Philosophy

Baumer offers what he sees to be a fatal flaw in Scotus' formulation. We examine Baumer's analysis and question whether he has understood the argument Scotus actually offers. Finally, we provide a possible answer to the objection given by Baumer.

It was common for Medieval thinkers to bring forth divers arguments, or "ways", for the existence of God-from motion, from efficient, formal and final causality, as well as eminence, truth and-and conclude each distinct "way" with a rather unsatisfying (for some) "and this everyone calls God." Scotus does not attempt to show that God exists by a series of arguments that can be used in a cumulative case, but by a single argument that contains several steps, each concluding to something that some might have added the tag, "and this we call God."1 Scotus does something a little different, pressing into service an argument from metaphysical (rather than physical) efficient causality as he begins his single (and rather long) proof for the actual existence of an infinite being. In the Lectura, Scotus explains why he intends to take the metaphysical route. Now efficiency can be considered either as a metaphysical or as a physical property. The metaphysical property is more extensive than the physical for "to give existence to another" is of broader scope than "to give existence by way of movement or change." And even if all existence were given in the latter fashion, the notion of the one is still not that of the other. It is not efficiency as a physical attribute, however, but efficiency as the metaphysician considers it that provides a more effective way of proving God's existence, for there are more attributes in metaphysics than in physics whereby the existence of God can be established. It can be shown, for example, from "composition and simplicity," from "act and potency," from "one and many," from those features which are properties of being. Wherefore, if you find one extreme of the disjunction imperfectly realized in a creature, you conclude that the alternate, the perfect extreme exists in God. Averroës, therefore, in attacking Avicenna at the end of Bk. I of the Physics, 14 is incorrect when he claims that to prove that God exists is the job of the physicist alone, because this can be established only by way of motion, and in no other way-as if metaphysics began with a conclusion which was not evident in itself, but needed to be proved in physics (For Averroës asserts this falsehood at the end of the first book of the Physics). In point of fact, however, [God's existence] can be shown more truly and in a greater variety of ways by means of those. As Wolter says in his discussion about Scotus' Triple Primacy argument: What is interesting to note is that Scotus, unlike Henry of Ghent, or for that matter St. Thomas, does not pause here to tell us that this first cause, or this ultimate end, or this supreme nature is God. In fact, he almost seems loath to use this term until he believes he has established the existence of a being so different and unique among existing things that we can attribute this name to it in a meaningful fashion.

In contemporary theological discourse it is typical to hear distinction between the "Eastern or Western" models of the trinity. One of the leading contemporary Trinitarian theologian who contributes to this debate is John Zizioulas (1931-), whose Trinitarian theology is both deconstructive and constructive. Zizioulas gives many critiques of Western Trinitarian theologies however, they could all be summarized as one main critique namely, that western Trinitarian theology safeguards monotheism at the cost of Trinitarianism. 1

Without the Θεοτόκος, there is no Salvation: The Soteriological and Christological significance of Mary at the Council of Ephesus ! ! During the council of Ephesus, called by Emperor Theodosius II, a new christological controversy over the unity of Christ arose between Cyril of Alexandria and Nestorius of Constantinople. The theological term that took center stage was Θεοτόκος, Mother of God. 1