Papers by Oded Na'aman
Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent's st... more Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent's states or attitudes at an individual time (Hedden 2015, 2016; Moss 2015); others argue that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with processes (Podgorski 2017). This distinction is not drawn in discussions of emotional rationality. As a result, a widely held assumption in the literature on emotional rationality has gone unexamined. I employ Abelard Podgorski's argument from rational delay to argue that many emotional norms are fundamentally concerned with emotional processes. I also claim that the main response available to the synchronist about belief is not available to the synchronist about emotions and, therefore, process norms are more plausible than epistemologists tend to believe. 0. Process rationality is the view that rational norms are fundamentally process-oriented, not stateoriented. There are at least two possible versions of process rationality. Strong process rationality is the view that all rational norms are fundamentally process-oriented. I shall neither argue for this version of process rationality nor contest it. It is, however, endorsed by Abelard Podgorski, to whom we will return later. Weak process rationality is the view that some rational norms are fundamentally process-oriented. Brian Hedden, to whom we will also return later, explicitly rejects weak process rationality: he argues there are no fundamental process-oriented norms. Hedden has many hidden allies. Most contemporary philosophers writing about rational norms for emotions unwittingly agree with him, which is to say that they implicitly reject weak process rationality. Today, I will argue that Hedden and the prominent implicit view in the literature on emotional rationality are mistaken: once the question is raised with regard to emotions, weak process rationality appears highly plausible. 1. Recent philosophical writing about emotion tends to focus on emotional episodes, or, more specifically, on "object-directed, irruptive states, that occur in relatively transient bouts involving positive or negative affect, and that typically involve a distinctive motivational profile" (D'Arms 2013, 3). Common examples of such states are: anger, amusement, contempt, disgust, envy, fear, guilt, jealousy, pride, regret, and shame. The focus on emotional episodes is prevalent among
Philosophical Studies, 2023
A joke is amusing if and only if it's fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and on... more A joke is amusing if and only if it's fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it's fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the fit-value biconditionals. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock of various metaethical projects, such as fittingattitude analyses of value and the 'fittingness first' approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit-value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn't imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn't imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn't imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered.
In Christopher Howard & Richard Rowland (eds.), Fittingness, Oxford University Press. forthcoming... more In Christopher Howard & Richard Rowland (eds.), Fittingness, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about. Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. This chapter argues: sometimes, yes. First, it claims that when a racing heart accompanies fear it seems to have the typical characteristics of fit-evaluable items. Then, it suggests that suspicion of this initial impression is explained by the assumption that whether an item is ever fit-evaluable is determined by the type of item it is. Fear is the type of thing that can be fit-evaluable, a racing heart is not. The chapter then proposes an alternative whereby the same type of item can be fit-evaluable on one occasion but not on another. What explains the difference, it is argued, is that only in the former occasion the item is explained by the agent’s narrative as an element of a fit-evaluable response.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2022
It is commonly thought that surprise is primarily an epistemic reaction elicited by unexpected fa... more It is commonly thought that surprise is primarily an epistemic reaction elicited by unexpected facts. This paper offers a novel view of what makes something surprising. We distinguish between descriptive and normative notions of what is surprising; clarify the sense in which surprising facts are unexpected; argue that many unexpected facts do not merit surprise; and develop and defend the significance account of surprise, according to which a fact is surprising to an agent if and only if (and to the extent that) it is both unexpected and significant to the agent. Since a surprising fact can be significant to an agent in various ways-personal, moral, epistemic, and aesthetic-surprise is not merely or primarily epistemic. Fitting surprise reflects more than a person's view of what is; it reflects a person's view of what is significant.
The Politics of Emotional Shockwaves, eds. Ana Falcato and Sara Graça da Silva
I propose that shock can be morally significant independently of its consequences but only as par... more I propose that shock can be morally significant independently of its consequences but only as part of an ongoing commitment to certain norms, in particular norms that constitute recognizing another as a person. When we witness others in agony, or being severely wronged, or when we ourselves severely wrong or mistreat others, our shock can reflect our recognition of them as persons, a recognition constituted by our commitment to certain moral norms. However, if we do not in fact respond to the suffering or wrong in accordance with these norms—if, for example, we do not act to relieve their suffering or to properly address the wrong done, and do not avoid or prevent its recurrence—then our commitment to the relevant norms is undermined. When we consistently violate the norms whose violation initially shocked us, our lingering shock upon repeated violations gradually loses its significance and becomes a mere impulse—a fossil of a past commitment, so to speak—before it disappears completely. The failure to be shocked in such instances marks the failure of our moral commitments, which is the failure to recognize others as persons.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s st... more Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015, 2016; Moss 2015]; others argue that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with processes [Podgorski 2017]. This distinction is not drawn in discussions of emotional rationality. As a result, a widely held assumption in the literature on emotional rationality has gone unexamined. I employ Abelard Podgorski’s argument from rational delay to argue that many emotional norms are fundamentally concerned with emotional processes. I also claim that the main response available to the synchronist about belief is not available to the synchronist about emotions and, therefore, fundamental process norms are more plausible than epistemologists tend to believe.
Noûs, 2019
The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by consi... more The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward-looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward-looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, I argue there are rationally self-consuming attitudes: affective attitudes that become less fitting the longer they endure while the facts that give reason for them persist. A widely held synchronic view of fitting affective attitudes denies that fittingness at a time depends on the agent's attitudes at different times and therefore denies that the fittingness of an affective attitude can depend on its duration. Once we reject the synchronic view, we may see that affective attitudes are often fitting due to the fitting processes of which they are part. These fitting processes explain the fitting diminution of backward-looking emotions as well as other diachronic aspects of the fittingness of emotions.
Philosophical Studies, 2020
How can we explain the rational diminution of backward-looking emotions (e.g., grief, regret, and... more How can we explain the rational diminution of backward-looking emotions (e.g., grief, regret, and anger) without resorting to pragmatic or wrong kind of reason explanations? That is to say, how can the diminution of these emotions not only be rational but fitting? In this paper, I offer an answer to this question by considering the case of anger. In Sect. 1, I examine Pamela Hieronymi’s account of forgiveness as the rational resolution of resentment. I argue that Hieronymi’s account rests on an assumption about the rationality of emotions (and of attitudes in general)—namely, that a rational (and fitting) change in emotion entails a change in the fact that constitutes the reason for the emotion. Then, in Sect. 2, I consider Agnes Callard’s recent criticism of accounts like Hieronymi’s as well as Callard’s alternative account of the rational resolution of anger. I argue that Callard offers a promising account but fails to explain how it avoids the criticism she levels against Hieronymi and others. Finally, in Sect. 3, I reject Hieronymi’s assumption and argue that an emotion can cease to be fitting without any change in the fact that constitutes the reason for it. I also explain how my proposal can complement Callard’s account of the rational dissipation of anger. My discussion of anger leads to a solution to the general problem about backward-looking emotions: a fitting backward-looking emotion can fittingly diminish when it is part of a process that is itself a fitting response to the past occurrence.
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy , 2017
First and primarily, I criticize Jay Wallace's account of the affirmation dynamic, which entails ... more First and primarily, I criticize Jay Wallace's account of the affirmation dynamic, which entails a willingness to bring about past occurrences that were necessary for one's present attachments. Specifically, I criticize his analysis of regret and affirmation as intention-like attitudes about the past. Second, I trace Wallace's notion of regret to a common but misguided model of retrospection as a choice between courses of history. Finally, I offer reason to think that the rationality of retrospection crucially differs from the rationality of choice.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2015
The paper presents an argument from love against universalism about practical reason, that is, th... more The paper presents an argument from love against universalism about practical reason, that is, the view that an agent's practical reasons normatively supervene on the agent's circumstances. Universalism explains the different reasons you and I have by citing differences in our properties, circumstances, relationships, etc. It thus rejects the possibility that the normative differences between us are basic. But love seems to make such basic distinctions, for it gives us special reasons with regard to particular individuals as such. To establish this, I criticize Niko Kolodny's relationship theory, which accounts for reasons of love in universal terms. Then I suggest that any universalist account will fail in the same way. (For the full paper, click the link above)
The paper examines three puzzles about the rationality of love: the puzzle of legitimate partiali... more The paper examines three puzzles about the rationality of love: the puzzle of legitimate partiality, the puzzle of particularity, and the puzzle of love's necessity. I argue that, in one way or another, the three puzzles arise from a failure to distinguish and understand the relation between two kinds of love-related reasons: reasons to love and reasons of love.
An essay about the possibility of conviction in the face of moral isolation, particularly with re... more An essay about the possibility of conviction in the face of moral isolation, particularly with regard to war.
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An essay about hope and despair in fights against systemic injustice. Discusses the shift toward ... more An essay about hope and despair in fights against systemic injustice. Discusses the shift toward politics of expression, Ta-Nehisi Coates, James Baldwin, Michelle Alexander, William James, and Israel-Palestine.
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Boston Review, Mar 2014
Oded Na'aman •• Normally, our death is present in our lives as an ending-yet-to-arrive. For most ... more Oded Na'aman •• Normally, our death is present in our lives as an ending-yet-to-arrive. For most of us, Simone Weil writes, "Death appears as a limit set in advance on the future." 1 We make plans, pursue goals, and navigate relationships-all under the condition of death. Our actions are shaped by death as a surface is shaped by its boundaries.
Dissertation by Oded Na'aman
A meaningful life involves loving people and valuing things. We typically love our spouses, paren... more A meaningful life involves loving people and valuing things. We typically love our spouses, parents, children, siblings, and friends, and value our projects, activities, causes, and ideals. In virtue of such attachments, a meaningful life is also susceptible to regret of a distinctively personal kind. Our regrets about the misfortunes and harms that befall the people we love and the things we value reflect the extent to which we are implicated in the fate of those people and things, the extent, that is, to which our attachments determine who we are. What are the reasons to which we respond in loving a particular person or valuing a particular thing, and how do these reasons explain personal regret as well as our conception of who we are? This is the question this dissertation aims to address. The primary thesis of the first chapter is that we have reasons to love particular individuals as such. The primary thesis of the second chapter is that different individuals rationally value different objects in different ways, while one and the same object can be rationally valued very much by some and not at all by others. The primary thesis of the third chapter is that our present attachments give us reason to regret or affirm the past. All three chapters make use of the distinction between reasons of attachment and reasons for attachment. Reasons of attachment are the reasons a person takes him-or herself to have with regard to the individual or object he or she loves or values, and reasons for attachment justify or warrant a person's attachments as well as enable the
This is the Introduction to my dissertation.
A meaningful life involves loving people and valuing things. We typically love our spouses, paren... more A meaningful life involves loving people and valuing things. We typically love our spouses, parents, children, siblings, and friends, and value our projects, goals, institutions, and ideals. In virtue of such attachments, a meaningful life is also susceptible to regret of a distinctively personal kind. Our regrets about the misfortunes and harms that befall the people we love and the things we value reflect the extent to which we are implicated in the fate of those people and things, the extent, that is, to which our commitments and devotions determine who we are. What are the reasons to which we respond in loving a particular person or valuing a particular thing and how do these reasons explain personal regret as well as our conception of who we are? This is the question my dissertation aims to address.
Teaching Documents by Oded Na'aman
Moral and political philosophy often focuses on ideals and principles we should aspire to and fol... more Moral and political philosophy often focuses on ideals and principles we should aspire to and follow. Yet individuals and societies almost invariably fall short of these ideals and principles. Unless you are a fundamentalist or a relentless perfectionist, you tolerate these failures. That is, you tolerate them to a point. This point will be the topic of our course. How badly may we fail? How far short of the ideal is too far? We will be concerned with that which is not merely bad, unjustified, wrong, or unjust, but which is intolerably so. Examples include: racial discrimination, rotten compromises, unconscionable contracts, dirty hands, and unjust wars. We will also consider instances of the personally intolerable: pain, personal failures, desperation, betrayal, humiliation, and public shame. Just as important, we will ask: how should we respond to the intolerable? Should intolerably unjust political institutions be met with disobedience, or perhaps rebellion? Must we continue to regret our past failures and mistakes? When we emerge from grief to continue with our lives, do we thereby accept our loss as tolerable? Can we ever forgive without forgetting the severity of the wrong done to us and the harm we suffered? Can we justify hope in the face of pervasive injustice on a massive scale? We will consider contemporary examples as well as literary examples, and we will draw on thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Du Bois, Orwell, De Beauvoir, and Baldwin, as well as contemporary thinkers, such as
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Papers by Oded Na'aman
Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about. Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. This chapter argues: sometimes, yes. First, it claims that when a racing heart accompanies fear it seems to have the typical characteristics of fit-evaluable items. Then, it suggests that suspicion of this initial impression is explained by the assumption that whether an item is ever fit-evaluable is determined by the type of item it is. Fear is the type of thing that can be fit-evaluable, a racing heart is not. The chapter then proposes an alternative whereby the same type of item can be fit-evaluable on one occasion but not on another. What explains the difference, it is argued, is that only in the former occasion the item is explained by the agent’s narrative as an element of a fit-evaluable response.
https://bostonreview.net/philosophy-religion/oded-naaman-imagine-worst
Click the link to read the article online.
Click the link to read the article online.
Dissertation by Oded Na'aman
Teaching Documents by Oded Na'aman
Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about. Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. This chapter argues: sometimes, yes. First, it claims that when a racing heart accompanies fear it seems to have the typical characteristics of fit-evaluable items. Then, it suggests that suspicion of this initial impression is explained by the assumption that whether an item is ever fit-evaluable is determined by the type of item it is. Fear is the type of thing that can be fit-evaluable, a racing heart is not. The chapter then proposes an alternative whereby the same type of item can be fit-evaluable on one occasion but not on another. What explains the difference, it is argued, is that only in the former occasion the item is explained by the agent’s narrative as an element of a fit-evaluable response.
https://bostonreview.net/philosophy-religion/oded-naaman-imagine-worst
Click the link to read the article online.
Click the link to read the article online.