Mordechai de Haas
Dr de Haas’ PhD thesis was on Russia’s security policy and air power (University of Amsterdam, 2004) and his MA thesis on Soviet policy towards Southern Africa (University of Leiden, 1987).
He was an Affiliated Professor of the University of Haifa, Israel, on Russia’s security policy in the Middle-East (2017-2021). From 2014-2016 he has been a Full Professor in Public Policy (Policy Analysis of Central Asia and the Caucasus), and subsequently Senior Researcher, at Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan. Dr De Haas was a Senior Researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (2005-2014).
Previously, Lieutenant-Colonel Royal Netherlands Army (ret.) De Haas has fulfilled a career in the Dutch public sector as a military officer. His last posting was as lecturer in International Security Studies at the Netherlands Defence College in The Hague (2010-2012). He was also a Military Assistant Professor at the Conflict Studies Department of the Royal Belgium Military Academy in Brussels. Earlier he has fulfilled positions such as Part time Arms Control Inspector for the CFE-Treaty and OSCE (1995-2012); Policy advisor, Future Concepts Branch, Netherlands Defence Staff (2004-2005); Head Research Branch, NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany (2003-2004); Lecturer in International Relations & International Law, Royal Netherlands Military Academy (1996-2003); Military-political analyst on the USSR, Russia, CIS and the former Yugoslavia, Army Staff (1988-1996) and infantry conscript with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNIFIL (1980).
Lt-Col (ret.) De Haas was editor of the first issue of the Netherlands Defence Doctrine (2005). His publications on national security strategy were used by the Dutch Senate in the 2006 Defence debate. He has contributed to the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on China (2006). He has lectured i.a. at Azeri, Belgium, British, Baltic, Bulgarian, Chinese, Danish, Dutch, Georgian, NATO, Russian, South-African and U.S. defence colleges, universities and think tanks. Marcel de Haas is a regular commentator for Dutch and international media outlets.
He was an Affiliated Professor of the University of Haifa, Israel, on Russia’s security policy in the Middle-East (2017-2021). From 2014-2016 he has been a Full Professor in Public Policy (Policy Analysis of Central Asia and the Caucasus), and subsequently Senior Researcher, at Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan. Dr De Haas was a Senior Researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (2005-2014).
Previously, Lieutenant-Colonel Royal Netherlands Army (ret.) De Haas has fulfilled a career in the Dutch public sector as a military officer. His last posting was as lecturer in International Security Studies at the Netherlands Defence College in The Hague (2010-2012). He was also a Military Assistant Professor at the Conflict Studies Department of the Royal Belgium Military Academy in Brussels. Earlier he has fulfilled positions such as Part time Arms Control Inspector for the CFE-Treaty and OSCE (1995-2012); Policy advisor, Future Concepts Branch, Netherlands Defence Staff (2004-2005); Head Research Branch, NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany (2003-2004); Lecturer in International Relations & International Law, Royal Netherlands Military Academy (1996-2003); Military-political analyst on the USSR, Russia, CIS and the former Yugoslavia, Army Staff (1988-1996) and infantry conscript with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNIFIL (1980).
Lt-Col (ret.) De Haas was editor of the first issue of the Netherlands Defence Doctrine (2005). His publications on national security strategy were used by the Dutch Senate in the 2006 Defence debate. He has contributed to the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on China (2006). He has lectured i.a. at Azeri, Belgium, British, Baltic, Bulgarian, Chinese, Danish, Dutch, Georgian, NATO, Russian, South-African and U.S. defence colleges, universities and think tanks. Marcel de Haas is a regular commentator for Dutch and international media outlets.
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It looked like that Putin was going to pursue the traditional approach of replying to an alleged attack by Ukrainian forces by conducting a full-fletched military invasion, with the larger part of his conventional forces currently deployed at the Russian-Ukrainian and Belarussian-Ukrainian borders. This is what Putin did in 2008, when Russia’s army invaded Georgia, after alleged artillery bombardments by Georgian forces on Russian troops. However, once more, the shrewd fox Putin surprised the West: instead of a military attack, Putin recognized the ‘independence’ of the separatist Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, which have been in conflict with Kiev since 2014, after Russia annexed the Ukrainian region Crimea.
Putin’s recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk follows another pattern of his long-term objective of restoring the Soviet-Russian empire: undermining independent former Soviet republics, by annexing parts of their territory, to an extent that such a state is just a hull, incapable of existing as an independent country. Why a pattern? He did exactly the same with the other former Soviet republic that aspires to join NATO and EU: Georgia. After the August 2008 war of Russia against Georgia, Moscow also recognized the independence of the Georgian separatist regions, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia.
The West – Europe and the USA – has a lack of collective memory. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly made it clear that he wants to restore the Russian empire after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This includes, that he does not accept that former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, join Western institutions: NATO and EU. Why a lack of collective memory? Since 2008 Putin has chosen the path of military action to achieve his objective of restoring the Russian empire: he fought a war against Georgia in August 2008, he annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and now he invades Ukraine as a whole. What did the West do? Only admonishing him and installing economic sanctions. From the pattern of Putin’s military action since 2008 it is clear that the soft-hearted Western approach has completely failed.
Moskous herwonnen positie van grote mogendheid te ondermijnen. Naast updates van
veiligheidsdocumenten waarin het antiwesterse Russische beleid zijn beslag krijgt besteedt het
Kremlin miljarden dollars aan militaire oefeningen en herbewapening, en voert het een assertief
veiligheidsbeleid, onder meer in Oost-Oekraïne en het Midden-Oosten. De NAVO roept veel maar de
slepende defensiebezuinigingen ondervinden geen echte kentering, ook in Nederland niet. Onderschat
het Westen het herwonnen politieke en militaire vermogen van Moskou of valt het allemaal wel mee?
Wat betekent deze strategie voor de NAVO, en voor de veiligheidssituatie in Europa?
In this chapter I shall provide an overview of actors (both organisations and persons) that were involved in the decision-making process of the RF security policy since then and of the security documents they generated. First, I shall explain the conceptual thinking of Russian security policy. Next, I shall deal with the development (both chronological and in contents) of the three leading security documents, i.e. the National Security Concept, the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine. Between 1992 and 2002 the RF presented three National Security Concepts, two Foreign Policy Concepts and four Military Doctrines.1 Other security-related documents of less importance, such as the naval doctrine and military reform plans, will not be treated in this chapter. Finally, I shall provide conclusions and an outlook on the future development of Russian security policy.
although no plans had yet been drafted—might conduct joint military exercises on a regular basis. Ivanov's statements are in line with the current comprehensive improvement of bilateral relations between China and Russia, a development which can be described as remarkable. For instance, the long standing border disputes between both
states were settled in agreements in 2005. Furthermore, Russia, in addition to its arms export, will supply China with oil and gas. But even more important, both countries have found each other in a strategic partnership aimed at countering the (Western/US) "monopoly in world affairs", as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and
Russian Presidents in July 2005.
The volume identifies key contemporary topics of research and debate and takes into account the changes that have occurred in the study of Russian security strategy since the end of the Cold War. The handbook is organised into five sections:
The theory and nature of Russian security policy
The domestic and foreign policy nexus
Instruments used by Russia in pursuing its security
Global and regional aspects of Russian security and foreign policy
Case studies of Russian involvement in a series of security conflicts.
The book concludes with case studies of the major examples of Russian involvement and operations in a series of security conflicts, including that in Georgia, the intervention in Ukraine and occupation of Crimea, and the ongoing Civil War in Syria.
This volume will be of great interest to students of Russian security, strategic studies, foreign policy, European politics, and International Relations in general.