Steven J Firth
Broadly speaking, my research falls in applied ethics and is both interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary. It centres the human experience and targets injustice, disadvantage, inequity, and the nature of our responsibility to others in the future. As a futurist, I explore related issues through futures studies and the philosophy of space. In addition to research, I am committed to teaching and emphasise active learning tools to help 'unstiffen' the study of philosophy by engaging students through immersive techniques. Students constitute an unrivalled fountain of inspiration and synthesis and I consider myself honoured to teach because it gifts me the remarkable opportunity to learn.
My doctoral dissertation, Whither a Better Place: Philosophical Reflections on Disability and Inclusion, was accepted at the University of Helsinki in December 2024, completing my terminal degree in philosophy. The work is an endeavour within bioethics, healthcare ethics, and social and political philosophy, and explores the intricate dynamics between exclusion, rights, and basic needs — arguing for enhanced state-funded obligations in areas like sexual citizenship and inclusion-based policies.
Outside the academic realm, I enjoy reading Terry Pratchett, watching film noir, and indulging in music. Additionally, I am an avid Land Rover enthusiast, running a YouTube channel dedicated to owning, maintaining, and modifying them. In 2015, I founded the Kilt-up 4 Cancer campaign to raise awareness of male-specific cancers, the campaign raised over $150,000 and continues to inspire ongoing efforts worldwide.
On a more personal note, my favourite colour is purple, and I am convinced that melted cheese is an abomination to humanity!
Phone: +14033939891
Address: Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada
My doctoral dissertation, Whither a Better Place: Philosophical Reflections on Disability and Inclusion, was accepted at the University of Helsinki in December 2024, completing my terminal degree in philosophy. The work is an endeavour within bioethics, healthcare ethics, and social and political philosophy, and explores the intricate dynamics between exclusion, rights, and basic needs — arguing for enhanced state-funded obligations in areas like sexual citizenship and inclusion-based policies.
Outside the academic realm, I enjoy reading Terry Pratchett, watching film noir, and indulging in music. Additionally, I am an avid Land Rover enthusiast, running a YouTube channel dedicated to owning, maintaining, and modifying them. In 2015, I founded the Kilt-up 4 Cancer campaign to raise awareness of male-specific cancers, the campaign raised over $150,000 and continues to inspire ongoing efforts worldwide.
On a more personal note, my favourite colour is purple, and I am convinced that melted cheese is an abomination to humanity!
Phone: +14033939891
Address: Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada
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Videos by Steven J Firth
Matti Häyry offers a treatment of utilitarianism which he calls ‘liberal utilitarianism' and advances a ‘greatest need-satisfaction’ principle. According to his revision “it is always right to maximise the satisfaction of needs, provided that the satisfaction if the more basic needs for survival, health, well-being, and happens is not prevented by the satisfaction of less basic needs…”
The negative principle buried in Häyry’s revision bodes well, as this iterative process may permit a steady increase in the well-being of disabled persons through a more perspicacious use of state services (perhaps even indicating the development of new services, such as a sex doula program).
This presentation looks at some of the non-profit responses that are made and considers what a healthcare funded program -- a sex doula program -- might look like.
This presentation reviews the sex doula program and provides theoretical support for such an office through the Capabilities Approach and shows how disabled people lack the relevant central capabilities for sex and a restriction of opportunity.
The presentation attempts to justify the development of a healthcare funded sex doula program to ensure disabled persons are able to access sexual citizenship and take part in the human condition.
The presentations offers justification for such a program under Liberal Utilitarianism and Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach.
The slide set includes criticisms which are separated by a blank slide (which was used to permit discussion from the audience).
WARNING: Adult Language; Viewer Discretion is Advised
Journal Articles by Steven J Firth
Deploying both philosophical and game theoretical analyses, this paper provides several refutations and a repudiation of Jebari and Olsson-Yaouzis's claims: I correct the assumption that ETI would necessarily adopt a game theoretical rationality, critique the notion that ETI would choose a risk-dominant strategy rather than a payoff-dominant strategy, repudiate the claim that communication with ETI would not be possible, and show how the Hobbesian equivalence principle is violated in a proximal first-contact situation. Finally, in the absence of game theoretic decision-making (and inline with the calls from the Billingham report), this paper commences work on the development of an incomplete set of Axioms of First Contact from which to generate a definitive groundwork for both post-detection protocol and rules of engagement. An open invitation to other contributors to criticise, augment, and advance this bottom-up approach to first contact is extended.
In this article, we consider and refute some of Di Nucci’s criticism of our sex doula programme, and repudiate his belief that we have not resolved his sexual rights puzzle. In addition, we believe that a meta-ethical discussion of the nature of sexual rights diverts attention away from those people who are most in need of sexual support — and they do not have time for us to make a full reckoning of the place of sex has in society.
Increasing data processing speed and the recent deployment of advanced remote sensing equipment is expected to significantly increase the discovery of extra-terrestrial life (ETL). The probability of an imminent first contact with extra-terrestrial intelligence (ETI) should be enough to prompt serious debates over the pragmatic, religious, political, and social ramifications of such an occurrence. However, much of the current debate instead focusses on developing resolutions to the Fermi Paradox. Some authors working on ETI first contact have criticised the endeavour, arguing that communication with ETI is impossible due to a lack of shared human context and conclude that the resultant uncertainty will throw us into a Hobbesian Trap. This paper shows that alternative shared contexts with ETI exist and that such contexts could permit the development of a sufficient level of communication needed to escape Hobbesian diffidence-and, thusly, the Hobbesian Trap. Finally, and in an effort to ignite a serious academic discussion on first contact itself, this paper offers an incomplete set of Axioms of First Contact which will help develop a definitive groundwork for the discussion; an open invitation to other contributors to criticise, augment, and continue this bottom-up approach to first contact is extended.
SSRN Location: Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4358759 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4358759
Analysis: This article provides a detailed and comparative account of the " off-the-shelf " systems and software used in developing the journal with an explanation of the rationale behind our choices.
Conclusion and implications: The choices we made can be adopted by other journals interested in a low-cost, " future-proof " approach to developing a publishing infrastructure.
Matti Häyry offers a treatment of utilitarianism which he calls ‘liberal utilitarianism' and advances a ‘greatest need-satisfaction’ principle. According to his revision “it is always right to maximise the satisfaction of needs, provided that the satisfaction if the more basic needs for survival, health, well-being, and happens is not prevented by the satisfaction of less basic needs…”
The negative principle buried in Häyry’s revision bodes well, as this iterative process may permit a steady increase in the well-being of disabled persons through a more perspicacious use of state services (perhaps even indicating the development of new services, such as a sex doula program).
This presentation looks at some of the non-profit responses that are made and considers what a healthcare funded program -- a sex doula program -- might look like.
This presentation reviews the sex doula program and provides theoretical support for such an office through the Capabilities Approach and shows how disabled people lack the relevant central capabilities for sex and a restriction of opportunity.
The presentation attempts to justify the development of a healthcare funded sex doula program to ensure disabled persons are able to access sexual citizenship and take part in the human condition.
The presentations offers justification for such a program under Liberal Utilitarianism and Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach.
The slide set includes criticisms which are separated by a blank slide (which was used to permit discussion from the audience).
WARNING: Adult Language; Viewer Discretion is Advised
Deploying both philosophical and game theoretical analyses, this paper provides several refutations and a repudiation of Jebari and Olsson-Yaouzis's claims: I correct the assumption that ETI would necessarily adopt a game theoretical rationality, critique the notion that ETI would choose a risk-dominant strategy rather than a payoff-dominant strategy, repudiate the claim that communication with ETI would not be possible, and show how the Hobbesian equivalence principle is violated in a proximal first-contact situation. Finally, in the absence of game theoretic decision-making (and inline with the calls from the Billingham report), this paper commences work on the development of an incomplete set of Axioms of First Contact from which to generate a definitive groundwork for both post-detection protocol and rules of engagement. An open invitation to other contributors to criticise, augment, and advance this bottom-up approach to first contact is extended.
In this article, we consider and refute some of Di Nucci’s criticism of our sex doula programme, and repudiate his belief that we have not resolved his sexual rights puzzle. In addition, we believe that a meta-ethical discussion of the nature of sexual rights diverts attention away from those people who are most in need of sexual support — and they do not have time for us to make a full reckoning of the place of sex has in society.
Increasing data processing speed and the recent deployment of advanced remote sensing equipment is expected to significantly increase the discovery of extra-terrestrial life (ETL). The probability of an imminent first contact with extra-terrestrial intelligence (ETI) should be enough to prompt serious debates over the pragmatic, religious, political, and social ramifications of such an occurrence. However, much of the current debate instead focusses on developing resolutions to the Fermi Paradox. Some authors working on ETI first contact have criticised the endeavour, arguing that communication with ETI is impossible due to a lack of shared human context and conclude that the resultant uncertainty will throw us into a Hobbesian Trap. This paper shows that alternative shared contexts with ETI exist and that such contexts could permit the development of a sufficient level of communication needed to escape Hobbesian diffidence-and, thusly, the Hobbesian Trap. Finally, and in an effort to ignite a serious academic discussion on first contact itself, this paper offers an incomplete set of Axioms of First Contact which will help develop a definitive groundwork for the discussion; an open invitation to other contributors to criticise, augment, and continue this bottom-up approach to first contact is extended.
SSRN Location: Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4358759 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4358759
Analysis: This article provides a detailed and comparative account of the " off-the-shelf " systems and software used in developing the journal with an explanation of the rationale behind our choices.
Conclusion and implications: The choices we made can be adopted by other journals interested in a low-cost, " future-proof " approach to developing a publishing infrastructure.
Analysis of the nature of exclusion for disabled people reveals a unique set of multi-dimensional problems, and despite efforts from the disability rights community and an increased academic interest in disability studies, there has been a limited incorporation of holistic or transdisciplinary approaches to the phenomenon in works of praxis and in governmental policy. Seeking to highlight and ameliorate the experience of exclusion for disabled people, disability rights organisations advocate for greater societal integration and inclusion into the social fabric of society by offering revisionary theoretical interpretations of disability in an effort to steer social change — a devoir to which the works of this thesis contribute academically.
Focussing on the interplay between the nature of exclusion, rights, and basic needs, this thesis investigates the limits of the welfare state’s obligations to afford disabled people a life of eu zen, argues for greater obligations in areas such as sexual citizenship, inclusion, and presents an alternate theory of disability. The Introduction situates the articles of this thesis within a wider theoretical context that highlights the importance of social context, and focusses on the nature of exclusion and inclusion for disabled people as a complex set of societal and political disadvantages which go beyond simple poverty and social disenfranchisement. The main claim of this thesis is that the experience of exclusion for disabled people constitutes a multi-faceted and interconnected set of disadvantages and barriers that constitute a greater and more substantive set of exclusions than those experienced by other excluded groups.
Grounded in Aristotelian concepts of flourishing, the programme identifies sexual citizenship as a fundamental basic need and seeks to ensure that disabled people have the opportunity to achieve the same level of sexu- ality as able-bodied people. Work advancing the programme includes both philosophical and theoretical arguments showing how the programme is justified under several moral frameworks, and claims made therein have resulted in velitation in the literature regarding the potential of such a programme to violate individuals’ negative rights.
Analysis of the nature of exclusion for disabled people reveals a unique set of multi-dimensional problems, and despite efforts from the disability rights community and an increased academic interest in disability studies, there has been a limited incorporation of holistic or transdisciplinary approaches to the phenomenon in works of praxis and in governmental policy. Seeking to highlight and ameliorate the experience of exclusion for disabled people, disability rights organisations advocate for greater societal integration and inclusion into the social fabric of society by offering revisionary theoretical interpretations of disability in an effort to steer social change — a devoir to which the works of this thesis contribute academically.
Focussing on the interplay between the nature of exclusion, rights, and basic needs, this thesis investigates the limits of the welfare state’s obligations to afford disabled people a life of eu zen, argues for greater obligations in areas such as sexual citizenship, inclusion, and presents an alternate theory of disability. The Introduction situates the articles of this thesis within a wider theoretical context that highlights the importance of social context, and focusses on the nature of exclusion and inclusion for disabled people as a complex set of societal and political disadvantages which go beyond simple poverty and social disenfranchisement. The main claim of this thesis is that the experience of exclusion for disabled people constitutes a multi-faceted and interconnected set of disadvantages and barriers that constitute a greater and more substantive set of exclusions than those experienced by other excluded groups.
Matti Häyry offers a treatment of utilitarianism which he calls ‘liberal utilitarianism' and advances a ‘greatest need-satisfaction’ principle. According to his revision “it is always right to maximise the satisfaction of needs, provided that the satisfaction if the more basic needs for survival, health, well-being, and happens is not prevented by the satisfaction of less basic needs...” (Matti Häyry. Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics. 1994) In addition, his interpretation shifts the focus away from the positive principle of ‘maximising the greatest good to the greatest number’, to the negative principle of ‘minimisation of harms to the greatest number’. Häyry’s iteration is not without concern, nevertheless, it also appears to offer enough significant improvements to classical utilitarianism to be worthy of further investigation.
With the recent cancellation of Singer’s book promotion in New Zealand (due to his position on euthanising newly-born disabled children), the classic utilitarian position on disability has once again been brought under scrutiny. While utilitarian concepts often fit well with the distributive justice requirements of welfare states, the conclusions that obtain are often unacceptable and inadequate; the QALY, for instance, is toted as an effective utilitarian calculus of cost-effectiveness — however, it has also received criticism for being neither a proper formed utilitarian calculus nor one which responds appropriately to the concerns health care users.
The negative principle buried in Häyry’s revision bodes well, however, as this iterative process may well permit a steady increase in the well-being of disabled persons through a more perspicacious use of state services (perhaps even indicating the development of new services, such as a sex doula program). With this in mind, this paper seeks to determine whether or not liberal utilitarianism can stand as useful tool in matters of disability, distributive justice, and health care; and whether or not there are any unwelcome side effects of this revisionary moral theory.
Background The autonomy of certain disabled persons, whose impairments or conditions make it impossible to access their sexual nature, is further constrained a lack of services and support which responds to their needs.
Objectives We advance a ‘capabilities approach’ argument for a welfare funded sex-doula program. Such a program responds to the sexual autonomy needs of certain disabled persons who’s sexual autonomy needs are otherwise frustrated.
Methods Using the lived experience data and phenomenological reports from disabled persons, a palpable frustration of sexual autonomy can be clearly demonstrated. These data were then analysed against current health care practices and services to generate a response to the loss of sexual autonomy experienced by certain disabled persons. Using Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, we were able to argue for a welfare funded sex-doula program.
Findings There is a palpable and imminent need to respond to the sexual autonomy needs of disabled persons. The health care system is well both well situated and behoved to develop a sex doula program.
Conclusion The lack of sexual autonomy experienced by many disabled persons is a matter of imminent and profound importance. Access to sexual citizenship can, and should be, afforded such persons on the basis of need. The health care system, charged with maintaining the well-being of a population, is appropriately positioned to be able to respond effectively to this need and can do so by developing a sex-doula program.
Background The autonomy of certain disabled persons, whose impairments or conditions make it impossible to access their sexual nature, is further constrained a lack of services and support which responds to their needs.
Objectives We advance a ‘capabilities approach’ argument for a welfare funded sex-doula program. Such a program responds to the sexual autonomy needs of certain disabled persons who’s sexual autonomy needs are otherwise frustrated.
Methods Using the lived experience data and phenomenological reports from disabled persons, a palpable frustration of sexual autonomy can be clearly demonstrated. These data were then analysed against current health care practices and services to generate a response to the loss of sexual autonomy experienced by certain disabled persons. Using Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, we were able to argue for a welfare funded sex-doula program.
Findings There is a palpable and imminent need to respond to the sexual autonomy needs of disabled persons. The health care system is well both well situated and behoved to develop a sex doula program.
Conclusion The lack of sexual autonomy experienced by many disabled persons is a matter of imminent and profound importance. Access to sexual citizenship can, and should be, afforded such persons on the basis of need. The health care system, charged with maintaining the well-being of a population, is appropriately positioned to be able to respond effectively to this need and can do so by developing a sex-doula program.
Over the last 50 or so years, many models have been proposed which seek to describe and define the phenomenon of disability. The medical model gained early ground and is still influential in many aspects of welfare distribution. Following seminal work in the mid ‘70s, the social model has since become hegemonic as praxis and is the model supported by disability rights movements. More recently, accounts such as the welfarist account have sought to provide a more structured philosophical perspective on the phenomenon.
These current hegemonic approaches, however, hold ‘disability’ to be nounal — the sort of thing possessed by a person, caused by a person’s environment, or some combination of the two. In contrast, the Picture Theory of Disability (PTD) offers an adverbial account of disability and evaluates disability as an experience rather than a property someone has.
In this sense then, the PTD asserts that ‘disability’ is an aspect of ‘doing’ rather than a ‘something’; for the PTD, there are no ‘disabled people’ or ‘disabling social conditions’, there are just people who experience a certain kind of irremediable impediment to ‘daily-living-tasks’ or ‘goals-like-ours’. More simply put, current models of disability make a category error: disability is not a ‘thing’, it is a certain kind of ‘experience’.
Method:
Conducted in the Analytic tradition, the PTD also incorporates feminist and phenomenological approaches. The PTD is a descriptive theoretical effort and offers a careful analysis of the interplay between the individual and their environment. Within the PTD, the use of Wittgensteinian pictures shows how and why a person in the picture experiences what they do, whilst conation arising as a result of Humean sympathy (in the historical sense of the term) helps to understand how a person in the picture might feel about that experience.
Results:
The PTD shows exactly when, where, and how disability is experienced — and by whom. In short, and broadly speaking, disability is experienced when verbs are negatively modified to the extent that the verb is irremediably impeded. The PTD makes no normative claims — but is offered as a heuristic, metric, and theoretical model of disability which, by paying close attention to the manner in which the verb is being modified, should permit focussed heteroclitic and neoteric ameliorations.
Conclusions:
Contemporary models of disability fundamentally misunderstand the nature of disability. Thus, current normative claims employed in health care, welfare distribution, law, social and political policy, etc., may be improper, unhelpful, and even counter-productive. The PTD stands as a heuristic, a metric, and offers an improved theoretical model from which to generate more appropriate normative claims.
Background:
Over the last 50 or so years, many models have been proposed which seek to describe and define the phenomenon of disability. The medical model gained early ground and is still influential in many aspects of welfare distribution. Following seminal work in the mid ‘70s, the social model has since become hegemonic as praxis and is the model supported by disability rights movements. More recently, accounts such as the welfarist account have sought to provide a more structured philosophical perspective on the phenomenon.
These current hegemonic approaches, however, hold ‘disability’ to be nounal — the sort of thing possessed by a person, caused by a person’s environment, or some combination of the two. In contrast, the Picture Theory of Disability (PTD) offers an adverbial account of disability and evaluates disability as an experience rather than a property someone has.
In this sense then, the PTD asserts that ‘disability’ is an aspect of ‘doing’ rather than a ‘something’; for the PTD, there are no ‘disabled people’ or ‘disabling social conditions’, there are just people who experience a certain kind of irremediable impediment to ‘daily-living-tasks’ or ‘goals-like-ours’. More simply put, current models of disability make a category error: disability is not a ‘thing’, it is a certain kind of ‘experience’.
Method:
Conducted in the Analytic tradition, the PTD also incorporates feminist and phenomenological approaches. The PTD is a descriptive theoretical effort and offers a careful analysis of the interplay between the individual and their environment. Within the PTD, the use of Wittgensteinian pictures shows how and why a person in the picture experiences what they do, whilst conation arising as a result of Humean sympathy (in the historical sense of the term) helps to understand how a person in the picture might feel about that experience.
Results:
The PTD shows exactly when, where, and how disability is experienced — and by whom. In short, and broadly speaking, disability is experienced when verbs are negatively modified to the extent that the verb is irremediably impeded. The PTD makes no normative claims — but is offered as a heuristic, metric, and theoretical model of disability which, by paying close attention to the manner in which the verb is being modified, should permit focussed heteroclitic and neoteric ameliorations.
Conclusions:
Contemporary models of disability fundamentally misunderstand the nature of disability. Thus, current normative claims employed in health care, welfare distribution, law, social and political policy, etc., may be improper, unhelpful, and even counter-productive. The PTD stands as a heuristic, a metric, and offers an improved theoretical model from which to generate more appropriate normative claims.
On further investigation, however, advances in novel therapeutics embolden worries over ‘normalisation’ as technology becomes more adaptive. Modern day prosthetic limbs, for instance, are becoming as little of an intrusion as reading glasses or contact lenses and are beginning to command the same type of acceptance. Yet, the carte blanche appropriateness of these therapeutics is ethically less clear — especially with respect to the distinction between congenital and acquired disability.
Deference to the hegemonic models of disability (namely, the social and medical models) perpetuates flawed models of disability, and results in inaccurate and potentially improper conclusions. Furthermore, these hegemonic models are of little help in identifying the boundaries of normalisation: the medical model actively promotes normalisation through the use of prosthetics and aids, and the social model repudiates normalisation at all (which is problematic for persons who acquire an impairment and would like to have their functionality returned). The Picture Theory of Disability (PTD), however, offers clearer indication of when novel therapeutics are appropriate and when they are not.
Results:
The use of prosthetics with certain impairments — especially at developing ages — can be counter productive, i.e. the use of prosthetics may generate less adaptability and functionality if encouraged during developmental stages; the use of prosthetics to return function to those who acquire disabilities are almost always ameliorative. The PTD is able to show when and how prosthetics and/or aids would reduce the experience of disability and when and how they are beneficial. The PTD does this through careful examination of the lived experience together with a visualisation of the experience itself. This theory thus improves upon the responses from the medical and social models which are found wanting in this arena.
Conclusions:
Common sense intuitions about developing technology — especially in prosthetics and certain aids — seem to approbate their use. However, these intuitions become strained when we draw the distinction between acquired and congenital impairments. The medical and the social models of disability offer little in the way of indicative guidance, as one actively promotes normalisation and the other condemns the need to conform to social norms. The Picture Theory of Disability stands as a better guide to resolving when and where these technologies are more appropriate.
Over the last 30 years, under-the-radar activities were arranged by inclusion organisations in the UK to assist disabled people with the sexual aspects of their lives. Government funding was never available for these initiatives and private funding proved difficult to obtain. Funding issues have since effectively terminated such activities. However, recently formed organisations (NPOs and NGOs) in North East Asia have been created to help disabled persons resolve their sexual needs and wants.
In line with many inclusion organisations, these NPOs and NGOs consider sexual release to be a part of everyday living (like brushing teeth and bathing) and hold that the enhancement of sexual life is a necessary condition for social independence. They argue that their services improve the quality of life, happiness, and self worth of disabled persons. By offering medically-focussed services, they believe that they are well positioned to offer physical release (together with some measure of mental support) to disabled persons who are severally unable to engage in the sexual aspects of life.
The successes of the Eastern organisations invites us to look at our options in the West where our welfare states have been tasked to facilitate the greater inclusion of disabled persons into society. In this endeavour the welfare state has become obligated to supplying such services as prosthetics, chirping crosswalks, Braille Libraries, career training, cochlear implants, etc. Given that these services seek to advance a certain quality of life, and given that a sexual life is an important part of life-in-general, the question arises as to whether or not the welfare state should also be obligated to help assist certain disabled persons enhance their sexual lives. If we believe the welfare state is obligated to assist in this matter, then a number of ethical dilemmas arise: Is the provision of psychological relief from sexual tensions an appropriate response to the issue of unsated sexual tensions? Who might be eligible for such services? What should be the threshold of the financial burden? If it is appropriate for a welfare state to provide the services of sex doulas, under what circumstances is it appropriate? And if we believe the welfare state is not obligated to assist in this matter, then we are left owing the disabled person a very good explanation for why we do not value the quality of their lives as we do our own.
Technology companies have responded to the unsated need for companionship by developing ‘virtual companions’. One such company has created a virtual holographic interfaced Internet-of-Things called Azuma, who is marketed as a bride and with whom a person is able to share life and build memories
The development of these technologies raises interesting and provocative questions about the nature of future human romantic relationships; the role of sex in contemporary societies; and the relationship between depression, sexual lethargy, and virtual companions. In this paper, I engage some of the arguments against virtual companion technologies, arguing that they are an inevitable consequence of shifting sociological norms. I note that the cause of these shifting norms is not the technology itself, but a manifold mix socio-economic pressures; concluding that, though romantic human/AI relationships are unlikely to ameliorate falling population growths, they are likely to increase mental health by reducing loneliness, anxiety, and depression. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I argue that closer human/AI relationships may help develop beneficent super-intelligent AI.
A major goal of philosophy courses is to advance writing skills — however, summer time is no time for composing belaboured written didactics! Instead, this course will give greater focus to recognising aspects of moral concern in your environment, on skill-development, the ability to engage in constructive argumentation, and developing the patience required for measured debate. Hopefully, you will leave this course with a greater awareness of the complexities of moral issues — and be better equipped, with tools and strategies to respond effectively to them. I have every confidence that you will leave the course with a greater understanding of the relevance of philosophy to our every-day lives, a greater tolerance for difference, and an understanding that others may not share the same moral dispositions that you do — and that there are often good reasons for differing opinions. Most importantly, however, my primary course objective is that you enjoy it.