Books by José Filipe Silva
The aim of the present work is to show the roots of the conception of perception as an active pro... more The aim of the present work is to show the roots of the conception of perception as an active process, tracing the history of its development from Plato to modern philosophy. The contributors inquire into what activity is taken to mean in different theories, challenging traditional historical accounts of perception that stress the passivity of percipients in coming to know the external world. Special attention is paid to the psychological and physiological mechanisms of perception, rational and non-rational perception and the role of awareness in the perceptual process.
Perception has often been conceived as a process in which the passive aspects - such as the reception of sensory stimuli - were stressed and the active ones overlooked. However, during recent decades research in cognitive science and philosophy of mind has emphasized the activity of the subject in the process of sense perception, often associating this activity to the notions of attention and intentionality. Although it is recognized that there are ancient roots to the view that perception is fundamentally active, the history remains largely unexplored.
The book is directed to all those interested in contemporary debates in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology who would like to become acquainted with the historical background of active perception, but for historical reliability the aim is to make no compromises.
Papers by José Filipe Silva
![Research paper thumbnail of [pre-edited version, together with J.F. Silva] "Nicholas of Cusa on Rational Perception." In: Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 59 (2017), 177-213.](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/57159267/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Despite being one of the major figures in late medieval thought and being the subject of numerous... more Despite being one of the major figures in late medieval thought and being the subject of numerous studies, certain topics concerning the Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) remain in need of further investigation. One of these is an aspect of his theory of cognition: his account of sense perception. It is our aim in this study to systematically look at his scattered remarks on the topic and make a number of suggestions as to the nature of his thought on how we come to know external things. It is not our purpose to offer a comprehensive account of his theory of cognition (for this, cf. C. KNY, Kreative, asymptotische Assimilation, forthcoming). Our focus in this article is on his account of perception and the specific claim that Nicholas develops a model whereby reason operates together with the senses in perceptual experience. Despite being tentative our claim is grounded on suggestions found in the scholarship on Cusanus; but these suggestions remain quite vague and in need of exploration. In this article, we closely examine the textual evidence and develop our claim based on this examination. In order to substantiate it, we proceed as follows: first, we consider the core theses on perception in several of Nicholas' works. Second, we bring these elements together and propose a reading of how perception is rational according to Cusanus. Despite being an academic outsider and employing terminology in a way that sometimes obstructs interpretive access, our paper shows that Nicholas is wellacquainted with the different traditions in the philosophy of perception, especially perspectivist optics and medieval Augustinianism. In addition, and as the result of the role he attributes to reason in our experience of the world, Cusanus occupies an important place in the history of the development of theories of perception.
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Books by José Filipe Silva
Perception has often been conceived as a process in which the passive aspects - such as the reception of sensory stimuli - were stressed and the active ones overlooked. However, during recent decades research in cognitive science and philosophy of mind has emphasized the activity of the subject in the process of sense perception, often associating this activity to the notions of attention and intentionality. Although it is recognized that there are ancient roots to the view that perception is fundamentally active, the history remains largely unexplored.
The book is directed to all those interested in contemporary debates in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology who would like to become acquainted with the historical background of active perception, but for historical reliability the aim is to make no compromises.
Papers by José Filipe Silva
Perception has often been conceived as a process in which the passive aspects - such as the reception of sensory stimuli - were stressed and the active ones overlooked. However, during recent decades research in cognitive science and philosophy of mind has emphasized the activity of the subject in the process of sense perception, often associating this activity to the notions of attention and intentionality. Although it is recognized that there are ancient roots to the view that perception is fundamentally active, the history remains largely unexplored.
The book is directed to all those interested in contemporary debates in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology who would like to become acquainted with the historical background of active perception, but for historical reliability the aim is to make no compromises.