that was envisioned by the framers’ of Israel’s Declaration of Independence. My main argument, however, is that much of the difference lies in form rather than substance. Regarding rights protection, I show how Israel’s judiciary took it upon itself to protect individual rights when the legislature stalled. Here too I argue that despite a seeming gap between idealism and realism, much of the difference lies in the form of protection rather than its substance. Regarding institutional image, I demonstrate how, in cases regarding torture and the separation wall, the Supreme Court seeks to transmit to its foreign audiences an image of a progressive rights protecting court by deciding which decisions to translate into English. I then point to a gap between the translated and non-translated decisions dealing with the same issues. Examining the translated decisions together with the non-translated decisions reveals a more complicated and messier picture than the Supreme Court would like to convey.
and Kenneth Watkin for the helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank the participants in th... more and Kenneth Watkin for the helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank the participants in the International Society of Public Law (ICON.S) Conferences in Berlin and Jerusalem and the "Half-Baked forum" at Radzyner Law School.
Constitutional theory is obsessed with an attempt to provide an adequate justification for judici... more Constitutional theory is obsessed with an attempt to provide an adequate justification for judicial review. In previous work, one of us argued that the traditional justifications for judicial review are flawed and proposed an alternative framework. Contrary to the traditional view, judicial review is not aimed (exclusively) to protect rights, democracy or bring about justice. Instead, it facilitates the hearing of (justified or unjustified) grievances. This chapter examines to what extent contemporary constitutions can be explained in terms of this framework. Seeking to answer that question, we provide a comparative analysis of the ways in which different systems of judicial review succeed in protecting the right to a hearing. We examine three components of the right to a hearing: the opportunity to raise a grievance, willingness to address the grievance and the willingness to reconsider the decision giving rise to the conflict. We establish that most systems of judicial review satisfy the first and the second conditions but fail to satisfy the third condition. Our framework responds to proposals to de-adjudicate and politicize the protection of constitutional rights. While much constitutional work can be done outside courts, the problem is that such work fails to account for the intrinsic value of adjudication. It fails to account for the right of every person to raise his grievance and force the state to deliberate and reconsider the soundness of its decision. The political process is inferior as it does not provide an opportunity for an aggrieved party to be provided with a hearing.
This article challenges the conventional understanding of the separation of church and state by a... more This article challenges the conventional understanding of the separation of church and state by arguing that there is no analytical or constitutional problem with using religious law for the purpose of constitutional interpretation. We situate our arguments within the context of the broader debate on the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation, and the more recent controversy surrounding the proposed bans on the use of religious law in US state courts. By examining the arguments for and against the use of foreign law, we show how they equally apply to the use of religious law. More importantly, we conclude that differences between foreign law and religious law are, at best, differences of degree rather than kind, and thus do not militate against the use of religious law in constitutional interpretation. This article demonstrates that religious law can be used, and in fact, has already been used by the Supreme Court for four limited purposes, none of which, we argue, offends the principles underlying the Establishment Clause. The ultimate import of our claim is not that religious law should be used by courts, but that recognizing its potential as a source in constitutional interpretation should result in a deeper and more careful engagement with the possibilities it generates.
The conventional view of constitutional adjudication depicts courts as institutions entrusted wit... more The conventional view of constitutional adjudication depicts courts as institutions entrusted with safeguarding the rule of law. This view, however, is at odds with the reality of constitutional doctrine, in which courts in fact incentivize some departures from the law. This Article argues that alongside their familiar role as law enforcers, courts design, maintain, and legitimize an incentive structure that enables public officials to resist the law. Through disparate judicial doctrines, such as standing, political question, sovereign immunity, state secrets, and contempt of court, courts grant public officials discretion to depart from laws that they are otherwise bound to obey. Notwithstanding important reservations, I argue that considerations of efficiency, democratic experimentation, justice, and, paradoxically, judicial legitimacy, lend qualified support to courts enabling such departures from the law. Focusing on those considerations not only sheds new light on seemingly fam...
In the ever growing literature on emergencies, writers mostly focus on normative questions. Yet t... more In the ever growing literature on emergencies, writers mostly focus on normative questions. Yet the structural aspect, investigating the interactions between institutions, is often overlooked. This article seeks to add to the institutional discourse by looking at emergencies through an institutional lens, situating the resolution of legal questions within the separation of powers framework. By looking at judicial decisions in emergencies, I argue that most of them can be explained not according to constitutional considerations of substantive individual rights, but by the position the courts assume within the broader governmental framework. In a presidential system, such as the one in the United States, courts are more likely to perceive themselves as enforcing the separation of powers scheme, rather than as protectors of individual rights. However, when looking at how emergencies are handled in a parliamentary system, in this case Israel, the courts tend to assume a more active role...
Public Economics: Miscellaneous Issues eJournal, 2016
Hebrew Abstract: בעשורים האחרונים אנו עדים לתהליך היטשטשות בין הספירה הפרטית לספירה הציבורית. היט... more Hebrew Abstract: בעשורים האחרונים אנו עדים לתהליך היטשטשות בין הספירה הפרטית לספירה הציבורית. היטשטשות זו באה לידי ביטוי בשלושה תחומים עיקריים. האחד, הפרטה ומיקור חוץ של פונקציות שבעבר בוצעו על-ידי המגזר הציבורי אל המגזר הפרטי. השני, הזרמה של נורמות מהמשפט הציבורי למשפט הפרטי. תחומים אלו זכו להתייחסות ענפה בספרות. המאמר יוקדש לבחינתה של מגמה שלישית, חדשה: מעבר של נורמות שוקיות מהמשפט הפרטי לתוך המגזר הציבורי, שעיקרו ייבוא פרקטיקות ניהוליות וכללים משפטיים אשר התפתחו במגזר הפרטי לתוך מגזר אשר אופן עבודתו הוסדר באופן מסורתי באמצעות כללים שונים. זוהי "הפרטה הפוכה", שמבקשת להפוך את הבירוקרטיה השלטונית לבירוקרטיה שוקית.המאמר משרטט, לראשונה, את מהלכי ההפרטה החדשים בישראל, שגולת הכותרת שלהם היא דו"ח ועדת דיין "לשיפור מנגנוני ניהול ההון האנושי בשירות המדינה", ומבקש להסב את תשומת הלב למורכבות הטמונה בתפיסה החדשה של בירוקרטיה שוקית. כך, למשל, הפיכת אופן הפעולה של המגזר הציבורי לכזה הדומה למגזר הפרטי מעוררת חשש שמקצועיות המינהל הציבורי תבוא על חשבון מקסום האינטרסים של ה...
What legitimates constitutions? One standard answer is that constitutions are legitimate only if ... more What legitimates constitutions? One standard answer is that constitutions are legitimate only if they represent the people they govern. This article identifies two different conceptions of representation. Representation can be grounded either in the consent or the will of the citizens or when the constitution reflects the ‘real’ identity of the members of the nation. Alternatively, it is sometimes stated that the constitution is legitimate because it promotes justice or, more generally, is grounded in reason. While constitutions are typically grounded both in claims to represent the people and in claims concerning the justness and wisdom of the constitutional provisions, we establish that there are two types of constitutions: constitutions that are primarily representational (e.g. the US Constitution) and constitutions that are primarily reason-based (e.g. the German Constitution). We also show that this distinction has important ramifications for how constitutions are drafted and r...
A central task of comparative constitutional law scholarship is categorization and classification... more A central task of comparative constitutional law scholarship is categorization and classification of constitutions. Recent scholarship, no doubt informed by the populist tide, has sought to develop the concept of a mixed constitution. Broadly speaking, a mixed constitution is a constitution that integrates liberal and illiberal elements, elements that are usually separate and not found under the same constitution. The study of “mixed constitutions” encompasses both descriptive and normative aspects. First, an attempt to ascertain what, exactly, makes a constitution “mixed.” Second, an attempt to analyze either the desirability of such a system or an attempt to figure out how to harness mixed constitutions in the service of particular normative goals, for example the protection of human rights. This article has two goals. First, an inquiry into the descriptive aspect of mixed constitutions. My aim is to show that given the seeming consensus of what constitutes a mixed constitution, t...
תקציר בעברית: האם ראוי "לפצל" את קולה של הרשות המבצעת למספר קולות שונים במסגרת הליכים מ... more תקציר בעברית: האם ראוי "לפצל" את קולה של הרשות המבצעת למספר קולות שונים במסגרת הליכים משפטיים להם המדינה היא צד? האם גופים שונים, בתוך הרשות המבצעת, רשאים להציג בפני בית המשפט הדן בסכסוך עמדות שונות מעמדתו של היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, או שמא על המדינה לדבר בקול אחד? בעוד שעמדתם המסורתית של בית המשפט העליון והיועץ המשפטי לממשלה היא כי "המדינה מדברת בקול אחד", תשובה זו אינה ברורה מאליה, וכפי שאטען במאמר זה, אף אינה רצויה.המאמר טוען כי שיקולים מתחום חופש הביטוי, יחד עם שיקולים מתחום הדמוקרטיה הדליברטיבית והמשפט המינהלי, מצדיקים, בנסיבות מסוימות, מתן מעמד לגוף שלטוני אשר מבקש להציג בפני בית משפט דעה שונה מהדעה אותה מציגה ה"מדינה". למעשה, הטענה כי המדינה "מדברת בקול אחד", איננה מתאימה למדינה הרגולטורית המודרנית. היא מונעת זרימת מידע חשוב מתוך הרשות המבצעת אל הרשות השופטת והציבור בכללותו ופוגעת בשקיפותו של ההליך המינהלי. מנגד, מתן מעמד לרשות חולקת צפוי להעשיר את המידע שבידי בית המשפט, יאפשר פיקוח נוסף על ההליך המינהלי, ויטייב את מבחני הסבירות והמידתיות. ...
Under the India "Housing for all" scheme, 20 million urban houses have to be constructed by 2022,... more Under the India "Housing for all" scheme, 20 million urban houses have to be constructed by 2022, which requires the rate of construction to be around 8000 houses/day. Previous results by the team show that present design methods for affordable buildings and structures in India need improvement. The challenges are the disposal of solid waste generated from agro-industrial activities and the energy peak demand in extremely hot and cold seasons. The development of bio-based urban infrastructure which can adapt to the climatic conditions has been proposed. Inclusion of sustainable materials such as agro-industrial by-products and insulation materials has resulted in effective environmental sustainability and climate change adaptability. Precast components are highlighted as a suitable solution for this purpose as well as to fulfil the need of mass housing. India has a lesser record in implementing this prefab technology when compared to a global view. For the first time, a novel and sustainable prefab housing solution is tested for scale-up using industrial waste of co-fired blended ash (CBA) and the results are presented here. A model house of real scale measuring 3 × 3 × 3 m 3 was considered as a base case and is compared with 17 other combinations of model house with varying alignment of prefab panels. Comparison was made with commercially available fly ash brick and CBA brick with a conventional roof slab. A simulation study was conducted regarding cost and energy analysis for all the 18 cases. Various brick and panel compositions with CBA for housing were tried and the superior composition was selected. Similarly, 18 model houses of real scale were simulated, with different combinations of walls made of bricks or panels and different building orientations, to check the impact on energy peak cooling and cost. Results show that peak cooling load can be reduced by six times with bio-based prefab panels. Prefab construction can be considered for mass housing ranging above 100 housing units, each consisting of an area of 25 m 2 .
This chapter, written for the Book “Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Realism and I... more This chapter, written for the Book “Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Realism and Idealism” (forthcoming, CUP), investigates three distinct, though interrelated, questions. First, what do the concepts of idealism and realism mean in the context of constitutional law? Second, what can the Israeli constitutional regime teach us, if anything, about the supposed gap between idealism and realism? Third, should a constitutional system work toward bridging the ideal and the real? The common intuition is that the gap between idealism and realism, however those terms are understood, should be bridged. The chapter will critically examine this proposition in the Israeli context, but will also provide some general insights. I make two overarching claims. One is that the categories of idealism and realism, though seemingly intuitive, turn out to be quite complicated to disentangle. The second claim is that the existence of a gap between the ideal and the real, though seemingly problematic at first blush, might have, on closer examination, limited normative significance. To demonstrate my claims, I examine three areas of Israel’s constitutional structure: constitution-making, rights protection, and institutional image. For each area, I discuss the ideal and the real, and especially the gap between the two. Regarding constitution-making, I show how today’s constitutional settlement looks very different from the one that was envisioned by the framers’ of Israel’s Declaration of Independence. My main argument, however, is that much of the difference lies in form rather than substance. Regarding rights protection, I show how Israel’s judiciary took it upon itself to protect individual rights when the legislature stalled. Here too I argue that despite a seeming gap between idealism and realism, much of the difference lies in the form of protection rather than its substance. Regarding institutional image, I demonstrate how, in cases regarding torture and the separation wall, the Supreme Court seeks to transmit to its foreign audiences an image of a progressive rights protecting court by deciding which decisions to translate into English. I then point to a gap between the translated and non-translated decisions dealing with the same issues. Examining the translated decisions together with the non-translated decisions reveals a more complicated and messier picture than the Supreme Court would like to convey.
and Kenneth Watkin for the helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank the participants in th... more and Kenneth Watkin for the helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank the participants in the International Society of Public Law (ICON.S) Conferences in Berlin and Jerusalem and the "Half-Baked forum" at Radzyner Law School.
Constitutional theory is obsessed with an attempt to provide an adequate justification for judici... more Constitutional theory is obsessed with an attempt to provide an adequate justification for judicial review. In previous work, one of us argued that the traditional justifications for judicial review are flawed and proposed an alternative framework. Contrary to the traditional view, judicial review is not aimed (exclusively) to protect rights, democracy or bring about justice. Instead, it facilitates the hearing of (justified or unjustified) grievances. This chapter examines to what extent contemporary constitutions can be explained in terms of this framework. Seeking to answer that question, we provide a comparative analysis of the ways in which different systems of judicial review succeed in protecting the right to a hearing. We examine three components of the right to a hearing: the opportunity to raise a grievance, willingness to address the grievance and the willingness to reconsider the decision giving rise to the conflict. We establish that most systems of judicial review satisfy the first and the second conditions but fail to satisfy the third condition. Our framework responds to proposals to de-adjudicate and politicize the protection of constitutional rights. While much constitutional work can be done outside courts, the problem is that such work fails to account for the intrinsic value of adjudication. It fails to account for the right of every person to raise his grievance and force the state to deliberate and reconsider the soundness of its decision. The political process is inferior as it does not provide an opportunity for an aggrieved party to be provided with a hearing.
This article challenges the conventional understanding of the separation of church and state by a... more This article challenges the conventional understanding of the separation of church and state by arguing that there is no analytical or constitutional problem with using religious law for the purpose of constitutional interpretation. We situate our arguments within the context of the broader debate on the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation, and the more recent controversy surrounding the proposed bans on the use of religious law in US state courts. By examining the arguments for and against the use of foreign law, we show how they equally apply to the use of religious law. More importantly, we conclude that differences between foreign law and religious law are, at best, differences of degree rather than kind, and thus do not militate against the use of religious law in constitutional interpretation. This article demonstrates that religious law can be used, and in fact, has already been used by the Supreme Court for four limited purposes, none of which, we argue, offends the principles underlying the Establishment Clause. The ultimate import of our claim is not that religious law should be used by courts, but that recognizing its potential as a source in constitutional interpretation should result in a deeper and more careful engagement with the possibilities it generates.
The conventional view of constitutional adjudication depicts courts as institutions entrusted wit... more The conventional view of constitutional adjudication depicts courts as institutions entrusted with safeguarding the rule of law. This view, however, is at odds with the reality of constitutional doctrine, in which courts in fact incentivize some departures from the law. This Article argues that alongside their familiar role as law enforcers, courts design, maintain, and legitimize an incentive structure that enables public officials to resist the law. Through disparate judicial doctrines, such as standing, political question, sovereign immunity, state secrets, and contempt of court, courts grant public officials discretion to depart from laws that they are otherwise bound to obey. Notwithstanding important reservations, I argue that considerations of efficiency, democratic experimentation, justice, and, paradoxically, judicial legitimacy, lend qualified support to courts enabling such departures from the law. Focusing on those considerations not only sheds new light on seemingly fam...
In the ever growing literature on emergencies, writers mostly focus on normative questions. Yet t... more In the ever growing literature on emergencies, writers mostly focus on normative questions. Yet the structural aspect, investigating the interactions between institutions, is often overlooked. This article seeks to add to the institutional discourse by looking at emergencies through an institutional lens, situating the resolution of legal questions within the separation of powers framework. By looking at judicial decisions in emergencies, I argue that most of them can be explained not according to constitutional considerations of substantive individual rights, but by the position the courts assume within the broader governmental framework. In a presidential system, such as the one in the United States, courts are more likely to perceive themselves as enforcing the separation of powers scheme, rather than as protectors of individual rights. However, when looking at how emergencies are handled in a parliamentary system, in this case Israel, the courts tend to assume a more active role...
Public Economics: Miscellaneous Issues eJournal, 2016
Hebrew Abstract: בעשורים האחרונים אנו עדים לתהליך היטשטשות בין הספירה הפרטית לספירה הציבורית. היט... more Hebrew Abstract: בעשורים האחרונים אנו עדים לתהליך היטשטשות בין הספירה הפרטית לספירה הציבורית. היטשטשות זו באה לידי ביטוי בשלושה תחומים עיקריים. האחד, הפרטה ומיקור חוץ של פונקציות שבעבר בוצעו על-ידי המגזר הציבורי אל המגזר הפרטי. השני, הזרמה של נורמות מהמשפט הציבורי למשפט הפרטי. תחומים אלו זכו להתייחסות ענפה בספרות. המאמר יוקדש לבחינתה של מגמה שלישית, חדשה: מעבר של נורמות שוקיות מהמשפט הפרטי לתוך המגזר הציבורי, שעיקרו ייבוא פרקטיקות ניהוליות וכללים משפטיים אשר התפתחו במגזר הפרטי לתוך מגזר אשר אופן עבודתו הוסדר באופן מסורתי באמצעות כללים שונים. זוהי "הפרטה הפוכה", שמבקשת להפוך את הבירוקרטיה השלטונית לבירוקרטיה שוקית.המאמר משרטט, לראשונה, את מהלכי ההפרטה החדשים בישראל, שגולת הכותרת שלהם היא דו"ח ועדת דיין "לשיפור מנגנוני ניהול ההון האנושי בשירות המדינה", ומבקש להסב את תשומת הלב למורכבות הטמונה בתפיסה החדשה של בירוקרטיה שוקית. כך, למשל, הפיכת אופן הפעולה של המגזר הציבורי לכזה הדומה למגזר הפרטי מעוררת חשש שמקצועיות המינהל הציבורי תבוא על חשבון מקסום האינטרסים של ה...
Constitutional theory is obsessed with an attempt to provide an adequate justification for judici... more Constitutional theory is obsessed with an attempt to provide an adequate justification for judicial review. In previous work, one of us argued that the traditional justifications for judicial review are flawed and proposed an alternative framework. Contrary to the traditional view, judicial review is not aimed (exclusively) to protect rights, democracy or bring about justice. Instead, it facilitates the hearing of (justified or unjustified) grievances This chapter examines to what extent contemporary constitutions can be explained in terms of this framework. Seeking to answer that question, we provide a comparative analysis of the ways in which different systems of judicial review succeed in protecting the right to a hearing.
We examine three components of the right to a hearing: the opportunity to raise a grievance, willingness to address the grievance and the willingness to reconsider the decision giving rise to the conflict. We establish that most systems of judicial review satisfy the first and the second conditions but fail to satisfy the third condition.
Our framework responds to proposals to de-adjudicate and politicize the protection of constitutional rights. While much constitutional work can be done outside courts, the problem is that such work fails to account for the intrinsic value of adjudication. It fails to account for the right of every person to raise his grievance and force the state to deliberate and reconsider its soundness. The political process is inferior as it does not provide an opportunity for an aggrieved party to be provided with a hearing.
Uploads
Papers by Adam Shinar
We examine three components of the right to a hearing: the opportunity to raise a grievance, willingness to address the grievance and the willingness to reconsider the decision giving rise to the conflict. We establish that most systems of judicial review satisfy the first and the second conditions but fail to satisfy the third condition.
Our framework responds to proposals to de-adjudicate and politicize the protection of constitutional rights. While much constitutional work can be done outside courts, the problem is that such work fails to account for the intrinsic value of adjudication. It fails to account for the right of every person to raise his grievance and force the state to deliberate and reconsider its soundness. The political process is inferior as it does not provide an opportunity for an aggrieved party to be provided with a hearing.