I study games with self-locating uncertainty in which an agent at a single information set is uncertain of his position evenwithina given information set of a given play of the game. In such games, there is an analogy to be drawn with Newcomb’s problem: in bothsettings, locally rational (thirder) reasoning and globally optimal (planning) reasoning can prescribe different strategies. I call this aNewcomb tension, and present a representation theorem: a Bayesian with commitment power and an uncommitted agent holding incorrect ‘one-boxer’ beliefs are behaviourally equivalent. In the single-agent case, randomisation always resolves the tension but in multi-agent games, in which planning and interim social weights diverge under some conditions, a multi-agent Newcomb tension can survive this randomisation resolution with an asymmetric awakening structure across agents. I consider the implications of this for the duplicating Sleeping Beauty problem, and a duplicating variant of the absent-minded driver.