ABSTRACT
To secure the scientific credibility of its theoretical foundations, CSR needs
to upda... more ABSTRACT To secure the scientific credibility of its theoretical foundations, CSR needs to update its cognitive model. Seminal work in CSR, and much contemporary research, employs a model of cognition that is subject to mounting criticism (i.e., cognitivism). The most significant of these critiques come from 4E cognition. This paper focuses on enactive cognition, arguing that reconstructing CSR along the lines of enactivism will put the field on firmer scientific grounding and can resolve long standing debates within the field. Beginning with an in-depth critique of a key component of the cognitivist model, representationalism, the paper also argues that a non-representational enactive cognitive model fits better with the evolutionary commitments of CSR. Next, it considers a case study in an enactive reconstruction of CSR: agency detection. This foundational concept has come under scrutiny due to lack of empirical support, raising concerns that it may need to be abandoned. Enactivism recasts the concept as “embodied agency-attunement.” This allows a cognitive sensitivity to agency to continue its foundational role in CSR, while addressing empirical critiques leveled against it. The enactive approach is also compared to the predictive processing model. The paper concludes with suggestions about next steps towards an embodied CSR.
The commentaries revealed several recurring themes, most prominent being my arguments against Rep... more The commentaries revealed several recurring themes, most prominent being my arguments against Representationalism and Predictive Processing. These require a more extensive treatment, but I will begin with a general, yet foundational topic: the evolutionary context of both cognition and religion. A failure to appreciate the role of the evolutionary context in the reconstructive project could contribute to a misreading of some discussions.
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpt20, 2020
The cognitive science of religion sets out a naturalistic account of religion, in which religious... more The cognitive science of religion sets out a naturalistic account of religion, in which religious phenomena are grounded in evolved cognitive and moral intuitions. This has important implications for understanding religious systems and the practice of theology. Religions, it is argued, are moral worldviews; theology, rather than a rational justification/explication of the truth of a religion, is an elaboration and/or defense a particular moral worldview, which itself is a particular construction of evolved cognitive and moral intuitions. The philosophical, social, and moral implications of this, which are far reaching, will be explored.
Filosofia Unisinos Unisinos Journal of Philosophy , 2018
A cognitive scientific approach to religion reveals the moral role of religion in human evolution... more A cognitive scientific approach to religion reveals the moral role of religion in human evolutionary history and provides insight into the continuing influence of religion in human affairs. While morality can be understood and justified apart from any religious foundation, religion cannot be separated from its moral function. After setting out the evolved cognitive bases of religious beliefs and behaviors, a model for the nexus between religion and morality is developed. From this it follows that religions constitute moral worldviews that emerge from and tap into deep moral and emotional instincts. This makes religion, and moral world-views more generally, profoundly important, but also makes them dangerously problematic. A case study of the intersection of religion, race, and politics in contemporary American presidential politics will be used to explicate these ideas. RESUMO Uma abordagem científica cognitiva da religião revela o papel moral da religião na história evolutiva humana e fornece insights sobre a contínua influência da religião nos assuntos humanos. Embora a moralidade possa ser entendida e justificada à parte de qualquer fun-damento religioso, a religião não pode ser separada de sua função moral. Depois de esta-belecer as bases cognitivas evoluídas de crenças e comportamentos religiosos, um modelo para o nexo entre religião e moralidade é desenvolvido. A partir disso, segue-se que as religiões constituem visões de mundo morais que emergem e instigam instintos morais e emocionais profundos. Isso torna a religião, e as visões de mundo morais mais genéricas, profundamente importantes, mas também as torna perigosamente problemáticas. Um es-tudo de caso da intersecção de religião, raça e política na política presidencial americana contemporânea será usado para explicar estas ideias. Palavras-chave: religião, moralidade, ciência cognitiva, evolução, visões de mundo.
Morality from an evolutionary perspective is a code of conduct that regulates behavior within a g... more Morality from an evolutionary perspective is a code of conduct that regulates behavior within a group in order to promote social cohesion and stability. Both religion and secularism are grounded in the same moral psychology. How should the distinction between secular and religious ethics be assessed? Religious morality is a late-comer to the natural history of morality, reinforcing much of morality with a worldview about unnatural powers that humans’ brains are prone to projecting onto reality. However, the natural history of morality reveals that religious moral traditions do not originate moral rules but instead reinforce ancient moral intuitions. Secularism as a worldview works within an immanent frame, compared to the transcendent frame of religious worldviews. This distinction is helpful in understanding the relationship between religious violence and secular-ideological driven violence.
Keywords: morality, evolution, secular ethics, humanism, secularism, religious violence
In the 19th century, the case of Phineas Gage suggested that our moral sense could be located in ... more In the 19th century, the case of Phineas Gage suggested that our moral sense could be located in a particular area of the brain. Damage to a part of the prefrontal cortex seemed to have selectively bereft the railroad worker of his moral faculties, resulting in lawless and anti-social behaviour. Additional studies revealed that behaviour of Phineas Gage and patients with similar brain damage can be further characterized by the disturbance of social behaviour, a diminished response of social emotions such as compassion and failures in non-moral decision-making or planning (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999). As the damage is not selective, the “moral” misbehaviour syndrome is apparently not confined to the moral sphere alone. This leads to the conclusion that there is no discrete “moral centre” or single morality module in the brain (Greene, 2005).
The relationship between religion and morality is a subject of widespread interest and intense de... more The relationship between religion and morality is a subject of widespread interest and intense debate: Is morality a product of religion? Can one be moral without religion? Can moral claims be justified outside of a religious context? These are important questions that have been subject to much investigation by theologians and philosophers, among others. Evolutionary studies provide a different way into this topic. Morality has long been a subject for evolutionary research, but an evolutionary approach to religion, based on research into the evolution of the brain, is a recent development, and one that is developing a substantial empirical grounding. Drawing on the insights from both of these fields, this chapter sets out the evolved cognitive mechanisms that constitute the nexus of religion and morality. In addition to providing insight into the nature of religious morality, this model may also help clarify the role religion played in human evolution.
The terrible events in Paris brought, once again, the threat of Islamic radicalism to the foregro... more The terrible events in Paris brought, once again, the threat of Islamic radicalism to the foreground of public consciousness. Such attacks, of course, raise vital questions of public safety and the costs we are willing to pay for that safety. They also raise questions of how to understand the complex conditions that give rise to such events-and the conditions for such events are always complex, even when facile "explanations" are readily available, i.e. the violent nature of Islam, their hatred of Western freedom, etc. A consistent element in many such explanations is a pronouncement on the nature of religion, in general, with some, predictably, placing the blame for such hate-filled acts squarely on religion:
In debates concerning evolutionary approaches to ethics the Naturalistic Fallacy (i.e., deriving ... more In debates concerning evolutionary approaches to ethics the Naturalistic Fallacy (i.e., deriving values from facts or "ought" from "is") is often invoked as a constraining principle. For example, Stephen Jay Gould asserts the most that evolutionary studies can hope to do is set out the conditions under which certain morals or values might have arisen, but it can say nothing about the validity of such values, on pain of committing the Naturalistic Fallacy. Such questions of moral validity, he continues, are best left in the domain of religion. This is a common critique of evolutionary ethics but it is based on an insufficient appreciation of the full implications of the Naturalistic Fallacy. Broadly conceived, the Naturalistic Fallacy rules out any attempt to treat morality as defined according to some pre-existent reality, whether that reality is expressed in natural or non-natural terms. Consequent to this is that morality must be treated as a product of natural human interactions. As such, any discipline which sheds light on the conditions under which values originate, and on the workings of moral psychology, may play a crucial role in questions of moral validity. The authors contend that rather than being a constraint on evolutionary approaches to ethics, the Naturalistic Fallacy, so understood, clears the way, conceptually, for just such an approach.
ABSTRACT
To secure the scientific credibility of its theoretical foundations, CSR needs
to upda... more ABSTRACT To secure the scientific credibility of its theoretical foundations, CSR needs to update its cognitive model. Seminal work in CSR, and much contemporary research, employs a model of cognition that is subject to mounting criticism (i.e., cognitivism). The most significant of these critiques come from 4E cognition. This paper focuses on enactive cognition, arguing that reconstructing CSR along the lines of enactivism will put the field on firmer scientific grounding and can resolve long standing debates within the field. Beginning with an in-depth critique of a key component of the cognitivist model, representationalism, the paper also argues that a non-representational enactive cognitive model fits better with the evolutionary commitments of CSR. Next, it considers a case study in an enactive reconstruction of CSR: agency detection. This foundational concept has come under scrutiny due to lack of empirical support, raising concerns that it may need to be abandoned. Enactivism recasts the concept as “embodied agency-attunement.” This allows a cognitive sensitivity to agency to continue its foundational role in CSR, while addressing empirical critiques leveled against it. The enactive approach is also compared to the predictive processing model. The paper concludes with suggestions about next steps towards an embodied CSR.
The commentaries revealed several recurring themes, most prominent being my arguments against Rep... more The commentaries revealed several recurring themes, most prominent being my arguments against Representationalism and Predictive Processing. These require a more extensive treatment, but I will begin with a general, yet foundational topic: the evolutionary context of both cognition and religion. A failure to appreciate the role of the evolutionary context in the reconstructive project could contribute to a misreading of some discussions.
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpt20, 2020
The cognitive science of religion sets out a naturalistic account of religion, in which religious... more The cognitive science of religion sets out a naturalistic account of religion, in which religious phenomena are grounded in evolved cognitive and moral intuitions. This has important implications for understanding religious systems and the practice of theology. Religions, it is argued, are moral worldviews; theology, rather than a rational justification/explication of the truth of a religion, is an elaboration and/or defense a particular moral worldview, which itself is a particular construction of evolved cognitive and moral intuitions. The philosophical, social, and moral implications of this, which are far reaching, will be explored.
Filosofia Unisinos Unisinos Journal of Philosophy , 2018
A cognitive scientific approach to religion reveals the moral role of religion in human evolution... more A cognitive scientific approach to religion reveals the moral role of religion in human evolutionary history and provides insight into the continuing influence of religion in human affairs. While morality can be understood and justified apart from any religious foundation, religion cannot be separated from its moral function. After setting out the evolved cognitive bases of religious beliefs and behaviors, a model for the nexus between religion and morality is developed. From this it follows that religions constitute moral worldviews that emerge from and tap into deep moral and emotional instincts. This makes religion, and moral world-views more generally, profoundly important, but also makes them dangerously problematic. A case study of the intersection of religion, race, and politics in contemporary American presidential politics will be used to explicate these ideas. RESUMO Uma abordagem científica cognitiva da religião revela o papel moral da religião na história evolutiva humana e fornece insights sobre a contínua influência da religião nos assuntos humanos. Embora a moralidade possa ser entendida e justificada à parte de qualquer fun-damento religioso, a religião não pode ser separada de sua função moral. Depois de esta-belecer as bases cognitivas evoluídas de crenças e comportamentos religiosos, um modelo para o nexo entre religião e moralidade é desenvolvido. A partir disso, segue-se que as religiões constituem visões de mundo morais que emergem e instigam instintos morais e emocionais profundos. Isso torna a religião, e as visões de mundo morais mais genéricas, profundamente importantes, mas também as torna perigosamente problemáticas. Um es-tudo de caso da intersecção de religião, raça e política na política presidencial americana contemporânea será usado para explicar estas ideias. Palavras-chave: religião, moralidade, ciência cognitiva, evolução, visões de mundo.
Morality from an evolutionary perspective is a code of conduct that regulates behavior within a g... more Morality from an evolutionary perspective is a code of conduct that regulates behavior within a group in order to promote social cohesion and stability. Both religion and secularism are grounded in the same moral psychology. How should the distinction between secular and religious ethics be assessed? Religious morality is a late-comer to the natural history of morality, reinforcing much of morality with a worldview about unnatural powers that humans’ brains are prone to projecting onto reality. However, the natural history of morality reveals that religious moral traditions do not originate moral rules but instead reinforce ancient moral intuitions. Secularism as a worldview works within an immanent frame, compared to the transcendent frame of religious worldviews. This distinction is helpful in understanding the relationship between religious violence and secular-ideological driven violence.
Keywords: morality, evolution, secular ethics, humanism, secularism, religious violence
In the 19th century, the case of Phineas Gage suggested that our moral sense could be located in ... more In the 19th century, the case of Phineas Gage suggested that our moral sense could be located in a particular area of the brain. Damage to a part of the prefrontal cortex seemed to have selectively bereft the railroad worker of his moral faculties, resulting in lawless and anti-social behaviour. Additional studies revealed that behaviour of Phineas Gage and patients with similar brain damage can be further characterized by the disturbance of social behaviour, a diminished response of social emotions such as compassion and failures in non-moral decision-making or planning (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999). As the damage is not selective, the “moral” misbehaviour syndrome is apparently not confined to the moral sphere alone. This leads to the conclusion that there is no discrete “moral centre” or single morality module in the brain (Greene, 2005).
The relationship between religion and morality is a subject of widespread interest and intense de... more The relationship between religion and morality is a subject of widespread interest and intense debate: Is morality a product of religion? Can one be moral without religion? Can moral claims be justified outside of a religious context? These are important questions that have been subject to much investigation by theologians and philosophers, among others. Evolutionary studies provide a different way into this topic. Morality has long been a subject for evolutionary research, but an evolutionary approach to religion, based on research into the evolution of the brain, is a recent development, and one that is developing a substantial empirical grounding. Drawing on the insights from both of these fields, this chapter sets out the evolved cognitive mechanisms that constitute the nexus of religion and morality. In addition to providing insight into the nature of religious morality, this model may also help clarify the role religion played in human evolution.
The terrible events in Paris brought, once again, the threat of Islamic radicalism to the foregro... more The terrible events in Paris brought, once again, the threat of Islamic radicalism to the foreground of public consciousness. Such attacks, of course, raise vital questions of public safety and the costs we are willing to pay for that safety. They also raise questions of how to understand the complex conditions that give rise to such events-and the conditions for such events are always complex, even when facile "explanations" are readily available, i.e. the violent nature of Islam, their hatred of Western freedom, etc. A consistent element in many such explanations is a pronouncement on the nature of religion, in general, with some, predictably, placing the blame for such hate-filled acts squarely on religion:
In debates concerning evolutionary approaches to ethics the Naturalistic Fallacy (i.e., deriving ... more In debates concerning evolutionary approaches to ethics the Naturalistic Fallacy (i.e., deriving values from facts or "ought" from "is") is often invoked as a constraining principle. For example, Stephen Jay Gould asserts the most that evolutionary studies can hope to do is set out the conditions under which certain morals or values might have arisen, but it can say nothing about the validity of such values, on pain of committing the Naturalistic Fallacy. Such questions of moral validity, he continues, are best left in the domain of religion. This is a common critique of evolutionary ethics but it is based on an insufficient appreciation of the full implications of the Naturalistic Fallacy. Broadly conceived, the Naturalistic Fallacy rules out any attempt to treat morality as defined according to some pre-existent reality, whether that reality is expressed in natural or non-natural terms. Consequent to this is that morality must be treated as a product of natural human interactions. As such, any discipline which sheds light on the conditions under which values originate, and on the workings of moral psychology, may play a crucial role in questions of moral validity. The authors contend that rather than being a constraint on evolutionary approaches to ethics, the Naturalistic Fallacy, so understood, clears the way, conceptually, for just such an approach.
Religion is one of the most powerful forces running through human history, and although often pre... more Religion is one of the most powerful forces running through human history, and although often presented as a force for good, its impact is frequently violent and divisive. This provocative work brings together cutting-edge research from both evolutionary and cognitive psychology to help readers understand the psychological structure of religious morality and the origins of religious violence.
Introduces a fundamentally new approach to the analysis of religion in a style accessible to the general reader
Applies insights from evolutionary and cognitive psychology to both Judaism and Christianity, and their texts, to help understand the origins of religious violence
Argues that religious violence is grounded in the moral psychology of religion
Illustrates its controversial argument with reference to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the response to the attacks from both the terrorists and the President. Suggests strategies for beginning to counter the divisive aspects of religion
Discusses the role of religion and religious criticism in the contemporary world. Argues for a position sceptical of the moral authority of religion, while also critiquing the excesses of the “new atheists” for failing to appreciate the moral contributions of religion
Awarded Honourable Mention, 2010 Prose Awards
Teehan sets out an evolutionary-psychological account of the connection between religion, moralit... more Teehan sets out an evolutionary-psychological account of the connection between religion, morality and violence. To do this, he works to create a plausible extension of evolution as it happens at the biological level, to cover behavior at the cultural level where human beings act as self-aware agents in a social environment. To avoid the twin obstacles of caricatures of evolutionary reasoning ("so ... belief in God helps you make more babies?") and simplistic views of religion, Teehan consults recent research into cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, as well as religious scholarship. What results is an intriguing and cogent theory that promises a significant advance in our understanding of the place of religion in human history and society.
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Papers by John Teehan
To secure the scientific credibility of its theoretical foundations, CSR needs
to update its cognitive model. Seminal work in CSR, and much
contemporary research, employs a model of cognition that is subject to
mounting criticism (i.e., cognitivism). The most significant of these
critiques come from 4E cognition. This paper focuses on enactive
cognition, arguing that reconstructing CSR along the lines of enactivism
will put the field on firmer scientific grounding and can resolve long
standing debates within the field. Beginning with an in-depth critique
of a key component of the cognitivist model, representationalism, the
paper also argues that a non-representational enactive cognitive model
fits better with the evolutionary commitments of CSR. Next, it considers
a case study in an enactive reconstruction of CSR: agency detection.
This foundational concept has come under scrutiny due to lack of
empirical support, raising concerns that it may need to be abandoned.
Enactivism recasts the concept as “embodied agency-attunement.” This
allows a cognitive sensitivity to agency to continue its foundational role
in CSR, while addressing empirical critiques leveled against it. The
enactive approach is also compared to the predictive processing model.
The paper concludes with suggestions about next steps towards an
embodied CSR.
Keywords: morality, evolution, secular ethics, humanism, secularism, religious violence
others. Evolutionary studies provide a different way into this topic. Morality has long been a subject for evolutionary research, but an evolutionary approach to religion, based on research into the evolution of the brain, is a recent development, and one that is developing a substantial empirical grounding. Drawing on the insights from both of these fields, this chapter sets out the evolved cognitive mechanisms that constitute the nexus of religion and morality. In addition to providing insight into the nature of religious morality, this model may also help clarify the role religion played in human evolution.
Keywords: religion, morality, evolutionary psychology, evolution, cognition
To secure the scientific credibility of its theoretical foundations, CSR needs
to update its cognitive model. Seminal work in CSR, and much
contemporary research, employs a model of cognition that is subject to
mounting criticism (i.e., cognitivism). The most significant of these
critiques come from 4E cognition. This paper focuses on enactive
cognition, arguing that reconstructing CSR along the lines of enactivism
will put the field on firmer scientific grounding and can resolve long
standing debates within the field. Beginning with an in-depth critique
of a key component of the cognitivist model, representationalism, the
paper also argues that a non-representational enactive cognitive model
fits better with the evolutionary commitments of CSR. Next, it considers
a case study in an enactive reconstruction of CSR: agency detection.
This foundational concept has come under scrutiny due to lack of
empirical support, raising concerns that it may need to be abandoned.
Enactivism recasts the concept as “embodied agency-attunement.” This
allows a cognitive sensitivity to agency to continue its foundational role
in CSR, while addressing empirical critiques leveled against it. The
enactive approach is also compared to the predictive processing model.
The paper concludes with suggestions about next steps towards an
embodied CSR.
Keywords: morality, evolution, secular ethics, humanism, secularism, religious violence
others. Evolutionary studies provide a different way into this topic. Morality has long been a subject for evolutionary research, but an evolutionary approach to religion, based on research into the evolution of the brain, is a recent development, and one that is developing a substantial empirical grounding. Drawing on the insights from both of these fields, this chapter sets out the evolved cognitive mechanisms that constitute the nexus of religion and morality. In addition to providing insight into the nature of religious morality, this model may also help clarify the role religion played in human evolution.
Keywords: religion, morality, evolutionary psychology, evolution, cognition
Introduces a fundamentally new approach to the analysis of religion in a style accessible to the general reader
Applies insights from evolutionary and cognitive psychology to both Judaism and Christianity, and their texts, to help understand the origins of religious violence
Argues that religious violence is grounded in the moral psychology of religion
Illustrates its controversial argument with reference to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the response to the attacks from both the terrorists and the President. Suggests strategies for beginning to counter the divisive aspects of religion
Discusses the role of religion and religious criticism in the contemporary world. Argues for a position sceptical of the moral authority of religion, while also critiquing the excesses of the “new atheists” for failing to appreciate the moral contributions of religion
Awarded Honourable Mention, 2010 Prose Awards