Humanities

This article is dedicated to Abraham Miguel Cardozo (1626–1706) and his philosophical work “Derush ha-Iqqarim” (Treatise (or Essay) on the Principles). Abraham Miguel Cardozo was a prominent leader and writer of early Sabbatean movement and one of its most influential ideologists. In our article we shall discuss his philosophy. Cardozo wrote his “Derush ha-Iqqarim” to elaborate the basis for his ontology and epistemology; the “Derush” is divided into several chapters, which Cardozo calls “principles”. The central principle of his work is a principle according to which the First Cause and Upper Infinity are completely unknowable. Their unknowability itself is treated as an epistemological principle, which Cardozo uses later in his work.


Резюме. Статья посвящена Аврааму Мигелю Кардозо (1626–1706) и его труду «Трактат об основах». Авраам Мигель Кардозо был выдающимся идеологом раннего саббатианского движения, что отразилось в его сочинениях. «Трактат об основах» представляет собой философское сочинение, в котором Кардозо разрабатывает основу своей онтологии и эпистемологии. Трактат разделен на ряд глав, которые Кардозо называет «основы». Основная идея его трактата — абсолютная непознаваемость Первопричины и Верхней Бесконечности. Кардозо трактует их непознаваемость как эпистемологическое основа

This article examines Abraham Miguel Cardozo’s analysis of philosophy and Kabbalah as two systems of knowledge and the limits of their knowability. Cardozo argues that Kabbalah is a more precise and exalted system of knowledge since it is based on knowledge directly received from the God of Israel rather than from human figures, such as Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle. According to Cardozo, philosophy cannot correctly comprehend the highest planes of being and consequently conflates the First Cause and the God of Israel. Moreover, philosophy claims to know the First Cause, which Cardozo deems to be absolutely unknowable. However, upon closer examination, Cardozo’s position on unknowability is very close to that of Maimonides. Based on this position, he shows that the First Cause cannot be known even through revelation and Kabbalah. Therefore, Cardozo criticises both systems of knowledge: he criticises philosophy through Kabbalah, and Kabbalah through philosophy