
Attila Nagy
Law Lecturer and Researcher with a wide regional and global experience. Focusing on Law, Business, Human and Minority rights and comparative Constitutional law.
Address: Serbia
Address: Serbia
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Papers by Attila Nagy
their authority. The factors which have guaranteed them for decades have started to self-regulate
certain legal and political issues, and thus, such behaviour has produced distrust and global
misunderstandings. In this work, our aim will be to connect and understand the recent United
Nations (UN) Resolutions, more specifically Security Council Resolution 1244 as related to
Kosovo. The UN has been an important factor of stability in the previous century and its role has
changed, thus, it is necessary to examine its recent decisions and the legal effects they have
produced. In the case of Serbia and Kosovo, we will examine the legal outputs and similar cases.
The need for authority in conflict resolution and legal decision enforcement is more than vital for
cases such as Ukraine or Syria and (unfortunately) future cases. The UN Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has been changed and reshaped in the recent period many times
according to its actual (everyday) needs. Contrary to the earlier cases of state recognition in the
Western Balkans, the acceptance of Kosovo by the UN never happened. Its recognition by the
European Union (EU) member states has caused another inner division in the EU and showed
how many decisions without unanimous agreements are harmful. We will focus on the special
agreements made between the UN and EU as related to the transfer of authority to Kosovo and
what precedents it creates. Kosovo’s independence in 2008 has started an avalanche in the World
as related to the establishment of new states on the Kosovo principle which has again harmed the
UN system of sovereign states and free nations. This case is of vital interest to both the UN and
EU and also to the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ), which could soon be
challenged again and tempted to define what sovereignty is. The number of international actors
present in Kosovo for almost 20 years, including the UN, the EU, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and various other organizations, provides a very challenging
example of conflict resolution and prevention. A recent agreement signed by Serbia and Kosovo
in Brussels in 2013, called the Brussels Agreement, deals with very challenging legal questions
which requires some constitutional changes in both countries. What binds Serbia to enforce and
respect such decisions when its sovereignty is guaranteed by the UN? In Serbia, the question is,
who interferes with its sovereignty and how does the EU treat the UN and its Security Council
decisions? In sum, extraterritorial governance has changed the understanding of sovereignty for
some post-conflict countries as well as more stable countries.
accession to the EU has to be researched in the prism of various conflicts
which are still present and also connected to the Danube Region by
various means. Although it can be stated that the whole idea of the
Danube region has grown out of a bigger regional conflict in which many
disparities have been by today successfully solved. Therefore, Danube
Region with its policies presents a golden mine of possible solutions which
are still a burning issue in many post-conflict societies. Common issues
such as development, infrastructure, sustainability and most importantly
education are just some areas where cooperation and know-how transfer
are possible. The very challenging environments and the clash of interests
in the region present a real challenge with which all stakeholders act
differently. It is necessary to overcome challenges and various interests
and present local and regional priorities which could be beneficial for all.
in Serbia as the Government has envisaged
a rapid change of the Constitution with
a referendum happening in January 2022.
The Constitution of Serbia, from 2006, has
been often seen through the lenses of its Preamble
which describes the undividable unity
and belonging of Kosovo to Serbia. Since no
law of Serbia is applicable, or better to say
enforceable, on the territory of Kosovo, the
declarative nature of the Serbia’s constitutional
Preamble therefore serves as the last
legal argument of the Serbian Sovereignty
over Kosovo. As many ordinary citizens are
unclear why the Constitution is not applicable
and how this loophole can be filled, the
government has offered a partial solution and
change of the constitution, at least for now.
The Constitution will be changed in as far
as the judiciary is concerned in order to enhance
its independence (sic). Therefore, the
change of the constitution, although awaited
in some form, has arrived but with a completely
different agenda. Many citizens have
been confused by the Referendum and it can
be seen in the low turnout rate of only about
a third of the citizens participating in the
voting. One of the biggest challenges of The
Serbian Constitution is that it can’t hold the
rule of law requirements as the de lege lata
does not correspond to the de lege ferenda.
It is hard to foresee whether, and when, the
change in the Serbian Constitution regarding
the issue of Kosovo will occur, but we are
sure that the EU and some stakeholders in
the International Community are pushing towards
this change. It is also hard to ‘sweep
under the carpet’ after all the inapplicability
of The Serbian Constitution and Laws in
Kosovo and the inability of its institutions to
act on this territory.
many forgot that it all happened with the Kosovo Albanians leaving
their land in the winter of 2015 and heading to EU. They have been
the first passengers on the immigration route leading to EU after many
others followed them creating a big immigration crisis. The reasons for
this crisis are various and we will focus on the case of Kosovo and thus
try to help understanding it. Years ago Kosovo citizens started leaving
their country legally with Serbian passports and this has created a
worrying effect in the EU. As an outcome Serbia was forced to issue a
different kind of passport to its citizens in Kosovo. In fact Serbian
citizenship belongs to each and every citizen of Kosovo, in fact they are
all dual citizens. The problem was that the Serbian government issued
passports of a different kind to its Kosovo citizens and that way
prevented them from using the visa free travel to EU. This case of
discrimination is coming together with the somewhat forceful pushing
of the Kosovo citizenship onto the Serbian minority in North Kosovo.
for secessionist movements so will these EU observed and guaranteed rights be soon potentially requested by various minority groups in and outside of the EU. As per the Brussels agreement from April 2013 (BA) a basis for a wide, but still unclear, Serbian minority rights have been established and in specifically the right to establish the Association/Community (A/C) of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo.
It will be a somewhat hybrid entity since it is not recognized by neither the Serbian or Kosovo constitutions in force. Also it will be interesting to see how EU will enforce such minority rights when we know that minority groups in EU have already started to build their positions on the Kosovo case and its outcomes. We will examine how rights present today in Kosovo and ensured by the Serbian state over the Serbs in Kosovo can be potentially changed. Rights offered by the Serbian
state in various areas are of a much higher volume than the same rights offered by Kosovo state towards its Serbian minority. How such rights could be changed or revoked? Naturally they can’t be revoked but just transformed and reshaped into the services of the future A/C of Serbian municipalities, just as the EU supported BA prescribes. What will be the answer of Albanians in Kosovo when they see, again, better conditions offered to Serbs than to Albanians in Kosovo? On the end we
research if there is a benchmark for minority rights for all EU minorities and if this idea is potentially applicable.
In particular our focus is the implementation of rights such as language use, education and administrative divisions. The Swiss model has already been used in the administrative division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our work will at this instance primarily focus on three main minority rights: the use of minority languages, education and territorial
divisions in Kosovo* and Macedonia. Together with language rights we have their parallel use in education which is a more complete use of such right, also necessary in guaranteeing inclusion and development for various communities. The Territorial Divisions of Switzerland, as they have already been used in Bosnia, and could serve us with solutions in our case studies of Kosovo* and Macedonia as well. In particular we will
apply the Swiss legal solutions to the applicability of “agreements” reached after the inter-ethnic conflicts in Kosovo with The Brussels Agreement from 2013 and in Macedonia with The Ohrid Framework Agreement from 2001.
written agreements to find solutions for problems and institutional reform. We will try to see a parallel structure
of agreements between EU and UK in the case of pending or future Brexit happening. Also we will try to see
if EU is using different tools and values in achieving democracy as it is understood in a broader context in
different situations? Why EU is investing huge amounts of resources into Kosovo whereas producing very
little value and advancement and how is transparency of such spending being explained? We will turn to see
what steps were taken in the case of Kosovo so we can apply them to the talks between EU and UK on the
first initial steps towards Brexit as soon as the two “governments” know their approach, priorities and goals.
In the Kosovo case the form of the basic First Brussels agreement as text on a blank page opens different
questions of possible enforcement and future recognition as law. Knowing that EU in Kosovo struggles with
many things among which is International Public Law and its founding principles, we would like to see how it
affects some states in and outside of EU and what we can expect in future EU affairs. Kosovo which is
partially administered by EU through its EULEX mission has its main policies, laws and other important
decisions strongly influenced by the EU limiting its factual sovereignty. Further we also have to focus on
recent agreements made between the Serbian and Kosovo* government where EU was represented by its
High Representative for Foreign Affairs. Agreements and conciliation was made on a level which has a
neutral view towards the status of Kosovo and its independence. Recent developments have the tendency
of providing some solutions which can be broadly accepted and applied to similar cases. Unfortunately
constitutions of Serbia and Kosovo simply do not reflect the recent agreements with EU in their legal
solutions. EU is also torn between its own law and members who recognize Kosovo and the wider level of
stakeholders committed to global peace and human rights such as the UN. The lack of broader consensus
towards some inner and foreign political decisions is tearing up the EU from inside as we have seen in some
recent cases related to sovereignty/autonomy demands and their recognition. We will examine the
documents which were signed with a country without UN recognition and see altogether how Kosovo can
advance or help understand the potential BrExit itself.
In the 1990 Dublin Convention, the signing parties recognized the need to regulate asylum seeking. They introduced the rule of the first country of application, where the asylum seeker has applied for asylum. That means
2
that this first country of application will exclusively deal with the asylum seekers case and either accept or reject it, after what other Dublin countries will not give a chance for another try. Now this system lived successfully for many years until Hungary did not become flooded with illegal migrants in the summer of 2015. Even after the failure of the Dublin regulation it became evident that it is not useful for the present problem and a solution has to be sought. The Hungarian solution was the infamous border lock or in Hungarian “határzár”1 whereas the EU invented, or reinvented the solution from the colonial era, the EU’s “real” solution/problem had been introduced then in the form of a quota system.
The fact is that Syrian citizens have a right to claim asylum in EU, but also in many countries prior to their arrival to EU as well. Also they never intended to claim it in e.g. Hungary but they are forced to since it became obvious that people cross the border and travel without any check to different EU countries to the west. Hungary was at some point blamed for its “law” enforcement using different tools and a border fence towards Serbia on the end.
We have many other questions, in particular related to the fact that refugees have to travel in very inhuman conditions. If there is a country where they want to go and that country can accept them, why don’t other countries help them to reach it easier? Why they are becoming an easy prey for people smugglers and cross border crossings illegally? On the end we will try to answer the ultimate question, why Germany? Or in other words why they are welcome on the west of EU and not so much welcome on the east of EU, when we say east we don’t mean Hungary solely.
of the rule of law, and is a comparative analysis of the results and expectations of international
organisations and citizens. The paper focuses on the role and the future of the OSCE in cases
similar to Kosovo and provides some guidance for future actions. The paper touches on the relationship
with the EU and its EULEX mission, which has tacitly taken over many of OSCE competences
and consequently, the leading role in the Implementation of the 1244 Resolution and the
Brussels agreement. The role of the OSCE has become more technical and administrative in nature,
and the Mission in Kosovo no longer deals with critical issues, as it used to before the 1999
NATO bombing of Serbia. Given that OSCE still constitutes one of the cornerstones of the rule of
law in Kosovo, in the final part of the paper we tried to provide an academic and practical perspective
for the future of the OSCE activity in Kosovo, and provide guidance for its successful presence
and role in dealing with the present and future challenges in this community.
the region of North Kosovo, the Brussels agreement from April 2013. The tremendous
influence this agreement has caused in the region and to both the Serbian and Kosovo
government is very big. Our aim is to see how such agreements are understood by
everyday people, politicians and other stakeholders not just in the region but broader.
This agreement is binding for Serbia and Kosovo, even more is binding for the people
who live on North Kosovo. It is necessary to see how people react to it and how they
can benefit, both on North and other parts of Kosovo. The application of the agreement
is very broad and in fact can influence more Kosovo inhabitants than just those residing
on North Kosovo. The specific situation which we call “Phenomena of North Kosovo”
requires a very careful approach since this region is very popular for its chaotic
situation which lasts for many years. The causes of division present here got stock in
time and there is no possibility to solve them in a manner of one year. For the better
understanding of the political and legal issue after the Brussels agreement present in
both Serbia and Kosovo we have examined the legal framework of these states and their
Constitutions. The Brussels agreement does change the meaning of some articles of the
Constitutions and it can be predicted that this agreement will change and influence
these Constitutions.
On the end we see that both states have given up something but at this moment we do
not see the exact benefits to people and can’t predict the final date when this agreement
will be a part of everyday life on North Kosovo.
ideas and opportunities which could happen in Serbia. Th ese ideas are based on the
Governmental policies and even more on the need of the Serbian economy and its
citizens. For a long period of time the economy was struggling and every small step
towards development is noticeable. Apart from having the same idea of joining the
EU diff erent governments in the past and now claim that they will lead Serbia on
the shortest and most effi cient path to the EU. Th eir political ideas diff er somehow
but certainly the decisions they are making are just following one pattern. Everyday
citizens and businesses just experience the same as in any other country which has its
economy in transition. Much depends on the determination to make a certain step
towards economic development. Sometimes it looks like the steps were made with a big
delay and that everyone except the government was ready to certain changes. Some big
structural changes are not properly done and there is not enough care taken of parallel
practices of states in transition. Th e new procedure of debt collection in Serbia is done
with an intention to make debtors pay more easily. Unfortunately on the end we see
that the system does not work perfectly since the state itself has some problems of getting
its tax money collected. In every aspect of life we see a big infl uence of politics to the
economy, some would say that there is no economy without being involved in politics.
Th is unfortunate situation is following Serbia and many Western Balkan countries
for a long period of time. It is hard to expect economic development with such a bad
attitude which is somehow always proved in practice. Th e redistribution of wealth is
also problematic, having in mind that the tax policy serves only as a tool to fi ll the
budget which is anyway not just in the sense of just redistribution. Th e budget of Serbia
has many loopholes and certainly the current economic development is not ready to
support it. Th ere is a clear need to adjust politics to economy and make the state treat
better the hand which is feeding it.
unique status and since recently its gaining more attention. It is even more interesting if we know that this small region has a
very important role in European Union (hereinafter EU) politics as well. We will focus on the long debated questions for which
not just the two countries Serbia and Kosovo, can’t reach an agreement, but the EU and other International actors also have
unclear and different opinions. For this region it is very hard to find relevant and applicable rules, since rules which could be
applied have either no real power or could not be enforced. Applicable laws are the ones of Serbia and Kosovo but
enforcement power is in the hands of European Union made body, EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission) (Eulex-
Kosovo), so how it is possible that such a strong political body like the EU can’t enforce them? From an Economic and Finance
perspective we will deal with the questions which are of tremendous importance not just for the people from the region but as
well for Serbia, Kosovo, EU and the International community. It has to be outlined that even after reaching some Agreements
between the Serbian and Kosovo governments, like the one from 19th April 2013 (1) (2) many important questions still lay
unanswered and untouched. The most important questions are the ones related to enforcement, rule of law, social welfare,
taxes and security. The pressure is now with the Agreement transferred from EULEX (Mission) to the Governments of Serbia
and Kosovo. As professionals we have to approach these issues with no biases and as reasonably as possible also we have to
focus on the on field situation and facts which are of crucial importance for anything what is happening and can happen.
their authority. The factors which have guaranteed them for decades have started to self-regulate
certain legal and political issues, and thus, such behaviour has produced distrust and global
misunderstandings. In this work, our aim will be to connect and understand the recent United
Nations (UN) Resolutions, more specifically Security Council Resolution 1244 as related to
Kosovo. The UN has been an important factor of stability in the previous century and its role has
changed, thus, it is necessary to examine its recent decisions and the legal effects they have
produced. In the case of Serbia and Kosovo, we will examine the legal outputs and similar cases.
The need for authority in conflict resolution and legal decision enforcement is more than vital for
cases such as Ukraine or Syria and (unfortunately) future cases. The UN Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has been changed and reshaped in the recent period many times
according to its actual (everyday) needs. Contrary to the earlier cases of state recognition in the
Western Balkans, the acceptance of Kosovo by the UN never happened. Its recognition by the
European Union (EU) member states has caused another inner division in the EU and showed
how many decisions without unanimous agreements are harmful. We will focus on the special
agreements made between the UN and EU as related to the transfer of authority to Kosovo and
what precedents it creates. Kosovo’s independence in 2008 has started an avalanche in the World
as related to the establishment of new states on the Kosovo principle which has again harmed the
UN system of sovereign states and free nations. This case is of vital interest to both the UN and
EU and also to the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ), which could soon be
challenged again and tempted to define what sovereignty is. The number of international actors
present in Kosovo for almost 20 years, including the UN, the EU, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and various other organizations, provides a very challenging
example of conflict resolution and prevention. A recent agreement signed by Serbia and Kosovo
in Brussels in 2013, called the Brussels Agreement, deals with very challenging legal questions
which requires some constitutional changes in both countries. What binds Serbia to enforce and
respect such decisions when its sovereignty is guaranteed by the UN? In Serbia, the question is,
who interferes with its sovereignty and how does the EU treat the UN and its Security Council
decisions? In sum, extraterritorial governance has changed the understanding of sovereignty for
some post-conflict countries as well as more stable countries.
accession to the EU has to be researched in the prism of various conflicts
which are still present and also connected to the Danube Region by
various means. Although it can be stated that the whole idea of the
Danube region has grown out of a bigger regional conflict in which many
disparities have been by today successfully solved. Therefore, Danube
Region with its policies presents a golden mine of possible solutions which
are still a burning issue in many post-conflict societies. Common issues
such as development, infrastructure, sustainability and most importantly
education are just some areas where cooperation and know-how transfer
are possible. The very challenging environments and the clash of interests
in the region present a real challenge with which all stakeholders act
differently. It is necessary to overcome challenges and various interests
and present local and regional priorities which could be beneficial for all.
in Serbia as the Government has envisaged
a rapid change of the Constitution with
a referendum happening in January 2022.
The Constitution of Serbia, from 2006, has
been often seen through the lenses of its Preamble
which describes the undividable unity
and belonging of Kosovo to Serbia. Since no
law of Serbia is applicable, or better to say
enforceable, on the territory of Kosovo, the
declarative nature of the Serbia’s constitutional
Preamble therefore serves as the last
legal argument of the Serbian Sovereignty
over Kosovo. As many ordinary citizens are
unclear why the Constitution is not applicable
and how this loophole can be filled, the
government has offered a partial solution and
change of the constitution, at least for now.
The Constitution will be changed in as far
as the judiciary is concerned in order to enhance
its independence (sic). Therefore, the
change of the constitution, although awaited
in some form, has arrived but with a completely
different agenda. Many citizens have
been confused by the Referendum and it can
be seen in the low turnout rate of only about
a third of the citizens participating in the
voting. One of the biggest challenges of The
Serbian Constitution is that it can’t hold the
rule of law requirements as the de lege lata
does not correspond to the de lege ferenda.
It is hard to foresee whether, and when, the
change in the Serbian Constitution regarding
the issue of Kosovo will occur, but we are
sure that the EU and some stakeholders in
the International Community are pushing towards
this change. It is also hard to ‘sweep
under the carpet’ after all the inapplicability
of The Serbian Constitution and Laws in
Kosovo and the inability of its institutions to
act on this territory.
many forgot that it all happened with the Kosovo Albanians leaving
their land in the winter of 2015 and heading to EU. They have been
the first passengers on the immigration route leading to EU after many
others followed them creating a big immigration crisis. The reasons for
this crisis are various and we will focus on the case of Kosovo and thus
try to help understanding it. Years ago Kosovo citizens started leaving
their country legally with Serbian passports and this has created a
worrying effect in the EU. As an outcome Serbia was forced to issue a
different kind of passport to its citizens in Kosovo. In fact Serbian
citizenship belongs to each and every citizen of Kosovo, in fact they are
all dual citizens. The problem was that the Serbian government issued
passports of a different kind to its Kosovo citizens and that way
prevented them from using the visa free travel to EU. This case of
discrimination is coming together with the somewhat forceful pushing
of the Kosovo citizenship onto the Serbian minority in North Kosovo.
for secessionist movements so will these EU observed and guaranteed rights be soon potentially requested by various minority groups in and outside of the EU. As per the Brussels agreement from April 2013 (BA) a basis for a wide, but still unclear, Serbian minority rights have been established and in specifically the right to establish the Association/Community (A/C) of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo.
It will be a somewhat hybrid entity since it is not recognized by neither the Serbian or Kosovo constitutions in force. Also it will be interesting to see how EU will enforce such minority rights when we know that minority groups in EU have already started to build their positions on the Kosovo case and its outcomes. We will examine how rights present today in Kosovo and ensured by the Serbian state over the Serbs in Kosovo can be potentially changed. Rights offered by the Serbian
state in various areas are of a much higher volume than the same rights offered by Kosovo state towards its Serbian minority. How such rights could be changed or revoked? Naturally they can’t be revoked but just transformed and reshaped into the services of the future A/C of Serbian municipalities, just as the EU supported BA prescribes. What will be the answer of Albanians in Kosovo when they see, again, better conditions offered to Serbs than to Albanians in Kosovo? On the end we
research if there is a benchmark for minority rights for all EU minorities and if this idea is potentially applicable.
In particular our focus is the implementation of rights such as language use, education and administrative divisions. The Swiss model has already been used in the administrative division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our work will at this instance primarily focus on three main minority rights: the use of minority languages, education and territorial
divisions in Kosovo* and Macedonia. Together with language rights we have their parallel use in education which is a more complete use of such right, also necessary in guaranteeing inclusion and development for various communities. The Territorial Divisions of Switzerland, as they have already been used in Bosnia, and could serve us with solutions in our case studies of Kosovo* and Macedonia as well. In particular we will
apply the Swiss legal solutions to the applicability of “agreements” reached after the inter-ethnic conflicts in Kosovo with The Brussels Agreement from 2013 and in Macedonia with The Ohrid Framework Agreement from 2001.
written agreements to find solutions for problems and institutional reform. We will try to see a parallel structure
of agreements between EU and UK in the case of pending or future Brexit happening. Also we will try to see
if EU is using different tools and values in achieving democracy as it is understood in a broader context in
different situations? Why EU is investing huge amounts of resources into Kosovo whereas producing very
little value and advancement and how is transparency of such spending being explained? We will turn to see
what steps were taken in the case of Kosovo so we can apply them to the talks between EU and UK on the
first initial steps towards Brexit as soon as the two “governments” know their approach, priorities and goals.
In the Kosovo case the form of the basic First Brussels agreement as text on a blank page opens different
questions of possible enforcement and future recognition as law. Knowing that EU in Kosovo struggles with
many things among which is International Public Law and its founding principles, we would like to see how it
affects some states in and outside of EU and what we can expect in future EU affairs. Kosovo which is
partially administered by EU through its EULEX mission has its main policies, laws and other important
decisions strongly influenced by the EU limiting its factual sovereignty. Further we also have to focus on
recent agreements made between the Serbian and Kosovo* government where EU was represented by its
High Representative for Foreign Affairs. Agreements and conciliation was made on a level which has a
neutral view towards the status of Kosovo and its independence. Recent developments have the tendency
of providing some solutions which can be broadly accepted and applied to similar cases. Unfortunately
constitutions of Serbia and Kosovo simply do not reflect the recent agreements with EU in their legal
solutions. EU is also torn between its own law and members who recognize Kosovo and the wider level of
stakeholders committed to global peace and human rights such as the UN. The lack of broader consensus
towards some inner and foreign political decisions is tearing up the EU from inside as we have seen in some
recent cases related to sovereignty/autonomy demands and their recognition. We will examine the
documents which were signed with a country without UN recognition and see altogether how Kosovo can
advance or help understand the potential BrExit itself.
In the 1990 Dublin Convention, the signing parties recognized the need to regulate asylum seeking. They introduced the rule of the first country of application, where the asylum seeker has applied for asylum. That means
2
that this first country of application will exclusively deal with the asylum seekers case and either accept or reject it, after what other Dublin countries will not give a chance for another try. Now this system lived successfully for many years until Hungary did not become flooded with illegal migrants in the summer of 2015. Even after the failure of the Dublin regulation it became evident that it is not useful for the present problem and a solution has to be sought. The Hungarian solution was the infamous border lock or in Hungarian “határzár”1 whereas the EU invented, or reinvented the solution from the colonial era, the EU’s “real” solution/problem had been introduced then in the form of a quota system.
The fact is that Syrian citizens have a right to claim asylum in EU, but also in many countries prior to their arrival to EU as well. Also they never intended to claim it in e.g. Hungary but they are forced to since it became obvious that people cross the border and travel without any check to different EU countries to the west. Hungary was at some point blamed for its “law” enforcement using different tools and a border fence towards Serbia on the end.
We have many other questions, in particular related to the fact that refugees have to travel in very inhuman conditions. If there is a country where they want to go and that country can accept them, why don’t other countries help them to reach it easier? Why they are becoming an easy prey for people smugglers and cross border crossings illegally? On the end we will try to answer the ultimate question, why Germany? Or in other words why they are welcome on the west of EU and not so much welcome on the east of EU, when we say east we don’t mean Hungary solely.
of the rule of law, and is a comparative analysis of the results and expectations of international
organisations and citizens. The paper focuses on the role and the future of the OSCE in cases
similar to Kosovo and provides some guidance for future actions. The paper touches on the relationship
with the EU and its EULEX mission, which has tacitly taken over many of OSCE competences
and consequently, the leading role in the Implementation of the 1244 Resolution and the
Brussels agreement. The role of the OSCE has become more technical and administrative in nature,
and the Mission in Kosovo no longer deals with critical issues, as it used to before the 1999
NATO bombing of Serbia. Given that OSCE still constitutes one of the cornerstones of the rule of
law in Kosovo, in the final part of the paper we tried to provide an academic and practical perspective
for the future of the OSCE activity in Kosovo, and provide guidance for its successful presence
and role in dealing with the present and future challenges in this community.
the region of North Kosovo, the Brussels agreement from April 2013. The tremendous
influence this agreement has caused in the region and to both the Serbian and Kosovo
government is very big. Our aim is to see how such agreements are understood by
everyday people, politicians and other stakeholders not just in the region but broader.
This agreement is binding for Serbia and Kosovo, even more is binding for the people
who live on North Kosovo. It is necessary to see how people react to it and how they
can benefit, both on North and other parts of Kosovo. The application of the agreement
is very broad and in fact can influence more Kosovo inhabitants than just those residing
on North Kosovo. The specific situation which we call “Phenomena of North Kosovo”
requires a very careful approach since this region is very popular for its chaotic
situation which lasts for many years. The causes of division present here got stock in
time and there is no possibility to solve them in a manner of one year. For the better
understanding of the political and legal issue after the Brussels agreement present in
both Serbia and Kosovo we have examined the legal framework of these states and their
Constitutions. The Brussels agreement does change the meaning of some articles of the
Constitutions and it can be predicted that this agreement will change and influence
these Constitutions.
On the end we see that both states have given up something but at this moment we do
not see the exact benefits to people and can’t predict the final date when this agreement
will be a part of everyday life on North Kosovo.
ideas and opportunities which could happen in Serbia. Th ese ideas are based on the
Governmental policies and even more on the need of the Serbian economy and its
citizens. For a long period of time the economy was struggling and every small step
towards development is noticeable. Apart from having the same idea of joining the
EU diff erent governments in the past and now claim that they will lead Serbia on
the shortest and most effi cient path to the EU. Th eir political ideas diff er somehow
but certainly the decisions they are making are just following one pattern. Everyday
citizens and businesses just experience the same as in any other country which has its
economy in transition. Much depends on the determination to make a certain step
towards economic development. Sometimes it looks like the steps were made with a big
delay and that everyone except the government was ready to certain changes. Some big
structural changes are not properly done and there is not enough care taken of parallel
practices of states in transition. Th e new procedure of debt collection in Serbia is done
with an intention to make debtors pay more easily. Unfortunately on the end we see
that the system does not work perfectly since the state itself has some problems of getting
its tax money collected. In every aspect of life we see a big infl uence of politics to the
economy, some would say that there is no economy without being involved in politics.
Th is unfortunate situation is following Serbia and many Western Balkan countries
for a long period of time. It is hard to expect economic development with such a bad
attitude which is somehow always proved in practice. Th e redistribution of wealth is
also problematic, having in mind that the tax policy serves only as a tool to fi ll the
budget which is anyway not just in the sense of just redistribution. Th e budget of Serbia
has many loopholes and certainly the current economic development is not ready to
support it. Th ere is a clear need to adjust politics to economy and make the state treat
better the hand which is feeding it.
unique status and since recently its gaining more attention. It is even more interesting if we know that this small region has a
very important role in European Union (hereinafter EU) politics as well. We will focus on the long debated questions for which
not just the two countries Serbia and Kosovo, can’t reach an agreement, but the EU and other International actors also have
unclear and different opinions. For this region it is very hard to find relevant and applicable rules, since rules which could be
applied have either no real power or could not be enforced. Applicable laws are the ones of Serbia and Kosovo but
enforcement power is in the hands of European Union made body, EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission) (Eulex-
Kosovo), so how it is possible that such a strong political body like the EU can’t enforce them? From an Economic and Finance
perspective we will deal with the questions which are of tremendous importance not just for the people from the region but as
well for Serbia, Kosovo, EU and the International community. It has to be outlined that even after reaching some Agreements
between the Serbian and Kosovo governments, like the one from 19th April 2013 (1) (2) many important questions still lay
unanswered and untouched. The most important questions are the ones related to enforcement, rule of law, social welfare,
taxes and security. The pressure is now with the Agreement transferred from EULEX (Mission) to the Governments of Serbia
and Kosovo. As professionals we have to approach these issues with no biases and as reasonably as possible also we have to
focus on the on field situation and facts which are of crucial importance for anything what is happening and can happen.