National Security Studies Department

The aim of this paper is to propose a model of an enduring rivalry as a learning process within a comparative psychological-cognitive theory between states, and state and non-state actor conflicts and draw conclusions about the perception of the adversary and the behavior of the sides.

Threat perception is a central diagnostic element in the manage ment of security objectives and foreign policy. At the level of Grand strategy planning the scope of threat perceptions is equivalent to the maximal scope of the definition of security and the capabilities to achieve them. Grand strategy is maximal policy making to maximal security concerns with maximal power and capabilities. As Keukeleire S. and MacNaughtan presented in their book "The Foreign Policy of the European Union". Maximal security concerns include • Military security and Territorial/National security; • Non-military security; • Global security; Societal security and Human security. Maximal power and capabilities include • Military instruments; Material instruments; Hard power; • Relational power; Non-military and Immaterial instruments; • Soft power and Structural power. Threat perception is a crucial pillar in all these dimensions, and embodies the domestic element in EU Security Grand Strategy.

The use of cyber capabilities by state actors to manage different types of conflicts increases asymmetrical violent scenarios. CBRNe terrorism becomes a weapon of the weak because it provides a relational advantage. This paradox is derived from the irrelevance of cyber capabilities to CBRNe detection as well as from an actor's cyber-capability inferiority. When an actor perceives that his

Rusland lijkt bezig met een come-back als zwaargewicht in de internationale arena. Hamas wordt door Moskou uitgenodigd voor besprekingen, Rusland neemt het voortouw in de onderhandelingen met Iran over kernenergie, Gazprom sluit de gasleveranties aan Oekraïne af en Rusland en China trachten het Westen te verdrijven uit Centraal-Azië. Dit zijn zomaar enkele recente gebeurtenissen in de internationale politiek waarop Rusland zijn stempel drukt. Is hier sprake van een nieuwe ontwikkeling? Een blik op Ruslands interne en externe veiligheidsbeleid.

Every week leading experts answer a new question from Judy Dempsey on the foreign and security policy challenges shaping Europe's role in the world. The answer is simple and complicated at the same time: yes, there is a way, if we take a united stance. A long-standing tradition in Moscow's policy toward Europe is "divide and rule." Last week, under the eyes of President Vladimir Putin, Russian gas giant Gazprom and its Dutch equivalent, Gasunie, signed a letter of intent to explore extending the Nord Stream pipeline to Britain. However, a few days later, Gazprom's CEO made it clear that such a deal could be struck with Belgium as well. In short, Russia is playing EU member states off against each other. This is only one detail in a broader ongoing energy war between Russia and the EU. By constructing the Nord Stream and South Stream gas pipelines, Russia is circumventing Ukraine. This tactic serves two purposes. First, it is an attempt to blackmail Ukraine into joining Moscow's Eurasian Union instead of the EU. Second, it aims to counter Nabucco, the EU-backed alternative pipeline from Turkey to Austria, seen as a way to decrease Europe's dependence on Russian gas. But instead of conducting a joint energy policy toward Russia, with the EU acting as a contractor on behalf of all member states, each country is making its own bilateral deals with Moscow. Russia's new Foreign Policy Concept states that Europe and the West are trying to preserve their traditional global leadership, even as their ability to dominate the world economy diminishes. It is time for Europe to recognize that this assessment is true, and that only a cohesive position toward Russia-including on energy-can counter the Kremlin's weight in Europe.