David Lewis produced a body of philosophical writing that, in four books and scores of articles, ... more David Lewis produced a body of philosophical writing that, in four books and scores of articles, spanned every major philosophical area, with perhaps the greatest concentration in metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind. ...
Recent enthusiasm for grounding often begins by observing that inquiry in metaphysics (and other ... more Recent enthusiasm for grounding often begins by observing that inquiry in metaphysics (and other areas) features a distinctive species of noncausal explanation. Having labeled this species “grounding explanation,” it’s a short step to the conclusion that we need a philosophical theory of grounding itself: an allegedly fundamental relation of metaphysical dependency between facts, such that a “grounding explanation” of some fact succeeds by providing information about what “grounds” that fact. This short step is hasty. For another live option is to accept that grounding explanation is a legitimate form of explanation, but to give it a thoroughly epistemic treatment, one that does not see it as involving any sort of special metaphysical relationship or structure at all. This paper sketches such a treatment, drawing inspiration from reflections on explanatory structure in mathematics.
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2018
What is the compositional structure of reality? That question divides naturally into these two: W... more What is the compositional structure of reality? That question divides naturally into these two: What is the compositional structure of the particulars that populate reality? And what is the structure of the properties and relations that fix what these entities are like? David Lewis's work in ontology and mereology provides the materials for an extraordinarily clean answer to the first question. First, among the particulars1 that populate reality are mereological simples: entities that have no proper parts. (A plausible candidate for these simples: spacetime points.) Second, every collection of such entities has a unique mereological fusion. And third, every particular is either a simple, or a fusion of simples.2 That's it. I propose to take this answer on board.3 What, then, about our second question? Here it looks as though we can draw on an additional Lewisian thesis: Joints: There is a distinction — at the level of metaphysics — between more and less natural properties. S...
proposed a new counterfactual analysis of causation. We argue that this – the PCA-analysis – is i... more proposed a new counterfactual analysis of causation. We argue that this – the PCA-analysis – is incorrect. In section 1, we explain David Lewis’s first counterfactual analysis of causation, and a problem that led him to propose a second. In section 2 we explain the PCA-analysis, advertised as an improvement on Lewis’s later account. We then give counterexamples to the necessity (section 3) and sufficiency (section 4) of the PCA-analysis. 1. Lewis’s two analyses and the problem of late preemption Following Lewis, say that event e counterfactually depends on event c iff, if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred. In his 1973, Lewis proposed that c causes e iff e is related to c by the ancestral of the relation of counterfactual dependence. (Following Ganeri et al., say that e is a descendant of c, and c is an ancestor of e, iff Lewis’s analysans holds.) However, this analysis does not give a necessary condition for c to cause e, as figure 1 shows: c
I Scott Soames's two volume work Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century 1 won the Am... more I Scott Soames's two volume work Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century 1 won the American 2003 Award for Best Professional/Scholarly Book in Philosophy. It has been said to be 'a marvellous introduction to analytic philosophy', to deliver much 'solid information on this dense and difficult subject', and it has been predicted to become the standard history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. 2 Professor Soames writes clearly and candidly. At the beginning of each volume he delineates his objectives and leitmotivs. He is concerned with the development of analytic philosophy from 1900 to 1975. He aims 'to explain what the most important analytic philosophers thought and why they thought it' (I, xi). His method is 'to provide clear, focused and intense critical examinations of some of the most important and representative works of each major philosopher discussed. ... to provide enough detail to allow one to understand and properly evaluat...
I'm going to explore the idea that what we philosophers mean by " metaphysical necessity... more I'm going to explore the idea that what we philosophers mean by " metaphysical necessity " – or, at any rate, what it's best for us to mean – is simply physical necessity. A bit more exactly: We should identify metaphysical necessity with the species of necessity we invoke (usually implicitly) when we try to explain stuff. Along the way, I'll try to show how this thesis connects to a lively contemporary debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans about laws of nature, and try to bring out the variety of distinct forms that physical (or as I'll put it: explanatory) necessity takes. It will also emerge, naturally, that conceivability isn't in any particularly interesting sense a guide to metaphysical possibility. (Maybe that's a feature, maybe it's a bug….)
I'm going to explore the idea that what we philosophers mean by " metaphysical necessity... more I'm going to explore the idea that what we philosophers mean by " metaphysical necessity " – or, at any rate, what it's best for us to mean – is simply physical necessity. A bit more exactly: We should identify metaphysical necessity with the species of necessity we invoke (usually implicitly) when we try to explain stuff. Along the way, I'll try to show how this thesis connects to a lively contemporary debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans about laws of nature, and try to bring out the variety of distinct forms that physical (or as I'll put it: explanatory) necessity takes. It will also emerge, naturally, that conceivability isn't in any particularly interesting sense a guide to metaphysical possibility. (Maybe that's a feature, maybe it's a bug….)
Among the many philosophers who hold that causal facts 1 are to be explained in terms of-or more ... more Among the many philosophers who hold that causal facts 1 are to be explained in terms of-or more ambitiously, shown to reduce to-facts about what happens, together with facts about the fundamental laws that govern what happens, the clear favorite is an approach that sees counterfactual dependence as the key to such explanation or reduction. The paradigm examples of causation, so advocates of this approach tell us, are examples in which events c and e-the cause and its effect-both occur, but: had c not occurred, e would not have occurred either. From this starting point ideas proliferate in a vast profusion. But the remarkable disparity among these ideas should not obscure their common foundation. Neither should the diversity of opinion about the prospects for a philosophical analysis of causation obscure their importance. For even those philosophers who see these prospects as dim-perhaps because they suffer post-Quinean queasiness at the thought of any analysis of any concept of interest-can often be heard to say such things as that causal relations among events are somehow "a matter of" the patterns of counterfactual dependence to be found in them.
Dejvid Luis je izneo interpretaciju objektivnih verovatnoća koja se zasniva na idejama hjumovske ... more Dejvid Luis je izneo interpretaciju objektivnih verovatnoća koja se zasniva na idejama hjumovske supervenijencije i najboljeg sistema zakona. Prema njegovoj interpretaciji, verovatnoće, zajedno sa ostalim nomičkim fenomenima, superveniraju na aktualnim činjenicama. Luis je, takođe, formulisao osnovni princip, koji bi trebalo da nam pokazuje vezu između objektivnih i subjektivnih verovatnoća. Ipak, Hol, Tau i sam Luis, kasnije su došli do zaključka da Osnovni princip i luisovska interpretacija verovatnoća nisu kompatibilni zbog problema podrivajućih budućnosti: problem koji je Luis nazvao "Velika Zla Buba". Popularan način rešavanja tog problema bio je menjanje osnovnog principa. U ovom radu izneću argumente u prilog teze da uzrok problema nije spajanje osnovnog principa sa luisovskom interpretacijom verovatnoća, već se problem nalazi u samoj interpretaciji verovatnoća. Menjanje principa, prema mišljenju koje ću zastupati u ovom radu, neće doprineti konačnom rešenju problema. ključne reči: Dejvid Luis, hjumovska supervenijencija, osnovni princip, objektivna verovatnoća, podrivajuće budućnosti. Uvod U tekstu "Subjektivistički vodič ka objektivnoj verovatnoći" Dejvid Luis [David Lewis] 1 dao je nacrt svoje interpretacije objektivnih verovatnoća. Takva interpretacija se oslanja na Luisovo tumačenje zakona prirode kao teorema najboljeg sistema iskaza koji tačno opisuju prirodu koju sačinjava takozvani hjumovski mozaik; zbog ovoga se interpretacija naziva i interpretacijom Najboljeg sistema [Best System] ili hjumovska interpretacija verovatnoća. Grubo rečeno, ovakvom interpretacijom objektivne verovat
Among the many philosophers who hold that causal facts1 are to be explained in terms ofor more a... more Among the many philosophers who hold that causal facts1 are to be explained in terms ofor more ambitiously, shown to reduce tofacts about what happens, together with facts about the fundamental laws that govern what happens, the clear favorite is an approach that sees ...
proposed a new counterfactual analysis of causation. We argue that thisthe PCA-analysis-is incorr... more proposed a new counterfactual analysis of causation. We argue that thisthe PCA-analysis-is incorrect. In section 1, we explain David Lewis's first counterfactual analysis of causation, and a problem that led him to propose a second. In section 2 we explain the PCA-analysis, advertised as an improvement on Lewis's later account. We then give counterexamples to the necessity (section 3) and sufficiency (section 4) of the PCA-analysis.
David Lewis produced a body of philosophical writing that, in four books and scores of articles, ... more David Lewis produced a body of philosophical writing that, in four books and scores of articles, spanned every major philosophical area, with perhaps the greatest concentration in metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind. ...
Recent enthusiasm for grounding often begins by observing that inquiry in metaphysics (and other ... more Recent enthusiasm for grounding often begins by observing that inquiry in metaphysics (and other areas) features a distinctive species of noncausal explanation. Having labeled this species “grounding explanation,” it’s a short step to the conclusion that we need a philosophical theory of grounding itself: an allegedly fundamental relation of metaphysical dependency between facts, such that a “grounding explanation” of some fact succeeds by providing information about what “grounds” that fact. This short step is hasty. For another live option is to accept that grounding explanation is a legitimate form of explanation, but to give it a thoroughly epistemic treatment, one that does not see it as involving any sort of special metaphysical relationship or structure at all. This paper sketches such a treatment, drawing inspiration from reflections on explanatory structure in mathematics.
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2018
What is the compositional structure of reality? That question divides naturally into these two: W... more What is the compositional structure of reality? That question divides naturally into these two: What is the compositional structure of the particulars that populate reality? And what is the structure of the properties and relations that fix what these entities are like? David Lewis's work in ontology and mereology provides the materials for an extraordinarily clean answer to the first question. First, among the particulars1 that populate reality are mereological simples: entities that have no proper parts. (A plausible candidate for these simples: spacetime points.) Second, every collection of such entities has a unique mereological fusion. And third, every particular is either a simple, or a fusion of simples.2 That's it. I propose to take this answer on board.3 What, then, about our second question? Here it looks as though we can draw on an additional Lewisian thesis: Joints: There is a distinction — at the level of metaphysics — between more and less natural properties. S...
proposed a new counterfactual analysis of causation. We argue that this – the PCA-analysis – is i... more proposed a new counterfactual analysis of causation. We argue that this – the PCA-analysis – is incorrect. In section 1, we explain David Lewis’s first counterfactual analysis of causation, and a problem that led him to propose a second. In section 2 we explain the PCA-analysis, advertised as an improvement on Lewis’s later account. We then give counterexamples to the necessity (section 3) and sufficiency (section 4) of the PCA-analysis. 1. Lewis’s two analyses and the problem of late preemption Following Lewis, say that event e counterfactually depends on event c iff, if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred. In his 1973, Lewis proposed that c causes e iff e is related to c by the ancestral of the relation of counterfactual dependence. (Following Ganeri et al., say that e is a descendant of c, and c is an ancestor of e, iff Lewis’s analysans holds.) However, this analysis does not give a necessary condition for c to cause e, as figure 1 shows: c
I Scott Soames's two volume work Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century 1 won the Am... more I Scott Soames's two volume work Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century 1 won the American 2003 Award for Best Professional/Scholarly Book in Philosophy. It has been said to be 'a marvellous introduction to analytic philosophy', to deliver much 'solid information on this dense and difficult subject', and it has been predicted to become the standard history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. 2 Professor Soames writes clearly and candidly. At the beginning of each volume he delineates his objectives and leitmotivs. He is concerned with the development of analytic philosophy from 1900 to 1975. He aims 'to explain what the most important analytic philosophers thought and why they thought it' (I, xi). His method is 'to provide clear, focused and intense critical examinations of some of the most important and representative works of each major philosopher discussed. ... to provide enough detail to allow one to understand and properly evaluat...
I'm going to explore the idea that what we philosophers mean by " metaphysical necessity... more I'm going to explore the idea that what we philosophers mean by " metaphysical necessity " – or, at any rate, what it's best for us to mean – is simply physical necessity. A bit more exactly: We should identify metaphysical necessity with the species of necessity we invoke (usually implicitly) when we try to explain stuff. Along the way, I'll try to show how this thesis connects to a lively contemporary debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans about laws of nature, and try to bring out the variety of distinct forms that physical (or as I'll put it: explanatory) necessity takes. It will also emerge, naturally, that conceivability isn't in any particularly interesting sense a guide to metaphysical possibility. (Maybe that's a feature, maybe it's a bug….)
I'm going to explore the idea that what we philosophers mean by " metaphysical necessity... more I'm going to explore the idea that what we philosophers mean by " metaphysical necessity " – or, at any rate, what it's best for us to mean – is simply physical necessity. A bit more exactly: We should identify metaphysical necessity with the species of necessity we invoke (usually implicitly) when we try to explain stuff. Along the way, I'll try to show how this thesis connects to a lively contemporary debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans about laws of nature, and try to bring out the variety of distinct forms that physical (or as I'll put it: explanatory) necessity takes. It will also emerge, naturally, that conceivability isn't in any particularly interesting sense a guide to metaphysical possibility. (Maybe that's a feature, maybe it's a bug….)
Among the many philosophers who hold that causal facts 1 are to be explained in terms of-or more ... more Among the many philosophers who hold that causal facts 1 are to be explained in terms of-or more ambitiously, shown to reduce to-facts about what happens, together with facts about the fundamental laws that govern what happens, the clear favorite is an approach that sees counterfactual dependence as the key to such explanation or reduction. The paradigm examples of causation, so advocates of this approach tell us, are examples in which events c and e-the cause and its effect-both occur, but: had c not occurred, e would not have occurred either. From this starting point ideas proliferate in a vast profusion. But the remarkable disparity among these ideas should not obscure their common foundation. Neither should the diversity of opinion about the prospects for a philosophical analysis of causation obscure their importance. For even those philosophers who see these prospects as dim-perhaps because they suffer post-Quinean queasiness at the thought of any analysis of any concept of interest-can often be heard to say such things as that causal relations among events are somehow "a matter of" the patterns of counterfactual dependence to be found in them.
Dejvid Luis je izneo interpretaciju objektivnih verovatnoća koja se zasniva na idejama hjumovske ... more Dejvid Luis je izneo interpretaciju objektivnih verovatnoća koja se zasniva na idejama hjumovske supervenijencije i najboljeg sistema zakona. Prema njegovoj interpretaciji, verovatnoće, zajedno sa ostalim nomičkim fenomenima, superveniraju na aktualnim činjenicama. Luis je, takođe, formulisao osnovni princip, koji bi trebalo da nam pokazuje vezu između objektivnih i subjektivnih verovatnoća. Ipak, Hol, Tau i sam Luis, kasnije su došli do zaključka da Osnovni princip i luisovska interpretacija verovatnoća nisu kompatibilni zbog problema podrivajućih budućnosti: problem koji je Luis nazvao "Velika Zla Buba". Popularan način rešavanja tog problema bio je menjanje osnovnog principa. U ovom radu izneću argumente u prilog teze da uzrok problema nije spajanje osnovnog principa sa luisovskom interpretacijom verovatnoća, već se problem nalazi u samoj interpretaciji verovatnoća. Menjanje principa, prema mišljenju koje ću zastupati u ovom radu, neće doprineti konačnom rešenju problema. ključne reči: Dejvid Luis, hjumovska supervenijencija, osnovni princip, objektivna verovatnoća, podrivajuće budućnosti. Uvod U tekstu "Subjektivistički vodič ka objektivnoj verovatnoći" Dejvid Luis [David Lewis] 1 dao je nacrt svoje interpretacije objektivnih verovatnoća. Takva interpretacija se oslanja na Luisovo tumačenje zakona prirode kao teorema najboljeg sistema iskaza koji tačno opisuju prirodu koju sačinjava takozvani hjumovski mozaik; zbog ovoga se interpretacija naziva i interpretacijom Najboljeg sistema [Best System] ili hjumovska interpretacija verovatnoća. Grubo rečeno, ovakvom interpretacijom objektivne verovat
Among the many philosophers who hold that causal facts1 are to be explained in terms ofor more a... more Among the many philosophers who hold that causal facts1 are to be explained in terms ofor more ambitiously, shown to reduce tofacts about what happens, together with facts about the fundamental laws that govern what happens, the clear favorite is an approach that sees ...
proposed a new counterfactual analysis of causation. We argue that thisthe PCA-analysis-is incorr... more proposed a new counterfactual analysis of causation. We argue that thisthe PCA-analysis-is incorrect. In section 1, we explain David Lewis's first counterfactual analysis of causation, and a problem that led him to propose a second. In section 2 we explain the PCA-analysis, advertised as an improvement on Lewis's later account. We then give counterexamples to the necessity (section 3) and sufficiency (section 4) of the PCA-analysis.
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