Infinity in Early Modern Philosophy, Ohad Nachtomy and Reed Winegar (Eds), 2018
There are many aspects of the Ethics that seem to suggest the possibility of deducing finite mode... more There are many aspects of the Ethics that seem to suggest the possibility of deducing finite modes from the infinite substance. This way of proceeding would track the ontological order, going from cause to effect, and from what is in itself to what is in another. In spite of the inviting and elegant nature of this top-down trajectory, once we try to actually follow it, things become complicated very quickly. In this paper I argue that a demand for an abstracted top-down trajectory is unwarranted because a top-down trajectory presupposes a previous ascent from confusion to adequacy. Furthermore, I argue that the state of confusion itself, which is our undeniable starting point, is made metaphysically possible only in virtue of there being a real plurality of modes, and hence in that sense in no need of a deduction.
Spinoza's bold claim that there exists only a single infinite substance entails that finite thing... more Spinoza's bold claim that there exists only a single infinite substance entails that finite things pose a deep challenge: How can Spinoza account for their finitude and their plurality? Taking finite bodies as a test case for finite modes in general I articulate the necessary conditions for the existence of finite things. The key to my argument is the recognition that Spinoza's account of finite bodies reflects both Cartesian and Hobbesian influences. This recognition leads to the surprising realization there must be more to finite bodies than their finitude, a claim that goes well beyond the basic substance-monism claim, namely, that anything that is, is in God. This leads to the conclusion, which may seem paradoxical, that finite bodies have both an infinite as well as a finite aspect to them. Finite bodies, I argue, both actively partially determine all the other finite bodies, thereby partially causing their existence insofar as they are finite, as well as are determined by the totality of other bodies. I articulate precisely what this infinite aspect is and how it is distinct from the general substance-monism dictum. 1 The Problem of Finite Modes A predictable tension arises between Spinoza's aim to maintain that, strictly speaking, there is only a single infinite substance and his desire to account for diversity within his metaphysics. The diversity of finite things is particularly difficult to account for: not only due to their plurality, but also because of their very nature qua finite. To pinpoint what seems to be problematic about finite modes, we can consider the way Spinoza
Proposition 28 of Part One of Spinoza’s Ethics is considered to be one of the most central propos... more Proposition 28 of Part One of Spinoza’s Ethics is considered to be one of the most central propositions of this magnum opus primarily because it is key to establishing the determinism pervading Spinoza’s universe. Commentators have taken for granted that what is being described here is an infinite regress of efficient causation among bodies or events. I propose an alternative reading of this fundamental feature of Spinoza’s philosophy, which, given its centrality, has far-reaching implications. I claim that the relation between finite things expressed in 1P28 must be understood as constitutive of the individuation of finite modes rather than describing the interaction between already established finite singular things.
Infinity in Early Modern Philosophy, Ohad Nachtomy and Reed Winegar (Eds), 2018
There are many aspects of the Ethics that seem to suggest the possibility of deducing finite mode... more There are many aspects of the Ethics that seem to suggest the possibility of deducing finite modes from the infinite substance. This way of proceeding would track the ontological order, going from cause to effect, and from what is in itself to what is in another. In spite of the inviting and elegant nature of this top-down trajectory, once we try to actually follow it, things become complicated very quickly. In this paper I argue that a demand for an abstracted top-down trajectory is unwarranted because a top-down trajectory presupposes a previous ascent from confusion to adequacy. Furthermore, I argue that the state of confusion itself, which is our undeniable starting point, is made metaphysically possible only in virtue of there being a real plurality of modes, and hence in that sense in no need of a deduction.
Spinoza's bold claim that there exists only a single infinite substance entails that finite thing... more Spinoza's bold claim that there exists only a single infinite substance entails that finite things pose a deep challenge: How can Spinoza account for their finitude and their plurality? Taking finite bodies as a test case for finite modes in general I articulate the necessary conditions for the existence of finite things. The key to my argument is the recognition that Spinoza's account of finite bodies reflects both Cartesian and Hobbesian influences. This recognition leads to the surprising realization there must be more to finite bodies than their finitude, a claim that goes well beyond the basic substance-monism claim, namely, that anything that is, is in God. This leads to the conclusion, which may seem paradoxical, that finite bodies have both an infinite as well as a finite aspect to them. Finite bodies, I argue, both actively partially determine all the other finite bodies, thereby partially causing their existence insofar as they are finite, as well as are determined by the totality of other bodies. I articulate precisely what this infinite aspect is and how it is distinct from the general substance-monism dictum. 1 The Problem of Finite Modes A predictable tension arises between Spinoza's aim to maintain that, strictly speaking, there is only a single infinite substance and his desire to account for diversity within his metaphysics. The diversity of finite things is particularly difficult to account for: not only due to their plurality, but also because of their very nature qua finite. To pinpoint what seems to be problematic about finite modes, we can consider the way Spinoza
Proposition 28 of Part One of Spinoza’s Ethics is considered to be one of the most central propos... more Proposition 28 of Part One of Spinoza’s Ethics is considered to be one of the most central propositions of this magnum opus primarily because it is key to establishing the determinism pervading Spinoza’s universe. Commentators have taken for granted that what is being described here is an infinite regress of efficient causation among bodies or events. I propose an alternative reading of this fundamental feature of Spinoza’s philosophy, which, given its centrality, has far-reaching implications. I claim that the relation between finite things expressed in 1P28 must be understood as constitutive of the individuation of finite modes rather than describing the interaction between already established finite singular things.
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