Papers by Stephen Burwood
“Probably there is no better guarantee of a really unhealthy life than perfect health.” This para... more “Probably there is no better guarantee of a really unhealthy life than perfect health.” This paradoxical, and somewhat melancholic, assessment of our prospects for clinical well-being is given by J. H. van den Berg in The Psychology of the Sickbed. This assessment embodies a profound truth about the experience of illness and health that reveals illness to consist in a number of existential ‘conflicts’—with oneself, one’s body, one’s environment and with others—which could be said to constitute the existential situation of the patient. One’s experience of good health, on the other hand, consists largely, though not entirely, in the absence of these conflicts. In good health, one might say, one is at home with oneself, one’s body, one’s environment and with others. The experience of good health, because it is largely constituted by the familiar and routine, therefore breeds forgetfulness. The consolation van den Berg suggests illness may bring is that it is the “giver of little things.” After all, it is the little things that often form the wellspring of our sense of well-being. Thus, amidst the travail and anguish—or at least within the course of recovery and rehabilitation—we can find a positive reminder of important things familiarity and routine made us forget.
The tension between the public utility and accountability of the university on the one hand, and ... more The tension between the public utility and accountability of the university on the one hand, and its core academic mission and the disinterested pursuit of truth on the other, lies at the heart of Jaspers’ reflections on the nature of this peculiar institution and his public falling out with Heidegger. Jaspers’ approach to this issue is to elaborate a normative ideal, with complete academic freedom at its core, that provides a goal that actual, real-world institutions can and should aim to realise. In a world where despotism and autocracy are very real threats to intellectual and academic freedom, and where the Humboldtian conception of the university is also threatened by populism and the ascendency of technocratic values in its heartland of the liberal democracies, Jasper’s idea of the university still has significance for us. In fact, or so I shall argue, an institution approximating Jaspers’ ideal is not one divorced from the state and society in which it resides, for it serves ...
A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education, 2017
It is now commonly argued that trust is fundamental to numerous and varied sorts of human relatio... more It is now commonly argued that trust is fundamental to numerous and varied sorts of human relationships and activities and that education takes place within a fiduciary framework: that a basic trust is essential to child development and the very possibility of initiate learning . It has also been suggested that Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty describe a “fundamental attitude of trust”. I argue that accounts of a generalized, background attitude of trust misuse the term “trust” and that no such notion is to be found in Wittgenstein’s remarks. Rather, Wittgenstein’s soft naturalism suggests that the phenomenon described is better understood as ein spontanes Mitgehen (a spontaneous following), something that he appears to have relied upon in his own, idiosyncratic approach to teaching .
Teorema Revista Internacional De Filosofia, 1996
One could begin any historical survey of philosophical positions on the relation between the ment... more One could begin any historical survey of philosophical positions on the relation between the mental and the physical by reviewing positions before Descartes.. One could, for example, profitably begin by examining the views of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas or any number of other thinkers. What one cannot do, however, is begin by looking at philosophical positions which have come after Descartes. Why is this? Not simply because Descartes gives us a classic statement of the problems involved, not simply because he represents a particular position which people still argue for an against (though both of these is true) but also because, to a large extent, his work has set the framework of Cartesian categories and so perpetuate the very problem they claim to resolve. Thus Erwin Straus exaggerated only a little when he said that "The ideas of Descartes have become so much a part of everybody's thought in Europe that later centuries took credit for the discoveries prepared or made by Descartes. Just because European thought was so deeply suffused with Cartesianism, those who came later were unaware of repeating the great thinker, they were ignorant of the sources on which they depended." Descartes' views are thus not simply of concern to those interested in the history of ideas and so no apology is needed for a continuing interest in his work. However, if the central thrust of Baker and Morris' ambitious and closely argued work is true, the foregoing claim for his continued relevance should be made with some reservation. At best, the relation between this 'Cartesian' heritage and Descartes' own views is not straightforward and, in fact, may be largely nebulous. Baker and Morris' main contention is that the 'Cartesianism' with which we have become so familiar is something of a changeling and 'has much of the character of a projection of distinctively more modern ideas on to an early seventeenth-century thinker'. Close textual analysis reveals that this changeling, what the authors dub the Cartesian Legend, is a strained interpretation of his work which requires Descartes to hold positions at odds with the general direction of his thought. Central to the Cartesian Legend, of course, is the view that Descartes was a Cartesian Dualist. Not so, say Baker and Morris: it is possible to read Descartes in a way such that he did not think that thoughts constitute an inner realm of mental objects, that this inner realm is apprehended by a quasi-perceptual faculty called 'introspection', that its deliverances are indubitable, that the body is an insentient machine, that the mental and the physical are causally (and thereby externally and contingently) related, and that he did not use the term 'thought' to embrace all 'states of consciousness'. They propose an alternative, more sympathetic, reading in which Descartes' Dualism is presented as more refined, of its time, and consistent with the general principles governing his own metaphysical, logical, ethical, and theological thought.
The authors explain the ideas of philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Putnam, Fodor, Davidson, Denn... more The authors explain the ideas of philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Putnam, Fodor, Davidson, Dennett, and Merleau-Ponty and examine the famous examples these and other philosophers have introduced. They also provide an overview of the issues and debates involving reductionism, functionalism, computational theories of mind, connectionism, the language of thought, externalism versus internalism in the theory of thought content, interpretationism, the problem of consciousness, and theories of experience. The fresh and incisive perspective of Philosophy of Mind will be of interest to both undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy as well as to students and professionals in cognitive science disciplines who would like an introduction to the philosophical treatment of the subject. Guides to further reading are provided in each chapter and the book includes a helpful glossary and useful diagrams.
Embodied Selves, 2012
Jean Amery’s autobiographical account of torture at the hands of the Gestapo provides the most st... more Jean Amery’s autobiographical account of torture at the hands of the Gestapo provides the most striking, if also the most harrowing, example of how the body resurfaces in conscious awareness due to pain and how such experiences often reveal an ambiguity in one’s embodied identity. Amery was an Austrian-born Jew who spent the early years of the Second World War working for the Belgian Resistance. After his arrest in July 1943 he was taken to the Fort Breendonk ‘reception camp’ and tortured before being shipped to a series of concentration camps, including Auschwitz.1 The Gestapo shackled his hands behind his back and then raised him by a chain until he was suspended by his hands a metre above the floor. Amery describes in detail his desperate but ultimately futile attempt to prevent the inevitable: the shattering dislocation of his arms from his shoulder joints. His arms were torn from behind and were twisted back over his head. As he remarks dryly, ‘Torture, from Latin torquere, to twist’ (ibid.: 32). As if this were not enough, during all of this the Gestapo officer present horsewhipped him with incredible brutality.
An Introduction to Metaphilosophy
An Introduction to Metaphilosophy
An Introduction to Metaphilosophy
Introduction Recently, Stephen Hawking boldly declared that philosophy is dead. ‘Philosophy’, he ... more Introduction Recently, Stephen Hawking boldly declared that philosophy is dead. ‘Philosophy’, he explains, ‘has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge’. As a result, he claims, philosophical discussion has become outdated and irrelevant. If Hawking is right, philosophy belongs to a past we have finally put behind us; it has no future. Of course, despite itself, Hawking’s claim voices a philosophical view, one based on a number of contentious and unacknowledged assumptions about the nature of philosophy. It appears to be a ‘residue’ view of philosophy which conceives of philosophy as a cognitive enterprise and an earlier, unsystematic and failed attempt to explain the natural world, in competition with physics and the special sciences. On this view, as explained in Chapter 2, incrementally (over the years and bit by bit), philosophy has found its subject matter become the business of natural science until it has been left with the ‘gaps’; that is, those questions, such as ‘Why does the universe exist?’, to which natural science has found difficulty offering an answer. But now, or so Hawking thinks, even this sort of inquiry is susceptible to scientific treatment, leaving philosophy outmoded and its purpose usurped.
An Introduction to Metaphilosophy
Introduction Philosophy seems to have had a somewhat disappointing career. It was once hailed as ... more Introduction Philosophy seems to have had a somewhat disappointing career. It was once hailed as the ‘queen of the sciences’, but more recently it has been demoted to their ‘under-labourer’, if not pronounced irrelevant or ‘dead’ altogether. Yet philosophy soldiers on, if not entirely unscathed, then at most with minor cuts and bruises. The number of professional practitioners of philosophy has never been higher, and students continue to enrol in philosophy programmes. Despite its loss of prestige, then, philosophy apparently continues to appeal to human beings. But what is this thing called philosophy? Tempting as it may be to start formulating one’s reply straightaway, it is worth pausing to consider what, precisely, the question is we are supposed to answer. As G. E. Moore once wrote: [I]n Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, the difficulties and disagreements, of which its history is full, are mainly due to a very simple cause: namely to the attempt to answer questions, without first discovering precisely what question it is which you desire to answer. As we shall see, Moore’s implicit suggestion that most philosophical disagreements would go away if only philosophers would get clear on the question they want to answer before setting about answering it is probably too optimistic. Yet at least the effort to clarify what the question is might enable us to see which philosophers genuinely agree or disagree in their answers to that question and which philosophers simply debate a different question altogether. The question ‘What is philosophy?’ is very much a case in point.
What is philosophy? How should we do it? Why should we bother to? These are the kinds of question... more What is philosophy? How should we do it? Why should we bother to? These are the kinds of questions addressed by metaphilosophy – the philosophical study of the nature of philosophy itself. Students of philosophy today are faced with a confusing and daunting array of philosophical methods, approaches and styles and also deep divisions such as the notorious rift between analytic and Continental philosophy. This book takes readers through a full range of approaches – analytic versus Continental, scientistic versus humanistic, 'pure' versus applied – enabling them to locate and understand these different ways of doing philosophy. Clearly and accessibly written, it will stimulate reflection on philosophical practice and will be invaluable for students of philosophy and other philosophically inclined readers.
Teaching in Higher Education, 1999
Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2009
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2003
When the gods wish to punish us, they first answer our prayers. Universities in the UK can now at... more When the gods wish to punish us, they first answer our prayers. Universities in the UK can now attest the truth of this cruel irony. Having long bemoaned the fact that they have been the victim of an endemic disregard bordering upon malign neglect, barely appearing on the register of public debate and governmental concern, they now find this is no longer true. Higher education has suddenly become a key battleground in British domestic politics and proposals abound from both government and opposition alike. However, even elemental issues such as its aims and values, and not just practical concerns like an effective and equitable method of funding, are up for discussion. Be afraid. Be very afraid. Charles Clarke, the cabinet minister responsible, says he wants to initiate 'a debate on fundamentals'. From his public statements so far, Clarke is a man who understands, or wants us to think he understands, a university to be nothing more than 'a semi-autonomous educational institution with degree awarding powers', and is, in any case, member of a political culture whose educational mentors appear for all the world to be Wackford Squeers and Thomas Gradgrind. Academics across the world will recognise the nature of the threat; the particulars are local, the pattern is global. Given continued fiscal constraints, a fascination for markets and so-called modernisation, and a crude utilitarian vocationalism, one cannot help feeling no good will come of this renewed interest on the part of politicians. Of course, there is a debate to be had and it is urgent that academics engage in it. Given that a core aspect of their role is the inculcation of critical thought, it is clearly unsatisfactory, as Gordon Graham says, that any 'change takes place entirely at the bidding of those voices and forces that demand it', i.e. outside interests [1] (p. 126). Regrettably, during the past two decades, apart from some notable exceptions [2], most academics have been reluctant to do so, even among themselves. This is now changing. The case for debate is laid out in Ronald Barnett's contribution to a recent addition to Blackwell's Companions to Philosophy series, the Companion to the Philosophy of Education [3]. (Though why, especially given the publication of this volume, is there no entry for philosophy of education in the expanded second edition of Blackwell's complementary generic volume [4]?) Universities, according to Barnett, are caught in the currents of uncertainty and fluidity (a condition he terms, in a different contribution, 'supercomplexity' [5]), so that the idea of the university has become 'conceptually fragile'. The boundaries between academe and the world outside its cloisters (or, more accurately nowadays, precincts) are, he argues, dissolving. They are now required to be more accountable to that outside world and responsive to its needs, and, at the same time, they find their traditional role as the 'dominant producers of knowledge' usurped by institutions in and of that world. It is only when academics respond to these
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2002
Is the only 'green' aspect of Norman Foster's proposed Baltic Exchange redevelop-m... more Is the only 'green' aspect of Norman Foster's proposed Baltic Exchange redevelop-ment the fact that it's been compared to a vegetable? The Swiss Reinsurance building is, in fact, the second of Foster's proposals for the redevelopment of this site, the first being the ambitious ...
A number of years ago Sydney Shoemaker remarked; "it is a striking fact about contemporary philos... more A number of years ago Sydney Shoemaker remarked; "it is a striking fact about contemporary philosophy of mind that, while scarcely anyone thinks that it is a live possibility that a mind-body dualism anything like Descartes' is true, considerable effort continues to be spent on the construction, consideration, analysis and refutation of arguments in favour of such dualistic positions."l This expenditure of effort has not yet subsided and one can almost hear Shoemaker paraphrasing Kant and claiming that it is a scandal of philosophy that such arguments have not yet been put to rest. Similarly, Richard Zaner has also noted how "the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and brain [ran] through most of the recent symposium of the 'Philosophical Dimensions of the Neuro-Medical Sciences'." Zaner resists the temptation to try and account for this phenomenon and instead suggests that "one cannot but marvel at the insistent way it [the 'Cartesian Problem'] keeps popping up."2 However, whilst it is generally true that it is an unfashionable thesis within philosophy departments, the Cartesian view of human nature is no straw-man to be set up only to be kicked down at the convenience of yet another postgraduate dissertation. This is a sprightly tri-centenarian which occasionally receives spirited professional defences. 3 Apart from this we also have to recognise that, for the most part, it also leads a full and invigorating life outside the narrow confines of faculty. But perhaps more significantly than both of these considerations, it is not as widely recognised as it should be, even within the diScipline, that many positions seemingly antithetical to Cartesian metaphysics owe their parentage to Descartes and continue to work within a framework of
The Philosophers' Magazine, 2004
Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2003
The current quality assurance culture demands the explicit articulation, by means of publication,... more The current quality assurance culture demands the explicit articulation, by means of publication, of what have been hitherto tacit norms and conventions underlying disciplinary genres. The justification is that publication aids student performance and guarantees transparency and accountability. This requirement makes a number of questionable assumptions predicated upon what we will argue is an erroneous epistemology. It is not always possible to articulate in a publishable form a detailed description of disciplinary practices such as assessment. As a result publication cannot achieve its stated goals. There are always elements of our knowledge that cannot be linguistically articulated. Dialogue between a Student (S.) and the Ideal Mathematician (I.M.). S. Sir, what is a mathematical proof? I. M. You don't know that? What year are you in? S. Third-year graduate.
Uploads
Papers by Stephen Burwood