Philosophy

The Scientific Revolution marks a stark shift in society's understanding of nature and how it works. However, this shift has done more than simply change the face of how we go about studying nature and natural objects; it changed the course of human evolution in a way that is irreversible and destructive. To begin, we must understand what came before Galileo, Boyle, and Newton's influence, when Aristotle's notion of a purposive nature directed human understanding. And from there, we will move into the Scientific Revolution and the resulting mechanistic philosophy of nature that was its product.

The Scientific Revolution marks a stark shift in society's understanding of nature and how it works. However, this shift has done more than simply change the face of how we go about studying nature and natural objects; it changed the course of human evolution in a way that is irreversible and destructive. To begin, we must understand what came before Galileo, Boyle, and Newton's influence, when Aristotle's notion of a purposive nature directed human understanding. And from there, we will move into the Scientific Revolution and the resulting mechanistic philosophy of nature that was its product.

To​ ​ ask​ ​ the​ ​ question​ ​ " Is​ ​ metaphysics​ ​ possible " ​ ​ seems​ ​ to​ ​ me​ ​ to​ ​ suggest​ ​ that​ ​ I​ ​ have​ ​ some knowledge​ ​ concerning​ ​ the​ ​ existence​ ​ or​ ​ non-existence​ ​ of​ ​ a​ ​ metaphysical​ ​ realm,​ ​ which​ ​ I​ ​ clearly could​ ​ not​ ​ have.​ ​ ​ ​ As​ ​ such,​ ​ I​ ​ was​ ​ troubled​ ​ in​ ​ my​ ​ attempts​ ​ to​ ​ develop​ ​ a​ ​ coherent​ ​ response​ ​ to​ ​ the question.​ ​ ​ ​ However,​ ​ after​ ​ additional​ ​ thought​ ​ I​ ​ believe​ ​ that​ ​ what​ ​ I​ ​ have​ ​ acquired​ ​ through​ ​ this course​ ​ and​ ​ the​ ​ experiences​ ​ I​ ​ have​ ​ had​ ​ in​ ​ the​ ​ world​ ​ provide​ ​ me​ ​ with​ ​ at​ ​ least​ ​ some​ ​ insight.​ ​ ​ ​ This insight,​ ​ gathered​ ​ primarily​ ​ through​ ​ the​ ​ philosophies​ ​ of​ ​ Plato​ ​ and​ ​ Kant,​ ​ have​ ​ led​ ​ me​ ​ to​ ​ claim​ ​ that no,​ ​ metaphysics​ ​ is​ ​ not​ ​ possible-or​ ​ at​ ​ least​ ​ is​ ​ not​ ​ an​ ​ endeavor​ ​ that​ ​ has​ ​ any​ ​ value​ ​ in​ ​ the​ ​ material world,​ ​ and​ ​ resultantly​ ​ is​ ​ an​ ​ arbitrary​ ​ pursuit​ ​ for​ ​ the​ ​ modern​ ​ philosopher.​ ​ ​ ​ In​ ​ order​ ​ to​ ​ make​ ​ this claim​ ​ with​ ​ any​ ​ justification​ ​ I​ ​ will​ ​ briefly​ ​ highlight​ ​ the​ ​ aspects​ ​ of​ ​ Plato​ ​ and​ ​ Kant​ ​ that​ ​ I​ ​ believe culminate​ ​ in​ ​ a​ ​ colloquially​ ​ pragmatic​ ​ refutation​ ​ of​ ​ metaphysics,​ ​ beginning​ ​ with​ ​ Plato's arguments​ ​ concerning​ ​ the​ ​ Forms​ ​ and​ ​ the​ ​ true​ ​ philosopher.​ ​ ​ ​ Subsequently,​ ​ I​ ​ will​ ​ present​ ​ Kant's reasoning​ ​ behind​ ​ the​ ​ distinction​ ​ between​ ​ the​ ​ phenomenal​ ​ and​ ​ noumenal​ ​ worlds,​ ​ and​ ​ conclude with​ ​ a​ ​ synthesis​ ​ of​ ​ these​ ​ two​ ​ theories​ ​ that​ ​ will​ ​ illustrate​ ​ my​ ​ decision​ ​ to​ ​ respond​ ​ against​ ​ the possibility​ ​ of​ ​ metaphysics. As​ ​ a​ ​ means​ ​ to​ ​ begin​ ​ this​ ​ inquiry,​ ​ it​ ​ is​ ​ important​ ​ to​ ​ understand​ ​ what​ ​ Plato​ ​ believes​ ​ is​ ​ the defining​ ​ feature​ ​ of​ ​ the​ ​ philosopher.​ ​ ​ ​ In​ ​ Plato's​ ​ writings,​ ​ the​ ​ Forms​ ​ dominate​ ​ his​ ​ ideas concerning​ ​ the​ ​ process​ ​ by​ ​ which​ ​ one​ ​ comes​ ​ to​ ​ acquire​ ​ true​ ​ knowledge.​ ​ ​ ​ These​ ​ Forms​ ​ are non-material​ ​ and​ ​ are​ ​ what​ ​ characterize​ ​ objects​ ​ in​ ​ reality,​ ​ thus​ ​ understanding​ ​ the​ ​ Form​ ​ of​ ​ an object​ ​ yields​ ​ true​ ​ knowledge​ ​ about​ ​ the​ ​ object.​ ​ ​ ​ The​ ​ question,​ ​ now,​ ​ is​ ​ who​ ​ can​ ​ have​ ​ access​ ​ to these​ ​ Forms?​ ​ ​ ​ In​ ​ the​ ​ Republic​ ​ and​ ​ the​ ​ Sophist,​ ​ Plato​ ​ offers​ ​ an​ ​ explanation​ ​ to​ ​ this​ ​ question​ ​ that​ ​ I believe​ ​ paved​ ​ the​ ​ path​ ​ for​ ​ future​ ​ metaphysicians.​ ​ ​ ​ Specifically,​ ​ Plato​ ​ claims​ ​ that​ ​ is​ ​ only​ ​ the philosopher​ ​ who​ ​ has​ ​ access​ ​ to​ ​ the​ ​ Forms,​ ​ and​ ​ as​ ​ such,​ ​ access​ ​ to​ ​ true​ ​ knowledge.​ ​ ​ ​ Following​ ​ is a​ ​ brief​ ​ examination​ ​ and​ ​ extrapolation​ ​ of​ ​ this​ ​ explanation. With​ ​ the​ ​ Sophist,​ ​ Plato​ ​ articulates​ ​ many​ ​ groups​ ​ and​ ​ subgroups​ ​ of​ ​ which​ ​ the​ ​ philosopher is​ ​ certainly​ ​ not​ ​ a​ ​ part​ ​ of​ ​ considering​ ​ that​ ​ they​ ​ constitute​ ​ the​ ​ definition​ ​ of​ ​ the​ ​ sophist.​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ Common knowledge​ ​ tells​ ​ us​ ​ that​ ​ the​ ​ philosopher​ ​ is​ ​ not​ ​ an​ ​ imitator,​ ​ but​ ​ one​ ​ who​ ​ strives​ ​ for​ ​ true​ ​ knowledge out​ ​ of​ ​ love​ ​ for​ ​ knowledge.​ ​ ​ ​ He/she​ ​ has​ ​ productive​ ​ expertise​ ​ within​ ​ the​ ​ acquisitive​ ​ art​ ​ group because​ ​ he/she​ ​ still​ ​ acquires​ ​ knowledge​ ​ from​ ​ the​ ​ Forms.​ ​ ​ ​ This​ ​ also​ ​ distinguishes​ ​ the philosopher​ ​ from​ ​ the​ ​ subgroup​ ​ ​ acquisition​ ​ ​ and​ ​ therefore​ ​ from​ ​ an​ ​ exchanger​ ​ of​ ​ goods​ ​ as​ ​ well. Instead,​ ​ the​ ​ philosopher​ ​ exchanges​ ​ knowledge​ ​ for​ ​ knowledge,​ ​ like​ ​ a​ ​ broker.​ ​ ​ ​ In​ ​ my​ ​ mind,​ ​ I​ ​ see the​ ​ philosopher​ ​ as​ ​ a​ ​ broker​ ​ despite​ ​ the​ ​ obvious​ ​ differences​ ​ concerning​ ​ greed​ ​ and​ ​ superficiality. In​ ​ terms​ ​ of​ ​ function,​ ​ however,​ ​ I​ ​ believe​ ​ they​ ​ are​ ​ quite​ ​ similar.​ ​ ​ ​ A​ ​ broker​ ​ is​ ​ paid​ ​ to​ ​ sell​ ​ or​ ​ buy goods,​ ​ usually​ ​ stocks,​ ​ that​ ​ stand-in​ ​ for​ ​ money.​ ​ ​ ​ Thus,​ ​ in​ ​ essence,​ ​ A​ ​ broker​ ​ is​ ​ paid​ ​ money​ ​ to handle​ ​ money.​ ​ ​ ​ In​ ​ much​ ​ the​ ​ same​ ​ way,​ ​ the​ ​ true​ ​ philosopher​ ​ is​ ​ a​ ​ lover​ ​ of​ ​ ​ ​ knowledge​ ​ and​ ​ truth, and​ ​ his/her​ ​ transactions​ ​ and​ ​ interactions​ ​ concern​ ​ the​ ​ dissemination​ ​ of​ ​ knowledge​ ​ for knowledge. The​ ​ metaphor​ ​ unfortunately​ ​ dies​ ​ here,​ ​ however,​ ​ because​ ​ Plato​ ​ offers​ ​ us​ ​ more​ ​ insight​ ​ for

I agree with Robbert Van den Berg that Plotinus endorses Socratic intellectualism, but I challenge his view that Plotinus rejects the phenomenon of akrasia. According to Van den Berg, the only form of akrasia acknowledged by Plotinus is a conditional, or 'weak', akrasia. I provide some reasons for thinking that Plotinus might have accept complete or 'strong' akrasia - full stop. While such strong forms of akrasia are usually taken to conflict with Socratic intellectualism, I argue that Plotinus's complex, dual-self psychology allows a way in which he, unique among ancient philosophers (and perhaps any thinker in the history of philosophy), could simultaneously endorse Socratic intellectualism and hard akrasia.

At Enchiridion §32, Epictetus raises the question of whether, and under what conditions, one should consult the art of divination (μαντική). Epictetus’ answer, along with Simplicius’ commentary on the passage four centuries later, provides a glimpse into late antique conceptions of fate, providence, and human responsibility. While united in a general acceptance of divination as an authentic science, doctrinal differences between Epictetus’ Stoicism and Simplicius’ Neoplatonism lead them to interpret the philosophical significance of the practice in different ways.

Review of: Philoponus, On Aristotle: Posterior Analytics 1.19-34. Translated by Owen Goldin & Marije Martijn. Bloomsbury, 2012. Pp. vi + 217. Philoponus, On Aristotle: Physics 4.1-5. Translated by Keimpe Algra & Johannes van Ophuijsen. Bloomsbury, 2012. Pp. vii + 151. Philoponus, On Aristotle: Physics 4.6-9. Translated by Pamela Huby. Bloomsbury, 2012. Pp. vi + 138. Philoponus, On Aristotle: Meteorology 1.4-9,12. Translated by Inna Kupreeva. Bloomsbury, 2012. Pp. vii + 198. Published in The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 9 (2015) p. 93-102.

3000 word commissioned entry on "Secularization and De-Secularization" for Brill's Vocabulary for the Study of Religion (eds. Robert A. Segal, Kocku von Stuckrad), 2015.

Entry abstract:

Secularization is the decrease of either religion or its influence in any sphere of human activity, social, political, or otherwise. The exact extent and form in which such a decrease can and does take place, as well as whether such a process might also be reversed, are matters of intense debate. Secularization has drawn interdisciplinary attention from sociologists, philosophers, theologians, political theorists, historians, and other fields. De-secularization refers to the process of a return of either religion’s influence in personal, social, or political settings. This entry focuses on the historical development of the concept of the secular and secularization from the ancient to the contemporary  world, as well as the main contours shaping the interdisciplinary debate about secularization today.

Simplicius is well regarded today as an insightful, comprehensive, detailed, sometimes repetitive, but generally useful and reliable interpreter of Aristotle. How he reads other authors though – with the possible exception of the Presocratics – is less well studied. In this chapter I examine Simplicius’ interpretation of Plato. By this I mean not Simplicius’ views regarding Platonism (though these of course influenced his interpretation), but rather the ways in which Simplicius read the particular dialogues written by Plato, as well as the history that had accumulated by his time regarding Plato’s life and thought. While something of a picaresque task, given that Simplicius’ extant commentaries all center on texts of either Aristotle or the Stoic Epictetus – the Physics, De Caelo, Categories, and, disputedly, the De Anima, as well as the Enchiridion – nevertheless, his frequent references, allusions, and discussions of Plato’s works in his writing provide ample evidence for gathering a good working picture of how Simplicius read him.