A joke is amusing if and only if it's fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and on... more A joke is amusing if and only if it's fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it's fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the fit-value biconditionals. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the 'fittingness first' approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit-value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn't imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn't imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn't imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered.
A joke is amusing if and only if it's fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and on... more A joke is amusing if and only if it's fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it's fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the fit-value biconditionals. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock of various metaethical projects, such as fittingattitude analyses of value and the 'fittingness first' approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit-value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn't imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn't imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn't imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered.
When we blame, we respond to someone’s wrongdoing. Yet remarkably diverse ways of responding to w... more When we blame, we respond to someone’s wrongdoing. Yet remarkably diverse ways of responding to wrongdoing might be counted as examples of blame. Public calling out, private seething, and even sadly deciding to stop relying on a friend can all arguably be instances of blame—but the first is an action, the second an emotional response, and the third a decision. Do such diverse forms of blame have anything significant enough in common to warrant theorizing about blame as such? This chapter argues that blame always involves an element of ‘reflexive endorsement’: a self-referential commitment to its own fittingness directly on the basis of someone’s wrongdoing. Reflexive endorsement accounts for blame’s directedness (at a person, for his wrong) and explains why blame can feel particularly self-righteous. This commitment also imputes unique fittingness conditions to blame, and thus provides reason to think of blame as meaningfully unified.
A joke is amusing if and only if it's fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and on... more A joke is amusing if and only if it's fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it's fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the fit-value biconditionals. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the 'fittingness first' approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit-value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn't imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn't imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn't imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered.
A joke is amusing if and only if it's fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and on... more A joke is amusing if and only if it's fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it's fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the fit-value biconditionals. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock of various metaethical projects, such as fittingattitude analyses of value and the 'fittingness first' approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit-value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn't imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn't imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn't imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered.
When we blame, we respond to someone’s wrongdoing. Yet remarkably diverse ways of responding to w... more When we blame, we respond to someone’s wrongdoing. Yet remarkably diverse ways of responding to wrongdoing might be counted as examples of blame. Public calling out, private seething, and even sadly deciding to stop relying on a friend can all arguably be instances of blame—but the first is an action, the second an emotional response, and the third a decision. Do such diverse forms of blame have anything significant enough in common to warrant theorizing about blame as such? This chapter argues that blame always involves an element of ‘reflexive endorsement’: a self-referential commitment to its own fittingness directly on the basis of someone’s wrongdoing. Reflexive endorsement accounts for blame’s directedness (at a person, for his wrong) and explains why blame can feel particularly self-righteous. This commitment also imputes unique fittingness conditions to blame, and thus provides reason to think of blame as meaningfully unified.
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