
franck orban
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Papers by franck orban
impact in 2022, Macron still lost. In the conclusion, Orban reminds us that
even if national and international measures to counter foreign cyber electoral interference are crucial in maintaining electoral integrity, they alone cannot rectify the deep-seated mistrust in political figures and institutions that can jeopardize democratic dialogue.
this study also suggests that the NMS might have less in common with deradicalization interventions than with existing reintegration measures that seek to empower prisoners to change their lifestyle and to prevent recidivism into crime.
impact in 2022, Macron still lost. In the conclusion, Orban reminds us that
even if national and international measures to counter foreign cyber electoral interference are crucial in maintaining electoral integrity, they alone cannot rectify the deep-seated mistrust in political figures and institutions that can jeopardize democratic dialogue.
this study also suggests that the NMS might have less in common with deradicalization interventions than with existing reintegration measures that seek to empower prisoners to change their lifestyle and to prevent recidivism into crime.
in terrorist activity, as well as for incarcerated people who were considered vulnerable to radicalization and to recruitment into terrorism. The Norwegian Mentoring Scheme (NMS) has now been running for six years, and was evaluated for the first time by the end of 2018. This paper dwells on the results of this evaluation, published in Norwegian in February 2019 (Orban, 2019). These results were obtained through access to primary sources from the Directorate of Norwegian Correctional Service (DNCS) and from the NMS’ archives, as well as through semi-structured interviews. Eight were conducted with participants in the scheme. Nine were conducted with their mentors. One particular feature of the NMS is the use of mentors from civil society with different backgrounds in order to engage sentenced radical prisoners and to moderate behaviors and discourses.
Twenty interviews were conducted with prison staff working with participants in the program, prison wardens and designers of the NMS. All interviews took place from March 2017 to October 2018. Due to high prison security measures, it was not possible to conduct more than one interview per mentee during the evaluation period. Interviews with both mentees and mentors averaged between 1.5 and 2 hours and were exclusively focused on how participation in the NMS was experienced by
both groups. This chapter suggests that good targeting of mentors and mentees and trust building are critical factors to create appropriate conditions for change. Despite shortages, unexpected geopolitical developments and economic constraints, the first results of the NMS review were promising. However, the efficiency of the trust model to prevent recidivism into terrorism has yet to be confirmed in the
long term. Aside from the work done on influencing behaviors and mindsets, mentors compensated for the lack of management of radicalized inmates in the prison system by providing a humanized form of support. In that sense, this study also suggests that the NMS might have less in common with deradicalization interventions than with existing reintegration measures that seek to empower prisoners to change their lifestyle and to prevent recidivism into crime.
This chapter deals with a minority within the leadership of French far right party National Front who want to frame NF as the sole holder of the Gaullist tradition. We first take a look back at the paradoxical relationship between French far right and more specifically National Front and Gaullism. The idea of any ideological convergence between Gaullism and far right extremists has never been obvious.
However, some elements in Gaullism can suggest that rather two different political families share some values. This chapter then looks at the evolution of NF since the early 1970's until now to determine to what extend NF's current narratives fit better into the main political system and have become a viable tool for political achievement.
This chapter concludes with the idea that in order to win future presidential elections in France, Nation Front could indeed be tempted to merge Gaullism and Frontism into a new hybrid ideology, Lepeno-Gaullism, or eventually Marino-Lepenism.
Keywords: Front National, France, Gaullism, far right, nationalism
Soon to appear in:
Guri Ellen Barstad, Arnstein Hjelde, Sigmund Kvam, Anastasia Parianou, John Todd (Hrsg.) Language and Nation Crossroads and Connections ISBN 978-3-8309-3497-4